Attorney Grievance Commission v. Camus

McDonald, J. The Attorney Grievance Commission (the “Commission”) charged Constance A. Camus with violating numerous provisions of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”). The alleged violations all arose during Ms. ⁴²⁰ Camus’ representation of two clients in domestic relations matters. Pursuant to Maryland Rules 16-752(a) and 16-757, we referred the matter to Judge Pamela L. North of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to conduct a hearing and to provide findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law. After a two-day hearing, Judge North concluded that Ms. Camus had committed all but one of the types of violations charged by the Commission, including violations of MLRPC 1.1 (duty to provide competent representation); 1.2(a) (duty to abide by client decisions regarding objectives of representation); 1.3 (duty to act with reasonable diligence and promptness); 1.4(a),(b) (duty to inform and consult with client); 1.5(a),(d) (prohibition against unreasonable fees); 1.15(a),(d) (duty to keep safe funds of client or third parties); 1.16(d) (duty to protect client interests after termination of representation); 3.4(c) (duty to obey an obligation under rules of a tribunal); 8.1(b) (duty to respond to lawful demand from disciplinary authority); 8.4(b) (prohibition against commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on fitness); 8.4(c) (prohibition against conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and 8.4(d) (prohibition against conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). 1 Although Ms. Camus did not dispute the findings of fact, she filed exceptions to Judge North’s conclusions of law.

This Court held a hearing to consider those exceptions and the appropriate sanction. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that Ms. Camus committed the violations found by Judge North and that she must be disbarred. Background Ms. Camus was admitted to the Maryland Bar in 1997. During the period relevant to this proceeding, she operated a solo practice focused on family law in Edgewater, Maryland. ⁴²¹ By her own testimony, she had a caseload of six to eight clients at that time.

The alleged violations arose out of her representation of two of those clients. 2 The Martin Complaint After obtaining a protective order against her son’s father, Robin D. Martin needed legal representation for a hearing in that case in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. A mutual friend introduced her to Ms. Camus, who agreed to represent her at the hearing for a $2,000 fee, which was paid by the friend. At the hearing on July 13, 2009, Ms. Camus entered her appearance and negotiated a consent order. After the proceeding, Ms. Camus and Ms. Martin discussed Ms. Martin’s pending custody action in the circuit court.

Ms. Camus agreed to represent her in the custody action if Ms. Martin, who owned a cleaning service, would come to Ms. Camus’ home once a week to clean and do other chores. This arrangement was not put in writing. From August 2009 until early January 2010, Ms. Martin went to Ms. Camus’ home on most Fridays to clean and do chores. As the custody case proceeded, Ms. Martin continued to receive mailings directly from the court because Ms. Camus had not entered her appearance in the case, despite Ms. Martin’s repeated requests that she do so.

Because there was no attorney of record in the case, opposing counsel also sent notices and discovery requests directly to Ms. Martin. At an October 28, 2009, scheduling conference with the domestic relations master at which Ms. Camus appeared, she was given the opportunity to enter her appearance, but did not do so. The master recommended that Ms. Camus be directed to enter her appearance within 10 days, and the circuit court issued an order to that effect on November 2, 2009. Nevertheless, Ms. Camus never entered her appearance in the case.

Judge North found that Ms. Camus’ testimony that she simply ⁴²² forgot to enter her appearance was not credible, in light of the various requests by her client, her representations to opposing counsel, and the court order. There were other instances of neglect. For example, although Ms. Camus discussed responses to discovery requests with both Ms. Martin and opposing counsel, she never completed or filed responses and never submitted discovery requests to the opposing party. When Ms. Martin told Ms. Camus that her son’s father had violated the protective order, Ms. Camus took no action. 3 According to Ms. Martin, when she asked questions about the status of her case, Ms. Camus became angry and threatened to terminate the representation.

When Ms. Camus did not attend a December 22, 2009, hearing concerning a violation of the consent order, Ms. Martin found another attorney to represent her. The substitute attorney called Ms. Camus to request the case file. Ms. Camus said the file could be picked up from her home, but did not have it ready when Ms. Martin attempted to retrieve it. In January 2010, Ms. Camus told Ms. Martin’s mother that she was mailing the file to the new attorney, but never did so.

Ms. Camus eventually provided Ms. Martin with a few documents, including business cards of police officers, discovery requests, a litigation timeline, and a witness list. On February 2, 2010, Ms. Martin filed a complaint against Ms. Camus with the Commission. After two requests by Bar Counsel, Ms. Camus eventually provided a belated written response to the complaint. The Eyles Complaint In June 2009, Donna Smith Eyles was in negotiations to settle her contested divorce.

Dissatisfied with a proposed settlement recommended by her lawyer at the time, Ms. Eyles searched online for a new attorney and found Ms. Camus. After some preliminary research, Ms. Camus agreed that Ms. ⁴²³ Eyles should not take the settlement and should, instead, challenge the enforceability of a prenuptial agreement. Ms. Eyles signed a retainer agreement on June 20, 2009, which set a rate of $250 per hour for Ms. Camus’ services, and paid a $3,000 retainer. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Camus entered her appearance on behalf of Ms. Eyles and the divorce trial was scheduled for September 11, 2009.

