Simmons v. Comfort Suites Hotel

GRAEFF, Judge. Appellant, Carol F. Simmons, appeals from the order of the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County reversing a workers’ compensation award in her favor and granting summary judgment to appellees, Comfort Suites Hotel, and its insurer, ²⁰⁷ Selective Insurance Company of North America (collectively, “Comfort Suites”). On appeal, Ms. Simmons presents the following issues: I. Is the installation of an alarm system to allay the post-traumatic fears of a robbery victim a cognizable medical expense under Maryland’s Workers’ Compensation law?

II

If the answer to Question I is in the affirmative, should the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission be affirmed? For the reasons set forth below, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This appeal arises from injuries that Ms. Simmons received while working as a night auditor at the Comfort Suites Hotel in Chestertown, Maryland. On September 25, 2006, at approximately 2:00 a.m., she was brutally attacked with a baseball bat during an attempted robbery of the hotel.

Left for dead, the 67-year-old victim was found hours later, lying unconscious in a pool of blood. Paramedics rushed Ms. Simmons to the University of Maryland Shock Trauma Center, where she was treated for severe traumatic brain injury, diffuse cerebral edema, and multiple skull fractures. On October 6, 2006, she was transferred to Kernan Hospital. After her discharge on December 5, 2006, the Kernan Team recommended that Ms. Simmons receive supportive care and outpatient rehabilitation services at home.

On September 29, 2006, Ms. Simmons filed a claim with the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission (the “Commission”) for the injuries she sustained in the attack. Comfort Suites did not contest the underlying compensability of the claim, and it paid for medical treatment for Ms. Simmons. The Commission awarded Ms. Simmons temporary total disability benefits. Ms. Simmons thereafter requested that Comfort Suites provide her with a home security system to allay her fear of a ²⁰⁸ home intruder.

The Commission held a hearing on Ms. Simmons’ request on September 14, 2007. In support of her claim, Ms. Simmons submitted a March 23, 2007, letter from Dr. M. Sementilli, a neuropsychologist. Dr. Sementilli wrote, in part: ' I continue to follow the neurobehavioral recovery of Ms. Simmons. Even though she continues to demonstrate cognitive and physical gains, her mood remains anxious to fear of additional assaults.

Her anxiety increases in the evening despite the presence of her son(s) who reside upstairs during the night. Ms. Simmons continues to fear that the perpetrator or associates, or random intruders may attempt to harm her. She is hyper vigilant to noises outside and inside the house. The resulting anxiety, ruminations and hyper vigilance are contributing to ongoing insomnia and fear.

To conclude, as her treating neuropsychologist I would strongly recommend that an in home security system be installed. If so I am confident that Ms. Simmons will ■ experience a reduction in fear, vigilance and resulting anxiety. I believe this is a reasonable request for any individual who has been assaulted and continues to be vulnerable during their recovery period. Comfort Suites did not introduce any medical evidence rebutting Dr. Sementilli’s opinion that Ms. Simmons’ anxiety would be reduced with the installation of an alarm system, noting that it was addressing the claim “strictly from a legal standpoint.” Comfort Suites argued that the Workers’ Compensation statute did not cover a home security system because it was not “medical treatment” pursuant to the statute.

In support of its position, Comfort Suites cited R & T Constr. Co. v. Judge, 323 Md. 514, 531 , 594 A.2d 99 (1991), for the proposition that modifications to a home constitute medical treatment only when they provide “access for necessities,” such as modifications that provide a quadriplegic access to physically travel in the home. ²⁰⁹ The Commissioner disagreed with the argument that a home security system was not covered under the Workers’ Compensation statute, stating: Ironically, I think this home modification ... the request is probably designed to do more potential good for the condition of the patient than the modification that you’ve cited in terms of access. Access is for someone whose condition is not going to get any better. This modification will theoretically make the condition better.

It’s more reason to do this than the other. The other is kind of vague, acknowledgment that it’s the civil thing to do if someone is a paraplegic or quadriplegifc], you’re improving the standard of the quality of their life. This has the double purpose of improving the quality of her life, and possibly the medical condition. I think with medical documentation from him, I think it’s appropriate.

