Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Framm

⁶²⁹ BARBERA, C.J. Petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Commission”), filed in this Court on December 15, 2014, a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Respondent, Rhonda I. Framm. The Commission charged Respondent with violating Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 1.1 (competence); 1.2 (scope of representation); 1.3 (diligence); 1.4 (communication); 1.5 (fees); 1.7 (conflict of interest); 1.15 (safekeeping property); 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal); 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (misconduct), and Maryland Rule 16-606.1 (attorney trust account record-keeping) 1 . Those charges arise from Respondent’s representation of Robert L. Wilson and her subsequent suit against Mr. Wilson for attorney’s fees. On December 16, 2014, this Court transmitted the matter to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County and designated the Honorable John J. Nagle, III (“the hearing judge”) to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The hearing judge presided over a hearing on June 1, 2, and 3, 2015, at which Respondent testified and presented evidence. On September 1, 2015, the hearing judge issued written findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluding that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4,1.7, 1.15, 3.3, 8.4(a) and (c), and Maryland Rule 16-606.1(a), but did not violate MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, or 1.5. The hearing judge drew no conclusion on the charged violation of MLRPC 8.4(d). Both Petitioner and Respondent filed exceptions.

Bar Counsel, on behalf of Petitioner, excepted to the hearing judge’s failure to make certain findings of fact and render a conclusion as to MLRPC 8.4(d). Petitioner also excepted to the hearing ⁶³⁰ judge’s conclusion that Respondent did not violate MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.5 and the hearing judge’s failure to find the presence of certain aggravating factors. Respondent challenged the hearing judge’s conclusions that she violated any of the charged rules of professional conduct, aside from MLRPC 1.15 and Maryland Rule 16-606.1(a). Following oral argument on February 4, 2016, we issued an Order of Remand instructing the hearing judge to make additional findings of fact and clarify his conclusions of law regarding MLRPC 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d).

Thereafter, the hearing judge issued Supplemental Findings and Conclusions of Law (“supplemental findings”), finding additional facts as set forth in Petitioner’s exceptions, finding that Respondent’s actions that constituted violations of MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c) were done intentionally, and concluding that Respondent violated MLRPC 8.4(d). Petitioner and Respondent each filed responses to the supplemental findings. Petitioner withdrew its exception to the hearing judge’s failure to make findings of fact and render a conclusion as to MLRPC 8.4(d) and renewed its remaining exceptions. Respondent renewed her previously filed exceptions and excepted to all of the additional findings and conclusions made in the supplemental findings.

For reasons we shall explain, we agree with the hearing judge that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4; 1.7; 1.15; 3.3; and 8.4(a), (c), and (d); as well as Maryland Rule 16-606.1(a), but did not violate MLRPC 1.3. Moreover, we agree with Petitioner that Respondent’s misconduct also violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, and 1.5. I. The hearing judge made the following findings of fact by clear and convincing evidence. 2 Respondent was admitted to ⁶³¹ the Bar of the Court of Appeals of Maryland on December 1, 1981, and maintains a solo law practice in Baltimore County. Respondent’s interaction with Robert L. Wilson began subsequent to a then-recently entered judgment of divorce in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County before the Honorable Sherrie R. Bailey (“the divorce case”).

On June 17, 2010, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson, through their respective counsel, had negotiated the terms of a settlement agreement in the divorce case, in which, relevant here, Mr. Wilson would pay Mrs. Wilson $55,000 plus interest over the next five years or $50,000 within sixty days. Judge Bailey accepted the settlement agreement and entered accordingly a judgment of absolute divorce. Mr. Wilson first met Respondent for an initial consultation on June 23, 2010, to assist him in vacating the divorce judgment because he did not understand the settlement agreement and was dissatisfied with its terms. He retained Respondent on June 24, 2010.

Mr. Wilson signed a retainer agreement providing that he would pay an initial retainer of $10,000 and Respondent would bill at an hourly rate of $425. On June 25, 2010, Mr. Wilson paid Respondent $10,125. Respondent admitted that she failed to create and maintain records of Mr. Wilson’s payments and consequently conceded that she violated Maryland Rule 16-606.1(a). Mr. Wilson typically sought and received help from his friend, Sandra McLean-Stewart (“Ms. Stewart”), and his cousin, Kevin Griggs, in understanding complex information, including legal documents.

