Zachair, Ltd. v. Driggs

⁴⁰⁸ ALPERT, Judge. In this appeal, we are asked to resolve a long-standing dispute involving a 424-acre tract of land in Prince George’s County known as Hyde Field, on which both an airport and a sand and gravel mining operation are located. In the course of this resolution, we address interesting problems concerning, inter alia, punitive damages and the conversion of mining products. PARTIES The appellant and cross-appellee is Zachair, Ltd. (“Zachair”), the current owner of the property.

Zachair was formed by Dr. Nabil Asterbadi for the purpose of acquiring Hyde Field at a foreclosure auction. The former owner, Washington Executive Airpark Limited Partnership (“the LP”), had purchased Hyde Field in 1988. To effectuate that purchase, the LP had given notes, totaling nearly $4,000,000.00 and apparently secured by deeds of trust, to Nationsbank 1 and to the previous owner of the property. The appellees and cross-appellants are John Driggs (“Driggs”) and The Driggs Corporation (“TDC”).

Driggs owned and controlled Washington Executive Airport, Inc. (“WEA”), which was the sole general partner of the LP. Thus, Driggs controlled the LP that owned Hyde Field. The LP contracted with WEA to operate the airport, and WEA in turn subcontracted the job to Freedom Air, Inc. 2 The LP contracted with Southern Maryland Sand and Gravel Corporation (“Southern”), which was also owned and controlled by Driggs, to run the mining operation. In 1992, Southern was replaced as mining vendor by TDC, another corporation owned and controlled by Driggs. ⁴⁰⁹ FACTS Dr. Asterbadi was an amateur pilot who took flying lessons at Hyde Field.

He eventually became interested in buying the property. Asterbadi initiated discussions with Driggs in 1991, but Driggs was not interested in selling. Asterbadi subsequently learned from TDC’s in-house counsel, James Berard, that both Driggs and the LP were in bankruptcy proceedings in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland and that the LP’s notes to Nationsbank and the previous owner were in default. Unbeknown to Driggs, Asterbadi began negotiations later in 1991 to purchase the notes.

In 1994, Asterbadi finally purchased the notes for $500,000.00. Asterbadi eventually foreclosed on the deeds of trust and an auction was held on November 3, 1994. Zachair was the high bidder at the auction, purchasing the property for $1,500,000.00. Zachair presented evidence at trial that established that Driggs and the various entities he controlled threw a number of obstacles in the path of Zachair’s acquisition of Hyde Field.

In particular, Zachair presented evidence that, after Asterbadi purchased the notes from Nationsbank and the previous owner of Hyde Field, the LP filed a motion in connection with its bankruptcy proceedings to establish that the note were invalid, then appealed from the denial of the motion, in this way, the LP delayed the foreclosure auction. Zachair also presented evidence that Jeffrey Frost—who was then counsel for Driggs, counsel to TDC, a member TDC’s board of directors, and a member of WEA’s board of directors—attended the auction along with two of Driggs’s friends, Charles Shapiro and Bruce Jaffe. The men disrupted the auction by raising numerous objections. The evidence indicated that, after Zachair purchased the property at auction, Driggs, TDC, and the LP filed exceptions in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to have the ⁴¹⁰ sale set aside. 3 WEA and TDC réfused to vacate the property and continued to conduct airport and mining operations and to reap the profits therefrom, turning over only a little more than $3,000.00 in mining profits to Zachair.

Even after the exceptions to the sale were denied and the sale was ratified on February 3, 1995, WEA and TDC refused to vacate the property, and an eviction was scheduled for March 17, 1995. On that date, TDC filed an emergency motion to stay the eviction on the ground that an appeal to this Court had been noted from the ratification of the sale. An appeal bond was never filed, however, and the eviction was rescheduled for, and earned out on, March 29,1995. The evidence indicated that Southern, which held a mining permit issued by the Bureau of Mines of the Maryland Department of the Environment, and which allowed TDC to use the permit to mine Hyde Field, refused to permit Zachair to use the permit and refused to consent to a transfer of the permit to Zachair.

