Attorney Grievance Commission v. Barton

BATTAGLIA, J. Sheron A. Barton, Respondent, was admitted to the Bar of this Court on December 17, 2002. On February 25, 2013, May ⁹⁶ 1, 2013 and October 23, 2013, the Attorney Grievance Commission, (“Petitioner” or “Bar Counsel”), acting pursuant to Maryland Rule lO-YSRa), 1 filed three separate Petitions for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Respondent related to her role as the supervising attorney of the Cardinal Law Firm, located in Camp Springs, Maryland. In its initial petition, filed on February 25, 2013, in which Winifred Winston, Brent Ellis, Howard and Avon Chapman (“the Chapmans”), and Joseph and Ernestine Johnson (“the Johnsons”) were complainants, collectively identified as the “Complaint of Bar Counsel,” as well as Rosemary Tyner and Teresa Barnes, Petitioner alleged that Respondent violated the following Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“Rule”): 1.1 (Competence), 2 1.3 (Diligence), 3 1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), 4 1.5(a) (Fees), 5 1.15(a) and (b) (Safe ⁹⁷ keeping Property), 6 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 7 5.1(a), (b) and (c) (Responsibilities of Partners, ⁹⁸ Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers), 8 5.3(a), (b) and (c) (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants), 9 5.4(a) and ⁹⁹ (b) (Professional Independence of a Lawyer), 10 5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law), 11 and 8.4(c) and (d) (Misconduct). 12 In a second petition, filed on May 1, 2013, the complainants were Arnell Simmons, Gwendelyn Rhett and Winifred Winston, clients of the Cardinal Law Firm, and Respondent was charged with violations of Rules 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), 5.3(a), (b) and (c) (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants), 5.5(a) (Un ¹⁰⁰ authorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law), and 8.4(d) (Misconduct). The Commission also charged Respondent with a violation of Rule 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation) with respect to Ms. Winston’s complaint.

In a third petition, filed on October 23, 2013, the complainants were Alma Miljkovic and Christine Gray-Knight, clients of the Cardinal Law Firm, and Respondent was charged with violations of Rules 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), 1.15(a) (Safekeeping Property), 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 5.3(a), (b) and (c) (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants), 5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law), and 8.4(a) and (d) (Misconduct). 13 The Commission also charged Respondent with a violation of Rule 1.5(a) (Fees) with respect to Ms. Miljkovic’s complaint. By Order, we referred the initial petition to Judge Marielsa A. Bernard of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for a hearing, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-757. 14 Respondent ¹⁰¹ was personally served with the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action and the Writ of Summons, to which she filed a timely response. By Order, we referred the second petition to Judge David A. Boynton of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for a hearing, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-757. Respondent was again personally served with the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, our Order, and the Writ of Summons, to which Respondent filed a timely response.

We issued an Order consolidating the first two petitions and transferred the second petition from Judge Boynton to Judge Bernard. By Order, we referred the third petition to Judge Bernard for a hearing, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-757. Respondent was served through counsel with the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, our Order and the Writ of Summons. Respondent filed a Motion to Extend Time and Consolidate Disciplinary Petitions.

We issued an Order consolidating the third petition with the two other previously consolidated petitions. Respondent was served through counsel with Interrogatories, a Request for Production of Documents and a Request for Admission of Facts and Genuineness of Documents, to which no response was forthcoming. Bar Counsel then filed ¹⁰² an Emergency Motion for Sanctions pursuant to Maryland Rules 2-432 and 2-433, to which no answer was filed. On the Friday prior to the January 27, 2014 hearing date on the Consolidated Petition, Respondent responded to the discovery requests, albeit over two weeks out of time.

On the hearing date, prior to taking evidence, after arguments of counsel, Judge Bernard granted Bar Counsel’s motion and determined that: Based on the tardiness in Respondent’s response to discovery (Respondent incompletely responded to Petitioner’s discovery request in the afternoon on the last business day before trial, Friday, January 24, 2014), this Court deemed each Request for Admission “admitted” but deferred ordering any relief so that such relief could be addressed if and when an issue arose at trial. During the evidentiary hearings, Bar Counsel presented testimony from Gwendelyn Rhett, Teresa Barnes, Arnell Simmons and Winifred Winston, all of whom had been complainants included in the first and second petitions, as well as relied on the deemed admissions. Bar Counsel introduced various documents, which were admitted into evidence, including a Post-Trial Memorandum from the United States Trustee for Region 4 (“Trustee Memo”), as well as a Memorandum of Decision from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland (“Bankruptcy Court Memo”) to which was appended an Order directing Respondent to refund fees in the Winston case. Bar Counsel also introduced emails and letters between Respondent and Ms. Rhett, as well as the complaints to Bar Counsel from Ms. Rhett, Ms. Barnes, Ms. Simmons and Ms. Winston, and Barton’s response to Bar Counsel about each complaint, which were admitted into evidence.

Finally, a letter from Barton to Richard Tolbert, the former office manager of the Cardinal Law Firm, as well as an email exchange between the two, were admitted into evidence. Barton testified on her own behalf; she was precluded from calling Leon Sutton, an individual who had served as a paralegal at her Washington D.C. office, as a witness, because of her failure to respond to the Request for Admissions. Respon ¹⁰³ dent did introduce various documents, which were admitted into evidence, including correspondence between Respondent and M & T Bank, a case list from the Cardinal Law Firm, two emails between Barton and Mr. Tolbert, an email from Barton to a document courier service, the federal Form 1099 for each of her employees from 2011, an application for statement of charges and a civil complaint filed by Barton against Mr. Tolbert, which were filed in the District Court of Maryland for Prince George’s County and the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, respectively, as well as a case information document showing pending criminal charges against Mr. Tolbert. 15 Judge Bernard issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in which she ultimately determined that Respondent violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(a), 1.15(a) and (b), 1.16(d), 5.3(a), (b) and (c), 5.4(a) and (b), 5.5(a), 8.4(a), (c) and (d). Judge Bernard’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law state: 16 In light of the admitted Requests for Admissions, the additional evidence submitted by the parties at trial, the trial testimony and the arguments of counsel, this Court finds the following facts to have been established by clear and convincing evidence: ¹⁰⁴ 1.