As described by Mr. Griggs, Mr. Wilson was able to understand “not too complicated matters” if they were broken down and explained slowly. Ms. Stewart accompanied Mr. Wilson to one of the three initial meetings with Respondent, but not the meeting at which he signed the retainer agreement. ⁶³² Divorce Case: Psychological Evaluation and Motion to Vacate After consulting with Mr. Wilson, Respondent concluded that Mr. Wilson had significant claims to a portion of Mrs. Wilson’s marital property. Respondent also recognized that Mr. Wilson had a diminished capacity to understand information and explained to him that, although vacating the settlement agreement underlying the divorce judgment would be difficult, he might be successful if he could prove that he was incapacitated. Respondent referred Mr. Wilson to a psychologist, Morris S. Lasson, Ph.D., P.A., to determine whether there were sufficient grounds for Mr. Wilson to file a motion to vacate the settlement agreement on the ground of incapacity- On June 28, 2010, Dr. Lasson conducted an initial evaluation of Mr. Wilson and concluded in a written report that Mr. Wilson had a neuro-cognitive disorder that impaired his ability to comprehend complex information.

Dr. Lasson noted that Mr. Wilson suffered a stroke around 1964 that affected his speech and memory. Dr. Lasson explained in his report: [Mr. Wilsonj’s physical appearance was satisfactory. At the same time, his orientation to time, person and place was erratic. He had difficulty absorbing details and showed lapses of attention.

He was unable to maintain concentration explaining, “I need time to think it out.” Mr. Wilson recited the alphabet incorrectly on his fingers. He did not know the name of the U.S. president nor was he aware of today’s date. He showed both expressive and receptive aphasia and speech stammering. His memory was flawed.

He showed difficulty with encoding, retrieval and focusing skills. This man cannot process information fluidly and has sensory integration problems. With reasonable psychological certainty, Robert Wilson has a neuro-cognitive disorder and cannot be held responsible to fully understand complex information and details. On July 1, 2010, Respondent, on behalf of Mr. Wilson, filed a motion to vacate the divorce judgment and attached Dr. ⁶³³ Lasson’s report.

In the motion, Respondent argued that Mr. Wilson lacked the capacity to understand the settlement agreement and consequently could not consent to it. Respondent further requested an extension of time for a complete psychological evaluation of Mr. Wilson to determine whether he required a guardian. Mrs. Wilson, through her attorney, Diana Denrich, filed a response in opposition to the motion to vacate the judgment. Dr. Lasson conducted a complete evaluation of Mr. Wilson and issued a report, dated August 9, 2010, in which he opined that Mr. Wilson should have a legal guardian.

In the August 2010 report, Dr. Lasson explained that Mr. Wilson has a cognitive impairment that affects “his ability to understand and comprehend both the written and spoken word. He should be counseled constantly not to sign any documents and, even in a verbal encounter, he should have guidance and direction to be absolutely certain that he understands to the best of his ability[.]” Dr. Lasson also stated that, “[w]hen asked to count from 20 to 0 backwards, '[Mr. Wilson] forgot specific numbers.” On August 16, 2010, Respondent wrote to Ms. Denrich to explain that she was in the process of having a guardian appointed for Mr. Wilson. Respondent attached to that correspondence Dr. Lasson’s August 2010 report. Guardianship Case: The First Petition On April 20, 2011, Respondent filed a Petition for Appointment of Guardian of the Property of Robert Wilson in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (“the guardianship case”).

In that petition, Respondent listed Mr. Wilson as the Petitioner and named Mr. Griggs as the person Mr. Wilson wished to be appointed as his guardian.'Respondent attached certificates from Dr. Lasson and Mr. Wilson’s treating physician, Beth Marcus, M.D., to show that Mr. Wilson had capacity to consent to a guardian. Those certificates were not verified and did not include the doctors’ full names, qualifications, history with Mr. Wilson, or opinions as to the cause and extent of his disability. ⁶³⁴ Two days later, the Circuit Court rejected the petition because it did not comply with Maryland Rule 10-301 and the certificates did not comply with Maryland Rule 10-202. Before the hearing judge, Respondent testified that she did not receive the court’s rejection until it was produced in the disciplinary investigation. Yet, by August 4, 2011, Respondent had known that the petition (“the first petition”) had been rejected, as she drafted a new petition for guardianship naming Mr. Griggs as the Petitioner.