On October 10, 2007, the Commission issued an order granting Ms. Simmons’ request for a home security system. Specifically, the order required Comfort Suites to “authorize medical treatment for [Ms. Simmons] of home modification of installation of a home security system to reduce stress and fear per treating physician.” On October 30, 2007, Comfort Suites filed in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County a Petition for Judicial Review of the Commission’s decision. On March 18, 2008, the circuit court held a hearing on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Counsel for Ms. Simmons argued that the home security system qualified as medical treatment because (1) it would “assist her in her recovery from the injuries she sustained both physically and emotionally,” and (2) Comfort Suites had not produced a medical opinion that she did not need this system to recover from the attack.

Comfort Suites did not take issue with the doctor’s recommendation that a home security system be installed; counsel stated: “I completely understand and frankly agree with” the need for a home security system for her peace of mind. Comfort Suites stated: ²¹⁰ [W]hat [counsel for Ms. Simmons] is focusing on is not the right thing here. We’re here on a motion for summary judgment. As Your Honor knows, there’s no dispute as to any material facts.

I’m not disputing that she may need, from a medical standpoint as Dr. Simantelli [sic] says, this home security system to help her with whatever problems she may have. That’s not the point. The point is legally she’s not entitled to the home security system under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Statute. They need to clear the first hurdle, which is: Is she even entitled to it under the statute?

This is not a medical question. It’s a legal question. Legally is she entitled to it under the statute? The answer is no unfortunately, because what we’re talking about here is the medical treatment in the form of a home modification.

Comfort Suites argued that, pursuant to Judge, 323 Md. at 530-31 , 594 A.2d 99 , modifications to a claimant’s home are considered medical treatment under the statute only if the modification provides access to necessities. Because a home security system would not provide necessary access, it was not “medical treatment” that was covered by the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Statute. The circuit court concluded that the question whether Ms. Simmons is entitled to a home security system under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act “is a legal, not a factual question.” The court stated that it “agrees with the proposition that this is not something that’s contemplated either by the statute or the [Judge ] case.” On March 28, 2008, the circuit court entered a written order granting Comfort Suites’ Motion for Summary Judgment and ordering “that the decision of the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission dated October 10, 2007 is REVERSED as it relates to the installation of a home security system.” This appeal followed. ²¹¹ STANDARD OF REVIEW Before addressing the merits of this case, we must address the applicable standard of review. Ms. Simmons argues that decisions of the Commission are entitled to a “presumption of correctness” under Md.Code (2008 RepLVol.), § 9-745 of the Labor and Employment (“L.E.”) Article.

Accordingly, she argues, the decision of the Commission satisfied her prima facie case, and the circuit court could not grant summary judgment against her when Comfort Suites “offered no medical evidence to controvert the opinion of [her] treating health care provider that the alarm system was an important component to [her] treatment plan.” Ms. Simmons is correct that, pursuant to L.E. § 9-745(b), on appeal: (1) “the decision of the Commission is presumed to be prima facie correct,” and (2) “the party challenging the decision has the burden of proof.” The Maryland appellate courts have made clear, however, that the language regarding the presumption of correctness of the Commission’s decision does not apply to all issues, but rather, it “is only pertinent when the issue on appeal to the circuit court is one of fact and not of law.” Board of Educ. v. Spradlin, 161 Md.App. 155, 173 , 867 A.2d 370 (2005). Accord Beyer v. Decker, 159 Md. 289, 291 , 150 A. 804 (1930) (presumption of correctness does not apply where the question “is one of statutory construction, and one of law for the court”); Symons v. R.D. Grier & Sons Co., 10 Md.App. 498, 500 , 271 A.2d 398 (1970) (presumption of correctness “has no application where the question is one of law instead of fact”). Here, on appeal in the circuit court, the parties each filed a motion for summary judgment asking the circuit court to rule in its favor, as a matter of law, on the issue whether a home security system constitutes a compensable medical expense under the Workers’ Compensation statute. In resolving that question of law, there was no presumption of correctness of the Commission’s decision that precluded the circuit court from granting Comfort Suites’ motion for summary judgment. ²¹² We review de novo a trial court’s grant of summary judgment.

