Yingling v. Miller

Fowler, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal involves the construction of the will of the late Henry Tasto of Carroll County, in this State, and the particular clause involved is as follows : “I give, devise and bequeath unto my daughter Margaret (intermarried to Ephraim Yingling) my other farm, * * * as described in a deed, &c., * * * to her, my said daughter, during her natural life, upon the condition that she pay to the Trustees (or Church Council) of the Emmanuel Lutheran Church, in Manchester, Carroll County, the sum of three hundred dollars, * * * in trust for the express use and benefit of the needy poor of said Church or congregation, and to be by them judiciously applied or appropriated to the express use aforesaid until fully exhausted, and after her death, to her children then living, (if any,) share and share alike, and if none,” then over. It is contended by the appellants that the condition annexed to the foregoing devise is void, because the beneficiaries who were to receive the bouuty of the testator are not designated with such clearness and precision as is required by the well settled law of Maryland. ¹⁰⁷ And this contention is based upon a long line of decisions of this Court, beginning with the case of Dashiel vs. The Attorney-General, 5 H. & J., 392 . In the case just cited it was held that the Statute of 43 Elizabeth, ch. 4, generally known as the “Statute of Charitable Uses,” was not in force in this State, and that “independent of that statute a Court of chancery cannot, in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction sustain and enforce a bequest to charitable uses, which if not a charity, would on general principles be void.” It was accordingly held in that ease, and was never disputed in this State, until the passage of the Act of 1888, ch. 249, that a charitable bequest, like the one we are now considering, cannot he sustained or administered in a Court of equity, and must, therefore, be declared void.

But it is contended on the part of the appellees, and was so held by a divided Court below, that section 305 A of the Act just mentioned, effectually removes all difficulty, and makes this bequest valid. We regret we cannot agree to this view, for the object of the testator was certainly a most worthy one. The section relied on by the appellees is as follows: “'Ho devise or bequest of real or personal property for any charitable uses shall he deemed or held to he void by reason of any uncertainty with respect to the donees thereof, provided the will or codicil making the same shall also contain directions for the formation of a corporation to take the same: and, within the period of twelve calendar months from the grant of probate of such will or codicil, a corporation shall be formed in correspondence with such directions, capable and willing to receive and administer such devise or bequest. ” How, remembering the settled law of this State, prior to the legislation of 1888, namely, that this bequest would have been void for uncertainty, notwithstanding there is no uncertainty as to the designation of the trustee, can we assume that the Legislature intended, by the language ¹⁰⁸ just quoted, to set aside entirely the long established policy of this State in regard to charitable bequests and devises, and practically to enact here the Statute of Elizabeth ? We find nothing in section 305 A which, we think, will justify us in concluding the Legislature intended to make such a radical change.

Indeed, if such had been the object it could have been fully