Abrams v. Gay Investment Co.

Marbury, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellee, The Gay Investment Company (Gay), filed suit on a confessed judgment note in the amount of $4,200.00 against Isadore M. Abrams and the appellant, Natalie A. Abrams, and judgment was entered in Gay’s favor on January 31, 1962. The appellant moved to vacate the judgment, and a hearing on this motion was held on December 10, 1963. At that hearing, the appellant admitted that she had signed the note in question but maintained that she thought she was signing an application for renewal of a driver’s license.

On December 23, 1963, the court struck the judgment against Mrs. Abrams allowing her to file a plea which she did. She also requested a jury trial. After a long delay for reasons not apparent from the record, the case was set for trial on May 17, 1967. Appellant’s then counsel obtained a postponement until May 25, 1967.

On that date appellant and her counsel failed to appear or request a continuance from the court, and a default judgment was entered against her in the amount of $2,785.00 with interest from May 25, 1967. (The amount owing on the note had been reduced to ¹²³ that amount from a source or sources not disclosed by the record.) Appellant then made a motion to set aside the judgment which was refused after a hearing held on January 19, 1968, before Judge John E. Raine, Jr. From that action Mrs. Abrams has appealed. The law which governs this case was set out by Judge Hammond, now Chief Judge, speaking for the Court in Clarke Baridon v. Union Co., 218 Md. 480, 483 , 147 A. 2d 221 , 222-23: “After the judgment properly was entered, the question of whether it should or should not be vacated in whole or in part was within the sound discretion of the trial court for the ensuing thirty days. The decisive point no longer was whether there existed a genuine dispute as to a material fact, but rather whether the court was satisfied that there had been shown a reasonable indication of a meritorious defense or other equitable circumstances that would justify striking the judgment. . .

On appeal, Mrs. Abrams suggests that the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to grant the motion to set aside the default judgment. Further, the appellant argues that the facts relied upon by the judge were not sufficiently clear, definite and certain enough to sustain his findings of facts underlying his decision. We disagree with both of these contentions. At the hearing held on January 19, 1968, to determine whether the judgment should be set aside, the appellant’s attorney proffered that Mrs. Abrams would testify that on May 24, 1967, the day before trial was scheduled, she went to the Circuit Court for Baltimore