In order to obtain the permit, Zachair had to file a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to establish that Southern’s consent to the transfer was not necessary. 4 The declaratory judgment action was not resolved until February of 1996, and Southern then appealed the decision to this Court. The appeal was ultimately dismissed, and the permit was transferred to Zachair. Upon the LP’s application at the time it acquired Hyde Field, the Prince George’s County Council, acting as the District Council, had granted a special exception to its zoning ordinance, allowing surface mining at Hyde Field. 5 After the eviction, the LP, through Jeffrey Frost, sought to withdraw the application and to thus abolish the special exception. A Zoning Hearing Examiner for the District Council denied the ⁴¹¹ LP’s attempt, and the LP appealed—unsuccessfully—to the District Council.

In October of 1997, Zachair filed suit against: Driggs; TDC; Southern; WEA; and Charles Shapiro and Bruce Jaffe, the two men who, with Frost, attended the foreclosure auction. The LP was not named in the suit, apparently because it was bankrupt when the suit was filed. The suit sought compensatory and punitive damages in connection with the various acts that impeded and delayed Zachair’s acquisition and operation of Hyde Field. It contained counts against various combinations of the defendants for trespass, conversion, tortious interference with contractual or economic relations, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, fraud, malicious use of process, abuse of process, and conspiracy.

A jury trial was held in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (Platt, J. presiding) in October of 1999. Before the case went to the jury, Zachair voluntarily dismissed the counts for trespass, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and fraud. Further, Zachair voluntarily dismissed WEA and Southern from the case because the testimony established that they were “basically defunct.” The case against Shapiro was stayed due to Shapiro’s bankruptcy. The remaining counts against Driggs, TDC, and Jaffe then went to the jury.

The jury found that Driggs and TDC had: converted the property of Zachair and were thus jointly and severally liable for $1,975,000.00 in compensatory damages; tortiously interfered with the contractual or business relations of Zachair and were thus jointly and severally liable for $275,000.00 in compensatory damages; maliciously used process against Zachair and were thus jointly and severally liable for $2,596,550.00 in compensatory damages, including $346,000.00 in attorney fees; and abused process against Zachair and were thus jointly and severally liable for $2,596,550.00 in compensatory damages, including $346,000.00 in attorney fees. The court merged the awards for malicious use of process and abuse of process, without objection from Zachair, making the total award of compensatory damages ⁴¹² $4,846,550.00. The jury further found that the acts of Driggs and TDC, as to each of these counts, was “accompanied by evil motive, intent to injure or ill will.” The jury found in favor of Jaffe as to all counts, however, and determined that neither Driggs nor TDC had conspired against Zachair. In light of the findings that Driggs and TDC had acted with “evil motive, intent to injure or ill will,” the case was returned to the jury for a determination as to punitive damages.

After further deliberations, the jury imposed punitive damages against TDC of: $1,500,000.00 for conversion; $1,000,000.00 for tortious interference with contractual or business relations; $1,500,000.00 for malicious use of process; and $1,000,000.00 for abuse of process. Thus, it imposed a $5,000,000 award of punitive damages against TDC. The jury imposed a punitive damage award of $170,000.00 against Driggs, consisting of: $40,000.00 for conversion; $50,000.00 for tortious interference with contractual dr business relations; $50,000.00 for malicious use of process; and $30,000.00 for abuse of process. Driggs and TDC moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, alternatively, for a new trial, to revise the verdict, or for a remittitur.

The court granted in part the motion for a remittitur. Subject to Zachair’s election to accept the remittitur or demand a new trial, the court reduced the combined award of compensatory damages for malicious use of process and abuse of process to $346,000.00, the amount representing attorney fees. The court explained: Less attorney’s fees, the damages awarded for the Abuse of Process and Malicious Use of Process claims total $2,250,550. Of this amount, Defendants contend that $550 represents eviction costs that were not recoverable under these counts.

I agree and for that reason the compensatory award of the merged count will be remitted by $550 in addition to the further remittitur that follows. Defendants assert the remaining damages, $2,250,000 represents an improper double recovery, based on the fact that its amount is equal to the sum of the amounts awarded for the Tortious Conversion and Tortious Interference with ⁴¹³ Contractual Relations counts. On this point, I agree with Defendants. I find that, plainly, damages were duplicated here.

