Ametek, Inc. v. O'CONNOR

HOLLANDER, Judge. In this Workers’ Compensation Act case, we must determine how to calculate the credit due to an employer/insurer for benefits paid to a claimant prior to an increase in the claimant’s award that resulted from judicial review. The claimant urges that the credit must be commensurate with the total monetary benefits actually paid, while the employer/insurer contends that the credit must be based on the actual number of weeks for which benefits were paid. In real terms, $2,650.00 is at stake.

Susan O’Connor (the “Claimant”), appellee, filed a claim against her employer, Ametek, Inc., and its insurer, Home Indemnity Company, appellants, to recover workers’ compensation benefits, pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”), Maryland Code (1991 RepLVol., 1997 Supp.), Title 9 of the Labor and Employment Article (“L.E.”). Initially, the Workers’ Compensation Commission (the “Commission”) found that O’Connor had sustained a permanent partial disability of 10% of her body as a whole. Accordingly, the Commission determined that the Claimant was entitled to benefits of $81.00 per week for 50 weeks. After a jury found that appellee had sustained a permanent partial disability of 70% of the body as a whole, the Commission determined that the Claimant was entitled to disability benefits of $134.00 per week for 467 weeks.

Thereafter, Ametek and Home Indemnity Company (collectively, “Ametek” or the “Employer”) filed a motion for reconsideration, seeking a credit for the 50 weeks of compensation benefits that were paid to the Claimant prior to the increase in her award. The Commission ultimately agreed to reduce the Employer’s obligation of 467 weeks of benefits by the 50 weeks for which benefits had already been paid. Accordingly, the Commission issued an amended order directing the Employer to pay O’Connor disability benefits of $134 per week for 417 weeks, rather than 467 weeks. The circuit court reversed ¹¹² the Commission’s decision.

It ordered appellants to pay the Claimant permanent partial disability benefits of $134.00 for 467 weeks, less a credit of $4,050.00. The credit reflected the Employer’s payment of benefits of $81.00 per week for 50 weeks. Appellants timely noted this appeal and present one question for our review, which we have rephrased slightly: When an award of compensation is increased following an appeal from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, is the employer/insurer entitled to a credit for benefits previously paid based on the number of weeks for which benefits were paid or, alternatively, based on the monetary amount of benefits actually paid? We conclude that, when an award to a claimant is increased pursuant to a petition for judicial review, the employer/insurer is entitled to a credit for the total amount of money actually paid to the claimant prior to the increase in the award.

Accordingly, we shall affirm the trial court’s decision. Factual Summary 1 In 1973, the Claimant began working for Ametek as a tapered bristle inspector operator. On March 24, 1980, while appellant was performing the duties of her employment, she was injured. On March 29,1980, O’Connor filed a claim under the Act.

In April 1981, it was determined that she had sustained an occupational injury arising out of her employment and that appellants were liable for her medical expenses. On August 7, 1995, the Commission conducted a hearing to determine the amount of compensation to which O’Connor was entitled under the Act in regard to her claim of a permanent partial disability. On August 16, 1995, the Commission found that O’Connor had sustained a permanent partial disability of 10% of her body as a whole and that she was entitled to benefits of $81.00 ¹¹³ per week for 50 weeks, commencing March 3,1995. Pursuant to the Commission’s order, the Employer paid those benefits to the Claimant.

Dissatisfied with the award, O’Connor sought judicial review in the circuit court. On August 29, 1996, a jury found that O’Connor had sustained a 70% permanent partial disability of her body as a whole. Accordingly, in a written order dated January 9,1997, the Commission determined that the claimant was entitled to permanent partial disability benefits of $134.00 per week for 467 weeks. On January 16, 1997, the Employer filed a motion for rehearing, contending that it was entitled to a credit based on the number of weeks for which it had paid benefits to appellee, in accordance with the Commission’s order of August 16, 1995. 2 Specifically, Ametek argued that “the credit for previous payments should be expressed in terms of weeks, not amounts, of compensation previously paid.” The Employer also asked the Commission to “issue an order clarifying the credit issue____” On January 21, 1997, the Commission amended its Order of January 9, 1997, “to include that compensation awarded for permanent partial disability is subject to a credit for ... payments made under the Order dated August 16, 1995.” Ametek then asked the Commission to reconsider the order of January 21, 1997; it sought credit for the weeks of benefits paid, rather than the amount of benefits paid.

