Administrator, Motor Vehicle Administration v. Vogt

Levine, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal is brought by Administrator, Motor Vehicles Administration (the Administrator) from a declaratory judgment and injunction entered against him in the Circuit Court for Carroll County (Weant, J.) on May 25, 1972. The court ruled in favor of appellees, who are a group of automobile “wreckers” licensed pursuant to Code (1957, 1970 Repl. Vol.) Art. 66%2, § 5-201.

The ⁶⁶³ judgment from which the appeal is taken declared unconstitutional, and permanently enjoined the Administrator from enforcing, a key provision in § 5-203 (d) of Art. 66V2, on the basis that it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Also, in a cross-appeal from the same judgment, appellees present a number of issues which were also raised in the trial court. Since we have determined that the cross-appeal must be dismissed, we shall state our reasons for doing so at the outset. This case began with an action at law for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief filed by appellees against the Administrator in which they allege various infirmities, mostly on constitutional grounds, in Chapter 556, Laws of Maryland, 1969, and Chapter 534, Laws of Maryland, 1970, with specific reference to those portions which are now designated as Code (1957, 1970 Repl.

Vol.) Art. 66Y2, §§ 5-201 through 5-208. When the case came on for trial before Judge Weant on September 29, 1971, testimony was heard from several witnesses. After it had been held sub curia, additional testimony was heard on March 27, 1972, and on April 28, 1972, the trial judge filed a carefully-considered opinion which dealt fully with the several issues which had been presented to him. Although styled an “Opinion And Order,” it is clear that it was merely an opinion and not an order.

This is evident from the final sentence which directed counsel for appellees to “present an order providing for judgment and decreeing injunctive relief in accordance with this opinion.” Moreover, the order, signed and filed on May 25,1972, opens with these words: “Upon the aforegoing opinion (mistakenly entitled Opinion and Order). . . .” (italics in original) The order of May 25, from which both appeals were taken, was confined to a declaration that the statutory provision mentioned earlier is unconstitutional, and enjoined its enforcement. Although by its opinion, the court purported to hold against appellees with respect to the ⁶⁶⁴ remaining issues they had raised, the order itself is devoid of any reference to them. In short, the court, in concise fashion, ruled against the Administrator on the single basis stated above, and rendered no further decision. The effect of all this is to place appellees in the position of cross-appealing from an order in which they are the prevailing parties.

Generally, a party cannot appeal from a judgment or order which is favorable to him, since he is not thereby aggrieved. Wright v. Baker, 197 Md. 315 , 79 A. 2d 159 (1951) ; Mugford v. Baltimore, 185 Md. 266 , 44 A. 2d 745 (1945). In Mugford , Judge Grason, speaking for the Court, put it rather succinctly: “It needs no authorities to support the proposition that one cannot appeal from a decree wherein the relief he prays for has been granted.” 185 Md. at 269 . While we regard Mugford as controlling against appellees, a motion to dismiss the appeal there was denied, since the declaratory decree, although essentially favorable to the appellant, did explicitly rule against him on a minor point which this Court therefore held reviewable.

The case at bar is not to be confused with the line of authority which says that a party, dissatisfied with the amount of a verdict, may appeal even though the judgment on that verdict is in his favor. Turner v. Wash. Sanitary Comm., 221 Md. 494, 504, 158 A. 2d 125 (1960); Jenkins v. Spedden, 136 Md. 637, 642 , 111 A. 136 (1920) ; Baer v. Robbins, 117 Md. 213, 225 , 83 A. 341 (1912). Nor are we concerned here with a cross-appeal taken by a prevailing party in order to preserve his right of review upon adverse rulings made during the course of trial.

Fennell v. G.A.C. Finance Corp., 242 Md. 209, 229 , 218 A. 2d 492 (1966) ; Reece, Adm’r v. Reece, 239 Md. 649 , 212 A. 2d 468 (1965). It is arguable, perhaps, that the conspicuous omission of any reference to the other grounds asserted by ap ⁶⁶⁵ pellees following the thorough treatment of those points in the opinion amounted to an implicit ruling upon them. We think it more likely that the trial judge intended to confine his decision to the issue explicitly mentioned in the judgment, apparently because he believed that appellees required only one reason for prevailing. That he considered them the winners is fairly demonstrated, we think, by his provision in the order for “the defendant [appellant] to pay the costs. . .- Although, as we noted earlier, the opinion fully considered the points sought to be raised by the cross-appeal, it is well settled that an appeal will not lie from the trial judge’s opinion, since it forms no part of the judgment.