The remaining $2,250,000 award for the Abuse of Process and Malicious Use of Process claims can only represent compensation for damages resulting from the retained airport and mining revenues, and the interference with [a contract entered by Zachair with a mining vendor]. I need not engage in improper speculation in order to determine that these damages were already awarded in full in the counts for Conversion and Interference with Contractual Relations. Consequently, I conclude that the compensatory damages award in this case is excessive and should be reduced by $2,250,[550], The court further reduced the awards of punitive damages from $5,000,000.00 against TDC to $650,000.00, and from $170,000.00 against Driggs to $125,000.00. 6 The court explained that, in doing so, it was “guided by the considerations applied by the Court of Appeals in Bowden v. Caldor [7] The court recognized that the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages was “approximately a modest 1:1,” but determined that the punitive damages awards were “simply disproportionate to the gravity of Defendant’s wrongful conduct.” It observed that “[tjhe conduct was' obviously not life threatening nor the type of conduct that would lead to permanent or even temporary physical injuries,” and that the economic injuries, while substantial, [were] certainly no greater and not in need of greater deterrence and/or punishment, than that which the Maryland General Assembly contemplated when it prescribed $500,000.00 as the maxi ⁴¹⁴ mum fine for a so-called “commercial crime” under the Maryland antitrust statute, and $1,000,000.00 as the maximum fine for a single criminal offense under the drug kingpin statute. The trial court considered “the tax returns and other financial documents admitted into evidence of both John A. Driggs and The Driggs Corporation” and concluded that “the respective awards against each are excessive in relation to the Defendant’s ability to pay.” It added that the award against TDC was several times higher than the largest criminal fine or civil penalty prescribed by the Legislature for any offense or misconduct.

The court surmised that the award “appears excessive” in comparison to other punitive damages awards in Maryland, and that the separate awards of punitive damages for malicious use of process and abuse of process were duplicative. Zachair noted an appeal from the trial court’s ruling, and Driggs and TDC noted a cross-appeal. ISSUES In its appeal, Zachair argues, in essence, that I. The trial court erred in reducing the award of punitive damages. In their cross-appeal, Driggs and TDC argue, in essence, that: II.

The trial court erred by failing to grant them motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to conversion, in that (i) the evidence as to the mining damages amounted to nothing more than speculation and conjecture, and (ii) there was no evidence that TDC converted airpark revenues.

III

The trial court erred by submitting the issue of attorney fees to the jury with the counts for malicious use of process and abuse of process, then by failing to grant their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to any award of attorney fees. ⁴¹⁵ IV. The trial court erred by failing to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of TDC as to the tortious interference count, in that (i) there was no evidence that, once evicted from Hyde Field, TDC interfered with Zachair’s relationship with its new mining contractor, and (ii) the evidence did not support the amount of the award. Driggs and TDC add that, if this Court finds in their favor as to any of their arguments, compensatory damages would necessarily be “drastically reduced.” They argue that, if that is the case, “[t]he only way to assure a well-grounded decision on punitive damages is to reverse the judgment and order a new trial on punitive damages.” We find no merit in any of the arguments presented in the appeal or cross-appeal. 8 We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. Because we do not find that any of the awards of compensatory damages must be reversed, we need not address the argument of Driggs and TDC as to punitive damages.