Respondent graduated from Nova Southeastern University in August 1998 and was admitted to the Bar of the Court of Appeals of Maryland on December 17, 2002. 2. In 2010 and 2011, Respondent owned and operated a law firm located at 5897 Allentown Rd., Camp Springs, Maryland, doing business under the name “Cardinal Law Firm”. Respondent owned and operated this firm. Respondent also maintained a law office in Washington D.C. 3.

Respondent was the supervising attorney of the Cardinal Law Firm. 4. Cardinal Law Firm regularly advertised in the local “Pennysaver” advertising circular, holding itself out as handling bankruptcy cases. 5. The Camp Springs office of the Cardinal Law Firm primarily represented clients regarding the filing of bankruptcy petitions. 6. Richard Tolbert (hereinafter referred to as “Mr. Tolbert”) owned the building at 5897 Allentown Road, Camp Springs, Maryland, at which the Cardinal Law Firm was located. 7.

Respondent employed Mr. Tolbert as the office manager for the Camp Springs office of the Cardinal Law Firm. Mr. Tolbert worked full-time at the Camp Springs office while Respondent primarily worked in her office in the District of Columbia. 8. Mr. Tolbert, who is not licensed to practice law, regularly met with prospective clients of the Cardinal Law Firm, accepted their cases, and set the fee that would be charged by the Cardinal Law Firm. Mr. Tolbert led several clients, such as Winifred Winston, to believe he was an attorney and regularly met with these prospective clients before they met with Respondent. 9.

Respondent permitted Mr. Tolbert to meet with prospective clients, to accept cases and set fees, and was aware that Mr. Tolbert was doing so on behalf of the Cardinal Law Firm. ¹⁰⁵ 10. At trial, Respondent testified that Mr. Tolbert’s duties were limited to taking client names and contact information and immediately forwarding this information to her. She indicated that he had no authority to charge client fees or to negotiate checks. This Court does not find Respondent’s testimony to be credible, however, and it is contradicted by all of the other evidence submitted at trial.

In a letter to Richard Tolbert (and apparently also sent to the U.S. Trustee’s office), Respondent stated “We entered into an arrangement around September/October of last year 2010, where you would work for me as an accountant, office manager, book[k]eeper, and sometimes intake person, you collected money for the firm.” Respondent also stated: “I gave you the Maryland rules to read and told you what the legal fees for bankruptcy cases in Maryland were supposed to be, additionally you worked with other attorneys before, so you knew.” Respondent further stated in the letter that she discovered that: “Mr. Tolbert spoke to new clients and had them sign retainers without giving me an accurate list of names and numbers who these clients are.” Respondent also told William Ramsey, an Investigator with the Attorney Grievance Commission, that she collected and deposited fees at first, but later Mr. Tolbert took over that role, although Respondent asserted that this statement only pertained to fees she had previously quoted to clients she had already met. Several emails introduced at trial also indicated that Mr. Tolbert and the firm were accepting client cases and charging fees independent of Respondent’s guidance. Respondent’s trial testimony that she had, on several occasions, educated Mr. Tolbert and Ms. Crawford on appropriate and reasonable fees in bankruptcy cases only further details Respondent’s level of participation and awareness. 11. Additionally, Arnell Simmons, Winifred Winston, and Gwendelyn Rhett, all of whom this Court found to be credible, each testified that Mr. Tolbert specifically informed them that Respondent would be the attorney handling their case.

Each witness also testified that Mr. ¹⁰⁶ Tolbert provided them with contact information for Respondent during their initial meeting. 12. Mr. Tolbert frequently advised clients regarding what type of bankruptcy petition would be appropriate to be filed in their case, routinely accepted retainers and fees from clients, and deposited the funds he received from the firm’s clients in an account maintained under the name “A. Barton Law Firm”. This account was not an escrow account. 13. Respondent permitted Mr. Tolbert to deposit funds in her “A. Barton Law Firm” operating account. 14.

Respondent was aware that Mr. Tolbert deposited client retainers in the “A. Barton Law Firm” operating account. 15. Respondent gave Mr. Tolbert a limited number of checks to disburse funds from the “A. Barton Law Firm” operating account to pay office expenses. Notably Respondent testified during trial that she continued to provide “blank” checks to Mr. Tolbert for several months after she had learned that Mr. Tolbert had stolen money from the firm. 16. Respondent regularly received bank statements for the “A. Barton Law Firm” operating account during 2010 and 2011 but testified that she did not review them.

With respect to the specific allegations of Ms. Winston, the hearing judge found: 17. Respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on behalf of her client, Winifred Winston (hereinafter referred to as “Ms. Winston”) on or about March 10, 2011. 18. Ms. Winston paid the Cardinal Law Firm a flat fee of $4,000.00, which Respondent disclosed on a Disclosure of Compensation filed in the Bankruptcy Court. Ms. Winston later paid the Cardinal Law Firm an additional fee payment of $526.00, but Respondent did not disclose Ms. Winston’s $526.00 payment to the Bankruptcy Court. 19.

Ms. Winston first met Respondent on April 21, 2011, at a 341 hearing on her bankruptcy case. Respondent arrived late for the hearing. According to Ms. Winston’s testimony, ¹⁰⁷ Respondent was unprepared for this hearing and unfamiliar with Ms. Winston’s case. 20. After the hearing on April 21, 2011, Ms. Winston discussed her case with Respondent and told her that she wanted to sell her condominium and to have the second mortgage removed.

Respondent told Ms. Winston to contact Mr. Tolbert to discuss the issues regarding sale of the condominium and removal of the second mortgage. Upon contacting Mr. Tolbert, Ms. Winston was told that an additional fee would be required, which Ms. Winston paid by a check payable to the A. Barton Law Firm. 21. Respondent failed to appear in court at a confirmation hearing in Ms. Winston’s case on May 24, 2011. Ms. Winston testified that she had to make several calls to the Cardinal Law Firm in an effort to find Respondent to see if she would appear.

Ms. Winston was told by office personnel that Respondent was on her way to court. 22. Ultimately, Respondent did not appear, but sent another attorney, Donya T. Zimmerman, in her place. Ms. Zimmerman had not met with Ms. Winston and was not familiar with her case. 23. During the representation, Ms. Winston made numerous attempts to reach Respondent to discuss her case, but Respondent failed to return her calls. 24.

