Doe v. Buccini Pollin Group, Inc.

ARRIE W. DAVIS (Retired, Specially Assigned), J. This appeal presents the question of whether an injury suffered by appellant at the hands of a third party was “directed against [him] in the course of” his employment. John Doe, appellant, appeals from the decision of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City that reversed an award of benefits made by the Workers’ Compensation Commission. In this workers’ compensation case, appellant raises two issues, which we have combined and rephrased to be whether the circuit court properly ruled that appellant’s injuries were not covered by the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act (Act). 1 II.Md. ⁴¹⁴ Code (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol., 2007 Supp.), § § 9-101 et seq. of the Labor and Employment Article (LE or Act). For the reasons set forth below, we shall hold that appellant’s injuries are not covered by the Act because the assault that caused them was not “directed” against him in the course of his employment.

Hence, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. Background and Procedure I According to an agreed statement of facts, appellant worked as a banquet houseman at the BWI Hilton Hotel in Linthicum. He was responsible for setting up tables in the banquet hall. 2 The events of this case began with a disagreement with a coworker, Keya Gardner, over work supplies, specifically a supply cart. Appellant had stocked the cart.

After appellant took a break, he returned to find the cart missing. He then sought to retrieve the cart from Gardner. Gardner refused to allow appellant to take the cart and, while he was taking the cart, appellant’s hand touched Gardner’s hand. Gardner then became enraged and began to curse.

She followed appellant into a banquet room, continuing her rant, and also upset several banquet tables that appellant had prepared. Gardner, still in a rage, used her cell phone to call a friend, Darryl Newsome. She told him that “[appellant] touched my hand and you should come get your thing and take care of him.” The argument moved to the lobby and came to the attention of the banquet supervisor. Apparently in response to the argument between appellant and Gardner, appellant’s supervisor told appellant that, since his shift was just about over, he should clock out and go home.

Appellant changed into street clothes and, at about 9:38 p.m., signed out to go home. ⁴¹⁵ He offered a ride to a Mr. Wees, who lived in Baltimore. As they left the hotel lot, appellant saw Darryl Newsome. Shortly thereafter, Gardner left the hotel lot in a separate vehicle. The stipulated facts portray a chase as Gardner and appellant were traveling at a high rate of speed.

Appellant brought his vehicle to a stop in a dark alley behind Wees’s home in Baltimore City, about thirteen miles from the hotel. New-some arrived in his vehicle, pulled behind appellant’s car, emerged and shot appellant, rendering him a paraplegic. 3 II On August 19, 2008, appellant filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits under the Act. 4 A hearing on this claim was conducted on December 4, 2008 before the Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission). On December 12, 2008, the Commission awarded appellant temporary total dis ⁴¹⁶ ability benefits and associated medical expenses. The Commission denied the employer’s motion for rehearing on January 16, 2009 and, on January 26, the employer filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.

See Md.Code (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol., 2008 Supp.), § 9-737 of the Labor and Employment Article (LE). 5 Initially, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court denied these motions and set the ⁴¹⁷ matter for trial. Following a hearing on April 27, 2010, the circuit court reversed the Commission’s decision awarding benefits and this appeal followed. In overturning the Commission’s award, the circuit court determined that appellant’s injuries were not covered by the Act.

The trial judge’s ruling from the bench included the following: At the proceedings below, the Workers’ Compensation Commission awarded benefits to the claimant. As I stated, the employer and insurer have appealed that award. The central issue in this case is whether the claimant’s injury is compensable under the Workers’ Compensation law. Here, the appellant employer and insurer maintain that the only category of injury that could make the claimant’s injury compensable falls under the ambit of Section 9-101(b)(2) of the Labor & Employment Article.

