Wyatt v. State

EYLER, DEBORAH S., J. A jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County found Scott R. Wyatt, the appellant, guilty of possessing a regulated firearm after conviction of a “disqualifying crime,” in violation of Md.Code (2003), section 5-133(b)(l) of the Public Safety Article (“PS”). He was sentenced to a one-year term of imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant poses two questions for review, which we have reworded slightly: I. Did the trial court err in ruling that his prior conviction was a “disqualifying crime” within the meaning of PS sections 5-101(g) and 5—133(b)(1)?

II

Was there sufficient evidence of possession of a regulated firearm to sustain his conviction? For the following reasons, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS The State charged the appellant with possessing a regulated firearm after being convicted of a “disqualifying crime.” PS § 5-133(b)(l). More specifically, the appellant was charged with possessing a regulated firearm after being convicted of “a violation classified as a misdemeanor in the State that carries a statutory penalty of more than 2 years.” PS § 5-101(g).

The evidence at trial, viewed most favorably to the State, showed that, on February 28, 2004, the appellant was convicted of attempted felony theft (ie., attempted theft of property valued at more than $500). The record does not reveal when he was sentenced for that crime, or what the sentence was, ³⁹⁸ although all parties agree that he did not receive a sentence of more than two years’ imprisonment. On the evening of the day he was convicted, the appellant entered his mother’s house and took, among other things, a .357 handgun that belonged to him. He had purchased the handgun legally in 1990.

It was operational. The appellant did not live in his mother’s house, did not have a key to the house, and did not have permission to enter the house. When he entered his mother’s house on February 28, 2004, his mother was out of state with her fíancé and one of the appellant’s brothers. Another brother called her, which prompted her to call her house.

The appellant answered the telephone. He told his mother he had hired a locksmith to let him in the house, and that he was there to pick up some of his things. His mother gave him permission to stay in the house just for the night. The appellant’s mother returned home the next day.

She discovered several items missing, including the appellant’s .357 handgun. She called the police and reported the gun stolen. She told the police that the appellant was renting a storage unit in Germantown. On May 5, 2004, the police executed a search warrant for the appellant’s storage unit.

They found the .357 handgun, loaded, in the unit. DISCUSSION I. The appellant contends that his conviction of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a “disqualifying crime,” in violation of PS section 5—133(b)(1), must be reversed because his prior conviction of attempted felony theft is not a “disqualifying crime” -within the meaning of that section and PS section 5-101(g). A “disqualifying crime” is defined in PS section 5-101(g) as: (1) a crime of violence; ³⁹⁹ (2) a violation classified as a felony in the State; or (3) a violation classified as a misdemeanor in the State that carries a statutory penalty of more than 2 years. As noted, the prior conviction in question was for attempted felony theft.

Under Maryland law, an attempt to commit a crime is a common-law misdemeanor. State v. North, 356 Md. 308, 312 , 739 A.2d 33 (1999) (stating that, “[ujnder Maryland common law, the attempt to commit a crime is, itself, a separate misdemeanor”). Because the appellant’s prior conviction of attempted felony theft was not a violent crime and was not a felony, the State charged him under PS section 5—101(g)(3), that is, for being in possession of a regulated firearm after having been convicted of “a violation classified as a misdemeanor ... that carries a statutory penalty of more than 2 years.” The statutory penalty for felony theft is “imprisonment not exceeding 15 years or a fine not exceeding $25,000 or both.” Md.Code (2002), section 7-104(g)(l)(i) of the Criminal Law Article (“CL”). Pursuant to CL section 1-201, “[t]he punishment of a person who is convicted of an attempt to commit a crime may not exceed the maximum punishment for the crime attempted.” See also Johnson v. State, 362 Md. 525, 530 , 766 A.2d 93 (2001) (holding that attempt is a common-law inchoate offense “for which the General Assembly has limited the punishment to the maximum punishment provided for the substantive or target offense”).

Thus, the appellant’s prior conviction of attempted felony theft was a common-law misdemeanor, for which, pursuant to CL sections 1-201 and 7-104(g)(l)(i), the statutory penalty was “imprisonment not exceeding 15 years or a fine not exceeding $25,000 or both.” The appellant maintains that, under the plain language of PS section 5—101(g)(3), attempted felony theft is not a misdemeanor that carries a statutory penalty of more than two years. Specifically, he argues that a misdemeanor that “carries a statutory penalty of more than 2 years” is one that mandates the court to impose a penalty of more than two years’ incarceration. The State reads the statutory language ⁴⁰⁰ differently. It maintains that a crime that carries a statutory penalty of more than two years is one that allows the court to impose a penalty of more than two years’ incarceration.