Ms. Winston discharged Respondent as her counsel on October 12, 2011. 25. In February 2012, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland ordered Respondent to refund $3,776.00 to Ms. Winston within 60 days. The Bankruptcy Court ordered the refund because it found that Respondent improperly failed to appear at the May 24, 2011 hearing, had been unresponsive to Ms. Winston’s inquiries, failed to file an amended plan, and gave her inaccurate advice. 26. Respondent confirmed during her testimony at trial that she has not refunded any fees to Ms. Winston.

With respect to the complaints of Brent Ellis, the Chapmans and the Johnsons, the hearing judge found: ¹⁰⁸ 27. Respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on behalf of Brent Ellis (hereinafter referred to as “Mr. Ellis”) on or about August 5, 2011. 28. Respondent filed a Disclosure of Compensation in Mr. Ellis’ case, reporting that Mr. Ellis paid a flat fee of $4,500.00. 29. Respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on behalf of her clients, Howard and Avon Chapman (hereinafter referred to as “the Chapmans”) on or about August 11, 2011. 30.

Respondent received a fee of $4,000.00 from the Chap-mans. 31. The Chapmans paid the fee by a check to the A. Barton Law Firm. 32. Mr. Tolbert set the fee and directed the Chapmans to make their check payable to the Cardinal Law Firm. 33. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland ordered Ms. Barton to refund $2,000.00 to the Chapmans, finding that her filing of the Chapter 13 petition was a “useless act that could not accomplish anything”. 34.

Respondent has not refunded any portion of the Chap-mans’ fee. 35. Respondent filed a bankruptcy petition on behalf of Joseph and Ernestine Johnson (hereinafter referred to as “the Johnsons”) on August 11, 2011. 36. Respondent’s firm received a fee of $4,500.00 from the Johnsons. 37. The Johnsons initially met with Mr. Tolbert, who advised them that they should file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. 38.

Mr. Tolbert informed the Johnsons that the Cardinal Law Firm would charge them a $4,500.00 fee for representing them in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding and led the Johnsons to believe that he was an attorney. 39. Respondent first met with the Johnsons on November 30, 2011. ¹⁰⁹ 40. At the time the Cardinal Law Firm represented the Johnsons, Respondent was the only attorney employed by the Cardinal Law Firm licensed to practice law in Maryland or before the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. 41. On March 21, 2012, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland ordered Respondent to refund $3,000.00 to the Johnsons. 42.

Respondent has not refunded any portion of the John-sons’ fee. With respect to the complaint of Ms. Tyner, the hearing judge found: 43. Rosemary Tyner (hereinafter referred to as “Ms. Tyner”) retained the Cardinal Law Firm to represent her regarding a bankruptcy matter in October 2010. 44. Ms. Tyner initially met with Mr. Tolbert. 45.

Mr. Tolbert advised Ms. Tyner to stop paying her mortgage payments. 46. Mr. Tolbert advised Ms. Tyner to use the money saved from not making her mortgage payment to pay her fee to the Cardinal Law Firm. 47. Ms. Tyner paid the Cardinal Law Firm $4,500.00 as her fee to file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case. 48. Ms. Tyner met Respondent at her pre-confirmation hearing on February 19, 2011. 49.

At the pre-confirmation hearing on February 19, 2011, Respondent showed Ms. Tyner a copy of a payment plan to be submitted on her behalf. Ms. Tyner had not been shown the payment plan prior to the pre-confirmation hearing. 50. Ms. Tyner attempted to communicate with Respondent about the status of her case but Respondent failed to keep her informed. 51. Ms. Tyner’s bankruptcy petition was dismissed after Respondent failed to appear in court for a hearing. 52.

In October 2011, Mr. Tolbert contacted Ms. Tyner to say that she was late in making a payment on her automo ¹¹⁰ bile loan and that she should bring in $500.00 to Mr. Tolbert. 53. Pursuant to Mr. Tolbert’s request, Ms. Tyner delivered to Mr. Tolbert $300.00. 54. Ms. Tyner later learned that her automobile loan payment was not late. 55. Respondent has not accounted for the $300.00 paid by Ms. Tyner and has not returned those funds to her.

With respect to the complaint of Ms. Barnes, the hearing judge found: 56. The Cardinal Law Firm filed a bankruptcy petition on behalf of Teresa P. Barnes (hereinafter referred to as “Ms. Barnes”) on April 19, 2011. 57. Ms. Barnes paid the Cardinal Law Firm a fee of $4,474.00 by a check payable to the A. Barton Law Firm. 58. Ms. Barnes initially met with Mr. Tolbert, who advised her on what kind of bankruptcy petition to file. 59.

Mr. Tolbert informed Ms. Barnes of the amount of the fee she would be charged by the Cardinal Law Firm. 60. On February 8, 2012, Ms. Barnes received a summons regarding a suit filed against her by Discover Bank. 61. Ms. Barnes attempted to contact Mr. Tolbert, who did not respond to her calls. 62. Ms. Barnes contacted Respondent by telephone in February 2012. 63.

Respondent informed Ms. Barnes that she had no knowledge of Ms. Barnes’s case, and that she was no longer affiliated with the Cardinal Law Firm. 64. Respondent did no work on Ms. Barnes’s bankruptcy case. 65. Respondent has not refunded any portion of the fee paid by Ms. Barnes. With respect to the complaint of Ms. Simmons, Judge Bernard found: ¹¹¹ 66.

Arnell W. Simmons (hereinafter referred to as “Ms. Simmons”) retained the Cardinal Law Firm in December 2010, to represent her regarding a bankruptcy. 67. Ms. Simmons paid to the Cardinal Law Firm $4,774.00 by checks payable to the A. Barton Law Firm. 68. Ms. Simmons initially met with Mr. Tolbert to discuss her case. 69. Mr. Tolbert accepted her case, informed her of the fee, and advised her that she should file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. 70.

Ms. Simmons later met with an associate of Respondent, who is an attorney. That attorney advised Ms. Simmons to file a Chapter 18 petition. 71. The attorney also advised Ms. Simmons to stop paying her mortgage so that she could pay her attorney’s fee to the Cardinal Law Firm. 72. Ms. Simmons stopped making mortgage payments based on the advice given to her by the Cardinal Law Firm. 73.

The Cardinal Law Firm filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on behalf of Ms. Simmons in February 2011. 74. Ms. Simmons met with Respondent three times. 75. Ms. Simmons also met with other lawyers and staff of the Cardinal Law Firm. 76. Respondent failed to keep Ms. Simmons informed of the status of her case. 77.

