Attorney Grievance v. Hoerauf

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Gwyn Cara Hoerauf, Miscellaneous Docket AG No. 7, September Term, 2019. Opinion by Biran, J. ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT — DISCIPLINE — DISBARMENT — Respondent Gwyn Cara Hoerauf violated Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 (Competence), 1.2(a) (Scope of Representation), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct). Respondent violated Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct 19-303.3(a)(1) (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 19-304.3 (Dealing with Unrepresented Person), 19-308.1(a) and (b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 19-308.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct). These violations arose from Respondent’s conduct in three separate client matters.

Respondent facilitated an attorney-client relationship between her client’s alleged victim, a 16-year-old minor, and another attorney, and then misled the circuit court in an effort to conceal that relationship and conceal her efforts to dissuade the victim from cooperating with the prosecution. Additionally, Respondent took advantage of the minor victim by gaining her trust in an effort to weaken the prosecution’s case against her client. Respondent failed to file motions on a client’s behalf, misrepresented she had done so, and failed to communicate the scope and terms of her representation in the client’s six cases. In her dealings with Bar Counsel, Respondent failed to timely respond on three occasions, provided inflammatory and unprofessional statements about a complainant, and falsely testified about what she agreed to do for a client.

Given these violations and the existence of several aggravating factors, the Court of Appeals held that disbarment was the appropriate sanction. Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No. 468445V Argued: Argument waived/submitted on papers IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 7 September Term, 2019 ______________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. GWYN CARA HOERAUF ______________________________________ Barbera, C.J. McDonald Watts Hotten Getty Booth Biran, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Biran, J. ______________________________________ Filed: June 26, 2020 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. Suzanne Johnson 2020-10-23 15:51-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk On June 20, 2019, Petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, acting through Bar Counsel, filed in this Court a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“Petition”) against Respondent, Gwyn Cara Hoerauf, alleging violations of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) and the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”).1 Petitioner subsequently filed an Amended Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“Amended Petition”).

The Amended Petition concerned three separate complaints against Respondent and alleged violations of MLRPC 1.1 (Competence), 1.2(a) (Scope of Representation), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct). Additionally, Petitioner alleged that Respondent violated MARPC 19-303.3(a)(1) (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 19-304.3 (Dealing with Unrepresented Person), 19-308.1(a) and (b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 19-308.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct). On June 20, 2019, pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-722(a), this Court transmitted this matter to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County and designated the Honorable Christopher C. Fogleman (the “hearing judge”) to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Maryland Rule 19-727. On August 8, 2019, pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-723(a), Respondent was served with the following: Writ of Summons issued June 28, 2019, by the Circuit Court for Montgomery 1 Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct were renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct and recodified without substantive changes in Title 19 of the Maryland Rules.

Respondent’s alleged misconduct occurred both before and after the recodification. County; Order of the Court of Appeals dated June 20, 2019; and both the Petition and Amended Petition. On August 30, 2019, pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-401(d)(2), Respondent was served with the following: Petitioner’s First Set of Interrogatories; Petitioner’s First Request for Document Production; and Petitioner’s Request for Admissions of Fact and Genuineness of Documents with Exhibits 1-37. On September 11, 2019, Petitioner filed a Motion for Order of Default after Respondent failed to answer the Amended Petition within 15 days of service.

On October 10, 2019, the hearing judge issued an Order of Default and scheduled a hearing for November 15, 2019. The Order notified Respondent that a default had been entered, and that she could move to vacate the Order of Default within 30 days. Respondent did not move to vacate the Order of Default. Respondent did not appear at the November 15, 2019 hearing, and the hearing judge admitted Petitioner’s exhibits into evidence.

Petitioner submitted Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on December 9, 2019, based on the evidence admitted at the hearing. The hearing judge issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on December 30, 2019, based on clear and convincing evidence. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent filed any exceptions, and Petitioner recommended disbarment. On March 18, 2020, Petitioner filed a request to waive oral argument.