DISCUSSION I Reduction of Punitive Damages Awards Zachair points out that the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, as awarded by the jury, was approximately one to one. It posits that the award of punitive damages was within “modest and well-established bounds,” and that the trial court therefore was not justified in making the “drastic eighty-percent reduction.... ” Zachair argues that “not one of [the trial court’s] proffered reasons for substituting its judgment for the jury’s can survive even the most glancing examination.” ⁴¹⁶ In Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 350 Md. 4, 25 , 710 A.2d 267 (1998), the Court of Appeals made clear that, “in a tort case where punitive damages are allowable, the amount of punitive damages awarded by the trier of fact is reviewable by the court for excessiveness.” The Court summarized nine principles of Maryland common law that are applicable to judicial review of punitive damages awards for excessiveness: (1) “ ‘[T]he amount of punitive damages must not be disproportionate to the gravity of the defendant’s wrong.’ ” Id. at 27 , 710 A.2d 267 (citation omitted); (2) “ ‘[T]he amount of punitive damages should not be disproportionate to ... the defendant’s ability to p ¡, .’ ” Id. at 28 , 710 A.2d 267 (citation omitted); (3) “The deterrence value of the amount awarded by the jury, under all the circumstances of the case, is relevant.” Id. at 29 , 710 A.2d 267 ; (4) “ ‘[Substantial deference’ ” should be accorded “ ‘to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue,’ ” and “when a punitive damages award is several times higher than the largest criminal fine or civil penalty prescribed by the Legislature for any offense or misconduct, the award should be strictly scrutinized.” Id. at 31 , 710 A.2d 267 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted); (5) Awards should be compared “with other final punitive damages awards in the jurisdiction and particularly with awards in somewhat comparable cases.” Id. at 31 , 710 A.2d 267 ; (6) “[EJvidence of other final and satisfied punitive damages awards against the same defendant for the same conduct may be considered by the trial judge,” as well as “evidence indicating that there have been no other such awards of punitive damages against the defendant for the same conduct____” Id. at 34 , 710 A.2d 267 ; (7) “When the total amount of punitive damages awarded against the defendant is based on separate torts, a pertinent consideration ... is whether the separate torts all grew out of a single occurrence or episode.” Id. at 34 , 710 A.2d 267 ; (8) “The plaintiffs reasonable costs and expenses resulting from the defendant’s malicious and tortious conduct, including the expenses of the litigation, which are not covered by the award of compensatory damages, are matters which appropriately can be consid ⁴¹⁷ ered....” Id. at 36 , 710 A.2d 267 ; and (9) “Whether a punitive damages award bears a reasonable relationship to the compensatory damages awarded in the case is ... a factor to be considered....” Id. at 39 , 710 A.2d 267 . The list set forth in Bowden was not “intended to be exclusive or all encompassing,” and “not all of the ... factors are pertinent in every case involving court review of punitive damages awards.” Id. at 41 , 710 A.2d 267 . See also Merritt v. Craig, 130 Md.App. 350, 371 , 746 A.2d 923 (where this Court relied upon only four of the principles set forth in Bowden in holding that a trial court properly determined that a punitive damages award of $150,000.00 against a seller of real property was not excessive in a fraud case where the seller willfully misrepresented the condition of a water supply system and the buyer was entitled to nearly $50,000.00 in compensatory damages or rescission of the contract of sale), cert. denied, 359 Md. 29 , 753 A.2d 2 (2000).

See generally Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Associates, Inc., 88 Md.App. 672, 715-16 , 596 A.2d 687 (where, prior to the Bowden decision, this Court set forth a list of factors, similar to the list in Bowden , to consider in determining whether an award of punitive damages is excessive), cert. denied, 323 Md. 1 , 590 A.2d 158 (1991), 323 Md. 2 (1991), and 326 Md. 435 , 605 A.2d 137 (1992). The Bowden Court explained that the principles for reviewing an award of punitive damages are legal principles, and that in applying legal principles to reduce a jury’s punitive damages award, [a court] is performing a legal function and not acting as a second trier of fact. Although the function also involves the evidence in the case, it is similar to the legal function of granting a judgment notwithstanding a verdict. Bowden, 350 Md. at 47 , 710 A.2d 267 .

Thus, in reviewing the trial court’s decision, this Court is reviewing a decision of law rather than a finding of fact, and we need not extend deference to the decision of the trial court. “Because the issue ... ⁴¹⁸ on which the court ruled was a purely legal issue, ... our review is expansive.” In re Michael G., 107 Md.App. 257, 265 , 667 A.2d 956 (1995). Our application of the relevant factors set forth in Bowden to the instant case convinces us that the reduction of punitive damages was proper. —Gravity of Wrong—• In reducing the punitive damages awards in the instant case, the trial court expressly recognized that, under Bowden , “[t]he most important legal rule in this area, applicable to every punitive damages award, is that the amount of punitive damages ‘must not be disproportionate to the gravity of the defendant’s wrong.’ ” Bowden, 350 Md. at 27 , 710 A.2d 267 (citation omitted). The court then opined that, “while [the conduct of Driggs and TDC was] clearly wrong and deserving of sanction in the form of punitive damages, the gravity of the wrong does not, if placed on a continuum of wrongful conduct which has in this state justified the award of punitive damages, reach the level necessary to justify an award of the size given here by the jury.” The court assigned great weight to the undisputed fact that the conduct was not life threatening nor of the type to lead to physical injury. As the Court of Appeals indicated in Bowden, 350 Md. at 42 , 710 A.2d 267 , and this Court indicated in Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 88 Md.App. at 721, 596 A.2d 687 , the assignment of such weight was entirely proper.