Respondent failed to file required papers on behalf of Ms. Simmons, resulting in the Bankruptcy Court issuing a deficiency notice. 78. Ms. Simmons attempted to contact Respondent about the status of her case, but was unable to reach her. With respect to the complaint of Ms. Rhett, the hearing judge found: 79. On March 4, 2011, Gwendelyn Rhett (hereinafter referred to as “Ms. Rhett”) met with Mr. Tolbert and retained the Cardinal Law Firm to represent her in a bankruptcy matter. ¹¹² 80.

Mr. Tolbert advised Ms. Rhett that she should file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. 81. Mr. Tolbert advised Ms. Rhett that the Cardinal Law Firm would charge her attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,000.00 and that the filing fee would be $229.00. 82. By April 4, 2011, Ms. Rhett paid the entire fee to the Cardinal Law Firm by checks payable to A. Barton Law Firm. 83. At Ms. Rhett’s meeting with Mr. Tolbert on March 4, 2011, Mr. Tolbert gave Ms. Rhett Respondent’s business card and told Ms. Rhett that she could call Respondent any time. 84.

Ms. Rhett sent a message by electronic mail to Respondent on April 13, 2011, asking her questions about the status of her bankruptcy case. 85. Respondent replied to her e-mail message on May 2, 2011, responding to her questions. 86. In her May 2, 2011 reply to Ms. Rhett, Respondent did not indicate that she was no longer connected with the Cardinal Law Firm or Mr. Tolbert. 87. On May 6, 2011 Ms. Rhett discharged the Cardinal Law Firm and requested a refund of her fee. 88.

On May 11, 2011 the Cardinal Law Firm responded in writing to Ms. Rhett, agreeing to refund the full amount paid. 89. Thereinafter, Ms. Rhett testified that Mr. Tolbert returned her fee in person, by check, along with a gift basket. With respect to the complaint of Ms. Miljkovic, the hearing judge found: 90. In January 2011, Alma Miljkovic (hereinafter referred to as “Ms. Miljkovic”) retained the Cardinal Law Firm to represent her in connection with a bankruptcy matter. 91.

Ms. Miljkovic initially met with Mr. Tolbert. 92. Mr. Tolbert accepted the case on behalf of the Cardinal Law Firm and informed Ms. Miljkovic that the fee would be $2,000.00 plus a filing fee of $299.00. ¹¹³ 93. On February 25, 2011, Ms. Miljkovic gave Mr. Tolbert a check for $1,299.00, payable to the A. Barton Law Firm. 94. Mr. Tolbert informed Ms. Miljkovic on February 25, 2011, that Respondent would be the attorney handling her case. 95.

Mr. Tolbert gave Ms. Miljkovic papers to complete in order to prepare the bankruptcy petition. 96. Mr. Tolbert advised Ms. Miljkovic to stop making payments on her mortgage loan. 97. Mr. Tolbert advised Ms. Miljkovic to use all of the available credit on her credit cards. 98. On April 13, 2011, Ms. Miljkovic paid $1,000.00 to the Cardinal Law Firm by a check payable to the A. Barton Law Firm. 99.

Ms. Miljkovic’s payments were not deposited in an attorney escrow account. 100. In the spring and summer of 2011, Ms. Miljkovic called the Cardinal Law Firm and Respondent’s Washington office to ascertain the status of her case, but could not reach Respondent. 101. In the summer of 2012, Mr. Tolbert advised Ms. Miljkovic that he was no longer associated with Respondent, but that Respondent would continue to represent her. 102. When Ms. Miljkovic subsequently contacted Respondent in the summer of 2012, Respondent refused to handle her case. 103.

Respondent and the Cardinal Law Firm did not provide any legal services to Ms. Miljkovic. 104. Ms. Miljkovic has not received a refund of any portion of her fee paid to the Cardinal Law Firm and A. Barton Law Firm. With respect to the complaint of Ms. Gray-Knight, Judge Bernard found: 105. Christine A. Gray-Knight (hereinafter referred to as “Ms. Gray-Knight”) retained the Cardinal Law Firm in ¹¹⁴ early 2011 to represent her in connection with a bankruptcy matter. 106.

Ms. Gray-Knight initially met with Mr. Tolbert on April 14, 2011. 107. At the April 14, 2011 meeting, Mr. Tolbert accepted Ms. Gray-Knight’s case on behalf of the Cardinal Law Firm, and advised her that the firm’s fee would be $2,000.00 plus a filing fee of $299.00. 108. At the April 14, 2011 meeting, Mr. Tolbert advised Ms. Gray-Knight to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. 109. On April 14, 2011, Ms. Gray-Knight gave Mr. Tolbert a check in the amount of $500.00, payable to the A. Barton Law Firm. 110.

The funds paid by Ms. Gray-Knight to the Cardinal Law Firm were not deposited in an escrow account. 111. Mr. Tolbert explained to Ms. Gray-Knight that the Cardinal Law Firm would not begin work on her bankruptcy petition until the fee was paid in full. 112. Mr. Tolbert informed Ms. Gray-Knight that Respondent would contact her about preparation of the bankruptcy petition. 113. In May 2011, the Cardinal Law Firm sent a notice to Ms. Gray-Knight, reminding her that a balance of $1,799.00 was owed to the firm and that she should make her check payable to the A. Barton Law Firm. 114.

In July 2011, the Cardinal Law Firm sent a notice to Ms. Gray-Knight, confirming that the firm was retained to represent her in a bankruptcy case. 115. On August 11, 2011, the Cardinal Law Firm sent another notice to Ms. Gray-Knight, reminding her that her bankruptcy petition would not be filed until the balance due was paid. 116. Ms. Gray-Knight attempted to contact Respondent on several occasions, without receiving a reply. 117. Ms. Gray-Knight subsequently spoke to Mr. Tolbert, who promised that Respondent would call her. ¹¹⁵ 118.

Ms. Gray-Knight did not receive a call from Respondent after speaking to Mr. Tolbert. 119. Ms. Gray-Knight subsequently discharged the Cardinal Law Firm and demanded a return of the unearned fee. 120. The Cardinal Law Firm provided Ms. Gray-Knight with no legal services. 121. Ms. Gray-Knight made several attempts to contact Respondent to request a refund of her retainer. 122.

