Aleman v. State

Pablo Javier Aleman v. State of Maryland No. 60, September Term 2019 Criminal Procedure – Interstate Compacts – Interstate Agreement on Detainers – Temporary Custody of Prisoner. When a detainer based on pending criminal charges in one state is lodged against a person serving a prison sentence in another state, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”) provides for the transfer of the prisoner from the jurisdiction of incarceration to the “temporary custody” of the jurisdiction where charges are pending. That temporary custody is for the purpose of resolving those charges, after which the prisoner is returned to the place of incarceration. Temporary custody under the IAD does not encompass a commitment of the prisoner to the Department of Health under Maryland Code, Criminal Procedure Article, §3-112 (if the charges are resolved by a verdict of “not criminally responsible”) before the prisoner is returned to the state of incarceration.

Criminal Procedure – Interstate Compacts – Interstate Agreement on Detainers – Application to Defendant Found Not Criminally Responsible. Article VI(b) of the IAD states that the IAD and its remedies do not apply to “any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill.” A verdict of “not criminally responsible,” which is a finding that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the crime, does not by itself trigger Article VI(b), as it does not necessarily relate to the defendant’s current mental status. Circuit Court for Baltimore County Case Nos. 03-C-18-006040 & 03-K-16-006061 Argument: March 10, 2020 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 60 September Term, 2019 _____________________________________ PABLO JAVIER ALEMAN V. STATE OF MARYLAND _____________________________________ Barbera, C.J., McDonald Watts Hotten Getty Booth Biran, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by McDonald, J. Watts and Getty, JJ., dissent. ______________________________________ Filed: June 30, 2020 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. Suzanne Johnson 2020-06-30 10:35-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk This case calls upon us to construe the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”).

The IAD is a congressionally-sanctioned compact among the states designed to facilitate the prompt disposition of a detainer lodged by one state against a person incarcerated in another state. In particular, the IAD allows for the temporary transfer of the prisoner from the state of incarceration to the state in which charges are pending, upon the request of either the prisoner or the prosecuting jurisdiction. Shortly after commencing an 11-year sentence in Ohio for felony assault, Petitioner Pablo Javier Aleman requested a transfer under the IAD to Maryland where a murder charge was pending against him in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. After he arrived in Maryland, Mr. Aleman pled guilty to second degree murder but, as permitted by Maryland law, requested a jury trial on the issue of criminal responsibility.

The jury returned a verdict of “not criminally responsible.” Such a verdict ordinarily requires that a defendant be committed to the Department of Health for treatment or released. However, the State maintained that, because Maryland had obtained only temporary custody of Mr. Aleman from Ohio, the IAD required that he first return to Ohio to finish his sentence. Mr. Aleman sought to remain in Maryland, but the Circuit Court denied his petition for habeas corpus seeking such relief. Mr. Aleman appealed and the Circuit Court stayed his return to Ohio, as well as a commitment to the Department for treatment, pending his appeal.

On appeal, Mr. Aleman argued that the Maryland statute providing for commitment to the Department superseded the State’s obligation under the IAD to return him to Ohio. He also argued that the not criminally responsible verdict exempted him from the IAD by the terms of the compact itself. The Court of Special Appeals rejected both arguments and, after carefully analyzing the IAD and other relevant statutes, affirmed the Circuit Court’s denial of Mr. Aleman’s habeas corpus petition. We agree with that analysis and disposition.

I Background This case concerns the intersection of two laws: (1) an interstate compact concerning the disposition of detainers based on criminal charges – the IAD – codified in Maryland as Maryland Code, Correctional Services Article (“CS”), §8-401 et seq., and (2) the State law concerning the consequences of a not criminally responsible verdict, codified as Maryland Code, Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”), §3-112. To place the facts of this case in their legal context, we first outline the provisions of the IAD and the State statutes concerning the mental health status of a defendant in a criminal case, including CP §3-112. A. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers 1. Interstate Detainers As pertains to the IAD, an interstate detainer has been described as “a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction.”1 Prosecuting authorities in the 1 Stone v. State, 344 Md. 97, 108 (1996) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Although the IAD itself does not define “detainer,” congressional reports concerning the IAD used this definition. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-1018 (1970); S. Rep. No. 91-1356 (1970).