The Commission granted the Employer’s motion by order dated March 13, 1997. In that order, which “rescinded and annulled” the earlier order of January 21, 1997, the Commission ruled: ORDERED that [the Commission’s] Order dated January 21, 1997 is hereby rescinded and annulled, and further ORDERED that the above-named employer and above-named insurer [appellants] pay unto the ... claimant com ¹¹⁴ pensation for permanent partial disability at the rate of $134.00, payable weekly, for a period of 417 weeks____ Accordingly, the Commission reduced by 50 weeks, from 467 to 417, the remaining number of weeks for which appellants had to pay benefits to the Claimant. As to the 50 weeks of payments for which the Employer received credit, appellee had actually recovered benefits of only $81.00 per week, amounting to a total of $4,050.00, rather than $134.00 per week. Thus, the effect of the order was to credit appellants with 50 weeks of payment as if paid at the rate of $134.00 per week (i.e., $6,700.00), rather than at the rate of $81.00 per week that appellee actually received.

After O’Connor challenged the Commission’s decision in the circuit- court, both sides filed cross-motions for summary judgment. At the motions hearing on March 24, 1998, the Claimant contended that the Commission improperly credited appellants with 50 weeks of benefits. She insisted that giving a weekly credit rather than a credit for the dollar amount resulted in the “claimant ... [being] short-changed ... because of an incorrect and erroneous decision of the Commission” in the first place. The trial court agreed, stating, in part: At issue here is whether the claimant should be compensated the difference between the $81 per week with which she was originally compensated by the Commission and $134 per week which was subsequently found to be the correct amount after the jury’s verdict.

I do believe the [A]ct, as indicated in the Wright versus Phillips [sic] case, should be liberally construed in favor of the claimant. And I do appreciate and acknowledge the arguments of counsel with regard to comparison of the facts in Wright ... as opposed to the facts here. I do find that the claimant is being compensated at a rate of $134 per week for a period of 417 weeks and she was previously compensated 50 weeks at $81 per week. That 50-week period was adjusted by the Commission in reducing the award from 467 to 417 weeks.

And I believe and ¹¹⁵ find that the claimant should be compensated for the difference .... And the Court accordingly will reverse the decision of the Commission dated January 21, 1997, and find that the claimant is in fact entitled to be compensated for a period of 467 weeks at the rate of $134 per week. Discussion This case presents the flip side of Philip Electronics North America v. Wright, 348 Md. 209 , 703 A.2d 150 (1997). There, the Court considered the following question: We must determine whether, after an award to a claimant is reduced pursuant to a petition for judicial review, the employer is entitled to a credit for the total amount of money paid to the claimant before the reduction of the original award, or whether the appropriate credit is the number of weeks the employer paid benefits prior to the reduction.

We shall hold that a credit based upon the number of weeks the employer has paid benefits is proper. Id. at 212 , 703 A.2d 150 . In its ruling, the Philip Electronics Court expressly reserved as to the precise issue presented here. The Court said, in a footnote: Philip Electronics also argues at length that affirming the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals would be detrimental to claimants if the reasoning of the intermediate appellate court were applied to cases where an award is increased, after the filing of a petition for judicial review, and the Commission must then determine whether to retroactively increase the award based on the number of weeks of benefits previously paid by the employer, or based on the total amount of monetary benefits previously received by the claimant.