Ms. Gray-Knight has not received a refund of any portion of her retainer. Judge Bernard then proceeded to her Conclusions of Law: In the proceedings before the Court, the Petitioner has the burden of proving the allegations by clear and convincing evidence. The Respondent has the burden of proving a matter of affirmative defense or mitigation by a preponderance of the evidence. In each matter, Petitioner charged Respondent with a violation of Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16, 5.3, 5.5, and 8.4 of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (hereinafter “MLRPC”).

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent violated Rule 1.1 by failing to respond to clients’ repeated requests for information, failing to attend hearings on behalf of clients, failing to file bankruptcy petitions, and failing to properly further the objectives of her clients. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Ficker, 349 Md. 13, 42 , 706 A.2d 1045, 1059 (1998), the Court of Appeals stated: “[T]he lawyer does have a duty to his or her client to remain diligent”. The evidence in this case clearly demonstrated that the Respondent abdicated her responsibility to supervise Mr. Tolbert and the other Maryland office employees, and provided inadequate representation to her clients despite taking a fee in each case. “Compliance with [Rule 1.1] requires more than knowing what to do. It requires applying the knowledge to the client’s problem.” Attorney Grievance Commission v. McCulloch, 404 Md. 388, 397-98 , 946 A.2d 1009, 1015 (2008).

The Court of Appeals has said “[e]vidence of a failure to apply the ¹¹⁶ requisite thoroughness and/or preparation in representing a client is sufficient alone to support a violation of Rule 1.1.” Attorney Grievance Commission v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 54 , 891 A.2d 1085, 1097 (2006). Such acts also demonstrate a lack of “diligence and promptness” in violation of Rule 1.3. McCulloch, 404 Md. at 398 , 946 A.2d at 1015 . (“The evidence shows that respondent failed to act with ‘diligence and promptness’ as required by Rule 1.3, for the same reasons discussed under Rules 1.1 and 1.2.”).

As in McCulloch and Guida , Respondent took a fee in each case but failed to do any cognizable work of value to the client. Therefore, Respondent, in each complaint, violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, and 8.4(a) and (d) of the MLRPC. See Attorney Grievance Commission v. Nelson, 425 Md. 344, 363 , 40 A.3d 1039, 1050 (2012). The Respondent through her persistent conduct clearly violated Rule 8.4(d), which states that it is professional misconduct to “engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Rule 8.4(a) was also violated when Respondent breached the other Rules of Professional Conduct.

Respondent is also charged in each complaint with a violation of Rule 1.4(a) and (b) of the MLRPC. Each and every witness testified to having difficulties contacting Respondent, and in some cases, being unable to contact Respondent entirely. In Ms. Simmons’ case, Respondent failed to adequately communicate with both Ms. Simmons and her creditors. Respondent did not keep her clients informed regarding the status of their case or respond to their attempts to communicate with her.

Moreover, to the extent that Respondent had difficulties with her personal health of which she testified, or with Mr. Tolbert and the Cardinal Law Firm, Respondent failed to inform her clients of these problems and any others that limited her ability to represent them. Thus, in each matter, Respondent violated Rule 1.4(a) and (b). Respondent violated Rules 5.3(a), (b) and (c) by failing to properly supervise Mr. Tolbert and the rest of the Cardinal Law Firm. It is undisputed that Mr. Tolbert met with ¹¹⁷ clients, quoted fees, provided legal advice to clients, and held himself out as an attorney.

Mr. Tolbert was able to do so because Respondent was not in the office to supervise him and had not made any efforts to ensure that his conduct was compatible with Respondent’s professional obligations. Mr. Tolbert also mishandled law firm and client funds, and deposited unearned funds into a business account, not an escrow account. Respondent was not only aware of this conduct; Respondent permitted this conduct and instructed both Mr. Tolbert and Ms. Crawford[ 17 ] so that the law office could effectively function without Respondent’s presence. More troubling perhaps is Respondent’s admission that she provided blank checks to Mr. Tolbert after she learned that he had stolen client money from the firm.

In fact, Respondent gave Mr. Tolbert total control of the firm bank accounts. Respondent testified that she did not review the bank statements, even after she had caught him stealing. Such conduct can only be seen as enabling and ratification of the misconduct. Despite Respondent’s testimony that she knew Mr. Tolbert “did not listen” she continued to condone his conduct.

The Court did not find the Respondent to be at all credible in her denial of Mr. Tolbert’s actions. She repeatedly testified that she knew that Mr. Tolbert “did not listen,” but did not take any affirmative action to deter or stop his behavior. In fact she testified that she continued to pay Mr. Tolbert up until July, 2011. Respondent knowingly permitted Mr. Tolbert to handle client intake, which included quoting fees (based upon an evaluation of the prospective client’s case) and providing legal advice, and therefore, assisted Mr. Tolbert in engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Rules 5.5(a) and 8.4(d).

Respondent violated Rule 1.16(d) in the Winston, Miljkovic, Gray-Knight, Tyner, Barnes and Bar Counsel complaints for failing to return unearned fees paid to Respon ¹¹⁸ dent by each client. The fees charged to those clients, while the respective fee may not have been unreasonable on its face, became unreasonable because Respondent did no work of value, or at all, in their case, in violation of Rule 1.5(a). See Guida, 391 Md. at 54 , 891 A.2d at 1096-97 . Respondent’s failure to disclose the receipt of an additional $526.00 payment from Winston to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court is a violation of Rule 8.4(c).

Respondent’s failure to maintain unearned fees of Cardinal Law Firm clients in an attorney trust account, and instead maintaining those fees in the A. Barton Law Firm checking account along with firm funds used to pay expenses and employees, without written informed consent of the clients violated Rule 1.15(a) and (b). Lastly, Petitioner alleged in its Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action that Respondent shared fees from cases with Mr. Tolbert in violation of Rule 5.4, which Respondent vehemently denied at trial. Notwithstanding that denial, this Court again finds Respondent’s testimony not credible. The evidence submitted at trial, coupled with Respondent’s testimony, demonstrated that Respondent paid Mr. Tolbert $1,000.00 every two (2) weeks.

On cross-examination, Respondent stated that Mr. Tolbert did not receive any additional salary on top of the $1,000.00 and that in 2011 Respondent was only paid for six months, until the end of June, 2011. Yet according to Mr. Tolbert’s 1099 for 2011, submitted into evidence during Respondent’s case, Respondent paid Mr. Tolbert $48,000.00 in 2011. Even if Respondent paid Mr. Tolbert for the entire 2011 year, Respondent would have only earned $26,000.00. Since Respondent testified that Mr. Tolbert was not paid any additional money, the only logical conclusion is that Respondent shared fees with Mr. Tolbert.