In other contexts, a detainer may be based on a pending charge for violation of parole or probation or a sentence already imposed against the prisoner in another jurisdiction, as well as pending criminal charges. See Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985). The IAD, 2 jurisdiction where the charges are pending may file a detainer with the institution in the jurisdiction where the prisoner is incarcerated to ensure that the prisoner, upon completing the term of incarceration, will be available to answer the pending charges. Prior to enactment of the IAD, there was no uniform method for managing an interstate detainer and resolving the charges on which it was based.

Moreover, a detainer could be lodged without proof of the underlying charges, a judicial officer was not involved in issuing it, and the filing of a detainer did not obligate the jurisdiction that lodged it to take any further prosecutorial action. Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182, 187-88 (4th Cir. 1968). As a result, there sometimes arose “a practice of filing detainers based on untried criminal charges that had little basis.” Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 729 (1985). This created the potential for abuse in which a detainer could be lodged against a prisoner, adversely affect the circumstances of the prisoner’s current incarceration, 2 and later be withdrawn as the prisoner came to the end of that sentence.

Even apart from the however, pertains only to detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints. 2 A congressional report summarized the concerns about the potential deleterious impact of an unresolved detainer that led to the creation of the IAD: [A] prisoner who has had a detainer lodged against him is seriously disadvantaged by such action. He is in custody and therefore in no position to seek witnesses or to preserve his defense. He must often be kept in close custody and is ineligible for desirable work assignments. What is more, when detainers are filed against a prisoner he sometimes loses interest in institutional opportunities because he must serve his sentence without knowing what additional sentences may lie before him, or when, if ever, he will be in a position to employ the education and skills he may be developing.

S. Rep. No. 91-1356 (1970). 3 effect of a detainer on a prisoner’s treatment in the place of incarceration, there was also a concern that the charges on which a detainer was based should be resolved “before the passage of time has dulled the memory or made witnesses unavailable.” S. Rep. No. 91- 1356 (1970). 2. Adoption of the IAD to Reform the Interstate Detainer System In 1948, the Joint Committee on Detainers (“Joint Committee”), an ad hoc group of law enforcement and corrections associations, was formed to address the problems posed by the detainer process.

The Joint Committee issued a report that recommended certain basic principles for the use and disposition of detainers. Among those basic principles were that detainers should be disposed of “as promptly as possible,” that “[n]o prisoner should be penalized” as a result of a pending detainer until it had been investigated and found valid, and that jurisdictions should observe principles of comity in settling detainers and disposing of pending charges. See Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation, Program for 1957, at 74-75 (1956) (“Council of State Governments Report”). With respect to the transfer of a prisoner from the place of imprisonment to the place where charges were pending, the Joint Committee included the following basic principle: There should be assurance that any prisoner released to stand trial in another jurisdiction will be returned to the institution from which he was released.

An important cause of long-standing detainers is the presence of unsettled charges pending against a prisoner held by another jurisdiction. If the charges appear to be valid and if the individual is to be brought to trial before completion of his sentence, then it is essential that the institution holding him in custody be assured of his return after the trial has been completed. Unless there is such assurance, many jurisdictions will understandably hesitate to cooperate. 4 Id. at 75 (emphasis in original). The principles stated by the Joint Committee served as the foundation of the IAD when, a few years later, the Council of State Governments drafted legislative proposals concerning detainers, including the IAD.3 See id. at 78-85.

Congress had assented in 1934 to the creation of such a compact. See 4 U.S.C. §112 (a); see also Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 , 438-42 & n.9 (1981). As a congressionally-sanctioned compact, the IAD falls within Article I, §10, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution and thus qualifies as a federal law.4 Id. Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have adopted the IAD.

See National Center for Interstate Compacts, Interstate Compacts – Agreement on Detainers, available at https://perma.cc/X9N5- UMNK. The federal government itself became a party to the compact in 1970. Pub. L. 91-538, 84 Stat. 1397.

Maryland became a party to the compact in 1965. Chapter 627, §1, Laws of Maryland 1965. 3. The Interstate Transfer Process under the IAD The IAD is organized as nine “Articles” designated by roman numerals – i.e., Article I, Article II, etc. – which, in Maryland, correspond to sections of the Correctional 3 Another proposed law dealt with the disposition of detainers arising within the state where a prisoner was located and was called the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act. Council of State Governments Report at 74-78. 4 In the Court of Special Appeals, the parties were asked to brief the question whether the IAD, as a federal law, would preempt other state statutes such as CP §3-112 that might pertain to Mr. Aleman’s situation. 242 Md. App. 632 , 644 n.9 (2019).