This Court issued an Order on March 27, 2020, directing Respondent to show cause why oral argument should be held and stating that, if Respondent failed to show such cause by April 6, 2020, the Court would consider the case on the papers. Respondent did not respond to the Order to Show Cause, and on April 9, 2020, this Court granted Petitioner’s request to waive oral 2 argument. On April 24, 2020, we issued a per curiam order disbarring Respondent. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hoerauf, 468 Md. 321 (2020), 2020 WL 1969945 , at ¹ (Md. Apr. 24, 2020).

We explain in this opinion the reasons for that action. I The Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact We summarize here the hearing judge’s findings of fact. Background Respondent was admitted to the Maryland Bar on December 12, 2000. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent maintained an office for the practice of law in Montgomery County, Maryland.

Complaint of Peggy Lyles/Representation of Stacy Simmons In December 2015, Peggy Lyles retained Respondent to represent her son, Stacy Simmons, in two criminal cases pending in the District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County (“District Court”).2 Respondent agreed to represent Mr. Simmons for a flat fee of $1,000, and required a $300 initial payment before she would enter her appearance or visit Mr. Simmons in jail. Ms. Lyles made the initial $300 payment to Respondent on December 17, 2015, and provided Respondent with a post-dated check for January 1, 2016 for the remaining $700. Respondent represented Mr. Simmons in these two cases without issue, and they were resolved on January 4, 2016, through a plea agreement. 2 State v. Stacy Terrell Simmons, District Court Case No. 4D00333029, filed on May 18, 2015; and State v. Terrell D. Lyles, District Court Case No. 1D00347418, filed on September 19, 2015 (charging Mr. Simmons under an alias). 3 On or about January 4, 2016, Ms. Lyles asked Respondent what the fee would be to represent Mr. Simmons in a third criminal case;3 a hearing had been scheduled in that case for January 12, 2016. Respondent advised Ms. Lyles that she would appear at the January 12 hearing for $250, but that the fee needed to be paid in advance; Ms. Lyles agreed to this arrangement.

Respondent visited Mr. Simmons in jail on the evening of January 11, 2016. Mr. Simmons confirmed that he wanted to retain Respondent as counsel for this third case. At 10:30 p.m. on January 11th, Respondent sent a text message to Ms. Lyles stating: I went to see Stacey [sic] earlier tonight and he would like me to appear tomorrow and his traffic matter scheduled for February. As for tomorrow, I am agreeing to appear and argue a motion to dismiss for $250.

If I win or a loss is followed by a plea, that is my whole fee for tomorrow. If I have to come back or try the case, my fee will be an additional $250. Per our discussion earlier, u were going to bring a check tomorrow for the minimum fee. Ms. Lyles responded to Respondent’s text at 6:15 a.m. the next day, January 12, and stated, “Gwyn[.] We have appointments this morning (last minute from appointment yesterday)[.] I will meet you at your office as soon as we are done without fail….” At 8:45 a.m., Respondent replied, “I have an emergency with my son.

Stacey [sic] wanted me to come to argue the motion to dismiss. He should b [sic] entitled to a postponement. If he can get one he should.” Respondent did not have an emergency with her son on January 12, 2016. Respondent did not appear at the hearing, and the State entered a nolle prosequi to Mr. Simmons’s charges. 3 State v. Terrell D. Lyles, District Court Case No. 5D00348430, filed on November 13, 2015. 4 On March 3, 2016, Ms. Lyles filed a complaint against Respondent with Bar Counsel.

Bar Counsel forwarded the complaint to Respondent on March 23, 2016, and requested a written response within 15 days. Respondent failed to respond. Bar Counsel wrote to Respondent again on April 29, 2016, and requested a response within 10 days. Respondent replied by letter dated May 17, 2016, and stated, “[Ms. Lyles] is only angry now that her intended theft of my services did not succeed.” Respondent also made the following statements: From the outset of our interaction, Ms. Lyles impressed me as dishonest and untrustworthy.

