In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598

³⁰¹ BELL, Judge. The instant case concerns the adoption of a female minor child born in Poughkeepsie, Dutchess County, New York. Over the objection of the biological father, pursuant to a private adoption agreement between the biological mother and prospective adoptive parents, the child was taken to Harford County, Maryland, where the adoptive parents, the petitioners, sought and were granted a decree of adoption. A divided panel of the Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Harford County, finding that the trial court should not have granted the adoption, because of the petitioners’ violation of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC).

In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109 Md.App. 475, 503 , 675 A.2d 170, 184 , cert. granted, 342 Md. 582 , 678 A.2d 1047 (1996). We shall hold that the best interest of the child standard continues to be the uncompromising standard in all adoption proceedings and, in relying on that standard, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the adoption petition at issue. Accordingly, we shall reverse the Court of Special Appeals and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. We observe, however, that certain facts and circumstances may provide an adequate basis for the dismissal of an adoption petition as a penalty for violating the ICPC.

I. In early 1991, Jerry C., the respondent and the natural father of Baby Girl S., and Amy S., her natural mother, both residents of State of New York, met at “Let’s Dance,” a night club located in Dutchess County, New York, and developed a casual friendship. The respondent and his brother were popular night club dancers; the natural mother frequented the area night clubs to dance and socialize with friends. As avid night club patrons, the respondent and the natural mother would meet at different clubs approximately twice a week. Over a short period of time, their casual relationship became intimate and, as a result, the natural mother, an eighteen year old high school senior, spent one night with the respondent ³⁰² and became pregnant.

The respondent, known to the natural mother only by the nickname “Manny,” was twenty-one years old at the time. A few days following the sexual encounter, the natural mother’s father moved to Vermont, thus prompting the natural mother to move to the other side of the Hudson River to live with her mother and stepfather in a mobile home. The respondent had no knowledge of either the natural mother’s relocation or her pregnancy until he saw her at a night club several months later. 1 Upon learning of the pregnancy, the respondent did not deny paternity; rather, he expressed a willingness to support the child. According to his testimony, the respondent said, “If you say I am the father, I am the father.

I will live up to my responsibilities.” The respondent’s assistance, as it turns out, materialized only in the form of casual services, not financial assistance. Although the natural mother was a high school student and the respondent was employed, the respondent never offered to pay any of the natural mother’s medical expenses. 2 The only overt acts by the respondent evidencing his willingness to assist the natural mother during her pregnancy consisted of driving the natural mother, on two occasions, from school to Vassar Brothers Hospital for prenatal care. On the first occasion, the respondent waited outside and then drove the natural mother home. On the second occasion, when they left the hospital, the respondent took the natural mother to his home, where she met his mother and other family members.

Because the ³⁰³ natural mother was experiencing difficulties in connection with the pregnancy at her mother’s home, the respondent’s mother invited the natural mother to move in with the respondent’s family, an invitation that, for reasons not in the record, the natural mother declined. On that occasion, after introducing the natural mother to his family, the respondent went out for the remainder of the evening without informing the natural mother of his whereabouts. In fact, when he had not returned by the next morning, and the natural mother had not received a phone call from him, the natural mother walked back to Vassar Brothers Hospital, where she called her relatives to come take her home. Aside from the hospital visits, the respondent and the natural mother had minimal contact, especially during the last few months of the pregnancy.

The respondent testified that the natural mother was responsible for the lack of contact, as he tried calling and visiting the natural mother, but the natural mother’s mother and stepfather told him to stay away. On one occasion, the respondent and his mother visited the natural mother’s mobile home, but were told by her stepfather to leave and that the natural mother did not want to see the respondent. The natural mother confirmed this incident, testifying that she was at home on that occasion, but that she did not want to see the respondent. During the last couple of months of the pregnancy, the natural mother received home-teaching and began meeting with a school-sponsored social worker.