Both parties have also addressed preemption in their briefs to us. Ultimately, the intermediate appellate court found it unnecessary to reach that issue to decide this case, as do we. 5 Services Article of the Maryland Code.5 Cases in various jurisdictions construing the IAD generally refer to the provisions of the IAD by their Article designations. Accordingly, we shall use those designations in the text of this opinion and cross-reference the Maryland Code analogs in footnotes, as appropriate. For purposes of this case, the key provisions of the IAD can be summarized as follows.

Underlying Policy The first Article of the IAD sets forth the problem that the compact was intended to address and the means of addressing that problem. Article I.6 It briefly refers to the fact that unresolved detainers based on outstanding charges can “obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.” Id. Accordingly, the IAD is intended “to encourage the expeditious and orderly” disposition of detainers based on untried charges. Id.

To that end, the IAD provides “cooperative procedures.” Id. The last Article of the IAD states that it is to be “liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes.” Article IX. 7 5 When the General Assembly enacted the law by which the State joined the compact, the IAD was codified in the Maryland Code as Article 27, §616A et seq. In 1999, it was recodified as part of the then-new Correctional Services Article. Chapter 54, Laws of Maryland 1999. 6 CS §8-403. 7 CS §8-411. 6 Lodging the Detainer The IAD applies when a state in which there are untried charges pending against an individual imprisoned in another state lodges a detainer with the state in which the individual is imprisoned.

The IAD uses the phrase “receiving state” to refer to the jurisdiction that has pending charges against the individual and that lodges a detainer. It uses the phrase “sending state” to refer to the jurisdiction where the individual is already incarcerated and the detainer is lodged. Article II(b), (c).8 Initiating a Transfer to the Receiving State After a detainer is lodged, a transfer of the prisoner9 from the sending state to the receiving state under the IAD can be initiated in two ways: (1) by the prisoner or (2) by the state in which charges are pending – i.e., the receiving state. First, Article III provides that a prisoner subject to a detainer may initiate a transfer.

The official in charge of the prisoner in the place of incarceration – i.e., the sending state – must inform the prisoner of the source and contents of any detainer, as well as of the prisoner’s right to request final disposition of the untried charges in the receiving state. Article III(c).10 The prisoner may then request a final disposition of the pending charges. 8 CS §§8-404(b), (c). 9 The IAD uses the term “prisoner” to refer to the person who is the subject of a detainer based on pending charges in one state while incarcerated in another state. For clarity, we will generally use the same term. 10 CS §8-405(c). 7 Article III(a)-(b).11 The prisoner’s request is “deemed to be a waiver of extradition” with respect to proceedings on the pending charges in the receiving state. Article III(e).12 Such a request also constitutes consent “to the production of the prisoner’s body in any court where the prisoner’s presence may be required in order to effectuate the purposes of [the IAD] and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to the original place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of [the IAD].” Id.

Finally, the request is deemed to be a waiver of extradition for the prisoner’s later return to the receiving state to serve any sentence imposed on those charges in that state after the prisoner completes the current term of imprisonment in the sending state. Id. Second, Article IV provides that, regardless of whether the prisoner requests final disposition of the pending charges, the jurisdiction in which charges are pending may also initiate a transfer. To do so, the receiving state may request “temporary custody or availability” of the prisoner to stand trial.

Article IV(a).13 The receiving state’s request for transfer of the prisoner must be approved, recorded, and transmitted by the court having jurisdiction over the pending charges in the receiving state. Id. In this situation, where the prisoner has not initiated the transfer, the governor of the state in which the prisoner is located may decline to allow the requesting state to have temporary custody of the prisoner. Id.