When she first retained me, she indicated that she could pay my fees, in part, by “selling” me some of the purses her son had stolen during his theft spree. When I expressed my surprise and disapproval at such a proposal, Ms. Lyles tried to suggest it was “a joke.” I have no doubt she has acted as her son’s accomplice in his theft scheme…. Peggy Lyles is a malicious and disingenuous person. She apparently acts as a broker for her son’s stolen property, which makes her just as guilty of theft as her son.

On July 22, 2016, Bar Counsel forwarded Respondent’s letter to Ms. Lyles. On August 22, 2016, Ms. Lyles provided Bar Counsel with her written comments and attached copies of text messages between her and Respondent. On September 21, 2016, Bar Counsel wrote to Respondent, requesting a written response to Ms. Lyles’s August 22 letter. Respondent failed to respond.

On October 18, 2016, Bar Counsel sent another letter to Respondent, requesting that she respond to Ms. Lyles’s letter of August 22. Respondent replied to Bar Counsel by letter dated November 1, 2016, and stated the following regarding her decision not to appear at Mr. Simmons’s January 12 hearing after having received Ms. Lyles’s text about having a last-minute appointment: “Rather than get into a 5 debate about whether she was in fact going to honor our agreement, I informed her that I also was involved in an emergency and that if her son wanted me to represent him, he could ask for a postponement.” Respondent also made the following statements in her November 1 letter to Bar Counsel: My descriptions of Ms. Lyles’ veracity and character have been civil, despite that I find her to be a despicable and vindictive individual. She should be relieved that Stacy Simmons, her son, despite his many short-comings, does not exhibit her bad character…. So, in the interest of candor, I do resent being required to defend myself from frivolous complaints like Ms. Lyles’.

It is not a reflection of my lawyering as she suggests, but rather on my generosity and desire to help people. Unfortunately, some of those people are unscrupulous, ungrateful, and likely sociopaths. As the saying goes, “no good deed goes unpunished.” Ms. Lyles embodies that principle…. She now seems to backtrack on her earlier claims that a “young white male” entered my office, right in front of her and me, and used drugs.

She now says it is “possible” that I did not see him use across from my desk. It was not possible for me to have seen the “young white male” do anything in my office because there was only one young white male present and he was obviously a figment of Ms. Lyles’ imagination. He was not visible to those of us whose perceptions were still governed by reality. If that is insulting, it was meant to be.

I believe I also retain my rights to insult people who attack my professional competence and integrity through insults and false accusations. I will not apologize. It is all I can do to refrain from using the language I believe would be far more appropriate for the likes of Ms. Lyles…. I hope in the future, when allegations can be tested by the public record, you use your considerable resources to do an investigation than put the entire onus on people like myself to prove their innocence when faced with preposterous claims.

On November 22, 2016, Bar Counsel requested by letter that Respondent provide proof of the emergency that prevented her from being able to attend and represent Mr. 6 Simmons at the January 12, 2016 hearing. Respondent failed to respond. On December 21, 2016, Bar Counsel again wrote to Respondent, requesting a written response to Bar Counsel’s November 22 letter. On or about January 2, 2017, Respondent sent a letter to Bar Counsel, which stated: “My ‘emergency’ was that I was not hired for the case and was not going to allow Ms. Lyles to steal services with fraudulent representations.” On or about September 28, 2017, Respondent and Bar Counsel entered into a Conditional Diversion Agreement (“CDA”) under Maryland Rule 19-716.

The Attorney Grievance Commission approved the CDA on November 15, 2017, and stayed the underlying disciplinary matter. In the CDA, Respondent conceded that she violated MLRPC Rule 8.1(b) when she failed to timely and completely respond to Bar Counsel, and that she violated MLRPC Rule 8.4(d) when she made disparaging comments about Ms. Lyles. The terms of the CDA provided that Respondent would obtain professional liability insurance and maintain it through the CDA’s duration, have her law practice monitored for two years, and consult with the Maryland State Bar Association’s Lawyer Assistance Program. The CDA contained an express condition that Respondent not engage in further conduct that would constitute professional misconduct.

