Abell v. Albert F. Goetze, Inc.

Finan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On February 4, 1964, appellant, Robert E. Abell, was an employee in the meat packing business of appellee, Albert F. Goetze, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the Employer. On April 28, 1964, the appellant filed a claim with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, alleging that on February 4, 1964, he sustained an accidental injury in the course of his employment. The Commission found that the appellant had sustained the alleged injury in the course of his employment and made an award.

On ap ⁴³⁵ peal to the Superior Court of Baltimore City, the finding of the Commission was reversed. This appeal followed. According to the appellant’s testimony, while working in the Employer’s sanitation department on the date of the alleged accident, he was informed that there was a can of grease to be removed from the plant cafeteria; he went to the cafeteria and picked up a five-gallon can of fat. As he was leaving, carrying the can of fat, he slipped on grease, which was on the floor, wrenching his left knee.

The appellant further testified that after the alleged accident he went to the company first-aid station and reported the occurrence to Dr. McElwain, the company physician, and treatment was prescribed. It appears from the record that appellant on three previous occasions had sustained injuries to his left knee, while working for his present employer. The first occurred on June 6, 1959, while lifting a tank to wash it, the second on May 7, 1960, when he stepped into a hole while cutting grass and wrenched his knee, and the third on March 8, 1961, when he wrenched his knee while lifting a tank. However no claim was ever filed for these injuries.

Counsel for the Employer and Insurer on cross-examination of appellant, adduced over objection, evidence concerning a hand injury sustained on September 6, 1962, a claim for which was filed February 29, 1964. The only other witness before the lower court was Julia S. McBride, the company nurse. She testified that on February 4, 1964, the appellant was called to the medical department “for evaluation of his hand injuries” and the appellant never mentioned to her the alleged knee accident of that date. She further testified that she has the duty of keeping records of injuries to company employees occurring on the job.

Each employee has a medical card and occupational injuries are noted on the face of the card, while non-occupational illnesses and miscellaneous complaints are noted on the reverse side of the card. It was the nurse’s testimony that the appellant’s medical card showed a notation “soreness in the left knee joint” on the reverse (nonoccupational) side of the card, dated February 4, 1964, and nothing on the front (occupational) side of the card for that date. It was stipulated by counsel for both sides that had Dr. Me ⁴³⁶ Elwain been called as a witness he would have testified that on February 4, 1964, the appellant came to the medical department at his request for evaluation of a previous hand injury and “[a]t this time he [appellant] again complained of soreness of his left knee joint.” The Doctor would have further testified : “It is interesting to note that the patient gave as the date of injury February 4, 1964, on his report, but he mentioned this only casually having come to the Medical Department at that time for evaluation of an injury of September 6, 1962.” The lower court, sitting without a jury, found as a fact that appellant “did not receive an injury on the 4th of February in the course of his employment, * * The judge in the court below relied on the testimony of nurse McBride, the stipulation as to Dr. McElwain’s testimony had he been called as a witness, and the fact that on February 29, 1964, appellant filed a written claim with the Commission concerning the previous hand injury without making claim for the alleged knee injury of February 4, 1964. The appellant contends: (1) that the finding of the Commission is presumed to be prima facie correct and that the appellee failed to introduce sufficient evidence to overcome this presumption and hence the lower court erred in reversing the Commission; and (2) the lower court erred in admitting evidence as to the occurrence of and the filing of a claim for an unrelated injury, and which testimony allegedly prejudiced the appellant’s case.

I The proposition that on appeal the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission is presumed to be prima facie correct is clearly set forth in the Statute. Art. 101, § 56(c) Code (1957) Richard F. Kline, Inc. and Great American Insurance Co. v. Courtney C. Grosh, 245 Md. 236 , 226 A. 2d 147 (1967). The main thrust of the appellant’s argument is based on the assumption that as long as there is some evidence to support the decision of the Commission, it is error for the Court to reverse it. In occupational disease cases, the Statute clearly provides ⁴³⁷ that all findings of fact by the Commission shall be final.

Art. 101, § 56(a) (1966 Cum. Supp., Code (1957)). However, this is not an occupational disease case. Accordingly, the inference that so long as there is sufficient evidence to support the Commission’s findings that it cannot be reversed is not to be drawn ; otherwise there would be little meaning to the law that upon appeal Workmen’s Compensation cases are to be tried de novo.

In Smith v. State Roads Comm., 240 Md. 525, 533-34 , 214 A. 2d 792, 796 (1965), Judge McWilliams reviewed the authorities on this matter and speaking for the Court, stated: “Maryland, on the other hand, in common with sixteen other states, authorizes a review of the facts as well as the law. Our statute contemplates a trial which essentially is de novo. Richardson v. Home Mutual, 235 Md. 252 , 201 A. 2d 340 (1964). “We are urged to consider two cases from New Jersey where, as in Maryland, appeals are tried de novo. In O’Reilly v. Roberto Homes, 31 N. J. Super. 387, 107 A. 2d 9 (1954), despite a conflict in the testimony in regard to tire marks and the fact of intoxication, the Commission refused to award compensation.

The court reversed the Commission and found in favor of the claimant. Because there was competent believable evidence sufficient to sustain the court’s finding it was not disturbed by the appellate court. Judge Foster, the trier of facts in this case, also reversed the Commission. If the evidence supporting his findings is legally sufficient then, if we follow the New Jersey court, we should not disturb his findings.” The burden is upon the appellant to overcome the presumption that the decision of the Commission is prima facie correct, and he must do this to the satisfaction of the trier of the