Alamo Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Howard County Metropolitan Commission

McWilliams, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Convenience rather than mnemonics suggests that we call the appellants “Alamo.” The appellee, created by Chap. 991 of the Acts of 1943, 1 will be known as the “Commission.” Alamo owns realty in Howard County abutting U. S. Route 1 on which it operates a trailer park and a trailer sales office. Having completed the construction of water and sewer facilities designed to serve properties along said highway the Commission, on 15 July 1964, notified Alamo that a specified part of its land would be classified and taxed as commercial property. ⁶⁶⁸ The notice also informed Alamo that the Commission would schedule a hearing if Alamo would “write this Commission at once stating * * * [its] reasons for objecting.” Appearing before the Commission on 10 September 1964 and 9 August 1965, Alamo contended, on each occasion, that its trailer park should be classified “residential” rather than “commercial.” The Commission refused to recede from its original position. In its bill for declaratory relief, filed 22 November 1965, Alamo alleged that the charges, levies, assessments and acts of the Commission were arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, illegal, null, void, unconstitutional and in violation of the Public Local Laws of Howard County.

The Commission’s demurrer was sustained with leave to amend. Alamo’s amended bill, filed 9 February 1966, amplifies the allegations contained in the original bill. Paragraph 7 of the amended bill reads as follows: “7. That the Commission’s notice of its determination of the classification of your Orators’ property as a commercial enterprise, as set forth in within Exhibits A and B, fails to name a time and place at which your Orators may be heard, in accordance with Section 132 (c) and that your Orators have not been afforded the opportunity to be heard in accordance with the aforesaid Laws.” On 17 March 1966 the trial judge (Mayfield, J.) sustained, without leave to amend, every paragraph of the amended bill except paragraph 7.

Four days later the Commission moved for summary judgment “with respect to the allegations set forth in paragraph 7 of the amended bill of complaint.” The motion was supported by the required affidavit and a number of exhibits. Since no opposing affidavit was filed, we must conclude that .Alamo has admitted, for purposes of the motion, all statements of fact in the Commission’s affidavit. Maryland Rule 610 a 3. On 7 April'!966, Alamo moved “for summary judgment in the above entitled case on the ground that there is no dispute as to any material fact’ (emphasis supplied) and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

This motion was supported by an affidavit which recites the personal knowledge of the affiant and continues: ⁶⁶⁹ “* * * that although public hearings were held by the HOWARD COUNTY METROPOLITAN COMMISSION on the assessments and charges which were levied against the Plaintiffs by said Commission, said public hearings were not in accordance with the provisions oí the Public Local Laws of Howard County, and that the decision of the Howard County Metropolitan Commission rendered pursuant to said hearings is therefore null and void.” On 25 April 1966 Judge Mayfield granted the Commission’s motion and, in the same order, denied the motion filed by Alamo. Although Alamo appealed only from “the order * * * of April 25, 1966” it contends, in its brief, that the earlier (17 March) order sustaining, without leave to amend, the demurrer to the amended bill of complaint (except paragraph 7) amounts to reversible error. Whether, in the odd circumstances of this case, that question is properly before us is a matter we need not, and do not, decide because, even if it is properly before us, we think Judge Mayfield’s analysis of the amended bill of complaint is sound and that his conclusions are correct. He dealt with all facets of Alamo’s contention in his able, thorough and comprehensive opinion, from which we quote several pertinent paragraphs: “From the cases hereinbefore cited it is clear that statutes similar to that now before the Court have been found to be constitutional, and that the assessments of front foot charges by the Commission under the