The latter advised her to consider adoption as an option for the child after birth. Coincidentally, the social worker learned through a mutual friend that the petitioners, Paul and Deborah M. 3 , were inter ³⁰⁴ ested in adopting a child. The natural mother testified that, faced with a Hobson choice, she concluded that, rather than rearing a child without financial support from the respondent, adoption was the optimal course of action for her. Therefore, she telephoned the petitioners and they began negotiating the terms of the adoption. 4 Throughout the negotiations, which included several telephone conversations and a personal meeting, the natural mother told the petitioners that the father of the child was “out of the picture” and was not interested.

She also told them that she did not know his name. In late April 1992, after the petitioners and the natural mother had agreed on the terms of the adoption, the petitioners engaged counsel in New York to represent the natural mother and to prepare and file the necessary documents to comply with the ICPC. On the application submitted to the New York State ICPC Administrator, the natural mother indicated that the father of the child was “unknown.” Prior to trial, it was stipulated by all parties that the natural mother knew at all relevant times the identity and whereabouts of the respondent, the natural father. On May 3, 1992, the natural mother gave birth to a female child, Baby Girl S., in Poughkeepsie, New York.

Two days later, the respondent, accompanied by his mother and other family members, came to the hospital to see Baby Girl S. carrying balloons, flowers, and gifts. As soon as they reached the natural mother’s floor, however, and, thus, before they were able to see new born Baby Girl S., at the behest of the natural mother’s mother and one of the petitioners’ relatives, pursuant to a complaint from the natural mother, hospital security escorted the respondent and his relatives out of the ³⁰⁵ hospital. As the respondent and his family were being escorted out of the hospital under protest, Mrs. M., who had been in New York since the natural mother went into labor and who had spent time with Baby Girl S. the previous day, was waiting in the hospital lobby to take possession of Baby Girl S. Upon receiving custody of Baby Girl S. from the natural mother’s attorney, Mrs. M. went to her father’s house in New Paltz, New York to await permission from the ICPC Administrator to transport Baby Girl S. to Maryland. Later that day, the natural mother, through counsel, filed an Affidavit Relating to the Biological-Father’s Consent and an Extrajudicial Consent Form 2-G with the Surrogate’s Court of Ulster County, New York.

Those forms were necessary in order for the natural mother to obtain approval to place Baby Girl S. with the petitioners. The natural mother’s affidavit, signed over her attorney’s signature and notary seal, states, in pertinent part: 2. The biological father of the child is unknown to [the natural mother] and no person has taken steps to establish legal responsibility for the child. 3. The biological father, if known, has not made payment of pregnancy nor birth expenses. 4.

The biological father, if known, has not publicly acknowledged paternity. 5. The biological father, if unknown, has taken no other steps to evince a commitment to the child. Likewise, in the Extrajudicial Consent Form, the natural mother stated that the respondent’s full name and address were “unknown.” That statement, like its counterpart in the affidavit, was false. Moreover, the respondent was never notified of the proceedings in the Surrogate’s Court.

Thus, it is clear, and the petitioners do not dispute, that the natural mother’s purpose in making these false statements was to obtain certification from the Surrogate’s Court in order to effectuate the placement of the child and ultimately to facilitate the adoption. ³⁰⁶ Two days after the incident at the hospital, on May 7, 1992, the respondent filed a petition in the Family Court of Dutchess County, New York, for a Filiation Order, declaring him to be the father of Baby Girl S. In response to this petition, by letter dated May 15, 1992, addressed to the court, the natural mother’s attorney informed the court that the natural mother admitted that the respondent was Baby Girl S.’s natural father. The letter states as follows: I represent [the natural mother] of Gardiner, New York, who received a copy of a Summons and Petition of the above-captioned petitioner to be declared the father of a child born out of wedlock to my client on May 3, 1992. The matter is returnable before you for an initial appearance on June 15,1992. My client does not deny the allegations of the Petition (although she was unaware of the true name of petitioner) and would consent to the entry of a decree of paternity at this time.