In addition, the prisoner has an opportunity to contest the transfer. Article V(d). 11 CS §§8-405(a)-(b). 12 CS §8-405(e). 13 CS §8-406(a). 8 In either case, if the transfer proceeds, the sending state – the place of incarceration – is to offer to deliver “temporary custody” of the prisoner to the receiving state for a “speedy and efficient prosecution.” Articles V(a).14 And, in either case, the authorities in the sending state are to provide a certificate stating the term of the prisoner’s incarceration, the time already served, the time remaining on the term, the amount of good time earned, when the prisoner is eligible for parole, and any parole-related decisions concerning the prisoner. Articles III(a), IV(b).15 Custody of the Prisoner in the Receiving State Among other things, Article V of the IAD establishes parameters for a prisoner’s stay in the receiving state and eventual return to the sending state. Of particular relevance to this appeal, Article V provides that the receiving state’s custody of the prisoner is “temporary” and limited in nature – it “shall be only for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or more untried indictments, informations, or complaints that form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction.” Article V(d).16 Moreover, Article V states that “[f]or all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as provided in [the IAD] is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to 14 CS §8-407(a). 15 CS §§8-405(a), 8-406(b). 16 CS §8-407(d). 9 remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state.” Article V(g).17 Finally, “[a]t the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of [the IAD], the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state.” Article V(e).18 As is evident, Article V establishes that the receiving state’s custody over a prisoner is temporary and extends only to the prosecution of the pending charges; the sending state retains custody over the prisoner for all other purposes.

Obligations of the Receiving State and Remedies for the Prisoner Once the transfer process under the IAD has been set in motion, the IAD imposes certain requirements on the receiving state and provides a remedy to the prisoner if those requirements are not satisfied. First, if the prisoner requests a transfer to the receiving state to dispose of charges underlying a detainer, but the receiving state declines to accept temporary custody of the prisoner for that purpose, the receiving state is to dismiss the charges with prejudice, and the detainer ceases to have any force or effect. Article V(c).19 Second, once a prisoner is transferred to the receiving state, the IAD requires the receiving state to dispose of any pending criminal charges before returning the prisoner to the sending state. Articles III(d), IV(e).20 This requirement is often referred to as an “anti- 17 CS §8-407(g). 18 CS §8-407(e). 19 CS §8-407(c). 20 CS §§8-405(d), 8-406(e). 10 shuttling” provision.

If the receiving state violates an anti-shuttling provision and returns the prisoner to the sending state without resolving the charges underlying the detainer, the receiving state is to dismiss the charges with prejudice and the detainer ceases to have any force or effect. Id. Third, the IAD imposes speedy trial deadlines in the receiving state. If the prisoner initiated the transfer, the receiving state must bring the prisoner to trial within 180 days of receiving the prisoner’s request under the IAD.

Article III(a).21 If the receiving state initiated the transfer, the trial must begin within 120 days of the prisoner’s arrival in the receiving state. Article IV(c).22 In either instance, the court presiding over the matter may grant “any reasonable and necessary continuance” beyond the deadline. Articles III(a), IV(c).23 Also, the duration and expiration of those periods are “tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter.” Article VI(a).24 However, if the receiving state otherwise does not bring the prisoner to trial on the charges underlying the detainer within the requisite time period, the receiving state is to dismiss those charges with prejudice. Article V(c).25 21 CS §8-405(a). 22 CS §8-406(c). 23 CS §§8-405(a), 8-406(c). 24 CS §8-408(a). 25 CS §8-407(c). 11 Applicability of the IAD to a Mentally Ill Prisoner Article VI of the IAD consists of two provisions that limit the application and remedies available under the IAD.

As previously mentioned, the speedy trial requirements that the IAD imposes in the receiving state are tolled “for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial.” Article VI(a). In addition, “[n]o provision of [the IAD], and no remedy made available by [the IAD], shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill.” Article VI(b).26 As will be seen, this case requires us to consider the scope of the latter subsection. IAD Forms The National Association of Extradition Officials has developed forms that party states may use to implement the provisions of the IAD. See National Association of Extradition Officials, description of Extradition and Interstate Agreement on Detainers Manual at https://perma.cc/ZRW3-TLYY.27 Following the pattern set by the IAD, these forms are designated by Roman numerals.