Mr. Griggs signed and returned the new petition to Respondent on August 10, 2011. Respondent, however, did not file that petition (“the second petition”) until November 2011. Divorce Case: Petition for Civil Constructive Contempt Meanwhile, on October 26, 2011, Mrs. Wilson, having received no communication from Respondent for more than a year after the filing of the motion to vacate the judgment of divorce, filed, through her counsel, Ms. Denrich, a Petition for Civil Constructive Contempt seeking to advance the case and obtain a hearing before Judge Bailey on the motion to vacate. On November 2, 2011, the Circuit Court issued a Show Cause Order why Mr. Wilson should not be found in contempt.

Respondent mailed Mr. Wilson a copy of the Order on November 8, 2011, and stated in a cover letter that Mr. Wilson had to pay her $7,500 to answer the petition and defend him at the hearing. Mr. Wilson paid the requested amount. Later that month, Respondent filed a motion to strike the petition for contempt and, insofar as the record reflects, there was no further action taken on the petition and Mr. Wilson ultimately was not held in contempt. Guardianship Case: The Second Petition On November 18, 2011, Respondent filed the second petition for guardianship, this time naming Mr. Griggs as the Petitioner.

A few days later, the Circuit Court rejected the second petition because once again the physicians’ certificates failed to comply with the applicable rules. On January 10, 2012, ⁶³⁵ Respondent filed amended certificates. The court thereafter accepted that petition. On January 17, 2012, the court appointed Katherine Linzer, Esq. to represent Mr. Wilson in the guardianship proceeding.

On March 14, 2012, Ms. Linzer, on behalf of Mr. Wilson, filed an answer in opposition to the petition. In the answer, Mr. Wilson denied that he was disabled and requested that the petition be dismissed. Attached to the answer was a certificate from Mr. Wilson’s treating physician, Dr. Marcus, attesting to his capacity to understand certain legal documents. On April 10, 2012, Respondent, on behalf of Mr. Griggs, filed an opposition to the answer arguing that Mr. Wilson is incapable of making decisions on his own and requires a guardian to act on his behalf.

Respondent asserted that, “contrary to the assertions made by attorney Katherine Lin-zer on Mr. Wilson’s behalf, Mr. Wilson suffers from a mental disability that his psychologist states causes cognitive and processing deficiencies that render Mr. Wilson incapable of both comprehending and making decisions on his own.” Respondent also argued that “Mr. Wilson presently cannot sufficiently process nor make decisions concerning the management of his property and investments when [the] same involve holding several facts in [his] mind,” nor is it “clear that Mr. Wilson would even have sufficient capacity to designate a power of attorney.” The Circuit Court issued a writ of summons to Mr. Wilson and scheduled trial for June 26, 2012. Respondent sent Mr. Griggs a letter dated May 16, 2012, informing him of the guardianship trial and attaching the writ of summons. Mr. Griggs and Mr. Wilson received conflicting advice from Ms. Linzer and Respondent. Ms. Linzer advised them that, if a guardian were appointed, Mr. Wilson would lose his ability to make financial decisions.

In contrast, Respondent advised that Mr. Wilson would retain some of his rights even if Mr. Griggs became his guardian. Mr. Griggs and Mr. Wilson decided that they no longer wanted to pursue the guardianship. On June 1, 2012, Mr. Griggs faxed Respondent a hand ⁶³⁶ written letter notifying her that he wanted to withdraw the guardianship petition immediately. Upon receiving Mr. Griggs’s letter, on June 19, 2012, Respondent filed a motion to withdraw the guardianship petition, which was granted.

Respondent never told Mr. Griggs or Mr. Wilson that there was a potential for a conflict of interest. Ms. Linzer subsequently filed a request for attorney’s fees, which Respondent did not oppose. On October 19, 2012, the court ordered Mr. Wilson to pay Ms. Linzer $1,120.06 in attorney’s fees. Respondent took no further action to pursue the guardianship.

Divorce Case: Dr. Lasson’s Deposition Meanwhile, in December 2011, Judge Bailey scheduled a hearing on the motion to vacate the settlement agreement and judgment of divorce to be held on February 24, 2012. On January 5, 2012, Respondent informed Mrs. Wilson’s counsel, Ms. Denrich, that she intended to introduce Dr. Lasson’s reports at that hearing. Ms. Denrich objected to the introduction of Dr. Lasson’s reports without his testimony. Respondent then unilaterally scheduled Dr. Lasson’s deposition for February 7, 2012.