In July 2009, Ms. Camus told Ms. Eyles that she had spent considerable time researching the enforceability of the prenuptial agreement and would require an additional $5,000 payment. Ms. Eyles sent the payment on July 23 and requested a billing statement. Ms. Camus did not respond to that request. In August 2009, Ms. Eyles, who had recently moved to Texas, contacted Ms. Camus for advice about a joint bank account that she had with her estranged husband.

Ms. Camus advised Ms. Eyles to take the money out of the account and transfer it into Ms. Camus’ trust account for safekeeping. On August 12, Ms. Eyles transferred $11,900 from the joint account to Ms. Camus’ trust account. Ms. Eyles did not believe that the money would be used for legal fees. Around this time, Ms. Camus filed a motion to bifurcate the proceedings on the prenuptial agreement and the divorce.

The circuit court granted the motion and scheduled a hearing on the enforceability of the prenuptial agreement for November 3, 2009, and the merits hearing for the divorce for January 28, 2010. On October 28, 2009, Ms. Camus — without informing Ms. Eyles — filed a motion to continue the hearing on the prenuptial agreement and it was rescheduled for January 28, 2010. Although Ms. Eyles told Ms. Camus that she wished to proceed without further delay, Ms. Camus attempted in early 2010 to have the court further postpone the hearing. Those requests were denied.

In preparation for the hearings, Ms. Camus encouraged Ms. Eyles to hire a forensic psychologist to testify as to Ms. Eyles’ state of mind at the time she signed the prenuptial agree ⁴²⁴ ment. 4 Ms. Camus also thought it necessary to hire a forensic accountant to testify about the couple’s financial assets and how they should be divided. 5 On January 22, 2010, Ms. Eyles called Ms. Camus to ask if she could pay the accountant’s fee from the funds in the trust account. She was told then for the first time that Ms. Camus had taken those funds for legal fees. Although this use of the funds was contrary to Ms. Eyles’ understanding, she did not challenge her lawyer, but made other arrangements to pay the accountant and shortly thereafter informed Ms. Camus that the accountant would be ready for the January 28 hearing on the prenuptial agreement. At that hearing, opposing counsel requested a continuance because of a family illness.

The request was granted and the hearing was postponed until February 5. On February 2, against Ms. Eyles’ wishes, Ms. Camus asked the court to reconsider its denial of her earlier request for a continuance. Although the forensic accountant was ready for the hearing, Ms. Camus told the court that the continuance was necessary because he was not prepared. The motion was granted and the hearing was rescheduled for April 6, 2010.

According to Ms. Eyles, Ms. Camus was frequently late for court appearances. For example, on April 5, 2010, Ms. Camus was 40 minutes late to a hearing on a motion to compel. That hearing was most notable not for its delayed start, but for its bizarre conclusion, which prompted Ms. Eyles to seek a new lawyer. At the close of the proceeding, Ms. Camus was arrested by deputy sheriffs for reasons unrelated to the divorce action. 6 As Ms. Camus was removed from the courtroom, Ms. Eyles retrieved Ms. Camus’ trial binder.

She ⁴²⁵ discovered that the binder contained only 25 pages of materials and did not include the pleadings discussed at the hearing or any other documents related to the motion at issue. This confirmed her belief that her lawyer had not been prepared to handle her case. 7 That night, Ms. Eyles called Ms. Camus to terminate the representation. The next day, the court rescheduled the hearing on the prenuptial agreement and the divorce trial for July and October 2010, respectively. Ms. Eyles soon retained new counsel.

The successor counsel called Ms. Camus and asked for Ms. Eyles’ files, which Ms. Camus agreed to send by May 3. The files, however, were never received. On May 7, Ms. Eyles wrote Ms. Camus and requested that her files be sent to the new attorney. In an email reply, Ms. Camus stated that the files would not be released until Ms. Eyles paid her outstanding legal bills.

As of that time, however, Ms. Camus had not provided Ms. Eyles with a billing statement of any kind. Two days after Ms. Eyles had retained a new lawyer, Ms. Eyles filed a complaint with the Commission against Ms. Camus. Bar Counsel wrote Ms. Camus on May 25, requesting a response to the complaint. Before submitting her response, however, Ms. Camus, on June 13, sent Ms. Eyles a “final legal bill” totaling $100,096.48.

The bill indicated that $19,900 had already been paid. The credited amounts included the initial $3,000 retainer fee, the $5,000 additional payment, and the $11,900 that Ms. Camus had taken from the trust account-resulting in a “balance owed” of $80,106.48. Ms. Camus had not sent periodic billing statements and, indeed, had not previously provided Ms. Eyles with any billing statements despite her requests. Ms. Eyles was shocked by the size of the bill and believed it had been sent in retaliation for her complaint to the Commission.