There are two reasons for this request. My client entered into an agreement, before the birth of the child, to place the child for adoption with an out-of-state couple. As of this writing, the requirements for the Interstate Compact approval are near completion and we expect the child to be released to the adoptive parents. When have simultaneously scheduled an appearance by the birth mother at the Ulster County Surrogate’s Court to formalize her surrender.

In light of the recent Court of Appeals decision [sic] in Matter of Raquel Marie X., 76 N.Y.2d 387 , 559 N.Y.S.2d 855 , 559 N.E.2d 418 , it appears likely that the putative father would be entitled to notice of the Surrogate’s Court proceeding and an order in the Dutchess County Family Court at this time acknowledging paternity would enable us to proceed in the Ulster County Surrogate’s Court without further delay, now that my client is aware of the name and address of the putative father. This letter had no effect on the paternity case. Notwith ³⁰⁷ standing the letter, 5 the respondent was not declared to be the father of Baby Girl S. until June 7, 1993. Indeed, during the paternity proceedings, the natural mother contested the respondent’s paternity, necessitating that she, the respondent and Baby Girl S. undergo blood analysis.

This caused a significant delay: blood could not be drawn from Baby Girl S. until she was at least six (6) months old, and thereafter, the petitioners canceled two scheduled blood examinations. Between May 16, 1992 or May 18, 1992, about two weeks after the birth of Baby Girl S., the petitioners transported Baby Girl S. from New York to Maryland. The petitioners testified that they did so only after their attorney in Maryland told them that she had received verbal approval from the ICPC Administrator. 6 As it turns out, neither New York nor Maryland ever approved the application. A handwritten letter dated May 27, 1992, from Maryland’s ICPC Administrator to New York’s ICPC Administrator, with a copy to the petitioners’ attorney, confirms that no approval was never granted: Somehow a mixup occurred and this couple came to MD with the baby prior to approval.

Referral is incomplete. I received only 100 A’s from your office. Please send special medical history of birth parents, home study of adoptive parents, delivery and discharge hospital information, and statement from the N.Y. attorney as to how the birth father’s rights will be addressed. To date, neither the Maryland nor the New York ICPC administrator has approved the placement of Baby Girl S. with the petitioners in Maryland. ³⁰⁸ On May 22, 1992, a few days after the petitioners arrived in Maryland with Baby Girl S., the petitioners filed a Complaint for Adoption and Change of Name in the Circuit Court for Harford County. 7 The Complaint named the respondent as the natural father of Baby Girl S and acknowledged that he had not consented to the adoption.

Accompanying the Complaint were the natural mother’s signed consent to the adoption, and a Show Cause Order and Notice of Objection to be served upon the respondent. On June 18, 1992, the circuit court granted temporary custody of Baby Girl S. to the petitioners. On the same day, the Show Cause Order was issued, notifying the respondent that he had the right to object to the adoption. Service of the show cause order was first attempted in early July by restricted certified mail.

The show cause order was returned marked “unclaimed.” In August 1992, service of the show cause order by private process server was again attempted. Unable to serve the respondent, the process server swore in his affidavit that, “Numerous attempts were made at the [respondent’s] home address. Never able to find him home. According to neighbors, he works very late in evening and leaves early morning.

Tried setting up appointment but he never returned call.” A third show cause order was issued, but not served, in November 1992. The respondent was finally served in April 1993, by the natural mother’s attorney, at a paternity hearing in New York. Although not served until April 1993, the respondent had knowledge of the pending adoption action in Harford County. At trial, the respondent testified that he learned about the adoption proceedings in August 1992 when, at a paternity hearing, the natural mother told him.