That section defines an accidental injury as being; “an injury caused by a willful or negligent act of a third person directed against a covered employee in the course of the employment of the covered employee; ...” It is noteworthy, as the appellant has maintained in this appeal, that the other two subsections of Section 9-101(b) cover actions that; “arise out of and in the course of employment”, as opposed to the language in Section 9-101(b)(2) that does not include language that “arises out of and in the course of employment” and only includes the language “in the course of employment.” The plain language of the statute restricts compensation to injuries resulting from willful acts to only those injuries that occur in the course of employment. [I]t is well settled that in the “course of employment” refers to the time, place and circumstance in which the injury occurred, and requires that an injury take place while the employee is at the place of employment performing his duties, or engaged in some task incident to [his] duties. ⁴¹⁸ Here, there is no dispute that the claimant was not at work and was not performing any task incident to his employment when he was most unfortunately, and regrettably shot. The circuit court surveyed case law from other jurisdictions in which compensation awards were granted in similar factual situations. Citing the Court of Appeals’ decision in Edgewood Nursing Home v. Maxwell, 282 Md. 422 , 384 A.2d 748 (1978), the court rejected appellant’s argument that this case presents an exception to the “going and coming rule”—the proximity rule—under which coverage for an injury, while generally excluded, would be allowed under certain circumstances. The court explained: Specifically, the claimant highlights this exception [proximity rule] and argues that exposure to a co-worker who would seek to have him killed over a minor workplace dispute, constitutes a special hazard that really should allow this injury to be compensable, even though injury occurred over thirteen miles from the place of employment, after the employee punched out for the day, and while the employee was not engaged in any activity on the employer’s behalf.

The proximity rule states that, by virtue of being in close proximity to his place of employment, an employee who is subjected to special risks beyond those to which the general public is exposed, and sustains an injury from that enhanced risk, sustains a compensable injury even though the injury occurs off the property of the workplace. While geographic proximity is not the sole factor at play under the proximity rule it clearly is a factor, and one that, under the facts of this case, regrettably, the claimant can not satisfy. Clearly, the Court understands the significant and tragic nature of this case. But I am required to apply the law as the Court understands it to be written at this time.

And so, based on that, I do find that the employer and insurer has carried their burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance ⁴¹⁹ of the evidence, that the decision reached by the Workers’ Compensation Commission was wrong. Therefore, based on the law as it exists today, this Court has no choice but to reverse the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s award of compensation and deny the claim for benefits that were made on behalf of the claimant. This timely appeal followed. Discussion Standard of Review Appellate scrutiny of a workers’ compensation decision depends upon the manner of the circuit court’s judicial review of the Commission’s decision.

There are two modalities of judicial review in the circuit court: A party dissatisfied by the action of the Commission may seek review in a circuit court by either proceeding on the record made before the Commission (much like judicial review of the final action of most state administrative agencies) or receive a new evidentiary hearing and decision before a jury [or the court] (much like an original civil complaint brought in a circuit court). Under either process ... the agency’s decision is entitled to a presumption of correctness that must be overcome. Baltimore County v. Kelly, 391 Md. 64, 67-68 , 891 A.2d 1103 (2006). In the case before us, the circuit court conducted a de novo trial based on stipulated facts.

Although the Commission’s decision is presumptively correct, see Wal Mart Stores, Inc. v. Holmes, 416 Md. 346, 357 , 7 A.3d 13 (2010), “the propriety of the Commission’s original fact finding is a matter of no consequenee[,]” where there is a de novo proceeding in the circuit court. Bd. of Educ. for Montgomery County v. Spradlin, 161 Md.App. 155, 173 , 867 A.2d 370 (2005). This is so because the circuit court in a trial de novo engages in a fresh consideration of the facts. See Keystone Masonry Corp. v. Hernandez, 156 Md.App. 496, 505-06 , 847 A.2d 493 (2004).

Because there was no testimony at the hearing, the court was presented with an agreed statement of facts and ruled on the ⁴²⁰ issue of coverage as a matter of law. Accordingly, the review of any factual findings by the court would be for clear error. Granite State Ins. Co. v. Hernandez, 191 Md.App. 548, 557-58 , 992 A.2d 528 (2010).