In her testimony before Judge North, Ms. Camus conceded that she had not created the bill contemporaneously with the representation, but ⁴²⁶ claimed that she had maintained time sheets and other records to support the charges. No exhibits were submitted to document those assertions. Two days after sending the bill to Ms. Eyles, Ms. Camus told Bar Counsel that she needed additional time to respond to Ms. Eyles’ complaint because her dog had died. Bar Counsel extended the deadline to June 23, 2010.

On that day, Ms. Camus again asked Bar Counsel for additional time, stating that her computer had been damaged in a storm. The response was ultimately filed on June 25. Seeking satisfaction of the $80,106.48 balance on her legal bill, Ms. Camus continued to resist efforts by Ms. Eyles and her new attorney to obtain the client file. On June 28, 2010, Ms. Camus wrote Ms. Eyles and asked if she still needed documents from her file.

Ms. Eyles’ new counsel replied the same day, again requesting the file in its entirety and instructing Ms. Camus not to contact Ms. Eyles directly. Ms. Camus later testified that she had been willing to allow the new counsel to copy some documents in the file, but had not been willing to give her the entire file. Ms. Eyles’ new counsel was eventually able to obtain copies of the pleadings from opposing counsel. The successor attorney, who had significant experience over the span of two decades in family law matters involving military families, 8 determined that the prenuptial agreement was enforceable and did not understand why a forensic psychologist had been hired.

On July 2, 2010, the parties reached a settlement that was less than the offer obtained by the counsel who had preceded Ms. Camus. 9 The expert opinions obtained by Ms. Camus were deemed unhelpful and were not used in the negotiation of the settlement. ⁴²⁷ On July 20, 2010, Ms. Camus filed a Motion to Enforce Attorney’s Lien against the funds due Ms. Eyles from the settlement. Some months later, the circuit court denied that motion, ruling that the lien was unenforceable because Ms. Camus’ work did not aid the ultimate outcome of the case. Meanwhile, Bar Counsel continued to seek information from Ms. Camus about Ms. Eyles’ complaint to the Commission. On July 14, 2010, Bar Counsel sent Ms. Camus a letter inquiring as to the fees charged, her billing practices, and the management of Ms. Eyles’ payments.

A written response, with copies of supporting documents, was due within 10 days. Ms. Camus submitted her response on November 1, 2011, more than 15 months after it was requested and just two days prior to the hearing before Judge North on the complaints against her. The Hearing Judge’s Conclusions of Law In a detailed analysis based on these facts, Judge North concluded that Ms. Camus had violated multiple rules of professional conduct. With respect to both clients, Judge North concluded that Ms. Camus had violated MLRPC 1.3 (duty to act with reasonable diligence and promptness), 1.4(a) (duty to inform and consult with the client), 1.4(b) (duty to enable the client to make informed decisions), 1.16(d) (duty to protect client interests after termination), and 8.4(d) (prohibition against conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

With respect to Ms. Martin alone, Judge North also concluded that Ms. Camus had violated MLRPC 1.2(a) (duty to abide by client decisions regarding objectives of representation) and 3.4(c) (duty to obey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal). With respect to Ms. Eyles alone, Judge North concluded that Ms. Camus had violated MLRPC 1.1 (duty to provide competent representation), 1.5(a) (prohibition on unreasonable fees), 1. 15(a) (duty to keep safe funds of client or third parties), 1.15(d) (duty to notify concerning funds or property received), 8.1(b) (duty to respond to lawful demands for information from a disciplinary authority), 8.4(b) (prohibí ⁴²⁸ tion against commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on fitness), and 8.4(c) (prohibition against conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). 10 Exceptions Ms. Camus did not except to Judge North’s findings of fact. She did take issue with some inferences and conclusions of law made by Judge North, largely with respect to the Eyles complaint. Discussion We review the hearing judge’s conclusions of law de novo pursuant to Rule 16-759(b)(l), in light of the exceptions filed by Ms. Camus.

Violations Related to Representation of Robin Martin We agree that Ms. Camus committed the violations cited by Judge North related to her representation of Robin Martin. Many of these violations stem from Ms. Camus’ failure to enter an appearance in the case after she was asked to do so by her client and after she was directed to do so by the court. For example, the failure to enter an appearance, together with her failure to carry out her undertakings with respect to discovery, was “prejudicial to the administration of justice” in violation of MLRPC 8.4(d), as it caused considerable confusion for opposing counsel, who was unable to rely on any of Ms. Camus’ actions or statements in the case because she was not the attorney of record. Those failings also violated MLRPC 1.3 (lawyer to act with “reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client”) and MLRPC 3.4(c) (“A lawyer shall not ...

(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal ... ”). The failure to enter an appearance caused both opposing counsel and the circuit court to send notices and other filings ⁴²⁹ directly to Ms. Martin. With this correspondence entirely bypassing Ms. Camus, she could hardly fulfill the obligations of MLRPC 1.4(a)(2), which required her to “keep the client reasonably informed about the status” of her case. Under