On January 13, 2012, Respondent’s paralegal sent an email to Ms. Denrich, informing her of the scheduled deposition and asking her to provide other dates if she was unavailable. Ms. Denrich responded on January 16, 2012, advising that she was not available on February 7, 2012, and proposing six alternate dates prior to the hearing. Respondent refused to reschedule the deposition because Dr. Lasson was only available on February 7, 2012. On January 24, 2012, Ms. Denrich served by first-class mail a motion for a protective order seeking to stop Dr. Lasson’s deposition and a motion to shorten time to respond.

On February 2, 2012, Respondent opposed the motion for a protective order, but the court had no opportunity to rule on it prior to the scheduled deposition because the motion had not been docketed. ⁶³⁷ On February 7, 2012, Respondent took Dr. Lasson’s de bene esse deposition in Ms. Denrich’s absence. Dr. Lasson testified that Mr. Wilson lacks the cognitive capacity to understand basic information. Dr. Lasson emphasized that Mr. Wilson had difficulty processing “basic information much less complicated ones.” He explained that: [I]f you said, sign here, he would be able to do it. But if you tell him, now, before you sign here, I just want to explain to you what this is, and you get involved in some type of detailed explanation, I believe he would lose you and not understand.

He may even be embarrassed to say that he doesn’t understand at times. ... But he would not be able to retain basic information that you have given him and just not understand what he has to do. As to legal matters, Dr. Lasson said that, “if something is involved either legally or any other way with a lot of different facts and information, [Mr. Wilson] would have extreme difficulty processing that and understanding it.” At the hearing on February 24, 2012, Judge Bailey granted the motion for a protective order, prohibiting Respondent from using Dr. Lasson’s deposition and postponing the matter to allow the parties to retake the deposition. The court did not enter a written order to that effect at that time.

Between February 2012 and May 2012, Respondent did not reschedule Dr. Lasson’s deposition, as she did not believe that she was obligated to do so because that responsibility was borne by Ms. Denrich at Mrs. Wilson’s expense. On May 4, 2012, upon Ms. Denrich’s request, Judge Bailey entered an order that prohibited the use of Dr. Lasson’s deposition, ordered Dr. Lasson to be deposed within sixty days at Ms. Denrich’s convenience, required Mr. Wilson to pay the costs of the deposition, and ordered that the failure to comply with the order would result in Dr. Lasson’s being precluded from testifying at trial. Mr. Wilson asked Respondent for clarification regarding that order. By letter dated May 31, 2012, Respondent wrote to Mr. Wilson: “As Dr. Lasson has to be paid before the deposi ⁶³⁸ tion is to occur, and as Ms. Denrich was given at least one month’s notice of [Dr. Lasson’s] deposition (with no objection ever noted from her), I took Dr. Lasson’s deposition as planned and sent her a copy of my questioning and Dr. Lasson’s responses.” The hearing judge found that this was an intentional misrepresentation to Mr. Wilson.

On May 30, 2012, Ms. Denrich and Respondent agreed to reschedule Dr. Lasson’s deposition for August 8, 2012, despite being outside of the court’s sixty-day timeframe. Yet, on June 18, 2012, Respondent noted Dr. Lasson’s deposition by written questions. 3 On July 3, 2012, Ms. Denrich filed a motion to strike the deposition by written questions. Respondent filed an opposition to the motion to strike, in which she claimed that she had tried to schedule a date for Dr. Lasson’s second deposition after the court’s May 4, 2012, order but “Ms. Denrich again would not supply dates on which she would commit to being available for [Dr. Lasson’s] deposition.” The hearing judge found that this statement was an intentional misrepresentation to the court because Ms. Denrich responded to Respondent and the parties agreed upon a new date. On July 24, 2012, Judge Bailey granted the motion to strike, ordered that Mr. Wilson was prohibited from using Dr. Lasson’s deposition or calling Dr. Lasson at trial, and awarded Mrs. Wilson $600 in attorney’s fees, for which Respondent and Mr. Wilson were jointly and severally liable.

On August 2, 2012, Respondent filed a motion to vacate and reconsider the court’s order prohibiting Dr. Lasson’s testimony and issuing sanctions. Divorce Case: Motion to Withdraw and Court Psychiatrist On August 21, 2012, Mr. Wilson discharged Respondent. In response, Respondent sent Mr. Wilson a letter informing him ⁶³⁹ of her intent to withdraw as counsel in the divorce case. Respondent mailed to the court a motion to withdraw, but neither the court nor Ms. Denrich received the motion.