Our review of the circuit court’s conclusions of law is de novo. See id., 191 Md.App. at 558 , 992 A.2d 528 . Introduction The “purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act ... is to ‘provide employees with compensation for loss of earning capacity, regardless of fault, resulting from accidental injury ... occurring in the course of employment.’ ” Sanchez v. Potomac Abatement, Inc., 417 Md. 76 , 82 n. 4, 8 A.3d 737 (2010) (quoting DeBusk v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 342 Md. 432, 437 , 677 A.2d 73 (1996)). The Act’s principle objective of compensating the injured worker “pursuant to the statutory plan for disabilities which are occupationally related” is its “centerline.” See Richard P. Gilbert & Robert L. Humphreys, Jr., Maryland Workers’ Compensation Law, § 2.02 at 2-2 (3d ed.2007).

Worker’s compensation legislation balances the interests of both employees and employers, for [a]t the same time ... the Act also recognizes the need to protect employers from the unpredictable nature and expense of litigation, and the public from the overwhelming tax burden of “caring for the helpless human wreckage found [along] the trail of modern industry.” Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Company v. Goslin, 163 Md. 74, 80 , 160 A. 804, 807 , (1932); Brenner v. Brenner, 127 Md. 189, 192 , 96 A. 287, 288 (1915). See Ch. 800 of the Acts of 1914; see also Belcher v. T. Rowe Price, 329 Md. 709, 736-37 , 621 A.2d 872, 885-86 (1993). In other words, the Act provides employees suffering from work-related accidental injuries, regardless of fault, with a certain, efficient, and dignified form of compensation. In exchange, employees abandon common law remedies, thereby relieving employers from the vagaries of tort liability.

Belcher, 329 Md. at 736 , 621 A.2d at 885 (citing 1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation, § 1.20 at 2 (1992)). ⁴²¹ Polomski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 344 Md. 70, 76-77 , 684 A.2d 1338 (1996) (footnotes omitted). Because the “Act is essentially social legislation[,]” its “provisions thereof are to be liberally construed. It must be interpreted to effectuate its general purpose and not strictly construed. Where there is a conflict in the Workmen’s Compensation law, questions of construction should be resolved in favor of the claimant.” Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc. v. Rosenthal, 185 Md. 416, 425 , 45 A.2d 79 (1945) (citations omitted).

See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Cassidy, 338 Md. 88, 97 , 656 A.2d 757 (1995). “The doctrine of liberal construction does not mean, however, that coverage may be granted beyond that which is authorized by the provisions of the Act.” Barnes v. Children’s Hospital, 109 Md.App. 543, 554 , 675 A.2d 558 (1996). Hence, the “mere occurrence of an accident is an insufficient basis upon which to predicate a workers’ compensation claim.” Montgomery County v. Wade, 345 Md. 1, 9 , 690 A.2d 990 (1997) (citing Gilbert & Humphreys, supra at § 5.2). Elements of Entitlement: LE § 9-101 (b)(1) The Act defines the term “accidental injury” at LE § 9-101(b). 6 A claim based on the intentional or negligent act of a third person that results in an injury is properly considered in light of the definition of “accidental injury” as set forth in LE § 9-101(b)(2). Nevertheless, it is instructive to review the two elements that make up the general definition of accidental injury as set forth in LE § 9—101(b)(1), because appellant also effectively maintains that his injury arose out of his employment because it originated in the workplace. ⁴²² In general, benefits are awardable to a covered employee who establishes by a preponderance of the evidence two elements of entitlement, that the claimant suffered an injury that both “arose out of’ and occurred “in the course of’ his or her employment.