Judge Bernard also concluded as to the mitigating factors: Having determined that Respondent violated the various previously referenced Rules, the Court turns now to the mitigation evidence presented by Respondent. The Court ¹¹⁹ determines by a preponderance of the evidence, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-757(b) that the following factor mitigates the misconduct charged in this case. Respondent testified that she took over 50 cases pro bono, filing them in Maryland. She indicated that she had to take on a second job, in addition to the document reviews that she was doing, in order to pay the filing fees and other associated costs.

She testified that she spoke with creditors, mortgage companies, etc. in order to try to protect the interests of the clients that she was handling on a pro bono basis. The Court did not find that Respondent’s illness in any way would mitigate the previously referenced violations. “This Court has original and complete jurisdiction over attorney discipline proceedings in Maryland.” Attorney Grievance v. O’Leary, 433 Md. 2, 28 , 69 A.3d 1121, 1136 (2013), quoting Attorney Grievance v. Chapman, 430 Md. 238, 273 , 60 A.3d 25, 46 (2013). We conduct an independent review of the record and we accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless shown to be clearly erroneous. Attorney Grievance v. Lara, 418 Md. 355 , 14 A.3d 650 (2011). “Under our independent review of the record, we must determine whether the findings of the hearing judge are based on clear and convincing evidence.” Attorney Grievance v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 73 , 753 A.2d 17, 26 (2000).

With respect to exceptions, upon our review of the record, “the hearing judge’s findings of fact generally will be accepted unless they are clearly erroneous.” Maryland Rule 16 — 759(b)(2); Attorney Grievance v. Whitehead, 405 Md. 240, 253 , 950 A.2d 798, 806 (2008). “A hearing judge’s factual finding is not clearly erroneous if there is any competent material evidence to support it.” Attorney Grievance v. McDonald, 437 Md. 1, 16 , 85 A.3d 117, 125 (2014) (internal quotation omitted). As to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, such as whether provisions of the MLRPC were violated, our consideration is essentially de novo. Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(l). Finally, as to the hearing judge’s mitigation findings, Maryland Rule 16-757(b) provides that “A respondent who asserts ... a matter of mitigation ... has the ¹²⁰ burden of proving the ... matter by a preponderance of the evidence.” Bar Counsel did not file any exceptions to Judge Bernard’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommends disbarment.

Respondent has filed multiple exceptions in which she challenges various findings of fact, numerous conclusions of law and Judge Bernard’s mitigation findings; at argument Barton’s counsel suggested a reprimand, or at worst, a suspension for 90 to 120 days as a sanction. Respondent initially challenges the use of the deemed admissions to establish the violations of the Rules alleged. She argues that the deemed admissions should not have been relied upon by the hearing judge as bases for the findings of fact and conclusions of law and that Bar Counsel was not prejudiced by her failure to answer within 30 days, because she eventually did answer the request for admissions, albeit on the eve of the hearing. We recognize that the hearing judge, generally, “is entrusted with the role of administering the discovery rules and, as such, is vested with broad discretion in imposing sanctions when a party fails to comply with the rules.” Attorney Grievance v. O’Leary, 433 Md. at 28-29 , 69 A.3d at 1137 , quoting Attorney Grievance v. Kreamer, 404 Md. 282, 342 , 946 A.2d 500, 535 (2008).

With respect to the sanctions for failing to respond to the requests for admissions, Maryland Rule 2-424(b) 18 provides that any matter for which an admission is ¹²¹ requested is deemed admitted if a party fails to respond to the request within 30 days. Maryland Rule 2-424(d) 19 provides that deemed admissions are conclusively established, unless the court permits their withdrawal or amendment, which the court may do if it will assist in the presentation of the merits of the action and if the party who obtained the admissions fails to satisfy the court that it will be prejudiced by the withdrawal or amendment of the admissions. Judge Bernard was within her discretion in deeming each Request for Admission admitted and not permitting their withdrawal on the eve of the hearing, as she rejected as inadequate the proffer by Barton’s counsel that, prior to the hearing, Barton was unavailable to him and that he was in another trial. Respondent also appears to take broad exception to the hearing judge’s credibility findings.

In developing her factual findings, Judge Bernard discredited much of Respondent’s testimony regarding the authority that she gave Mr. Tolbert in managing the Cardinal Law Firm in Camp Springs, as well ¹²² as his access to the firm’s bank accounts and Barton’s recollection of specific interactions she had with clients. We, generally, “defer to the credibility findings of the hearing judge.” Attorney Grievance v. Agbaje, 438 Md. 695, 722 , 93 A.3d 262, 277 (2014). “The hearing judge is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and to decide which one to believe and, as we have said, to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon.” Attorney Grievance v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 390 , 794 A.2d 92, 101 (2002); see also Attorney Grievance v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 17 , 741 A.2d 1143, 1152 (1999) (stating that the hearing judge is “in the best position to assess first hand a witness’s credibility.”). As we have stated, a hearing judge is “free to disregard the testimony of respondent if the judge believed the evidence was not credible.” Monfried, 368 Md. at 390 , 794 A.2d at 101 . Respondent excepts to Judge Bernard’s finding that “Respondent permitted Mr. Tolbert to meet with prospective clients, to accept cases and set fees, and was aware that Mr. Tolbert was doing so on behalf of the Cardinal Law Firm”, based on her own testimony during the hearing that she did not leave Mr. Tolbert in charge of the firm and he did not have the authority to accept clients, give legal advice, charge client fees or negotiate checks because he was not a lawyer; he was only to take the names and contact information of potential clients.

Respondent also testified that she had no supervisory authority over Mr. Tolbert after March, 2011, because she had closed the firm. The hearing judge specifically stated that Respondent’s testimony in regard to her supervision of and authority over Mr. Tolbert was incredible. In a letter from Barton to Mr. Tolbert, which was admitted into evidence as Exhibit R, Barton writes, “we entered into an arrangement around September/October of last year 2010, where you would work for me as an accountant, office manager, book[k]eeper, and sometimes intake person, you collected the money for the firm”, and that, “I gave you the Maryland rules to read and told you what the legal fees for bankruptcy cases in Maryland were ¹²³ supposed to be”. Respondent also testified that she had told Mr. Tolbert about fee structures in bankruptcy cases, after Mr. Tolbert suggested that the firm charge higher fees.