On September 14, 2012, Judge Bailey held a hearing on Respondent’s motion to vacate the divorce judgment and her motion to vacate and reconsider Judge Bailey’s order dated May 4, 2012. 4 At the outset of the hearing, Respondent gave Judge Bailey a copy of her motion to withdraw. In support of that motion, Respondent explained that Mr. Wilson has a diminished capacity and that, pursuant to MLRPC 1.14, 5 she had obtained a medical report stating that Mr. Wilson requires a guardian, and she had attempted to have one appointed. Respondent further argued, “I cannot represent Mr. Wilson because I do not have any source of competent explanation of what he wants and if he has even understood what it is that he wants me to do for him.” Respondent called Ms. Stewart and Mr. Griggs to testify that Mr. Wilson lacks capacity to handle his medical and financial decisions. Mr. Wilson, evidently changing his mind, testified that he still wanted Respondent to represent him.

Judge Bailey stayed ruling on the motion to withdraw and ordered Mr. Wilson to be evaluated by a court psychiatrist within the Office of the Court Psychiatrist, Stephen W. Siebert, M.D., M.P.H. On January 4, 2013, Dr. Siebert filed his evaluation with the court and reported that Mr. Wilson was not competent to enter into the settlement agreement. Dr. Siebert explained that Mr. Wilson has cognitive and memory impairments that ⁶⁴⁰ affect his short-term memory and that Mr. Wilson “is unable to explain, in lay terms, the nature of the current legal dispute.” Dr. Siebert further opined that, Mr. Wilson cannot retain verbal information and then repeat the content of the information after several minutes. My opinion is that this impairs his competency to understand and sign an agreement, even after this has been dis'cussed or explained to him. My opinion is that he is not competent, at this time, to sign a settlement agreement regarding his property or alimony.

On February 13, 2013, at a hearing before Judge Bailey, Respondent renewed her motion to withdraw from the representation. Respondent stated: “I can’t work with Mr. Wilson because there is no consistent strategy nor understanding of a strategy nor a continued ability to remember what decisions were made even five minutes ago[.]” Judge Bailey accepted Dr. Siebert’s report and found that “Mr. Wilson is incompetent to enter into a legal agreement, a contractual agreement, or to enter into a settlement agreement or to even file a petition for divorce.” Consequently, Judge Bailey granted Respondent’s motion to withdraw as well as the motion Respondent had filed on Mr. Wilson’s behalf to vacate the judgment of absolute divorce. Judge Bailey, recognizing Mr. Wilson’s incapacity, reconsidered and vacated her earlier award of sanctions against him. The Fee Case On July 30, 2013, after the divorce and guardianship cases had concluded, Respondent filed suit against Mr. Wilson for attorney’s fees in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Baltimore County (“the fee case”).

Respondent testified before the District Court that Mr. Wilson owed her $30,000 plus prejudgment interest — an amount reduced by $10,261.27, allegedly to satisfy Mr. Wilson’s complaints about the guardianship case and to comply with the jurisdictional limit of the District Court. From June 2010 to February 2013, Respondent had billed Mr. Wilson for a total of $58,748.77 in attorney’s fees. And, ⁶⁴¹ from June 2010 to November 2011, Mr. Wilson paid Respondent $19,125. Although Respondent presented all of her invoices to the District Court, she claimed that she was not seeking payment of her fees from the guardianship case as a conciliatory gesture to Mr. Wilson given his complaints about her handling of that matter.

On August 8, 2013, Mr. Wilson, representing himself, filed a Notice of Intention to Defend. On August 20, 2013, Respondent asked Mr. Wilson to sign a Consent Judgment, which represented that Mr. Wilson was “of sound mind.” Mr. Wilson refused. Ms. Stewart and Mr. Griggs assisted Mr. Wilson in his defense. In response to an interrogatory question propounded by Respondent, Mr. Wilson answered that, in the divorce case, “Judge Bailey ruled that Mr. Wilson is incompetent to enter into a legal agreement, a contractual agreement, or to enter into a settlement agreement or even file a petition for divorce.” The Honorable Marsha L. Russell presided over the trial concerning Respondent’s claim for attorney’s fees, which occurred on October 22, 2013.

