Young v. State

GARRITY, Judge. In appealing his convictions of first degree murder and robbery, Leon Michael Young, Jr., asks us to review the admissibility of his confessions made after a lengthy series of police interrogations. Background At Young’s trial, his friend Lawrence Hart testified that Young had telephoned Janet Bogan on the morning of February 17, 1984. Disguising his voice as that of an acquaintance, Young invited Bogan to his home in Montgomery County with the avowed purpose of “getting high,” apparently with the assistance of cocaine.

After Ms. Bo ¹²³ gan’s arrival, Young forced her at knifepoint to remove her clothes and engage in a variety of sexual acts. Fearing that she would report his bizarre behavior, Young bound his victim’s hands behind her back, placed her face down on the floor, wrapped his belt around her neck, put his foot on her back, and pulled on the belt until she could no longer breathe. Young then replaced the dead woman’s clothes and removed her ring. He later discarded her body in a park located in Prince George’s County and pawned the ring.

Hart explained at trial that his testimony was a recitation of Young’s recounting of his own acts. Indeed, Hart had been so troubled by the story that he had almost immediately telephoned Crime Solvers, Inc. This telephone call, in turn, led to a police investigation which recovered both the victim’s body and ring at the places identified by Hart. On February 23, 1984, Young was arrested at his place of employment in Montgomery County. While still in police custody the next day, and after several rounds of interrogation, Young twice confessed to the murder and robbery of Janet Bogan.

Subsequent to the denial of a motion to suppress his confessions, a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Beard, J., presiding) found Young guilty of first-degree murder and robbery. Young received a sentence of life imprisonment for the murder and a consecutive ten-year term for the robbery. The appellant raises four issues for our review. The first three are challenges to the denial of his motion to suppress his inculpatory statements.

First, he contends the confessions were involuntary; second, he claims that he did not receive a proper recitation of his right to an attorney; and third, he claims that his request for an attorney was ignored. The fourth issue the appellant raises is whether the trial court erred in not giving a requested jury instruction cautioning the jury against attaching undue credibility to the testimony of police officers. Because we here decide ¹²⁴ that it was error to admit Young’s inculpatory statements made to the police, we need not consider the appellant’s second and third issues. We shall discuss the fourth issue raised by the appellant, since it may be pertinent to a new trial.

Confessions to Police—Facts According to evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, at 12:09 p.m. on February 23, 1984, Corporal F.M. McQuillan of the Prince George’s County Police, pursuant to a warrant, arrested Leon Michael Young, Jr., at his place of employment in Silver Spring, Maryland. McQuillan transported Young to police headquarters in Prince George’s County, arriving at approximately 12:45 p.m. At this time, McQuillan placed Young in an interrogation room and handcuffed him to a three-foot chain attached to the floor. McQuillan provided Young with a cigarette and a soda.

He informed Young that he was under arrest for the murder of Janet Bogan. He also advised the accused of his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney. While Young refused to sign a Waiver of Rights form, he indicated to McQuillan that he would cooperate. With no one else in the room, the police officer interrogated his prisoner continuously until 5:45 p.m.

According to McQuillan, the suspect remained calm and appeared sober throughout the questioning. Further, Young never requested food, drink, nor permission to visit the bathroom throughout this period. McQuillan testified that he made neither promises nor inducements to get Young to talk with him. Throughout this interrogation, Young maintained his innocence.

At about 6:00 p.m., Detective John SanFelice replaced McQuillan in the interrogation room. SanFelice also advised Young of his rights. Again, Young refused to sign a Waiver of Rights form but agreed to discuss the matter. SanFelice told Young that the police had received an anonymous tip from a phone caller, who claimed that Young had murdered Janet Bogan and pawned her ring.

SanFelice ¹²⁵ related to Young that the police had gone to the pawn shop described by the informant and recovered the ring. Young then identified the informant as his friend, Hart. The interview lasted until 7:00 p.m., when SanFelice left the room to speak with the informant, who had again called the station. SanFelice also testified that Young remained calm and attentive throughout the interrogation.