The circuit court agreed with the State’s interpretation of the statutory language. We review a trial court’s interpretation of a statute de novo. Cain v. State, 386 Md. 320, 327 , 872 A.2d 681 (2005). Our goal in interpreting statutes is to “identify and effectuate the legislative intent underlying the statute[ ] at issue.” Id.

(internal quotations and citations omitted). The primary source of legislative intent is the statute’s plain language. Id. Before we may look beyond the plain language of the statute to other sources for interpretation, there first must be an ambiguity within the statutory language; that is, “there must be two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute.” Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423, 429 , 701 A.2d 419 (1997).

The chief goal of statutory interpretation is to discover the actual intent of the legislature in enacting the statute, and the legion of eases that support this proposition need not be repeated here. In fact, all statutory interpretation begins, and usually ends, with the statutory text itself, for the legislative intent of a statute primarily reveals itself through the statute’s very words. A court may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute; nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application. In short, if the words of a statute clearly and unambiguously delineate the legislative intent, ours is an ephemeral enterprise.

We need investigate no further but simply apply the statute as it reads. Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387 , 835 A.2d 1221 (2003) (internal citations omitted). Relying primarily on DeLeon v. State, 102 Md.App. 58 , 648 A.2d 1053 (1994), the appellant argues that attempted felony theft carries a statutory penalty of no more than 15 years in ⁴⁰¹ prison—not a minimum statutory penalty of more than two years in prison—and therefore is not a “disqualifying crime” under PS section 5-101(g)(3). In DeLeon , three defendants were convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin and sentenced to terms of imprisonment, the first five years of which were to be without parole.

The defendants were arguing that their sentences were illegal because the sentencing court did not have authority to restrict parole. We agreed with the defendants, holding that the statutes stating that a punishment for the crime of conspiracy “shall not exceed the punishment for the offense [the defendant] conspired to commit” 1 place a cap on the sentencing court’s otherwise unfettered common-law sentencing discretion; they do not, however, incorporate any mandatory minimum sentencing requirement, such as a restriction on parole. We explained: In a very fundamental sense, neither [of the conspiracy statutes limiting punishment to the maximum penalty for the target offense] do anything to the possible sentence for conspiracy other than impose a ceiling on the trial judge’s otherwise open-ended common law sentencing discretion. The conspiracy sentencing provisions and the substantive crime sentencing provisions are linked only at their upper ends, not at their lower ends.

To legislate as to the ceiling is not to legislate as to the floor. A sentencing provision that provides only that a sentence “may not exceed the maximum” provided for something else clearly does not incorporate any minimum or mandatory provisions provided for that something else. 102 Md.App. at 67 , 648 A.2d 1053 (emphasis in original). The appellant reasons, by analogy, that the statute that limits a sentence for attempt to the maximum sentence that could be imposed for the target crime does not also limit the sentencing court’s discretion by incorporating a mandatory minimum sentence; and because (in appellant’s view) the ⁴⁰² phrase “a violation classified as a misdemeanor ... that carries a statutory penalty of more than 2 years” means a mandatory minimum sentence of more than two years, the statutory sentence for his prior misdemeanor conviction was not more than two years. Hence, the crime was not a “disqualifying crime.” The State argues that the language of PS section 5-101(g)(3) can only reasonably be read to mean that a “violation classified as a misdemeanor ... that carries a statutory penalty of more than 2 years” is one for which, by statute, the court is authorized—but not necessarily required—to impose a penalty of more than two years in prison.

The appellant is correct that, as Judge Moylan thoroughly explained in DeLeon , a statutory limitation upon the upper end of the court’s sentencing discretion by no means creates a limitation upon the lower end of the court’s sentencing discretion. “To legislate that an otherwise discretionary sentence may not go above some designated maximal point does not even imply, let alone unequivocally state, that such discretion may not go below some designated minimal point.” DeLeon, supra, 102 Md.App. at 67 , 648 A.2d 1053 . By restricting the court’s discretion in sentencing for the crime of attempt to the limit of the sentence that can be imposed for the crime