McCann v. McGinnis, 257 Md. 499 , 263 A. 2d 536 (1970) ; Mattingly v. Houston, 252 Md. 590 , 250 A. 2d 633 (1969) ; Hayman v. Messick, 252 Md. 384 , 249 A. 2d 695 (1969). While we must dismiss the cross-appeal for the foregoing reasons, it is not inappropriate for us to note here, having thoroughly reviewed the entire record, that even if we were free to pass upon the merits of the cross-appeal, we would reach the same result. We turn, then, to the single question presented by the Administrator’s appeal in which he attacks the trial court’s ruling that the assessment provision of § 5-203 (d) is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1969, the General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 30, which became Chapter 556, Laws of Maryland, 1969.

While, in customary fashion, it repealed several existing sections of Article 66 1 /£¡, the title also stated that the Act provided “for the disposal of abandoned motor vehicles, the licensing of wreckers and scrap processors of motor vehicles, the procedure for notifying the Department of Motor Vehicles of the scrapping, dismantling or destroying of motor vehicles, the authority of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles [now known as Administrator, Motor Vehicle Administration] to promulgate rules and regu ⁶⁶⁶ lations relating to records and scrap processors, . . . [and] the payment of a fee for the destruction of motor vehicles . . . .” In the following year, by Chapter 534, the Act was amended in certain respects when Article 66V^ was repealed and reenacted in its entirety. With the latter enactment, came the Code designation now known as Subtitle 5, “Licensing of Dealers, Wreckers, Scrap Processors and Vehicle Salesmen.” It is “Part II. Wreckers and Scrap Processors” (§§ 5-201 through 5-210) that gives rise to these proceedings. Section 5-201 makes it unlawful “to store any vehicle, or body or chassis thereof, which is to be scrapped, dismantled, or destroyed, on any private property for a period in excess of thirty days, unless” licensure as a wrecker or scrap processor is obtained.

Section 5-201.1 defines “scrap processor” as “an establishment having facilities for processing iron, steel and nonferrous scrap metal and whose principal product is scrap iron, steel and nonferrous scrap for sale for resmelting purposes only,” and defines a “wrecker” as an establishment “engaged in the business of purchasing or otherwise acquiring vehicles for the benefit of the materials contained therein or parts thereof.” Section 5-202 provides in pertinent part that: “No wrecker or scrap processor shall be entitled to obtain a license unless: * * * “6. The fee of $15 is paid to the Department for the issuance of such wrecker’s license and a fee of $100 is paid to the Department for the issuance of such scrap processor’s license .... “7. A copy of the application shall be submitted to the State Department of Health for its comments on matters pertaining to air pollution and health generally. “8. In the case of a scrap processor, he maintains a hydraulic baler and shears, or a shred ⁶⁶⁷ der, or such other equipment suitable for processing motor vehicle scrap as required by regulation of the Department. . . .” Section 5-203, Subsections (a) through (c), imposes certain notice and titling requirements attendant to the acquisition and disposal of vehicles.

Subsection (d), the subject of this appeal, authorizes the promulgation of rules and regulations pertaining to notification of receipt of vehicles “and the manner in which an assessment is placed upon a wrecker if a vehicle or body or chassis thereof has a designated model year in excess of seven years as determined by a national publication of used car values adopted for use by the Department [and] is not scrapped, dismantled, or destroyed within one year from the date a wrecker acquires possession of the vehicle or body or chassis thereof, and the assessment shall be in the amount of $5 for each and every six (6) month period the vehicle or body or chassis thereof remains not scrapped- dismantled, or destroyed.” 1 (emphasis added) Section 5-205 provides for payment of a “bounty” of $10.00 for each vehicle completely destroyed, to be equally divided between the wrecker conveying ownership and the scrap processor attending to its destruction. 2 Prior to the 1969 enactment, wreckers and scrap processors were the subjects of modest regulation under the Motor Vehicle Code, and surely were not part of a comprehensive scheme. Such regulation as did exist was aimed at them almost entirely with respect to the titling and registration of vehicles. In fact, it not only appears that scrap processors had been previously unmentioned by that name, but also that they were largely ignored in the original version of Chapter 556, which dealt mainly with wreckers before the bill was amended. Illustrative ⁶⁶⁸ of the modest role which the processors were originally intended to play is that initially they were not covered by the requirements for licensing, license fees and heavy equipment.