She explained that she no longer had Baby Girl S. Also, in late November 1992, the ³⁰⁹ petitioners contacted and met the respondent, his mother, and his aunt at a diner in New Paltz, New York. At that meeting, which both parties described as amicable, the petitioners showed the respondent pictures of Baby Girl S., whom, he testified, he knew beyond doubt, was his biological child, as soon as he saw the pictures. That meeting did not resolve the differences, between the petitioners and the respondent, however; both sides maintained their desire to have Baby Girl S. The blood analysis indicated that the probability of the respondent’s paternity was 98.19% and, accordingly, on June 7, 1993, the Dutchess County court entered an Order of Filiation declaring the respondent to be the natural father of Baby Girl S. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 1993, the respondent filed his notice of objection to the adoption, accompanied by with a copy of the filiation order, in the Circuit Court for Harford County. On July 26, 1993, the circuit court appointed counsel to represent the interest of Baby Girl S., conduct an investigation of the case, and make a recommendation to the court.

The court also appointed a social worker to conduct an investigation as required by Maryland Code (1991 RepkVol., 1997 Supp.) § 5-312(c) of the Family Law Article. 8 Both, the attorney and the social worker, submitted reports concluding that the best interest of Baby Girl S would be served by allowing the petitioners to adopt the child. 9 ³¹⁰ On December 14, 1993, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the adoption petition citing, as justification, violations of the ICPC by the petitioners. The circuit court denied the motion. On September 16, 1993, Jerry C. filed a motion for visitation, which the court held in abeyance. . Trial on the adoption petition commenced on March 7, 1994. 10 On November 9, 1994, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion granting the petitioners’ petition for adoption.

The trial judge found, inter alia, that the respondent made no sincere effort to fulfill his role as the natural father of Baby Girl S, having failed to contribute to the prenatal and postnatal care of Baby Girl S. The judge also found that adoption was in the best interest of Baby Girl S. because, over a period of two (2) years, she had emotionally bonded to the petitioners and a separation at that point would have been traumatic. On March 24, 1995, therefore, the court entered a final decree of adoption. ³¹¹ A divided panel of the Court of Special Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and ordered dismissal of the adoption decree. The majority held that the petitioners, or their attorney, “knowingly violated the ICPC,” and that those violations mandated dismissal of the adoption petition. The court also held that the trial court granted the adoption in violation of § 5—312(d)(2) of the Family Law Article.

That section prohibits the granting of an adoption when the sole basis is because one birth parent has deprived the other birth parent of custody. The dissenting judge countered by contending that the trial court “is vested with the discretion to balance the nature and gravity of the [ICPC] violation with the best interest of the child and that, based on this case, there is sufficient evidence to support the trial judge’s findings.” II. The standard of review in adoption cases, like custody cases, is whether the trial court, in making its determination, abused its discretion or made findings of fact that were clearly erroneous. Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 470 , 648 A.2d 1016, 1023 , (1994); In Re Adoption No. 11137, 106 Md.App. 308, 314 , 664 A.2d 443, 446 (1995); Coffey v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 41 Md.App. 340, 345 , 397 A.2d 233, 237 (1979).

We said in Petrini : The standard of review in custody cases is whether the trial court abused its discretion in making its custody determination. Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 125 , 372 A.2d 231 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 , 98 S.Ct. 430 , 54 L.Ed.2d 299 (1977), reh. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 , 98 S.Ct. 754 , 54 L.Ed.2d 774 (1978). In setting forth this standard, we concluded that “when the appellate court views the ultimate conclusion of the chancellor founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, the chancellor’s decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” Davis, supra, 280 Md. at 126 , 372 A.2d 231 . See also Robinson v. Robinson, 328 Md. 507, 513-14 , 615 A.2d 1190 (1992); Domingues v. ³¹² Johnson, 323 Md. 486, 491-92, 593 A.2d 1133 (1991); Ross, supra, 280 Md. at 186 , 372 A.2d 582 .