In Bowden , a jury awarded $9,000,000.00 in punitive damages against retail store Caldor and in favor of a teenage employee who was wrongfully accused of theft and fired by Caldor. The trial court reduced the award as excessive, and the Court of Appeals agreed. The Court observed that the award was “about thirteen times higher than the largest punitive damages award ever upheld by this Court,” and was “one hundred and fifty times higher than the compensatory damages award-' ed in this case.” 350 Md. at 42 , 710 A.2d 267 . The Court concluded, inter alia, that the size of the award was not ⁴¹⁹ justified by the gravity of the wrong.

It explained: “As heinous as it was, ... Caldor’s malicious and wrongful conduct was not life threatening or the type of conduct which would likely lead to permanent physical injuries.” Id. at 42 , 710 A.2d 267 . In Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 88 Md.App. 672 , 596 A.2d 687 , a jury awarded more than $40,000,000.00 in punitive damages against one insurance broker and in favor of another insurance broker where the first broker interfered with the second broker’s contract with a client and thus deprived the second broker of commissions. The award “represent[ed] nearly fifty times the ... compensatory damages.” Id. at 720 , 596 A.2d 687 .

The trial court reduced the award to $12,500,-000.00, but this Court vacated the award and remanded the case for a new trial as to punitive damages. We explained that in those cases in which high awards of punitive damages have been allowed to stand, the harm has involved death or, at least, substantial health or environmental damage. We stated: Nothing like that kind of harm occurred in this case. A & A did not endanger the public health or safety; its conduct was not life-threatening to anyone.

We accept the conclusions reached below that it set out to cause economic harm to a competitor, that it used inappropriate means to achieve that goal, and that it should be punished for, and others should be deterred from, engaging in that conduct. But nothing approaching $12.5 million is necessary to achieve either goal. Id. at 721 , 596 A.2d 687 . The trial court also evaluated the gravity of the conduct by comparing it to certain conduct for which the Legislature has enacted specific penalties.

It pointed to (i) § 11-212 of the Commercial Law article, which establishes a penalty of “a fine not exceeding $500,000 or imprisonment not exceeding six months or both” for “[a]ny person who willfully violates” certain antitrust provisions, and (ii) § 286(g) of article 27, which provides for “[a] fine of not more than $1,000,000,” in ⁴²⁰ addition to “[i]mprisonment for not less than 20 years nor more than 40 years,” for drug kingpins who commit certain drug offenses. The court recognized that the acts proscribed by the Legislature are not the same as the acts committed by Driggs and TDC. It suggested that the proscribed antitrust and drug kingpin violations are more heinous than any act committed by the appellants, yet the financial aspects of the penalties for those violations are less severe than the penalty imposed upon the appellants by the jury. —Ability to Pay— The trial court explained that, “[hjaving independently considered the tax returns and other financial documents admitted into evidence of both John A. Driggs and The Driggs Corporation, [it] found that the respective awards against each are excessive in relation to Defendants’ ability to pay.” The trial court did not specify precisely what evidence indicated that Driggs or TDC would be unable to pay the jury’s award. Tax returns for the year 1997 which were entered into evidence established that, for that year, Driggs and his wife had a total income of $679,684.00.

Those same tax returns indicated that, for 1997, the Driggses suffered nearly $100,000.00 in losses from various investments and paid $87,874.00 in home mortgage interest and points, $232,000.00 in mortgage interest to banks for rental real estate, taxes of more than $185,000.00, and nearly $45,000.00 in legal fees. Taking into account that the Driggses .no doubt had other expenses, it is apparent that they would have found it extremely difficult to pay the $170,000.00 award of punitive damages. TDC’s tax returns for 1997 showed that, for 1997, TDC’s total income was $10,257,679.00. TDC’s taxable income—the amount left after payment of salaries and wages, debts, rents, taxes, and other expenses—was only $1,643,225.00.