In terms of the amount of time during which Mr. Tolbert was employed, Judge Bernard had before her Exhibit 11 — federal Form 1099, which was accepted into evidence at the hearing and, paired with Barton’s testimony, shows that Mr. Tolbert was paid by the Cardinal Law Firm up until July of 2011. Thus, we overrule this exception. Barton also excepts to the hearing judge’s findings that, “Respondent permitted Mr. Tolbert to deposit funds in her ‘A. Barton Law Firm’ operating account”, and, “Respondent was aware that Mr. Tolbert deposited client retainers in the ‘A. Barton Law Firm’ operating account”, based upon her own testimony that client funds were not supposed to be deposited in the A. Barton Law Firm operating account and that Mr. Tolbert was not authorized to deposit any client funds into that account. Barton, however, during the hearing, testified with reference to the operating account, that “[Mr. Tolbert] could only deposit.” Further, Barton testified at a November 30, 2011 hearing before the Bankruptcy Trustee, that, “clients were told to pay A. Barton Law Firm because that was the name on the IOLTA and business bank accounts”; she further testified that Mr. Tolbert “was in total control of the [IOLTA and business] bank accounts”, according to the Trustee Memo, admitted into evidence as Exhibit B. We overrule this exception.

Respondent also excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that: Respondent gave Mr. Tolbert a limited number of checks to disburse funds from the “A. Barton Law Firm” operating account to pay office expenses. Notably Respondent testified during trial that she continued to provide “blank” checks to Mr. Tolbert for several months after she had learned that Mr. Tolbert had stolen money from the firm. Barton initially testified during the hearing that she gave Mr. Tolbert no authority to write checks, but later testified that he was given checks from the A. Barton Law Firm business ¹²⁴ account to pay firm expenses. She further testified that she provided Mr. Tolbert with pre-signed blank checks for the A. Barton Law Firm business account, even after she caught him stealing money from the firm in February 2011.

We overrule this exception. Barton also excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that: In February 2012, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland ordered Respondent to refund $8,776.00 to Ms. Winston within 60 days. The Bankruptcy Court ordered the refund because it found that Respondent improperly failed to appear at the May 24, 2011 hearing, had been unresponsive to Ms. Winston’s inquiries, failed to file an amended plan, and gave her inaccurate advice. Respondent excepts based on her testimony that she “substantially completed” the work in Ms. Winston’s case; that she would have completed Ms. Winston’s bankruptcy were it not for her illness and that Ms. Winston’s bankruptcy was eventually approved by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland (“Bankruptcy Court”).

The Bankruptcy Court Order undergirding Judge Bernard’s finding, however, had been admitted into evidence as Exhibit C and recited, verbatim, what Judge Bernard stated. Ms. Winston’s testimony before the Bankruptcy Court, and also during the disciplinary hearing, reflects that Barton was unprepared during the bankruptcy hearing, as well as that Barton failed to appear at another hearing. Ostensibly, Barton seemingly credits the eventual approval of Ms. Winston’s bankruptcy petition as obviating the finding, despite the fact that it was Ms. Winston who represented herself ultimately and successfully in the Bankruptcy Court. We, as a result, overrule this exception.

Respondent also excepts to Judge Bernard’s finding that, “Respondent failed to file required papers on behalf of Ms. Simmons, resulting in the Bankruptcy Court issuing a deficiency notice.” Barton argues that although Simmons did receive a “routine” deficiency notice, “it was corrected” and the case proceeded to confirmation. Respondent again, thus, argues no harm, no foul; in reality, however, her client ¹²⁵ snatched victory from the jaws of defeat because Ms. Simmons acted to correct the problem. We, therefore, overrule this exception. Barton excepts to Judge Bernard’s finding that: Ms. Rhett sent a message by electronic mail to Respondent on April 13, 2011, asking her questions about the status of her bankruptcy case....

Respondent replied to her email message on May 2, 2011, responding to her questions. ... In her May 2, 2011 reply to Ms. Rhett, Respondent did not indicate that she was no longer connected with the Cardinal Law Firm or Mr. Tolbert. Respondent testified during the hearing that she was unaware that Ms. Rhett was a client and that she never authorized Mr. Tolbert to take any legal fees from Ms. Rhett. The emails upon which Judge Bernard relied, however, were admitted into evidence at the hearing, as Exhibit I. Exhibit I reflects that, in her email of April 13, 2011, Ms. Rhett wrote that she had retained Barton’s law firm and asked Barton numerous questions pertaining to her representation, including when her bankruptcy paperwork would be filed and what she should expect from Barton as her attorney.

In Barton’s reply, also contained in Exhibit I, three weeks later, Barton confirmed that her firm was representing Ms. Rhett, stated that she would file Ms. Rhett’s bankruptcy paperwork as soon as possible, and assured Ms. Rhett that she would answer any questions by phone, email or in person. At no point in her May 2, 2011 reply did Barton state that the Cardinal Law Firm was shuttered, despite Barton’s testimony that she closed the firm after March 1, 2011; rather, Respondent confirmed her representation of Ms. Rhett, offered that the firm’s paralegals would be working with Ms. Rhett, and described what Ms. Rhett should expect during the bankruptcy process. We, therefore, overrule this exception. Respondent also makes several specific exceptions to Judge Bernard’s findings concerning the allegations of individual complainants, specifically the allegations of Ms. Winston, Ms. Simmons, Ms. Rhett and Ms. Barnes. ¹²⁶ Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s findings that, “Ms. Winston paid the Cardinal Law Firm a flat fee of $4,000.00, which Respondent disclosed on a Disclosure of Compensation filed in the Bankruptcy Court.” Barton argues that she did not accept payment of Ms. Winston’s $4,000.00 fee.

The issue is not, however, whether Barton had accepted payment, but whether the Cardinal Law Firm had. In making the findings, Judge Bernard relied on the deemed admissions as well as the Trustee Memo, which reflected that Barton affirmed, under the penalty of perjury, in a Disclosure of Compensation form required by the Bankruptcy Court, that Ms. Winston had paid Barton $4,000.00. We, therefore, conclude that Judge Bernard’s findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence and overrule this exception. Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s findings that: After the hearing on April 21, 2011, Ms. Winston discussed her case with Respondent and told her that she wanted to sell her condominium and to have the second mortgage removed.