Petrini, 336 Md. at 470 , 648 A.2d at 1023 . Judicial discretion was defined in Saltzgaver v. Saltzgaver, 182 Md. 624, 635 , 35 A.2d 810, 815 (1944) (quoting Bowers’ Judicial Discretion of Trial Courts at ¶ 10) as “that power of decision exercised to the necessary end of awarding justice and based upon reason and law, but for which decision there is no special governing statute or rule.” It has also been defined as a “reasoned decision based on the weighing of various alternatives.” Judge v. R and T Construction Co., 68 Md.App. 57, 60 , 509 A.2d 1236, 1237 (1986), cert. denied, 307 Md. 433 , 514 A.2d 1211 (1986). There is an abuse of discretion “where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court,” North v. North, 102 Md.App. 1, 13 , 648 A.2d 1025, 1031 , (1994)(quoting In Re Marriage of Morse, 240 Ill.App.3d 296 , 180 Ill.Dec. 563, 571 , 607 N.E.2d 632, 640 (1993)) or when the court acts “without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” North, 102 Md.App. at 13 , 648 A.2d 1025 (quoting Long John Silver’s, Inc. v. Martinez, 850 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex.App.1993)). An abuse of discretion may also be found where the ruling under consideration is “clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court,” Id.

(quoting Shockley v. Williamson, 594 N.E.2d 814, 815 (Ind.App.1992)), or when the ruling is “violative of fact and logic,” Id. (quoting Young v. Jangula, 176 Mich.App. 478 , 440 N.W.2d 642, 643 (1989)). Questions within the discretion of the trial court are “much better decided by the trial judges than by appellate courts, and the decisions of such judges should only be disturbed where it is apparent that some serious error or abuse of discretion or autocratic action has occurred.” Northwestern National Insurance Co. v. Samuel R. Rosoff, Ltd., 195 Md. 421, 436 , 73 A.2d 461, 467 (1950). See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 242 Md. 240, 243 , 218 A.2d 684, 686 , cert. denied, 385 U.S. 924 , 87 S.Ct. 239 , 17 L.Ed.2d 147 (1966); Ryan v. Johnson, 220 Md. 70 , 150 A.2d 906 (1959); and Clarke Baridon, Inc. v. ³¹³ Union Asbestos and Rubber Co., 218 Md. 480, 483 , 147 A.2d 221, 223 (1958); Cromwell v. Ripley, 11 Md.App. 173, 177 , 273 A.2d 218, 221 (1971), citing Abrams v. Gay Investment Co., 253 Md. 121 , 251 A.2d 876 (1969).

In sum, to be reversed [t]he decision under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable. North, 102 Md.App. at 14 , 648 A.2d at 1032 .

III

The petitioners argue that the Court of Special Appeals exceeded its scope of review, with respect to the ICPC, in finding that they or their attorney “knowingly violated the ICPC,” and consequently, the respondent’s legal rights were impaired. The intermediate appellate court held: We believe that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court abused its discretion in denying [the respondent’s] motion to dismiss on grounds of a violation of the ICPC. [The petitioners] or their attorney knowingly violated the ICPC by bringing Baby Girl S. into Maryland before Compact approval. There was absolutely no evidence below that either the New York State Compact Administrator or the Maryland Compact Administrator ever gave [the petitioners] permission to remove Baby Girl S. from New York. Hs * * * The illegal removal of Baby Girl S. from New York greatly impaired the rights of the [respondent] to have custody of Baby Girl S. [The respondent’s] paternity action was substantially delayed, and the removal deprived [respondent] of the ability to develop emotional ties with Baby Girl S. and thus ultimately made it more difficult, under Maryland law, to object to the adoption.

We conclude that the violation was not a mere technicality; it prevented the Maryland Compact Administrator and the New York State ³¹⁴ Compact Administrator from making a proper determination; it prevented both administrators from conducting further investigations that might have revealed [respondent’s] objections; it deprived the State of New York of jurisdiction over a child born within its boundaries; and it ultimately led to a situation whereby sufficient time elapsed that the child’s welfare seemingly dictated adoption. In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109. Md.App. at 503-04, 675 A.2d at 184 . Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals opined, the trial judge should have revoked the petitioners’ “legal authorization” to bring Baby Girl S. into Maryland, thereby dismissing the petition for adoption.