The issue is not presented in this case, and we express no opinion on that scenario. Id. at 215 n. 4, 703 A.2d 150 . The Employer posits that the circuit court erred in crediting appellants based on the total amount of monetary benefits. ¹¹⁶ Relying on Philip Electronics, the Employer contends that it is entitled to a credit for the number of weeks for which benefits were paid before the increase in the compensation award. Ametek points to the Court’s reasoning in Philip Electronics, in which the Court said: “The plain language of the Act leads us to conclude that the Legislature expressed a commitment to the payment of permanent partial disability benefits based on a weekly framework, rather than focusing upon the total monetary value of such an award.” Id. at 221 , 703 A.2d 150 (citations omitted).

The Claimant acknowledges that, in Philip Electronics, the Court concluded that “the General Assembly intended that an employer’s credit-for the payment of partial disability benefits be based upon the number of weeks of compensation previously paid, absent clear legislative expression to the contrary.” Id. at 225 , 703 A.2d 150 . Nonetheless, appellee distinguishes Philip Electronics because the employer there sought to effectuate a credit against overpayment of benefits by terminating the payment of weekly benefits to recoup the overpayment. Moreover, she points out that the Court’s ruling in Philip Electronics was consistent with the primary purpose of the Act, which is to protect workers and their families from hardships inflicted by work-related injuries. We agree with the Claimant. - If we were to accept appellants’ argument, they would pay total benefits to O’Connor of $59,928.00, rather than the $62,578.00 to which she is clearly entitled, thereby depriving the Claimant of $2,650.00 in benefits.

Such a result would contravene the purpose of the Act, as elucidated by the Court in Philip Electronics, 348 Md. at 226 , 703 A.2d 150 , and numerous other cases. We explain further. The Act is a remedial statute, and its provisions are liberally construed in favor of employees in order to realize the Act’s benevolent purposes. See Engel & Engel, P.A. v. Bruce Ingerman, et al., 353 Md. 43, 51 , 724 A.2d 645 (1999); Porter v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 349 Md. 609, 616 , 709 A.2d 1205 (1998); Para v. Richards Group of Washington Ltd. ¹¹⁷ Partnership, 339 Md. 241, 251 , 661 A.2d 737 (1995); B. Frank Joy Co. v. Isaac, 333 Md. 628, 634-35 , 636 A.2d 1016 (1994); Victor v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg.

Co., 318 Md. 624, 628-29 , 569 A.2d 697 (1990); Jung v. Southland Corp., 114 Md.App. 541, 548 , 691 A.2d 263 (1997), aff'd, 351 Md. 165 , 717 A.2d 387 (1998); Barnes v. Children’s Hosp., 109 Md.App. 543, 553 , 675 A.2d 558 (1996); Lombardi v. Montgomery County, 108 Md. App. 695, 703 , 673 A.2d 762 (1996); see also L.E. § 9-102(a). As a consequence, any ambiguities in the Act must be resolved in favor of a claimant. See Philip Electronics, 348 Md. at 217 , 703 A.2d 150 ; Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Cassidy, 338 Md. 88, 97 , 656 A.2d 757 (1995); Barnes, 109 Md.App. at 554 , 675 A.2d 558 ; Lombardi 108 Md.App. at 703 , 673 A.2d 762 . Nevertheless, in construing the Act, we may not “stifle ... [its] plain meaning ... exceed its purposes ... [or] create ambiguity or uncertainty in [its] ... provisions where none exists so that a provision may be interpreted in favor of the ... claimant.” Philip Electronics, 348 Md. at 217 , 703 A.2d 150 (internal citation omitted); see also Porter, 349 Md. at 616-17 , 709 A.2d 1205 ; Morris v. Board of Educ. of Prince George’s County, 339 Md. 374, 384 , 663 A.2d 578 (1995); Jung, 114 Md.App. at 548 , 691 A.2d 263 ; Lombardi, 108 Md.App. at 703 , 673 A.2d 762 ; Tortuga, Inc. v. Wolfensberger, 97 Md.App. 79, 83 , 627 A.2d 56 , cert. denied, 332 Md.