Pertinent to this case, Form II is used by a prisoner to invoke the IAD to request final disposition of pending charges in another state. That form recites the provisions of Article III that the request constitutes a waiver of extradition to the receiving state and a consent to be returned to the place of imprisonment after the charges in the receiving state are resolved. 26 CS §8-408(b). 27 Congress has authorized the United States Attorney General and the Mayor of the District of Columbia to develop forms as well. 18 U.S.C. App. 2 §6. 12 B. Mental Status of a Defendant in a Criminal Case The mental status of a defendant in a criminal case may become an issue in that case primarily in two instances: (1) whether the defendant is incompetent to stand trial; and (2) whether the defendant was not criminally responsible at the time of the crime. Both concern the mental status of the defendant, but during different time periods, which may or may not overlap. 1. Incompetent to Stand Trial Under Maryland law, a defendant is incompetent to stand trial if the defendant is unable “to understand the nature or object of the proceeding” or “to assist in one’s defense.” CP §3-101(f).28 If at any time before or during trial the court suspects that the defendant is incompetent or if the defendant alleges incompetence, the court must determine whether the defendant is competent to stand trial.

CP §3-104(a). The court may reconsider the issue of competence at any time before final judgment. CP §3-104(c). The statute provides ultimately for the dismissal of the charges if the defendant remains incompetent to stand trial for a specified period.

CP §3-107. The prohibition against trying an incompetent defendant reflects the due process right to a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975). 28 This standard has been part of State law since the General Assembly adopted it by statute in 1967. Raithel v. State, 280 Md. 291, 297-98 (1977).

Although this standard was not applied in Maryland prior to the General Assembly’s action, it had been part of the common law of many other states. See Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 454 (1967). 13 2. Not Criminally Responsible A defendant in a criminal case “is not criminally responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of that conduct, the defendant, because of a mental disorder or mental retardation, lacks substantial capacity to: (1) appreciate the criminality of that conduct; or (2) conform that conduct to the requirements of the law.” CP §3-109(a).29 A defendant who asserts that he or she lacked criminal responsibility at the time of the offense may enter a plea of “not criminally responsible.” CP §3-110(a); Maryland Rule 4-242(a).

If a defendant enters a plea of not criminally responsible, the State retains the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the criminal act. CP §3-110(c). The defendant bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she was not criminally responsible at the time of that act. CP §3-110(b)-(c).

It is not uncommon, as happened in this case, for the defendant to admit to having committed the criminal act and for the trial to concern solely the issue of criminal responsibility. Maryland Rule 4-314(a)(4).30 If the factfinder – either the jury or, in a bench trial, the judge – returns a verdict of not criminally responsible, “the court shall order the defendant committed to the facility that the Health Department designates for institutional inpatient care or treatment.” CP §3- 29 This standard was adopted by the General Assembly in 1967 based on a provision of the Model Penal Code. See State v. Conn, 286 Md. 406, 417 (1979). 30 Alternatively, a defendant could enter a plea of not guilty and not criminally responsible. In such cases, the trial may be bifurcated.

Maryland Rule 4-314(a)(1)-(3), (b). 14 112(b).31 The Department of Health must “admit the defendant to the designated health care facility as soon as possible, but not later than 10 business days” after receiving the order of commitment. CP §3-112(e)(1). As an alternative to commitment, the defendant may be released, with or without conditions, if certain criteria are met. CP §3-112(g).

If committed to a facility, the defendant may be released if he or she “would not be a danger, as a result of mental disorder or mental retardation, to self or to the person or property of others.” CP §3-114(b). The defendant may also be conditionally released after commitment if it is possible to satisfy that standard with conditions imposed by the court. CP §3-114(c). While on conditional release, the individual is still regarded as a “committed person” under the statutory scheme and may be returned to the mental health facility if the conditions are violated.

CP §3-121; see also Simms v. Department of Health, 467 Md. 238 (2020). 3. Comparison As is evident, the determination whether a defendant is competent to stand trial is distinct from the determination whether the defendant was criminally responsible at the time of the alleged offense. For competency, the court must assess the defendant’s current mental health status to determine whether the defendant is able to understand the 31 At the time of the Circuit Court proceedings in this case in June 2018, the statute required the court to commit the defendant to the Health Department in somewhat different language. The statute was amended during the 2018 session of the General Assembly, effective October 1, 2018, to its current form.

Chapters 188, 189, 702, 703, Laws of Maryland 2018. The changes wrought by the 2018 amendment are not pertinent to the issues in this case. 15 proceedings and assist in the defense. For criminal responsibility, the court must assess the defendant’s past mental health status at the time of the commission of the offense, which may or may not be the same as the defendant’s mental health status at the time of trial. See Jolley v. State, 282 Md. 353, 373 (1978).