After hearing testimony, Judge Russell entered judgment in favor of Respondent for $30,000 with prejudgment interest of $5,029.93. To satisfy that judgment, Respondent garnished Mr. Wilson’s accounts. The hearing judge accepted Respondent’s testimony at the disciplinary hearing concerning the reasonableness of her fees and expenses because Petitioner had not offered any evidence to the contrary. He found, though, that Respondent, who had testified at the trial before Judge Russell, had misrepresented Dr. Lasson’s opinion of Mr. Wilson’s mental capacity by testifying in the fee case that Dr. Lasson had concluded that Mr. Wilson “can certainly deal with his day-to-day events and simple contracts,” and that Dr. Lasson’s “report didn’t indicate he couldn’t understand normal contracts he entered into.” Respondent also misrepresented that she “was aware that not only does Mr. Wilson have a fairly good capacity to understand agreements ... but he has people who have re ⁶⁴² sources[.]” The hearing judge found that Respondent in her testimony in the fee case, at best, “continually understated the extent to which Wilson had a serious and permanent cognitive disorder.” The hearing judge found that Respondent’s failure to testify specifically that Judge Bailey had found Mr. Wilson incompetent further contributed to her misrepresentation as to Mr. Wilson’s capacity.

The hearing judge rejected Respondent’s argument that Judge Russell was made fully aware of Judge Bailey’s finding because Mr. Wilson had informed Judge Russell of this fact in his interrogatory answer. The hearing judge also found that Respondent intentionally misrepresented to Judge Russell the circumstances surrounding Dr. Lasson’s deposition. Respondent had testified in the fee case that she told the opposing counsel that since she didn’t show up, if she wants to ask any questions, she certainly can and we’ll be glad to reschedule. Opposing counsel then filed a motion for protective order asking not only that it not be included but that Mr. Wilson and I be sanctioned for going ahead with the deposition when she was not available.

The court ordered that we retake the deposition with her present, and that we do that before the hearing occur[ed]. Respondent further misrepresented to Judge Russell that she usually provided Mr. Wilson with advice both orally and in writing to allow him to confer with Ms. Stewart or Mr. Griggs, and that Ms. Stewart was present when Mr. Wilson signed the retainer agreement, when she in fact was not. The hearing judge found that “Respondent intentionally misrepresented to Judge Russell that she filed various ‘motions in supporting the fairness of a court psychiatrist’ and motions and pleadings regarding the records to be produced to Dr. Siebert in the Divorce Case,” because, in fact, no such documents had been filed. Further, “Respondent intentionally misrepresented to Judge Russell that ‘there was a hearing scheduled October 19, 2012, which was cancelled the day before the hearing, so we had to prepare for that and get everyone geared up for that[.]’ ” In fact the hearing on Octo ⁶⁴³ ber 19, 2012, was cancelled no later than October 8, 2012.

Respondent admitted to the hearing judge that her statement to Judge Russell was false. The hearing judge found, in addition, that Respondent intentionally misrepresented Dr. Siebert’s opinion. Respondent had testified in the fee case that “Dr. Siebert thankfully agreed with us, and he said, ‘this is way too complicated of an issue for this gentleman to be able to work through without assistance.’ ” The hearing judge found that, because Respondent knew the details of Dr. Siebert’s report, she should have relayed his findings accurately. The hearing judge found as well that Respondent made misrepresentations by omitting relevant medical information, including Dr. Lasson’s and Dr. Siebert’s reports and Dr. Lasson’s deposition testimony.

Respondent had also failed to inform Judge Russell that she had filed an opposition to Mr. Wilson’s answer to the second petition for guardianship. Based upon those findings, the hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4; 1.7; 1.15; 3.3; and 8.4(a), (c), and (d); and Maryland Rule 16-606.1(a), but did not violate MLRPC 1.1,1.2,1.3, or 1.5. II. “In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court has original and complete jurisdiction and conducts an independent review of the record.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Good, 445 Md. 490, 512 , 128 A.3d 54 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). We accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous.

Id. “That deference is appropriate because the hearing judge is in a position to assess the demeanor-based credibility of the witnesses.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tanko, 427 Md. 15, 27 , 45 A.3d 281 (2012). “The hearing judge is permitted to ‘pick and choose which evidence to rely upon’ from a conflicting array when determining findings of fact.” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50 , 891 A.2d 1085 (2006)). We review the hearing judge’s legal ⁶⁴⁴ conclusions de novo and thus render the ultimate decision as to an attorney’s alleged misconduct. Good, 445 Md. at 512 , 128 A.3d 54 .

We must therefore determine independently whether sufficient evidence in the record exists to support the hearing judge’s conclusions of law under a “ ‘clear and convincing’ standard of proof.” Tanko, 427 Md. at 27 , 45 A.3d 281 . Both Petitioner and Respondent have filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Given the number of exceptions presented, we address each exception as it relates to our de novo review of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law. MLRPC 1.1 MLRPC 1.1 provides that “[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.

Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” The hearing judge concluded that Petitioner failed to prove a violation of MLRPC 1.1 by clear and convincing evidence. The hearing judge recognized that “there had to be a point in time ... where Respondent should have advised Wilson, and documented such advice, that the costs of all of the respective litigation had reached a point where it was not feasible to continue.” The hearing judge nevertheless rejected Petitioner’s contention that Respondent was required to perform a cost-benefit analysis, and he concluded that Respondent did not violate MLRPC 1.1 by failing to do so. The hearing judge also concluded that Respondent’s conduct in the divorce case, while aggressive, was sufficiently competent because she ultimately was successful in getting the divorce judgment vacated for Mr. Wilson. Likewise, the hearing judge rejected Petitioner’s contention that Respondent’s deficient filings in the guardianship case rose to the level of a violation of MLRPC 1.1.

Petitioner takes exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent did not violate MLRPC 1.1. Petitioner points out that Respondent, among other failures, never conducted a cost-benefit analysis for Mr. Wilson and that Respondent’s ⁶⁴⁵ guardianship petitions were twice rejected by the court. Petitioner also asserts that Respondent’s failure to identify a conflict of interest in the guardianship case and to advise Messrs. Wilson and Griggs to that effect “does not meet the bare minimum required of competent representation.” We sustain Petitioner’s exception.

The essence of competent representation under MLRPC 1.1 is adequate preparation and thoroughness in pursuing the matter. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Blair, 440 Md. 387, 401 , 102 A.3d 786 (2014). Consequently, “[attorneys remain potentially susceptible to violating MLRPC 1.1 notwithstanding they possess the requisite skill or knowledge to represent a client.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Adams, 441 Md. 590, 610 , 109 A.3d 114 (2015). We agree with Petitioner that Respondent’s mistakes and errors in judgment demonstrate a lack of competence, in violation of MLRPC 1.1.

Respondent’s failure to advise Mr. Wilson at any time during the representation that the cost of continuing to pursue litigation might vitiate any benefit he may receive ultimately does not reflect thorough and competent representation. Cf. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sutton, 394 Md. 311, 323 , 906 A.2d 335 (2006) (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.1 “by undertaking representation of [his client’s] claim although respondent recognized from the beginning that the likelihood of success with [his client’s] claim was limited” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Respondent’s abuses of discovery, which delayed the divorce proceedings and caused Dr. Lasson’s testimony to be excluded entirely from the case, also demonstrate Respondent’s failure to provide Mr. Wilson competent representation.

Similarly lacking in competence was Respondent’s representation of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Griggs in the guardianship case. Respondent filed a petition for guardianship that wholly failed to comply with the Maryland Rules and only in her third attempt were the physicians’ certificates accepted by the court. Respondent’s evident failure to conduct even minimal research, which would have revealed the defects in her submissions and avoided multiple filings, violates MLRPC 1.1. See ⁶⁴⁶ Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Davy, 435 Md. 674, 698 , 80 A.3d 322 (2013) (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.1 when “the bankruptcy court sent Davy three deficiency notices regarding the bankruptcy filing” because the respondent did not adequately research her case).

Further, Respondent’s failure to recognize the inherent conflict of interest in representing Mr. Griggs in the guardianship case while remaining counsel to Mr. Wilson in the divorce case falls below the minimum standard of competence. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Olszewski, 441 Md. 248, 266 , 107 A.3d 1159 (2015) (“We agree with the hearing judge that, on the facts of this case, ‘a minimal threshold of competent representation was breached when [Respondent] agreed to represent one client against another[.]’ ” (alteration in original)). In sum, we conclude that the facts found by the hearing judge present clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.1. MLRPC 1.2 MLRPC 1.2(a) provides that “a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and, when appropriate, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.” The hearing judge noted that “what happened in the Guardianship Case could potentially have been avoided through better and more detailed communication between Respondent and Wilson.” Evidently for this reason, the hearing judge concluded that Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.2(a) because Respondent, in filing the guardianship petition on behalf of Mr. Griggs, was “still ultimately attempting to advance Wilson’s position in the Divorce Case.” Petitioner excepts to this conclusion.