Detective Jeffrey A. Krauss, who was in charge of the investigation, replaced SanFelice in the room at about 7:15 p.m. Krauss never questioned Young about the murder. According to his testimony, the police officer merely sought general information about Young in order to complete certain forms. Young requested that Krauss let him use the bathroom, and Krauss complied.

Krauss left Young’s presence at about 7:40 p.m. Detective Michael G. Ferriter entered the interrogation room at approximately 7:45 p.m. and advised Young of his rights. As in the prior interrogations, Young refused to sign the waiver form but agreed to cooperate. Detective Ferriter then turned on a tape recorder so that Young could hear Hart’s statement.

Young continued to make exculpatory statements; however, he did admit that the pawn shop receipt for Janet Bogan’s ring bore his signature. Ferriter suggested to Young that, while Young had not intended to murder Ms. Bogan, “kinky” sexual activity between Young and Ms. Bogan had led to her accidental death. Ferriter also suggested to Young that the murder may have resulted from the victim’s demand for money or drugs. Ferriter explained to the court that he presented these scenarios to Young “to give him an out.” Young thereupon told Ferriter that he had discovered Janet Bogan’s ring in his bathroom after the two had engaged in sex.

He conceded that, after learning of Bogan’s death, he had pawned her ring. As to the murder, however, Young maintained his innocence. At approximately midnight, Corporal Larry D. Bowman of the Prince George’s County Police Department removed ¹²⁶ Young from the interview room for processing. Bowman then presented Young to the District Court Commissioner’s office in Upper Marlboro, Maryland.

Commissioner Gary Filmore advised the accused of his rights, and Young signed the form acknowledging his understanding of them. Young indicated on the form that he would provide his own counsel. Pursuant to specific orders from the Prince George’s County District Court’s Administrative Judge Graydon S. McKee, III, the Commissioner committed Young to the Montgomery County Detention Center and directed Officer Bowman to take the prisoner to that facility. Instead, Bowman, following orders from Detective Krauss, returned Young to the police station in Prince George’s County.

Detective SanFelice visited Young in the interrogation room at 1:45 a.m. SanFelice asked Young if he had changed his mind and was now willing to talk. SanFelice showed Young a typed statement made by the informant, Hart. SanFelice then left Young with the statement and went out to prepare a search warrant.

The detective advised Young that until the search warrant was served, he would not be allowed to make any telephone calls. 1 According to the police officer’s testimony, he continued to check on his prisoner throughout the night by means of a “peephole in the door.” Though handcuffed, Young “appeared” to sleep in a chair during the night. There was no cot or bed in the room. SanFelice entered the room at approximately 7:30 a.m. and asked Young if he needed to eat. Young rejected the offer but requested and received a cigarette and permission to use the bathroom.

At approximately 8:15 a.m., Detective Garland D. Price went into the interrogation room. Price asked Young if it were okay “if I talked to him in reference to the case and he said he didn’t mind.” Price thereupon advised Young of his ¹²⁷ “Miranda rights.” Price testified that Young appeared alert, cooperative, and in excellent physical health. Initially, Young made several exculpatory statements. At approximately 10:00 a.m., after his second cigarette, Young began to make inculpatory remarks.

Finally, he made a full confession, describing in detail the events leading up to the murder .and his commission of the crime. At 11:30 a.m., Detective Price left the interrogation room and obtained food for Young upon his request. At approximately 2:30 p.m., Detective Ferriter entered the room. Although Young refused to sign a Waiver of Rights form, he reiterated to Ferriter his earlier inculpatory statements.

Prior to trial, Young moved to suppress police testimony as to those inculpatory,statements. The motion was denied, and Detectives Ferriter and Price related Young’s confessions to the jury. In essence, the confessions paralleled Hart’s statement. I. Confessions to Police—Admissibility A. The Tests The issue is whether it was error to allow the police officers to testify as to the inculpatory statements made by their prisoner.

There are two separate tests for the admissibility of confessions, and they are from two separate sources. One is the Maryland common law, and the other is federal constitutional law. For over 100 years, the Maryland Court of Appeals has “attempted to delineate and clarify the boundary between that of proper police conduct from that of improper police conduct.” Bellamy v. State, 50 Md.App. 65, 75 , 435 A.2d 821 (1981). This “traditional” test is whether the confession was obtained without force, coercion, or the holding out of any promise.

Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 715 , 490 A.2d 1228 (1985), vacated and remanded, - U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1452 , 89 L.Ed.2d 711 (1986). Scott v. State, 61 Md.App. 599, 602 , 487 A.2d 1204 (1985); Pharr v. State, 36 Md.App. 615, 627-28 , 375 A.2d 1129 (1977); Greenwell v. ¹²⁸ State, 32 Md.App. 579, 583 , 363 A.2d 555 (1976); Keller v. State, 2 Md.App. 623, 627 , 236 A.2d 313 (1967). In such cases, the State has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant voluntarily confessed. See, e.g., Lodowsky, 302 Md. at 715 , 490 A.2d 1228 ; Pharr, 36 Md.App. 615, 627 , 375 A.2d 1129 .

The United States Constitution, specifically the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, impressed procedural safeguards on the traditional test of voluntariness. As in the traditional approach, we must make an independent review of the record to decide whether, in light of the “totality of the circumstances,” a confession was voluntary and, therefore, admissible. Lodowsky, 302 Md. at 711 , 490 A.2d 1228 ; Scott, 61 Md.App. at 605 , 487 A.2d 1204 ; Finke v. State, 56 Md.App. 450, 487 , 468 A.2d 353 (1983); Greenwell, 32 Md.App. at 587 , 363 A.2d 555 . Although we must, if possible, decide this case on Maryland common law principles, see Scott v. State, 289 Md. 647, 651 , 426 A.2d 923 (1981); Simms v. State, 288 Md. 712, 725 , 421 A.2d 957 (1980) [cases collected]; Hillard, 286 Md. at 150, n. 1 , 406 A.2d 415 ; Comptroller v. Crown Central Petroleum, 52 Md.App. 581, 597 , 451 A.2d 347 (1982), we are guided by cases decided on both constitutional grounds and on Maryland common law principles.

The federal law in this area stems from that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution commanding that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him or herself.” Lodowsky, 302 Md. at 716 , 490 A.2d 1228 . As constitutional principles developed from Supreme Court decisions, they now control state action through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 295-303 , 101 S.Ct. 1112, 1116-20 , 67 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538, 541-42 , 4 S.Ct. 111 , 28 L.Ed. 232 (Harlan, J. dissenting); see also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 , 84 S.Ct. 1758, 1764-65 , 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 , 83 S.Ct. 792, 795 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (“[A] provision ¹²⁹ of the Bill of Rights which is ‘fundamental and essential to a fair trial’ is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 2 As noted, the appellant contends that his confessions were not admissible at trial because they were the product of coercion and, therefore, involuntary. Specifically, he lists as factors: the considerable length of his custody; the length of the interrogations; the absence of rest; the fact that one officer would relieve another to continue the interrogations; the delay in presenting him to the Commissioner; his return to the station after appearing before the Commissioner; his confinement in unfamiliar surroundings; and, similarly, his being held incommunicado.

We shall address those factors most pertinent to our determination in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding Young’s confessions. 1. Method of Interrogation Our focus is on the police conduct during the period that Young was held in custody. In its landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1964), the United States Supreme Court made the following observation of police practices as prescribed in official police manuals: To highlight the isolation and unfamiliar surroundings, the manuals instruct the police to display an air of confidence in the suspect’s guilt and from outward appearance to maintain only an interest in confirming certain details. ¹³⁰ The guilt of the subject is to be posited as a fact. The interrogator should direct his comments toward the reasons why the subject committed the act, rather than ... asking the subject whether he did it____ The officers are instructed to minimize the moral seriousness of the offense, to cast the blame on the victim or on society.

These tactics are designed to put the subject in a psychological state where his story is but an elaboration that he is guilty. Id. at 450 , 86 S.Ct. at 1615 . To remedy the coercive nature of this police conduct, the Supreme Court in Miranda created a set of now well-known procedures “to permit a full