When a defendant enters a plea of not criminally responsible, the court may order an evaluation of the defendant’s competence to stand trial, presumably on the theory that whatever condition is the basis of that plea may have persisted and may affect the defendant’s ability to assist in the defense. See CP §3-111.32 In any event, a defendant may be found competent to stand trial at present, yet deemed not criminally responsible for the past conduct at issue. Indeed, that is precisely what happened in the case at hand. B. Facts and Legal Proceedings The essential facts are undisputed and can be briefly summarized, along with the procedural path of this case.

Murder Charges in Maryland On March 17, 2016, Mr. Aleman fatally stabbed Victor Adolpho Serrano, his former landlord, at Mr. Serrano’s home in Baltimore County. On March 18, 2016, an arrest warrant was issued for Mr. Aleman based on a statement of charges filed in the District 32 CP § 3-111(a) provides that “[i]f a defendant has entered a plea of not criminally responsible, the court may order the Health Department to examine the defendant to determine whether the defendant was not criminally responsible under § 3-109 of this title and whether the defendant is competent to stand trial.” 16 Court charging him with first degree murder of Mr. Serrano. However, Mr. Aleman had fled the State. Conviction and Imprisonment in Ohio Approximately two weeks later, Mr. Aleman was in Glendale, Ohio, where a police officer came upon him walking along a highway.

When the officer approached, Mr. Aleman drew a knife and threatened the officer, causing the officer to shoot Mr. Aleman in an attempt to disarm and apprehend him. Mr. Aleman later explained to police in Ohio that “I don’t want to kill somebody else. And I wanted the officer to kill me.” Mr. Aleman was tried in Ohio, where a jury found him guilty of felony assault. The Ohio court sentenced him to 11 years in prison.

Mr. Aleman’s IAD Request and Return to Maryland The Maryland arrest warrant was lodged as a detainer against Mr. Aleman in Ohio. On September 26, 2016, while serving his sentence in Ohio, Mr. Aleman filed a request under Article III of the IAD for final disposition of the outstanding murder charge in Maryland. Mr. Aleman filed his request on IAD Form II, in which he acknowledged that he waived extradition to Maryland for disposition of the pending charge and consented to be returned to Ohio following resolution of those charges. Maryland agreed to take temporary custody of Mr. Aleman under the IAD.

He was transferred from Ohio, the sending state, to Maryland, the receiving state, on November 17, 2016. On December 5, 2016, the grand jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County returned an indictment that superseded the statement of charges and charged him with first 17 degree murder, first degree assault, robbery with a deadly weapon, robbery, theft, and carrying a dangerous weapon with intent to injure – all related to his attack on Mr. Serrano. Trial in Maryland – Verdict of Not Criminally Responsible In the Circuit Court, Mr. Aleman initially entered pleas of not guilty and not criminally responsible with respect to the charges against him. The Circuit Court ordered, pursuant to CP §3-111(a), an examination of Mr. Aleman with respect to his competency to stand trial and criminal responsibility.

After examining Mr. Aleman, the Department of Health provided a report to the court on his mental status. Based on that report, the court found him competent to stand trial. The prosecution and defense agreed to bifurcate the issues of whether Mr. Aleman had committed the acts alleged and whether he was criminally responsible for those acts. On February 23, 2018, Mr. Aleman pled guilty to second degree murder of Mr. Serrano under the first count of the indictment.

(The State later nolle prossed the remaining charges). The Circuit Court scheduled the trial on the issue of criminal responsibility for a later date.33 Mr. Aleman ultimately elected to have the issue of criminal responsibility decided by a jury. At the jury trial on May 29-31, 2018, the parties presented a stipulation of facts about the underlying offense and a video recording of an encounter between Mr. Aleman and the victim earlier on the day of the murder that had been captured by a surveillance 33 Mr. Aleman had waived the requirement under State law for speedy trial pursuant to the State “Hicks rule.” See Tunnell v. State, 466 Md. 565 (2020). 18 camera. The prosecution and the defense each presented the testimony of a forensic psychiatrist.

Both psychiatrists diagnosed Mr. Aleman as suffering from a schizo-affective disorder, but reached divergent opinions on whether he was criminally responsible at the time of the offense. The jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Aleman was not criminally responsible for the killing of Mr. Serrano. Immediately following the jury verdict, the Circuit Court indicated that it would commit Mr. Aleman to the Department of Health. However, upon being advised that Mr. Aleman had been brought to Maryland under the IAD, the court expressed the view that he would have to be returned to Ohio and remanded him to the county detention center.