Mounting a full-scale attack on Part II, including virtually every provision to which we have just referred, appellees filed their action at law, seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality and appropriate injunctive relief. In so doing, they charged that the Acts of 1969 and 1970, respectively, violate Art. 3, § 29 of the Maryland Constitution because the titles embrace more than one subject and do not properly describe its subject matter; that the Acts constitute zoning legislation in contravention of Article 66B; that since the wreckers already pay a tangible personal property tax on vehicles held by them, the $5.00 assessment imposed by § 5-203 (d) results in double taxation; that the Acts violate the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving them of their property without due process of law; that they constitute an unreasonable exercise of the police power; and finally, that since the $5.00 assessment is imposed upon wreckers and not upon scrap processors, it is arbitrary and discriminatory in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The last claim was sustained by Judge Weant, and that ruling is the subject of this appeal. The remaining contentions were the subject of the cross-appeal, which we have already indicated we must dismiss.

At the hearings in the circuit court, appellees sought to establish that wreckers and processors are similarly situated and should not be treated differently in the statutory scheme, by testimony that appellees had purchased used parts from scrap processors on two or three occasions; and that some processors had engaged in storage as if they were wreckers. Furthermore, they urged, cars over seven years of age are popular, and a great demand for parts replacement exists since they are largely unobtainable from more conventional sources. ⁶⁶⁹ As this summary might suggest, the evidence produced by appellees to support their claim of discrimination was sparse. Their testimony seemingly boils down to a claim that increased regulation possibly will add to the cost of doing business, a contention which is unlikely to evoke vigorous dissent. On the other hand, there was testimony from two appellees which completely belied their basic argument that there are no differences in the respective operations of wreckers and scrap processors.

Since the most profitable phase of the wrecking business is said to be the sale of used parts, one might wonder why the parts are not quickly removed from the used cars and stored separately so as to be more readily available for customers, thereby freeing the automobile hulks for prompt destruction. The response to that query was that it would not be economically feasible to inventory parts in that manner, and that it was more advantageous to store them by leaving them in place; hence, the larger the number of cars in storage, the greater the inventory of parts. Actually, the testimony presented by both sides was consistent with the distinctions made by the statutory definitions of wreckers and scrap processors, and reflected rather overwhelmingly that it is in the best interests of wreckers to store old cars, whereas the reverse is true of scrap processors. As further evidence of the differences in the two industries, witnesses pointed out that in compliance with § 5-202, processors were required to maintain equipment capable of processing vehicles so that they could be re-smelted.

One witness described wreckers as being generally interested in the sale of used parts obtained by stocking large inventories of whole automobiles, while scrap processors were concerned with destroying the vehicles for resmelting purposes. That the equipment which scrap processors are required to maintain is costly was illustrated by testimony that one particular processor, so equipped, could handle a car every minute, and re ⁶⁷⁰ quired five hundred cars a day to achieve maximum efficiency. Employees of the Motor Vehicle Administration, engaged in supervising the two industries, furnished impressive statistics showing that only five per cent of the automobiles in use are over seven years of age. They also pointed out that the underlying purpose of Part II was to arrest the problems developing from the storage of old automobiles, which had become a cause for concern in terms of environmental health.

There was evidence, for example, that some hulks have remained undisturbed so long that they have become infested with rodents. The purpose of the law, therefore, was to halt the growth of this trend and to induce recycling of vehicles which had fallen into disuse. The bill, when first introduced, provided for the assessment without regard to the automobile’s age. The wrecking industry involved itself in the legislative process,, leading to the enactment of the seven-year requirement.

The same efforts apparently led to the amendment in the payment of the bounty to both processor and