See Livering v. Richardson’s Restaurant., 374 Md. 566, 574 , 823 A.2d 687 (2003). See LE § 9-501. 7 To satisfy the “arises out of’ element, a claimant must establish that the injury “results from some obligation, condition, or incident.of employment.” Livering v. Richardson’s, 374 Md. at 574 , 823 A.2d 687 . Judge Raker pointed out in Livering that “Maryland has adopted the positional-risk test to determine whether an injury arose out of employment.” Livering, 374 Md. at 575 , 823 A.2d 687 (citing Mulready v. Univ. Research Corp., 360 Md. 51, 66 , 756 A.2d 575 (2000)).

In his treatise, Professor Larson describes this standard: An important and growing number of courts are accepting the full implications of the positional-risk test: An injury arises out of the employment if it would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of the employment placed claimant in the position where he was injured. It is even more common for the test to be approved and used in particular situations. This theory supports compensation, for example, in cases of stray bullets, roving lunatics, and other situations in which the only connection of the employment with the injury is that its obligations placed the employee in the particular place at the particular time when he or she was injured by some neutral force, meaning by “neutral” neither personal to the claimant nor distinctly associated with the employment. A. Larson & L. Larson, Workers’ Compensation Law § 3.05 at 3-6 (2011) (footnote omitted).

The “arising out of’ element thus embraces injuries resulting from employment that is incidental to the work, although “not specifically required by ⁴²³ the employment.” Livering, 374 Md. at 576 , 823 A.2d 687 . A “ ‘reasonably incidental’ relationship between the injury and the claimant’s work is sufficient, in itself, to establish that an injury arose out of employment[.]” Jennifer v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 176 Md.App. 211, 223 , 932 A.2d 1213 (2007) (citation omitted).

As to the second element in the definition set forth in LE § 9-101(b)(1), the “ ‘course of employment’ test directs our attention to the time, place, and circumstances of the accident in relation to the employment.” Montgomery County v. Wade, 345 Md. at 11 , 690 A.2d 990 (citing Knoche v. Cox, 282 Md. 447, 454-55 , 385 A.2d 1179 (1978) (further citation omitted)). Judge Karwacki continued in Wade : An analysis of the occupational correlation of these factors “demands that the injury be shown to have arisen within the time and space boundaries of the employment, and in the course of an activity whose purpose is related to the employment.” ... Questions pertinent to this inquiry are: 1) when the employment began and ended, 2) whether the continuity of the period was broken, and 3) how far the employee placed himself or herself outside the employment during that period.... Stated otherwise, an injury is in the course of employment when it occurs during the period of employment at a place where the employee reasonably may be in performance of his or her duties and while fulfilling those duties or engaged in something incident thereto.... “In the course of’ refers to an injury occurring while the employee is performing a duty that he or she is employed to perform at a place where he or she reasonably may be in performance thereof....

If the injury occurred at a point where the employee was within the range of dangers associated with the employment, it is held compensable under the Act. When the employer provides the mode of transportation, the predicate for an award of compensation under the Act is even more clear—courts have held that injuries incurred under these circumstances are ordinarily compensable because the employer has broadened the scope of employment by its provision of the transportation____Throughout this ⁴²⁴ analysis, however, it must be borne in mind that whether a given injury is in the course of the employment is determined by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Montgomery County v. Wade, 345 Md. at 11-12 , 690 A.2d 990 (citations and internal punctuation omitted). Appellant’s injuries do not qualify as an “accidental injury” as defined in LE § 9-101(b)(l).

Simply put, his injury did not arise out of his employment. Although appellant suffered from his association with Gardner, the “causative danger” was not “incidental to the nature of his work” and was independent of his employment relationship. See Dep’t of Corr. v. Harris, 232 Md. 180, 183-84 , 192 A.2d 479 (1963). Appellant essentially contends that his injury originated in his employment.

He cites the fact that Gardner conspired with Newsome to kill him while she was present at work. We do not agree that appellant’s injury had its origin in his employment for purposes of defining an “accidental injury,” and are unable to conclude that it arose out of his work, notwithstanding that the dispute that ultimately led to his tragic injuries took place at the job. There is nothing incidental to appellant’s duties in a personal dispute that, while being played out on the job, was peculiar to the nature of appellant’s duties as a banquet houseman. Gardner’s criminal behavior was not an incident of appellant’s employment.