Respondent failed to comply with the CDA. As discussed in greater detail below, Respondent knowingly and intentionally provided a false statement under oath to Bar Counsel on September 19, 2018, in connection with its investigation of Respondent into a complaint filed by Valerie Brown. On May 28, 2019, Bar Counsel sent written notice to Respondent, through counsel, of its intention to declare a proposed default of the CDA based on Respondent’s false testimony. On July 2, 2019, Bar Counsel filed a Petition to revoke the CDA under 7 Maryland Rule 19-716(h).

Respondent did not file an opposition to the Petition. On July 24, 2019, the Attorney Grievance Commission found Respondent to be in material default of the CDA, revoked the CDA, and lifted the stay of the disciplinary proceeding against Respondent relating to Ms. Lyles’s Complaint. Complaint of Valerie Brown/Representation of Samuel Goldenberg Respondent represented Samuel Goldenberg in six criminal cases in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (the “Circuit Court”) and/or the District Court.4 On September 21, 2012, Mr. Goldenberg was charged with theft in District Court; the case was forwarded to the Circuit Court on December 5, 2012 (“Case One”). On December 28, 2012, Respondent entered her appearance on behalf of Mr. Goldenberg in Case One.

Mr. Goldenberg agreed to pay Respondent’s standard District Court fee of $1,000 to $1,500. 4 Case One: State v. Samuel Goldenberg, District Court Case No. 1D00282164, filed on September 21, 2012; case forwarded to the Circuit Court on December 5, 2012, Case No. 121810C. Case Two: State v. Samuel Goldenberg, District Court Case No. 0D00282373, filed on October 4, 2012; case forwarded to the Circuit Court on February 11, 2013, Case No. 122195C. Case Three: State v. Samuel Goldenberg, District Court Case No. 3D00301787, filed on June 1, 2013. Case Four: State v. Samuel Goldenberg, District Court Case No. 0D00311262, filed on July 26, 2013; case forwarded to the Circuit Court on August 29, 2013, Case No. 123428C.

Case Five: State v. Samuel Goldenberg, District Court Case No. 4D00294151, filed on September 2, 2013; case forwarded to the Circuit Court on October 30, 2013, Case No. 123774C. Case Six: State v. Samuel Goldenberg, District Court Case No. 6D00308125, filed on November 17, 2013; case forwarded to the Circuit Court on December 12, 2013, Case No. 124083C. 8 On October 4, 2012, Mr. Goldenberg was charged in District Court with one count of credit card theft and four counts of fraud; the case was forwarded to the Circuit Court on February 11, 2013 (“Case Two”). Respondent entered her appearance on behalf of Mr. Goldenberg in Case Two on February 12, 2013. Mr. Goldenberg subsequently accepted a plea agreement resolving both Cases One and Two.

On April 1, 2013, Mr. Goldenberg was sentenced in Case One to an 18-month suspended sentence and two years of supervised probation. He received a concurrent 18-month suspended sentence and term of probation in Case Two. On June 1, 2013, Mr. Goldenberg was charged in District Court with seven theft- related counts, three fourth-degree burglary counts, and one marijuana possession count (“Case Three”). Respondent represented Mr. Goldenberg in Case Three, and on August 13, 2013, a nolle prosequi was entered as to each charge.

On July 26, 2013, Mr. Goldenberg was charged in District Court with one count of possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance (“CDS”), one count of dispensing a prescription drug, and one count of drug paraphernalia possession; the case was forwarded to the Circuit Court on August 29, 2013 (“Case Four”). These new charges were potentially a violation of Mr. Goldenberg’s probation in Cases One and Two. On September 2, 2013, Mr. Goldenberg was charged in District Court with six theft- related counts and two counts of rogue and vagabond; the case was forwarded to the Circuit Court on October 30, 2013 (“Case Five”). Mr. Goldenberg wanted Respondent to represent him in his pending cases (Cases Four and Five) but was unable to pay her fee.