It is thus apparent that the $5,000,000.00 punitive damages award against TDC would work a substantial hardship against TDC. ⁴²¹ In any event, assuming arguendo that both Driggs and TDC had the ability to pay the awards against them, over an extended period of time if not immediately, that alone would not justify the awards. As the Court of Appeals explained in Bowden , merely because a defendant may be able to pay a very large award of punitive damages, without jeopardizing the defendant’s financial position, does not justify an award which is disproportionate to the heinousness of the defendant’s conduct. ... “ ‘[WJhere a defendant has not committed an act that would warrant a large punitive damages award, such an award should not be upheld upon judicial review merely because the defendant has the ability to pay it.’ ” Bowden, 350 Md. at 28-29 , 710 A.2d 267 (citation omitted). —Deterrence Value— The trial court did not discuss the deterrence value of the amount awarded, except to observe that the conduct in question was “not in need of greater deterrence and/or punishment” than the conduct proscribed by Maryland’s antitrust statute 9 or drug kingpin statute. 10 We agree that the conduct was not so heinous as to require, for deterrence, what would be one of the largest punitive damages awards ever made in this State. —Legislative Sanctions— In Bowden, 350 Md. at 31 , 710 A.2d 267 , the Court of Appeals explained that, “when a punitive damages award is several times higher than the largest criminal fine or civil penalty prescribed by the Legislature for any offense or misconduct, the award should be strictly scrutinized.” (Emphasis in original.) As the trial court indicated, the punitive damages, at least cumulatively, were several times higher than ⁴²² any fine or penalty authorized by the Legislature, even if the conduct upon which the damages were based could be viewed not as a single action but as several different actions which could warrant several different fines or penalties. —Comparison to Other Awards— Particularly significant in determining whether an award of punitive damages is excessive is a comparison of the award to “other final punitive damages awards in the jurisdiction.” Bowden, 350 Md. at 31 , 710 A.2d 267 . The trial court conducted such a comparison and determined that, “[i]n light of other awards upheld by the Court of Appeals, the award against The Driggs Corporation appeal's excessive.” In our view, that statement applies equally to the award against Driggs. The Bowden Court conducted an exhaustive review of Maryland cases involving large awards of punitive damages.

Zachair directs us to no Maryland cases involving larger awards that have been decided since Bowden was filed. The Bowden Court summarized: In Alexander & Alexander,[,] Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Assoc., Inc. 88 Md.App. 672, 720 , 596 A.2d 687, 710-711 (1991), cert. denied, 326 Md. 435 , 605 A.2d 137 (1992), Chief Judge Wilner for the Court of Special Appeals, in vacating an extremely large punitive damages award, stated: “On this record we do not believe that a $12.5 million punitive award comports with [the law]. Although we cannot say with complete certainty that it is the largest punitive award rendered by a Maryland court, it is the largest, by far, of which we are aware. The nearest in amount was $7,500,000 rendered in Potomac Electric v. Smith, 79 Md.App. 591 , 558 A.2d 768 ... [, cert. denied, 317 Md. 393 , 564 A.2d 407 (1989), overruled on other grounds in United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533 , 620 A.2d 905 (1993) ], and the nearest to that was $1,000,000, which we vacated in Edmonds v. Murphy, ... 83 Md. App. 133 , 573 A.2d 853 [ (1990), aff'd, 325 Md. 342 , 601 A.2d 102 (1992) ].

Most of the punitive awards to date have been well under $100,000; other than the award in ⁴²³ Potomac Electric , the highest allowed to stand was $910,000 against Exxon Corporation in Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 69 Md.App. 124 , 516 A.2d 990 (1986)[, cert. denied, 309 Md. 47 , 522 A.2d 392 (1987) ]. [T]he $12.5 million allowed by the court [is] extraordinary in terms of Maryland history.... The cases in which punitive damages awards have been upheld by this Court are even more striking. Apparently the largest award of punitive damages which has ever been upheld by this Court was $700,000, and in that case the size of the award was not an issue before this Court. Franklin Square Hosp. v. Laubach, 318 Md. 615, 617-618 , 569 A.2d 693, 694-695 (1990).

The next ten highest awards of punitive damages upheld by us seem to be as follows: $107,875 (St. Luke Church v. Smith, 318 Md. 337 , 568 A.2d 35 (1990)); $100,000 each for two plaintiffs, based on two separate acts of fraud (Nails v. S. & R., 334 Md. 398 , 639 A.2d 660 (1994)); $82,000 (Luppino v. Gray, 336 Md. 194 , 647 A.2d 429 (1994)); $50,000 (Macklin v. Logan, 334 Md. 287 , 639 A.2d 112 (1994)); $40,000 (Embrey v. Holly, .. . 293 Md. 128 , 442 A.2d 966 [ (1982) ] ); $36,000 (Drug Fair of Md., Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341 , 283 A.2d 392 (1971)); $35,000 (General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627 , 381 A.2d 16 (1977)); $30,000 (Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643 , 261 A.2d 731 (1970)); $25,000 (Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Keulemans, 275 Md. 441 , 340 A.2d 705 (1975)); $25,000 (American Stores Co. v. Byrd, 229 Md. 5 , 181 A.2d 333 (1962)). Moreover, in most of these cases no argument was made that the punitive awards were excessive. We recognize that the awards involved in the older cases cited above, if adjusted for inflation, would be larger in terms of present dollars.