Indeed, it is this type of aberrant behavior that led the General Assembly to enact LE § 9-101(b)(2), because third-party actions of this nature are generally not incidental to a claimant’s work and, thus, would not “arise out of’ a claimant’s employment. Single Element in Third-party Assault Cases—LE § 9-101 (b)(2). Although appellant would not prevail on a claim for an accidental injury as that term is defined in LE § 9-101(b)(1), because his injury did not arise out of his employment, we turn to the issue before us, i.e., whether his injury constitutes an “accidental injury” within the definition of LE § 9—101(b)(2). To satisfy this definition, appellant need only ⁴²⁵ demonstrate that he suffered an injury caused by a third party in the course of appellant’s employment.

LE § 9-101(b)(2) reflects the General Assembly’s intent to “ ‘broaden the scope of the compensation statute to include as compensa-ble an injury not attributable to the working environment provided it' was incurred in the course of employment.’ ” See Edgewood Nursing Home v. Maxwell, 282 Md. 422, 425 , 384 A.2d 748 (1978) (quoting Giant Food, Inc. v. Gooch, 245 Md. 160, 165 , 225 A.2d 431 (1967)). The Legislature relieved claimants, who had been injured by an intentional or negligent act of a third party, of the difficult burden of demonstrating the direct causative nexus between a sudden irrational act of a third party and the claimant’s employment. Accordingly, in the case of an injury inflicted by a third party, the Act provides that a claimant need only demonstrate that the willful act of that party was directed at the claimant “in the course of the employment.” This provision, in both its current and preceding statutory form, has been addressed in a number of Maryland decisions. In Giant Food, Inc v. Gooch, the claimant, a parking lot attendant for Giant Food Stores, was shot and wounded in the parking lot of his store shortly before he was to begin work.

The employer and carrier asserted that Gooch was not entitled to benefits under the Act, claiming that an injury that was inflicted by a third person did not “arise out of’ Gooch’s employment. The Court of Appeals rejected the claim that Gooch was not entitled to an award, and concluded that a claimant who is injured as the result of the wilful or negligent act of a third person need not establish that the injury “arose out of’ his employment, but only that it be demonstrated that the injury occurred “in the course of’ the employment: It is only reasonable to infer, therefore, that the legislature when it said that accidental personal injury as defined and made compensable by § 15 of Art. 101 was also to include “an injury caused by the wilful or negligent act of a third person directed against an employee in the course of his ⁴²⁶ employment” intended to broaden the scope of the compensation statute to include as compensable an injury not attributable to the working environment provided it was incurred in the course of employment. Giant Food, Inc. v. Gooch, 245 Md. at 165 , 225 A.2d 431 . In Edgewood Nursing Home v. Maxwell, the employee was shot by her estranged paramour while she was at work.

The employer challenged the compensation award made to her dependent on a number of grounds. First, the employer averred that the provision allowing for recovery for an injury inflicted by a third party was unconstitutional because it permitted an award even though the employee’s death “was not causally connected with her employment, and was in no sense due to inherent conditions of her work.” Reviewing its decision in Gooch and citing to other cases, the Court of Appeals rejected the employer’s challenge and concluded that the injury was compensable: We think the employer’s obligation under § 67(6) to pay compensation on behalf of an employee injured in the course of his employment by the wilful or negligent act of a third party does rest upon the employer-employee relationship. The injury is work-related in the sense that even though it arose for personal reasons not attributable to the working environment, it occurred within the course of employment on the employer’s premises at a time when the employee was obliged to be present and at work; in other words, the employee’s presence at the nursing home when the peril struck was a necessary part of her employment and the injury was inflicted in the course of that employment. In view of this nexus, and because the appellants have failed to carry the burden of establishing the invalidity of § 67(6), we think the strong presumption of constitutionality afforded to the statute has not been overcome.