Respondent told Ms. Winston to contact Mr. Tolbert to discuss the issues regarding sale of the condominium and removal of the second mortgage. Upon contacting Mr. Tolbert, Ms. Winston was told that an additional fee would be required, which Ms. Winston paid by a check payable to the A. Barton Law Firm. Ms. Winston later paid the Cardinal Law Firm an additional fee payment of $526.00, but Respondent did not disclose Ms. Winston’s $526.00 payment to the Bankruptcy Court. Respondent excepts, stating that she did not mention “an additional five hundred dollar[ ]” fee to Ms. Winston after the April 21, 2011 bankruptcy hearing.

The challenged findings, however, do not rest on whether Barton mentioned an amount to Ms. Winston, but whether the $526.00 was paid and not disclosed. Judge Bernard relied upon the deemed admissions that mirrored her finding, as well as Ms. Winston’s testimony ¹²⁷ that Barton knew that Ms. Winston wanted to remove the second mortgage and directed her to Mr. Tolbert, who charged her the additional $526.00. We overrule this exception. Respondent excepts to Judge Bernard’s finding that, “Ms. Barnes paid the Cardinal Law Firm a fee of $4,474.00 by a check payable to the A. Barton Law Firm.” Respondent excepts that Ms. Barnes made payments to the Barton Law Firm and not the Cardinal Law Firm.

Judge Bernard relied on the deemed admissions in making her finding, and, accordingly, we overrule this exception. Barton also seems to argue that she did not accept Ms. Simmons’s payments of $700.00 and $2,300.00, Mr. Tolbert did. Judge Bernard relied on the deemed admissions in making her findings, as well as Ms. Simmons’s testimony that she initially made payments to the Cardinal Law Firm by checks payable to the A. Barton Law Firm in the amounts of $700.00 and $2,300.00, and that she later was instructed by Mr. Tolbert that she needed to pay an additional $1,774.00 to convert her Chapter 7 bankruptcy to a Chapter 13, which she paid. Ms. Simmons’s bank statements, additionally, were accepted into evidence as Exhibit L, which showed withdrawals totaling $4,774.00, confirming Ms. Simmons’s testimony.

Judge Bernard’s findings, thus, were supported by clear and convincing evidence, and we overrule this exception. Barton also excepts to Judge Bernard’s finding that, “Ms. Simmons attempted to contact Respondent about the status of her case, but was unable to reach her.” Barton argues that despite a delay, she eventually responded to Ms. Simmons and that Ms. Simmons was ultimately satisfied with their communication, relying on a letter, accepted into evidence at the hearing as Exhibit N, in which Ms. Simmons informed the Attorney Grievance Commission that despite a prior “misunderstanding” she was now “satisfied” with her communication with Barton. Judge Bernard relied upon the deemed admissions in making her findings. Ms. Simmons also testified at the hearing that she attempted to contact Barton and that ¹²⁸ Barton did not respond.

Judge Bernard’s finding was based on clear and convincing evidence and we, accordingly, overrule this exception. Respondent also excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that, “On May 11, 2011 the Cardinal Law Firm responded in writing to Ms. Rhett, agreeing to refund the full amount paid.” Respondent argues that she did not respond to Ms. Rhett and that she never reimbursed Ms. Rhett. Judge Bernard again relied on the deemed admissions. Ms. Rhett, additionally, testified at the hearing that Respondent stated, during a telephone conversation, that she would authorize Mr. Tolbert to refund the legal fees, and that Ms. Rhett could retrieve a check from the firm’s office.

Rhett further testified that Mr. Tolbert personally delivered her refund along with a gift basket, as well as also provided Ms. Rhett with a receipt, admitted as Exhibit H at the hearing, printed on Cardinal Law Firm letterhead in which Barton’s name was featured. Again, there was clear and convincing evidence to support Judge Bernard’s finding, and we, therefore, overrule this exception. Respondent finally excepts to the hearing judge’s failure to find facts which she offered in her post-hearing Proposed Findings of Fact, to include that Mr. Tolbert was never a signer on Respondent’s bank accounts; Respondent had to continue working with Mr. Tolbert after February 2011, despite being aware that he had stolen from the firm, because he owned the office building in which the firm rented space and she had approximately 20 active clients remaining; Mr. Tolbert reacted angrily when learning Barton was closing the law firm; Mr. Tolbert accepted over 50 clients after March 2011 and stole their money plus their filing fees; Mr. Tolbert embezzled from the firm by somehow using checks that Barton had provided him; Tolbert was criminally charged with impersonating a lawyer and theft; Barton has not been criminally charged with regard to Mr. Tolbert’s thefts; Barton, as the only attorney in the office who was barred in Maryland, had to attend court hearings and could not be in the office at all times; Barton only practiced law in jurisdictions in which ¹²⁹ she was authorized; Respondent’s communication with her clients was “adequate[ ]”; and all the clients’s bankruptcy petitions were eventually approved by the Bankruptcy Court. A hearing judge, however, is not required to accept any proposed findings submitted by Bar Counsel or a Respondent: A judge hearing an attorney grievance matter does not need to meld together his or her own opinion, taking bits and pieces of each party’s proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law, but may adopt one party’s filing in its entirety, as long as it accurately reflects the judge’s independent factual findings, proven by clear and convincing evidence at the hearing, and the legal conclusions flowing therefrom.

Attorney Grievance v. Joseph, 422 Md. 670, 696 , 31 A.3d 137, 153 (2011). Judge Bernard made her own findings, which were established by clear and convincing evidence, based upon the deemed admissions and her evaluation of what she heard and saw during two days of evidentiary hearings. Having overruled all Respondent’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and having determined that the findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence, we now turn to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law. The hearing judge determined that Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(a), 1.15(a) and (b), 1.16(d), 5.3(a), (b) and (c), 5.4(a) and (b), 5.5(a), and 8.4(a), (c) and (d) were violated.

Bar Counsel has filed no exceptions. Although Barton excepted to the determinations that she violated Rules 1.1 and 1.3, at oral argument, her counsel conceded the violation of those Rules and we agree that those violations are supported by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent generally excepts to a lack of evidentiary foundation for the violations of Rules 1.5(a), 1.15(a) and (b), and 5.4(a) and (b), and takes the same