Nonetheless, a multi-million dollar award of punitive damages is entirely beyond the range of punitive damages awards previously upheld by this Court.” Bowden, 350 Md. at 32-33 , 710 A.2d 267 . It is thus apparent that the $5,000,000.00 award against TDC is far above the range of punitive damages awards ⁴²⁴ accepted in Maryland, and the $170,000,00 award against Driggs as an individual is somewhat above that range. —Duplication of Awards— If separate punitive damages are awarded for separate torts, but “the separate torts all grew out of a single occurrence or episode,” the awards may be duplicative. Bowden, 350 Md. at 34 , 710 A.2d 267 . The trial court determined that the malicious use of process and abuse of process claims “[b]oth ... arise out of Defendants’ misuse of the court system, and thus may be said to have their basis in one continuous course of conduct.” By this, the court indicated that one reason it was reducing the punitive damages awards was because it believed them to be, in part, duplicative.

Zachair now suggests that the “malicious use of process claim involved the filing of multiple frivolous legal proceedings from 1994 through 1997,” while the “abuse of process claim involved defendants’ efforts to use process ... as part of an ulterior scheme to force Zachair off [Hyde Field] and to resume lucrative mining operations.” At the trial below, however, Zachair expressly agreed that the awards of compensatory damages for malicious use of process and abuse of process were duplicative and should be merged. Zachair may not be heard to argue otherwise on appeal. —Relationship to Compensatory Damages— Zachair makes much of the fact that the ratio between the jury’s awards of punitive damages and compensatory damages is approximately one to one. Zachair contends that “[ajwards with a ratio of 3:1 between punitive damages and compensatory damages are presumptively proper as a matter of law.” In Bowden , the Court of Appeals explained that an award of punitive damages should bear “a reasonable relationship to the compensatory damages awarded.” Bowden, 350 Md. at 39 , 710 A.2d 267 . The court noted that when the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages is greater than three to one, it is likely—but by ho means certain-that the relationship is not reasonable.

See id. at 39 n. 11, 710 A.2d 267 . The ⁴²⁵ court observed that, “in some states where the matter is controlled by statutes, there are statutory provisions that the amount of a punitive damages award, where authorized, may not exceed three times the amount of the plaintiffs actual or compensatory damages.” Id. It added: “This three to one ratio corresponds to numerous statutes in Maryland and throughout the country ... authorizing treble damages as a civil penalty.” Id. at 40 n. 11, 710 A.2d 267 . Contrary to Zachair’s suggestion, the Bowden Court did not suggest that punitive damages should not be deemed excessive unless the ratio between them and any compensatory damages awarded exceeds three to one.

The Court specifically stated: “[W]e do not suggest that punitive damages awards in most cases must reflect this ratio.” Id. The Court acknowledged, moreover, that “there are situations in which little or no consideration should be given to the relationship which punitive damages awards bear to compensatory damages awards.” Id. at 40 , 710 A.2d 267 . We are satisfied that the situation at hand-where a multi-million dollar award of compensatory damages was made for purely economic loss-is just such a situation. —Propriety of Reduction— The trial court’s reduction of the punitive damages awards changed the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages from approximately one to one to approximately one to five. Both the award against TDC and the award against Driggs remain among the highest punitive damages awards ever made in this State, however.

While certainly egregious, the conduct in question did not pose a risk to life or health and, as the trial court explained, was no more heinous than other acts for which the Legislature has prescribed lesser penalties. Driggs and TDC were engaged in a battle to save their businesses. Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the trial court properly reduced the awards of punitive damages. ⁴²⁶ II Conversion In the cross-appeal, Driggs and TDC first take issue with the jury’s award of $1,975,000.00 11 in compensatory damages for converting mining products and airport revenues from November 3, 1994, when Zachair purchased Hyde Field at auction, until March 29, 1995, when the eviction occurred. —Conversion of Mining Products— As to the mining products, Driggs and TDC