In or around October 2013, Mr. Goldenberg’s 9 mother, Valerie Brown, contacted Respondent and asked her to represent Mr. Goldenberg. Ms. Brown told Respondent that she would pay her fee any way she could. On November 17, 2013, Mr. Goldenberg was charged in District Court with one count of first-degree burglary, six theft-related counts, two CDS possession counts, and one drug paraphernalia count; the case was forwarded to the Circuit Court on December 12, 2013 (“Case Six”). At Ms. Brown’s request, Respondent agreed to represent Mr. Goldenberg in Cases Four, Five, and Six, as well as his probation violation in Cases One and Two, for a flat fee of $5,000.

Respondent did not enter into a written fee agreement with Mr. Goldenberg or Ms. Brown with respect to any of the six cases. Ms. Brown paid Respondent the following: $800 by check dated October 28, 2013; $200 by check dated November 2, 2013; $50 by check dated January 26, 2014; and a book of garden photographs taken by Ms. Brown as payment in kind. On May 7, 2014, Ms. Brown emailed Respondent asking about the value she gave to four canvas photographs that Ms. Brown had also given to Respondent as payment in kind. Ms. Brown suggested a total value of $1,000 for the four canvases, noting that she sells such photographs for $375 apiece.

Respondent did not reply to Ms. Brown’s email, but admitted to crediting Ms. Brown $1,000 for the four canvases. On December 19, 2013, Respondent entered her appearance in Cases Four, Five, and Six, and on February 11, 2014, Mr. Goldenberg pled guilty under the terms of a global plea agreement. On May 1, 2014, Mr. Goldenberg appeared for sentencing in Cases Four, Five, and Six, and for the violation of probation in Cases One and Two. He received 10 concurrent sentences totaling 10 years of executed jail time, as well as five years of probation.

Following sentencing, Respondent informed Mr. Goldenberg that she would file a motion for modification of sentence, which pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345(e)(1), was required to be filed 90 days after sentencing. Respondent failed to file the motion for modification of sentence, and failed to advise Mr. Goldenberg that she did not file the motion. On or about October 20, 2014, Mr. Goldenberg wrote Respondent and requested that she obtain the property seized from him during his arrest, including his cell phone and $455 in cash. Mr. Goldenberg told Respondent that she could keep the $455 as part of her fee, but asked that the other property be returned to his mother.

Respondent did not respond to Mr. Goldenberg’s letter. On or about December 11, 2014, Ms. Brown exchanged text messages with Respondent about the return of Mr. Goldenberg’s property, in which Ms. Brown stated that she wanted Respondent to have the money but that she wanted Mr. Goldenberg’s phone back to facilitate canceling his cellular service with Verizon. Following sentencing, Mr. Goldenberg and his mother asked Respondent to file a motion for drug treatment. On December 11, 2014, Respondent and Ms. Brown exchanged the following text messages: Ms. Brown: Were you able to file forms Respondent: I mailed then [sic] in yesterday so they will b docketed by Friday The motion for trea[tm]ent 11 Respondent never drafted or filed a motion for drug treatment.

The hearing judge found that Respondent knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to Ms. Brown that she had filed such a motion. On March 2, 2015, Respondent requested that the State return the $455 seized from Mr. Goldenberg and, on April 7, 2015, she received a check in that amount made payable to Samuel Goldenberg, c/o Gwyn Hoerauf. Respondent kept the $455 as payment of her fee for representing Mr. Goldenberg. Respondent did not request the return of Mr. Goldenberg’s other property, nor did she inform Mr. Goldenberg or his mother that she had failed to request the return of Mr. Goldenberg’s cell phone.

On August 25, 2017, Ms. Brown filed a complaint with Bar Counsel against Respondent. On September 1, 2017, Bar Counsel forwarded the complaint to Respondent, through counsel, and requested a written response. On September 19, 2018, Bar Counsel took Respondent’s statement under oath in connection with Ms. Brown’s complaint. Respondent knowingly and intentionally falsely testified that she did not inform Mr. Goldenberg or his mother that she would attempt to secure the return of Mr. Goldenberg’s personal property that was seized during his arrest.