Baltimore County v. Kelly, 391 Md. 64, 73 , 891 A.2d 1103 (2006); Youngblud v. Fallston Supply Co., Inc., 180 Md.App. 389, 399 , 951 A.2d 118 , cert. denied, 406 Md. 114 , 956 A.2d 203 (2008). Summary judgment is appropriate “if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. “ ‘A material fact is a fact that, depending on how it is decided by the trier of fact, will affect the outcome of the case.’ ” Rivers v. Hagner Mgmt. Corp., 182 Md.App. 632, 646 , 959 A.2d 110 (2008) (quoting Mandl v. Bailey, 159 Md.App. 64, 82 , 858 A.2d 508 (2004)). We determine whether any material facts are in dispute, and, if not, we determine whether the court was legally correct in its ruling.

Newell v. Runnels, 407 Md. 578, 630 , 967 A.2d 729 (2009). DISCUSSION I. This case concerns L.E. § 9-660, which provides, in pertinent part: (a) In general.—In addition to the compensation provided under this subtitle, if a covered employee has suffered an accidental personal injury, compensable hernia, or occupational disease the employer or its insurer promptly shall provide to the covered employee, as the Commission may require: (1) medical, surgical, or other attendance or treatment; (2) hospital and nursing services; (3) medicine; (4) crutches and other apparatus; and (5) artificial arms, feet, hands, and legs and other prosthetic appliances. (b) Duration.—The employer or its insurer shall provide the medical services and treatment required under subsection (a) of this section for the period required by the nature ²¹³ of the accidental personal injury, compensable hernia, or occupational disease. This Court has interpreted this statute as dealing “with medical services necessary or desirable to treat the effects of the injury....” Harris v. Janco Enter., 53 Md.App. 674, 677 , 455 A.2d 453 (1983). 1 The question here focuses on the scope of § 9—660(a)(1), and whether a home security system can be considered to be medical treatment under the statute. 2 Ms. Simmons argues that there is evidence from her doctor that she needs a home security system to help her recover from her injuries, and, under these circumstances, the “installation of an alarm system to allay the post-traumatic fears of a robbery victim” is medical treatment under the statute.

Comfort Suites makes no argument that medical treatment to allay the psychological effects of an injury falls outside the scope of medical treatment under the statute. See Belcher v. T. Rowe Price, 329 Md. 709, 745-46 , 621 A.2d 872 (1993) (mental injury may be compensable under Workers’ Compensation Act.) Accord Richard P. Gilbert & Robert L. Humphreys, Jr., Maryland Workers’ Compensation Handbook § 10.3 (3d ed. 2007) (“Claims for psychiatric treatment” have been held compensable as medical treatment.). Indeed, during oral argument in this Court, counsel for Comfort Suites conceded that if, instead of a home security system to reduce anxiety and insomnia, a doctor had recommended medication for this purpose, it would be covered under the statute. ²¹⁴ Comfort Suites argues, however, that a home security system, as a matter of law, is not medical treatment as contemplated by the statute, and therefore, the circuit court properly granted its motion for summary judgment. Both parties rely exclusively on R & T Constr.

Co. v. Judge, 323 Md. 514 , 594 A.2d 99 (1991), in support of their contentions. We agree that Judge is instructive, but for reasons other than those relied on by the parties. As explained below, we reverse the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Comfort Suites based on its finding that a home security system, as a matter of law, does not constitute medical treatment under § 9-660(a)(l). We recognize that a home security system typically is not viewed as a form of medical treatment.

The Maryland Court of Appeals, however, has found that items that are not intrinsically medical in nature could constitute medical treatment if there is evidence that the item conveys a medical benefit. Thus, the question whether a home security system constitutes compensable medical treatment pursuant to § 9-660(a)(1) is a factual question to be resolved on the evidence in each particular case. Under the unique circumstances of this case, where the claimant was brutally attacked, where she suffered both physical and mental disability as a result of the attack, 3 and where her treating neuropsychologist recommended a home security system to improve her medical condition by reducing her anxiety and resulting insomnia, the trier of fact could find that a home security system constituted medical treatment pursuant to the statute. Accordingly, we will remand for further proceedings.