Such an enforcement of the ICPC, it posits, would deter future violations and forum-shopping, and prevent Maryland from becoming “a safe haven for those who illegally remove babies from foreign states.” Id. at 506 , 675 A.2d at 185 . The ICPC has been enacted in 49 states, including Maryland, Maryland Code (1984,1991 Repl.Vol. & 1996 Supp.) §§ 5-601 to 5-611 of the Family Law Article, with the intended purpose of facilitating interstate adoption and increasing the number of acceptable homes for children in need of placement. In re Adoption No. 10087, 324 Md. 394, 404 , 597 A.2d 456, 461 (1991) (citing Bernadette W. Hartfield, The Role of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children in Interstate Adoption, 68 Neb. L.Rev. 292, 293 (1989)).

The primary purpose of the ICPC in Maryland is to assure that the child being placed receives “the maximum opportunity to be placed in a suitable environment ... with persons or institutions having appropriate qualifications and facilities to provide a necessary and desirable degree and type of care.” Family Law Art. at § 5-602(l). 11 To accomplish its purpose, ³¹⁵ the ICPC “extend[s] the jurisdictional reach of a party state into the borders of another party state for the purpose of investigating a proposed placement and supervising a placement once it has been made.” In Re Adoption No. 10087, 324 Md. at 404 , 597 A.2d at 461 (quoting Hartfield at 296). The ICPC requires that, No sending agency 12 shall send, bring, or cause to be sent or brought into any other party state any child ... as a preliminary to a possible adoption unless the sending agency shall comply with each and every requirement set forth in this section and with the applicable laws of the receiving state governing the placement of children therein. Family Law Art. § 5-604(a). The ICPC further requires: The child shall not be sent, brought, or caused to be sent or brought into the receiving state until the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state shall notify the sending agency, in writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear to be contrary to the interests of the child. § 5-604(d).

Compliance with the procedures set forth in the ICPC are mandatory. Bernhardt v. Lutheran Social Services, 39 Md.App. 334, 344 , 385 A.2d 1197 (1978). In the case sub judice, the petitioners engaged attorneys in New York and Maryland to obtain ICPC approval. The ICPC ³¹⁶ application and accompanying documents were filed with the New York compact office and were later transmitted to the Maryland compact office.

The petitioners testified that they were advised by their attorney in Maryland that the compact administrator had approved the placement of Baby Girl S. in Harford County. Based solely on that communication, the petitioners testified, they brought Baby Girl S. into Maryland, and soon thereafter filed a petition for adoption in circuit court. The trial court found that the petitioners acted in “good faith” in bringing Baby Girl S. to Maryland only after they were orally advised to do so. It also found that the petitioners’ attorney did receive a call from a compact administrator stating that the ICPC application had been approved, noting, in support, the evidence of the completed application that the New York compact office transmitted to the Maryland compact office.

That application included a notation asking a Maryland administrator to call with verbal approval. These findings are supported in the record, and therefore are not clearly erroneous. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. In fact, based on the evidence, the trial judge exercised sound judgment.

It bears repeating that the best interest of the child is paramount. That interest may well be found to have been met along with the purpose and goals of the ICPC to have been achieved when, as here, the adoptive parents are previously-approved foster parents and whose home has been determined to be suitable by a prior home study, and subsequently by a court-appointed social worker and attorney. The trial court also found that the respondent’s legal rights had been protected. To reach that conclusion, the trial court considered and weighed the natural mother’s conduct vis-a-vis the respondent’s conduct, and in the final analysis, concluded that the respondent’s substantial rights were not impaired and that Baby Girl S. should not suffer as a result of the natural mother’s actions.