On June 4, 2018, the Circuit Court entered an order committing Mr. Aleman to the Department of Health pursuant to CP §3-112 with the date of transfer and place of commitment “to be determined.” At the same time, the Circuit Court sent a letter to the Secretary of Health, with copies to the attorneys involved in the case, as well as attorneys representing the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services and the Maryland Department of Health, and an official of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction. That letter summarized the proceedings in the Circuit Court, noted that Mr. Aleman had been brought to Maryland while serving a sentence in Ohio, and provided copies of the pertinent IAD forms concerning Mr. Aleman’s temporary custody in Maryland.34 34 There is no indication in the record whether the Secretary responded to this letter. In his brief, Mr. Aleman states that the Ohio official shown as copied on the letter to the 19 Mr. Aleman’s Habeas Corpus Petitions and Appeals Two days later, on June 6, 2018, Mr. Aleman filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County in which he challenged his continued confinement in the county detention center and asked to be committed to the Department of Health. He argued that the Maryland jury’s determination that he was not criminally responsible at the time of the March 2016 offense placed him outside the purview of the IAD, pursuant to Article VI(b) of the IAD, and, accordingly, that he should not be returned to Ohio’s custody.

The State opposed the petition, arguing that the IAD required his return to Ohio. The Circuit Court held a hearing on June 13 and, concluding that the IAD required Mr. Aleman’s return to Ohio, denied the relief sought in his habeas corpus petition. Mr. Aleman immediately noted an appeal and asked the court to stay his return to Ohio pending his appeal. The Circuit Court granted that request, staying its order committing Mr. Aleman to the Department of Health, as well as the denial of his habeas corpus petition and his return to Ohio,35 with the result that Mr. Aleman remained in the county detention Secretary did not take action in response to the letter.

In any event, the IAD does not require that a sending state request return of a prisoner from the receiving state. 35 The State sought reconsideration of the order staying his return to Ohio on the ground that the denial of the habeas corpus petition was not appealable. Mr. Aleman opposed that motion on the basis that, while an order denying habeas corpus relief is ordinarily not appealable, there is an exception when the writ is sought “for a purpose other than to challenge the legality of a conviction or sentence” – in this case, commitment to the Department of Health rather than detention for return to Ohio. CP §7-107. The Circuit Court denied the motion to reconsider and the Court of Special Appeals agreed with Mr. 20 center pending the disposition of his appeal.36 Shortly thereafter, on June 18, 2018, Mr. Aleman filed a second petition for habeas corpus, seeking to compel the State to transfer him to the Department of Health pending his appeal of the denial of his first habeas corpus petition.

A hearing was held on July 20, 2018, before a different judge of the Circuit Court, who denied the second petition. Mr. Aleman again noted an appeal. The Court of Special Appeals consolidated Mr. Aleman’s two appeals and affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court.37 242 Md. App. 632 (2019). The intermediate appellate court held that, under the IAD, Maryland acquired temporary custody over Mr. Aleman only to prosecute the charges on which the detainer was based and therefore lacked custody over Mr. Aleman to commit him to the Department of Health before returning him to Ohio under the IAD.

The Court of Special Appeals held that Article VI(b) of the IAD did not require otherwise. We granted Mr. Aleman’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Aleman on the issue of appealability. 242 Md. App. at 636 n.2. Before us, the State does not contest the appealability of the order. 36 We note that, under Article V(f) of the IAD (CS §8-407(f)), Mr. Aleman is to receive credit on his Ohio sentence for the time served in temporary custody in Maryland.

Whether he will receive good time credits as well is to be determined under Ohio law. 37 The Court of Special Appeals ultimately held that Mr. Aleman’s appeal of the denial of his second habeas corpus petition was moot as a result of its decision affirming the denial of his first petition. 242 Md. App. at 636 n.3. 21 II Discussion There appears to be no dispute that, if Mr. Aleman had been either acquitted or convicted of the Maryland charges, he would be promptly returned to Ohio under the IAD. The question in this case is whether a verdict of not criminally responsible requires a different result. Mr. Aleman offers two arguments as to why he should remain in Maryland following the not criminally responsible verdict. First, he suggests the IAD contemplates