A. Statutory Construction In determining the meaning of medical treatment under § 9-660, we must apply settled principles of statutory inter ²¹⁵ pretation. In Green v. Carr Lowery Glass Co., Inc., 170 Md.App. 502 , 907 A.2d 845 (2006), aff'd, 398 Md. 512 , 921 A.2d 235 (2007), another case interpreting the language of the Workers’ Compensation statute, this Court stated: As this Court repeatedly has made clear, the paramount goal of statutory interpretation is to identify and effectuate the legislative intent underlying the statute(s) at issue. The legislative intent of a statute primarily reveals itself through its very own words. As a rule, we view the words of a statute in ordinary terms, in their natural meaning, in the manner in which they are most commonly understood.

If the words of a statute clearly and unambiguously delineate the legislative intent, ours is an ephemeral enterprise: we need investigate no further but simply apply the statute as it reads. Even so, we do not view the plain language of a statute in a vacuum. As we have often reiterated, “While the language of the statute is the primary source for determining legislative intention, the plain meaning rule of construction is not absolute; rather, the statute must be construed reasonably with reference to the purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body. The Court will look at the larger context, including the legislative purpose, within which statutory language appears.” Id. at 508, 907 A.2d 845 (quoting Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 335-36 , 748 A.2d 478 (2000)).

The Court of Appeals has explained the background of the Workers’ Compensation Act: The Maryland Workmen’s Compensation Act was enacted in 1914 to compensate employees who were injured in the course of their employment. The statute took the place of the common law tort system, which proved to be an inadequate means of compensating employees for their work-related injuries. [T]he statute struck a delicate balance between workers and employers: Workers lost their right to sue their employers for negligence but gained the right to quick and certain compensation for injuries sustained during the course of their ²¹⁶ employment, regardless of fault. In return, employers lost their defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and fellow servant rule but gained the advantage of having their liability limited. Brady v. Ralph Parsons Co., 308 Md. 486, 496-97 , 520 A.2d 717 (1987) (footnotes and citations omitted).

The purpose of the Act was “to protect workers and their families from hardships inflicted by work-related injuries by providing workers with compensation for loss of earning capacity resulting from accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment,” Howard Co. Ass’n, Retard. Cit. v. Walls, 288 Md. 526, 531 , 418 A.2d 1210 (1980), and “to promote the general welfare of the State and to prevent the State and its taxpayers from having to care for injured workmen and their dependents, when under the law as it previously existed, such workmen could not recover damages for their injuries.” Paul v. Glidden Co., 184 Md. 114, 119 , 39 A.2d 544, 546 (1944). Breitenbach v. N.B. Handy Co., 366 Md. 467, 474 , 784 A.2d 569 (2001). In Breitenbach , the Court of Appeals stated that, when interpreting the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act, a court should keep in mind that “the Act is remedial in nature and ‘should be construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes.’ ” Id. at 472 , 784 A.2d 569 (quoting Para v. Richards Group, 339 Md. 241, 251 , 661 A.2d 737 (1995)). “[Ajpplying a canon of construction specific to the Act, if the intent of the legislature is ambiguous or remains unclear, we resolve any uncertainty in favor of the claimant.” Id. at 473, 784 A.2d 569 .

The Court cautioned, however, that it “may not stifle the plain meaning of the Act, or exceed its purposes, so that the injured worker may prevail.... Similarly, the Court may not create ambiguity or uncertainty in the Act’s provisions where none exists so that a provision may be interpreted in favor of the injured claimant.” Id. ²¹⁷ B. Medical Treatment In accordance with the liberal construction to be given the Workers’ Compensation Act, the Court of Appeals has given a broad construction of the terms in § 9-660, including the term medical treatment. In A.G. Crunkleton Electric Co., Inc. v. Barkdoll, 227 Md. 364 , 177 A.2d 252 (1962), the Court gave a liberal construction of the term “nursing services” under the statute, rejecting the argument that it was limited to professional health care providers and holding that it included services rendered at home by the claimant’s wife, who was not a professional nurse. Id. at 371 , 177 A.2d 252 . 4 Moreover, in Breitenbach , the Court held that, because § 9-660 was not clear and unambiguous regarding whether an employer was obligated to reimburse an employee for travel expenses incurred to