When asked how much she charged and collected as a fee for each of Mr. Goldenberg’s cases, Respondent was unable to articulate the amount of fees charged and paid by Mr. Goldenberg or his mother in cash or in kind. Respondent never prepared any written retainer agreements, invoices, or accountings in connection with her representation of Mr. Goldenberg. 12 Complaint of April Ademiluyi/Representation of Eric Solomon In or about November 2016, Eric Solomon retained Respondent to represent him in a case pending in the District Court, in which he was charged with crimes relating to allegations that he sexually assaulted K.J., his 16-year-old minor cousin.5 During the pendency of the case in the District Court, Respondent invited and met with K.J. at her office. K.J. was 17 at the time and accompanied by her parents, but Respondent insisted on meeting with K.J. alone. During the meeting, K.J. told Respondent that she did not want her family to know about her sexual history and drug and alcohol use.

Respondent advised K.J. of the types of cross-examination questions that might be asked if the case went to trial, and told K.J. that her personal information could be admitted into evidence through her testimony, including the fact that K.J. had asked her sister and cousin for a ride to CVS to purchase a Plan B pill. Additionally, Respondent told K.J. that she had difficulty believing that K.J. had been raped, that her statements did not evidence criminal assault but rather inappropriate and embarrassing behavior, and that K.J. was blaming someone else because that is what young women do when they regret their decisions about sex. Respondent also discussed topics with K.J. that were unrelated to the alleged incident, including gender discrimination and cultural issues. Respondent encouraged K.J. to take advantage of her American residency, educate herself, and work on shedding all the shame and discrimination that, Respondent believed, defined K.J.’s experience. 5 State v. Eric A. Solomon, District Court Case No. 1D00362769, filed on September 20, 2016. 13 K.J. responded warmly to Respondent and seemed to appreciate talking to Respondent because she felt that Respondent would not judge her.

K.J. told Respondent she had not trusted the adults in her life, and asked Respondent to tell Mr. Solomon that what happened between them was wrong and that he should seek counseling. Respondent agreed to relay K.J.’s message to Mr. Solomon. K.J. also told Respondent she did not want to go trial and asked Respondent how she could get out of it. Respondent exchanged personal text messages with K.J. after their meeting.

With respect to the meeting between Respondent and K.J., the hearing judge found: Respondent’s true purpose for meeting with K.J. was not to investigate her client’s case, but rather to improperly dissuade K.J. from participating in the criminal prosecution of her client, Mr. Solomon. In speaking with K.J., Respondent intentionally emphasized the potential embarrassment she might suffer if the case proceeded to trial and took advantage of a vulnerable minor’s insecurities. Respondent intended for her comments to discourage K.J. from cooperating, which, by no coincidence, would have benefitted her client. Furthermore, Respondent intentionally obfuscated her role as counsel for K.J.’s alleged abuser by initiating a personal conversation with K.J. involving subjects unrelated to the criminal case, such as gender discrimination and cultural issues, and then exchanging personal text messages with her after the meeting.

In doing so, Respondent gained K.J.’s trust and misled her to believe that she was an advocate for her best interest. Respondent’s actions were intended to benefit her client, the person accused of assaulting K.J. On December 23, 2016, the State entered nolle prosequi on all counts in the District Court case against Mr. Solomon. Mr. Solomon subsequently was indicted in the Circuit Court based on the same allegations of sexual assault of K.J.6 On March 16, 2017, Respondent entered her appearance in the Circuit Court on behalf of Mr. Solomon. 6 State v. Eric A. Solomon, Case No. 131311C, filed on March 2, 2017. 14 During the pendency of the Circuit Court case, K.J.’s parents asked Respondent to recommend an attorney to represent K.J. Respondent had a pre-existing professional relationship with attorney April Ademiluyi and, on or about September 30, 2017, communicated with Ms. Ademiluyi about the possibility of Ms. Ademiluyi representing K.J. “for the limited purpose of discussing the victim’s rights.” Respondent informed Ms. Ademiluyi that K.J. had not been sexually assaulted, but rather had engaged in consensual sex with Mr. Solomon. Respondent told Ms. Ademiluyi that Mr. Solomon’s father would pay Ms. Ademiluyi’s $1,000 fee.

Based on Respondent’s