We agree with Petitioner that, by opposing Mr. Wilson’s answer in the guardianship case, Respondent took a position that was directly contrary to that of her client. By definition, Respondent did not “abide by [her] client’s decisions concerning the objectives of ⁶⁴⁷ the representation.” See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Haley, 443 Md. 657, 669 , 118 A.3d 816 (2015) (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.2(a) by seeking primary physical custody of his client’s children despite the client’s instruction for shared physical custody). We disagree with the hearing judge that Respondent did not violate MLRPC 1.2(a) simply because the issues in the guardianship case might have been resolved through better communication. That Respondent’s misconduct with respect to MLRPC 1.2(a) might overlap with another one of our rules of professional conduct does not remove that misconduct from its scope.

We conclude that Petitioner proved a violation of MLRPC 1.2(a) by clear and convincing evidence. MLRPC 1.3 MLRPC 1.3 provides that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” The hearing judge concluded that Respondent did not violate MLRPC 1.3. The hearing judge determined that the seven-month delay between the filing of the first and second petitions for guardianship did not establish a lack of diligence because proceedings in the divorce case were ongoing. Similarly, the hearing judge declined to conclude that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.3 in failing to file timely physicians’ certificates because the Maryland Rules impose a “narrow time-frame” of twenty-one days from the time of the evaluation to the filing of the certificate.

Petitioner excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion. Petitioner argues that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.3 by failing both to advance the divorce case for almost one year after filing the motion to vacate and to file diligently petitions for guardianship that complied with the Maryland Rules. Petitioner also argues that Respondent’s failure to communicate adequately, conduct a cost-benefit analysis, perform any research on Mr. Wilson’s claims for Mrs. Wilson’s marital property, and abide by the Maryland Rules and court orders with respect to Dr. Lasson’s deposition violates MLRPC 1.3. Petitioner states, in sum, that “two years after [Respondent] was retained to ⁶⁴⁸ represent Mr. Wilson, no guardian had been appointed and the only evidence in support of Mr. Wilson’s motion to vacate the divorce judgment, namely Dr. Lasson’s testimony, had been excluded due to the Respondent’s misconduct.” We overrule Petitioner’s exception.

We are not persuaded that the time elapsed between the filing of the motion to vacate and Respondent’s next advancement of Mr. Wilson’s claims in the guardianship case, in itself, violates MLRPC 1.3. The remainder of Petitioner’s arguments in support of its charge speak more to Respondent’s violations of other rules of professional conduct than a lack of diligence in violation of MLRPC 1.3. MLRPC 1.4 MLRPC 1.4 provides: (a) A lawyer shall: (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(f), is required by these Rules; (2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; (3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and (4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

The hearing judge rendered conclusions of law on MLRPC 1.4 with respect to Respondent’s overall representation of Mr. Wilson as well as her representation of Mr. Griggs in the guardianship case. ⁶⁴⁹ With respect to Respondent’s representation of Mr. Wilson, the hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4(b) but not MLRPC 1.4(a). The hearing judge determined that Respondent did not violate MLRPC 1.4(a) because she orally communicated with Mr. Wilson regarding the divorce and guardianship cases. In concluding that Respondent’s representation of Mr. Wilson violated MLRPC 1.4(b), the hearing judge took judicial notice of Judge Bailey’s determination that Mr. Wilson was “incompetent to enter into a legal agreement” and found that Mr. Wilson was a vulnerable adult. The hearing judge concluded consequently that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4(b) by failing to communicate major events to Mr. Wilson in writing, which was necessary for him to be able to understand and later recall that information.

With respect to Respondent’s representation of Mr. Griggs, the hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4(a) and (b). The hearing judge noted that Respondent did not explain her role as Mr. Griggs’s attorney or the existence or appearance of a conflict of interest between Mr. Griggs and Mr. Wilson in the guardianship case. The hearing judge concluded that Respondent’s failure to explain adequately the guardianship case deprived Mr. Griggs of the ability to make informed decisions. Respondent takes exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated MLRPC 1.4 in any respect in representing both Mr. Wilson and Mr. Griggs.

Respondent asserts that she adequately communicated all facets of the guardianship case to Mr. Griggs and Mr. Wilson. As to Respondent’s representation of Mr. Wilson, Respondent argues that the hearing judge erred in concluding that Mr. Wilson was a vulnerable adult because there was no competency hearing or expert testimony opining that Mr. Wilson was incompetent. She also contends that she was under no legal obligation to memorialize her advice in writing and therefore did not violate MLRPC 1.4(b). ⁶⁵⁰ We