The trial court acknowledged that the natural mother was not totally truthful when she ³¹⁷ denied knowledge of the respondent’s whereabouts, but it was not convinced that she was “perpetrating an injustice upon him.” Rather, the court’s view was that the respondent “simply did not move quickly enough to plan for and provide a home for an infant child.” The Court of Special Appeals held that these findings were a clear abuse of discretion. In so holding, the intermediate appellate court determined the respondent’s rights were impaired by “numerous violations of the ICPC,” to wit, the natural mother’s purposeful omission of the respondent’s identity and whereabouts on the ICPC application, and the affidavit and extra-judicial consent form filed with the Surrogate Court for Ulster County, New York. Another basis for the court’s holding that the respondent’s rights were violated was the natural mother’s failure to serve him with notice of the proceedings in the Surrogate’s Court. Thus, the Court of Special Appeals concluded: Because [the respondent] was not notified of those proceedings and thus did not appear before it, the Surrogate Court gave the natural mother the certification required by New York law to proceed with the adoption.

If [the respondent] had been identified as the father of the child and his objection revealed, New York State Compact Administrator and the New York Surrogate Court in Ulster County would certainly not have permitted appellees to remove Baby Girl S. from New York. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109 Md.App. at 492 , 675 A.2d at 178 . Contrary to the Court of Special Appeals, we hold that the findings of the trial court are not clearly erroneous. With respect to the false statements in the ICPC documents, there is no evidence, nor any reason to believe, that the Maryland ICPC Administrator would have withheld ICPC approval had she been informed of the respondent’s objection to the adoption.

The procedure set forth in the ICPC does not provide for the rejection of a complete application on the basis that a non-custodial parent is contesting the adoption. Indeed, the ICPC was not designed to protect the rights of birth parents; instead, it is designed to ensure that ³¹⁸ placements for children across state lines are safe. As discussed supra, that goal was found by the trial court to have been achieved in this case. Regarding the failure to provide the respondent with notice of the Ulster County Surrogate’s Court proceeding, here too, there is no evidence that the respondent would have successfully opposed the natural mother’s efforts to proceed with the adoption of Baby Girl S. Under New York law, the respondent’s consent would not have been required for this adoption, as, in that State, an unwed father has the right to veto an adoption only if he manifests a willingness to assume full custody of the child within a six-month period immediately preceding the placement of the child for adoption.

Matter of Raquel Marie X, 76 N.Y.2d 387, 408 , 559 N.Y.S.2d 855 , 865, 559 N.E.2d 418 , 428 (N.Y.), cert. denied, Robert C. v. Miguel T., 498 U.S. 984 , 111 S.Ct. 517 , 112 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990), on remand, Matter of Raquel Marie X, 173 A.D.2d 709 , 570 N.Y.S.2d 604 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.1991); Matter of Robert O. v. Russell K, 80 N.Y.2d 254, 262 , 590 N.Y.S.2d 37, 40 , 604 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1992). In Matter of Raquel Marie X, 173 A.D.2d 709 , 570 N.Y.S.2d 604 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.1991), two months after the birth of an infant female child, the biological mother, without the biological father’s consent or knowledge, decided to place the child for adoption. A few days before the biological mother’s consent was executed, however, the biological father commenced a custody proceeding against the biological mother, and an order of filiation was subsequently entered. At the adoption proceeding, initiated by the prospective adoptive parents, the trial court denied the petition for adoption.

After several appeals on related legal issues, the intermediate appellate court, on remand, held that, although there was evidence that the biological father had made minimal financial contributions toward the post-natal care of the child, 13 ³¹⁹ [i]n our view, the evidence of legal responsibility, public acknowledgement of paternity, and contribution to pregnancy and birth expenses fails to demonstrate that [the biological father] is ‘a father who has promptly taken every available avenue to demonstrate that he is willing and able to enter into the fullest possible relationship with his under-six-month-old child’ (Matter of Raquel Marie X., 76 N.Y.2d 387, 403, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855 , 559 N.E.2d 418 , supra). Id., at 713, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 607. Thus, the court concluded that the biological father’s “manifestation of parental responsibility in this case Vas neither sufficiently prompt nor sufficiently substantial’ to require constitutional protection.” Id (quoting Matter of John E. v. Doe,