It may be that § 67(6) will lead to results unjust to employers in some cases, but if a causal connection between the injury and the employment beyond the requirement that the injury occur in the course ⁴²⁷ of employment is to be mandated, it can only be done by the legislature. Edgewood Nursing Home, 282 Md. at 430 , 384 A.2d 748 . In both Giant Food, Inc. v. Gooch and Edgewood Nursing Home v. Maxwell, the Court had no difficulty in concluding that the injuries in each case were suffered “in the course of’ each employee’s employment. Both employees were injured on the premises; one was just preparing for work while the other was killed during working hours.

We conclude that appellant did not suffer an “accidental injury” because the assault was not directed against him in the course of his employment. The injury, tragic as it is, did not occur in the course of appellant’s employment. Primarily, appellant’s claim is precluded by operation of the “going and coming rule,” which takes a claimant’s injury out of the course of his or her employment. In general, injuries suffered by an employee traveling on the way to or from his place of employment are not compensable under the Act because they do not arise “out of and in the course of employment.” Bd. of County Comm’rs for Frederick County v. Vache, 349 Md. 526, 531 , 709 A.2d 155 (1998) (citations omitted).

The “going and coming rule” embodies this concept and thus excludes injuries sustained while traveling to or from a place of employment, as falling outside the “course of employment.” Authorities reason that the hazards of such travel are ones to which the public at large is exposed while undertaking personal errands and, thus, should not be compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Richard P. Gilbert & Robert L. Humphreys, Jr., Maryland Workers’ Compensation Handbook § 6.6 (2d ed.1993); see also Director of Finance v. Alford, 270 Md. 355, 359 , 311 A.2d 412, 414 (1973) (“Well established, in respect of the application of Workmen’s Compensation acts, is the general rule that if an employee is injured while going to work or returning therefrom his injury cannot be said to have arisen out of or in the course of his employment.”). ⁴²⁸ Montgomery County v. Wade, 345 Md. at 15 n. 7, 690 A.2d 990 . Moreover, another reason for the rule is that the workmen’s compensation law contemplates an employee engaged in service growing out of his employment. An employee who is merely going to or coming from his work is not rendering any such service.

He is therefore exposed to the hazards encountered on such trips, not as an employee, but rather as a member of the general public. Wiley Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 280 Md. 200, 206 , 373 A.2d 613 (1977) (citations omitted). This rule is subject to certain exceptions in the appropriate case.

Chief Judge Robert C. Murphy pointed out for the Court of Appeals: Onto this general rule, however, the courts have engrafted several exceptions when compensation benefits may properly be granted. Thus, where the employer furnishes the employee free transportation to and from work, the employee is deemed to be on duty, and an injury sustained by the employee during such transportation arises out of and in the course of employment. Tavel v. Bechtel Corporation, 242 Md. 299, 304 , 219 A.2d 43 (1966); Rumple v. Henry H. Meyer Co., Inc., 208 Md. 350, 357 , 118 A.2d 486 (1955). Compensation may also be properly awarded where the employee is injured while traveling along or across a public road between two portions of the employer’s premises.

Wiley Mfg., supra, 280 Md. at 206 [ 373 A.2d 613 ]; Proctor-Silex [Corp.] v. DeBrick, 253 Md. 477, 482 , 252 A.2d 800 (1969). The “proximity” exception allows compensation for an injury sustained off-premises, but while the employee is exposed to a peculiar or abnormal degree to a danger which is annexed as a risk incident to the employment. Pariser Bakery v. Koontz, 239 Md. 586, 591 , 212 A.2d 324 (1965); see Md. Paper Products Co. v. Judson, 215 Md. 577, 584-588 , 139 A.2d 219 (1958). Injuries incurred while the employee travels to or from work in performing a special mission or errand for the employer are likewise compensable.

Reisinger-Siehler Co. v. Perry, 165 Md. 191, 199 , 167 ⁴²⁹ A. 51 (1983); see Dir. of Finance v. Alford, 270 Md. 355, 359-364 , 311 A.2d 412 (1973). Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane v. Tornillo, 329 Md. 40, 44 , 617 A.2d 572 (1993). A single exception is relevant in the case before us, viz. the “proximity” or “special hazard” exception. Upon review of the record, however, we conclude that the “special hazard” exception to the going and coming rule does not apply.

In Frederick County v. Vache, the Court elaborated on the proximity rule or exception: We have said the proximity rule has two components, both of which must be satisfied in order for the rule to apply. The first component is “the presence of a special hazard at the particular off-premises point.” ... The second component “is the close association of the access route with the premises.” With regard to the first component, we have described this special hazard as a “peculiar and abnormal exposure to a common peril beyond that to which the general public was subjected.” ... Furthermore, the “gravamen of the rule” is not that the employee was near [his] workplace, but by virtue of [his] proximity to [his] workplace [he] was exposed to a danger peculiarly or to an abnormal degree greater than the degree to which the general public is exposed.

Frederick County v. Vache, 349 Md. at 538-39 , 709 A.2d 155 (quoting Wiley Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 280 Md. at 208, 215 , 373 A.2d 613 ). As stated by Judge Levine in Wiley Mfg. Co., “the proximity rule is identified with those cases involving accidents which occur at a point where the employee is within range of dangers peculiarly associated with the employment.” Id., 280 Md. at 208 , 373 A.2d 613 (citing 1 Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 15.00 (1972)).

In the case before us, we are unable to conclude that appellant, who was en route to his home when he was shot by Newsome, suffered an “accidental injury” in the course of his employment. Notwithstanding appellant’s insistence that his injury need not have “occurred” in the course of employment, ⁴³⁰ we conclude otherwise. Although the term “occur” is not specified in the Act, we think it clear that the injury must “occur” in the course of employment to be compensable. Again, the Act compensates an injured employee for an “accidental injury ... occurring in the course of employment.” Sanchez v. Potomac Abatement, Inc., supra, 417 Md. at 82 n. 4.

See Livering, 374 Md. at 576 , 823 A.2d 687 . Delayed Injury & Cases Numerous are the cases from various jurisdictions that address “delayed injury” cases in which the employee is assaulted some distance from the workplace, but the assault originated at the workplace or in the course of the claimant’s employment. One such case, cited by appellant, Matter of Field v. Charmette Knitted Fabric Company, 245 N.Y. 139 , 156 N.E. 642 (1927), has been “regarded as the grandfather of such cases.” Matter of Malacarne v. City of Yonkers Parking Authority, 41 N.Y.2d 189 , 391 N.Y.S.2d 402 , 359 N.E.2d 992 , 996 (1976). In Field, the company general manager and superintendent, Mr. Field, discharged an employee, Magid, for performing unsatisfactory work.

When Field ordered Magid off the premises, an argument followed. After intervention by other employees, Magid left. “A few minutes later, Field went downstairs and out of the building.” Magid was waiting and, after challenging Field, struck the latter in the face, causing Field to fall and suffer a fatal head injury. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the award. Justice Cardozo explained: Our decisions make it plain that the injury to Field was one that might fairly be found by the triers of the facts to have arisen “out of’ the employment (Workmen’s Comp.

Act; Cons.Laws, ch. 67, § 2, subd. 7).[ 8 ] Magid was the aggressor in an assault provoked by the discharge and the ⁴³¹ ensuing war of words (Matter of Rydeen v. Monarch Furniture Co., 240 N.Y. 295 [ 148 N.E. 527 (1925) ]; Matter of Knocks v. Metal Packing Corp., 231 N.Y. 78 [ 131 N.E. 741 (1921) ]; Matter of Fried v. Quinlan, Inc., 242 N.Y. 496 [ 152 N.E. 899 (1926)