Attorney Grievance v. Miller

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland. v. Anne Margaret Miller, Misc. Docket AG No. 40, September Term 2018. Opinion by Greene, J. ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE — DISCIPLINE — DISBARMENT The Court of Appeals held that disbarment is the appropriate sanction where an attorney’s protracted involvement in adoption proceedings resulted in, among other violations, a litany of misrepresentations to her clients and Bar Counsel. Respondent Anne Margaret Miller violated Rules 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), 1.5(a) (Fees), 8.1(a) and (b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a), (b), and (c) (Misconduct).

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE — DISCIPLINE — DISBARMENT The Court of Appeals held that, although Respondent Anne Margaret Miller suffered from Post- traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”), her PTSD was not the “root cause” of her misconduct under Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376 , 773 A.2d 463 (2001), and therefore, given the intentionally dishonest nature of her actions, did not warrant a sanction lesser than disbarment. Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 24-C-18-007035 Argued: November 4, 2019 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 40 September Term, 2018 ______________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. ANNE MARGARET MILLER Barbera, C.J. McDonald Watts Hotten Getty Booth Greene Jr., Clayton (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Greene, J. ______________________________________ Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document Filed: January 29, 2020 is authentic. 2020-01-29 09:28-05:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk This attorney discipline case arises out of an attorney’s misrepresentations to her client concerning an adoption and subsequent misrepresentations the attorney made to the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Bar Counsel”) throughout its investigation of complaints lodged against the attorney. Anne Margaret Miller and her client, R.W.,1 met in 2015.

Based on events which occurred throughout this representation, R.W. filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission that ultimately led to Bar Counsel filing a “Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action” (“Petition”) against Ms. Miller. Pursuant to Md. Rule 19-721(a), Bar Counsel filed its Petition with this Court on December 12, 2018. Therein, Bar Counsel averred that Ms. Miller’s conduct throughout her representation of R.W. ran afoul of several provisions of the MARPC.2 More specifically, Bar Counsel alleged that Ms. Miller violated Rules 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4 (Communication), 1.5 (Fees), 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation), 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4 (Misconduct). On December 18, 2018, we ordered that the case be transmitted to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to hold a hearing under Maryland Rule 19-727.

The Honorable Charles H. Dorsey, III (“hearing judge”) held a hearing in the matter on May 17 and 20, 2019. 1 We refer to Ms. Miller’s client and related parties by their initials to protect the confidentiality of the underlying adoption. 2 On July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyer’s Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) were renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) and codified in Title 19 of the Maryland Rules. Bar Counsel alleged that some of Ms. Miller’s conduct occurred both prior to July 1, 2016 and after July 1, 2016. At the time of Bar Counsel’s filing on December 12, 2018, the Rules were codified as the MARPC. For purposes of consistency, we shall refer to the Rules as they are currently codified as the MARPC throughout this opinion.

Before the circuit court, Bar Counsel withdrew its allegation that Ms. Miller violated MARPC 1.16, and Ms. Miller conceded that her conduct constituted violations of both MARPC 1.4 and 8.4(a). Ms. Miller denied the remaining allegations of misconduct. As a result of that hearing, Judge Dorsey issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as required under Maryland Rule 19-727(d), in which he found by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Miller violated MARPC 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(a), 8.1(a) and (b), and 8.4(a), (b), and (c). Based on the record before us, we are convinced that the evidence adduced at the hearing clearly and convincingly supports the hearing judge’s conclusions of law concerning Ms. Miller’s violations of the MARPC.

The Hearing Judge’s Factual Findings and Conclusions of Law. We summarize the hearing judge’s findings of fact as follows: Ms. Miller was admitted to the Maryland Bar on June 24, 1998. At all relevant times, Ms. Miller maintained a law office in Baltimore City as a sole practitioner. She focused her practice on panel work for the Office of the Public Defender, private criminal defense, and guardianship work.

Prior to June 2015, Ms. Miller had completed two or three adoption cases. Ms. Miller met R.W. in 2015 at R.W.’s brother’s wedding. Ms. Miller had previously represented R.W.’s brother. At the wedding, R.W. informed Ms. Miller that she and her soon-to-be husband, M.W., wished to adopt her grandniece N.R. R.W. had been awarded custody and guardianship of N.R. by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City in March of 2009.

N.R.’s mother suffered from issues with substance abuse, and the identity of N.R.’s biological father was unknown. After the wedding, R.W. contacted Ms. Miller -2- to discuss representation and the adoption generally. Ms. Miller indicated to R.W. that the adoption would likely cost $5,000 or more. Prior to entering an attorney-client relationship, R.W. informed Ms. Miller that she wanted to have the adoption completed by July 30, 2016, the date she and M.W. were scheduled to marry, because she and her future husband wished to announce the adoption at the wedding.

The hearing judge noted that, although Ms. Miller informed R.W. that the adoption process may not be complete by this date, Ms. Miller was aware that this deadline was “significant” to R.W. Thereafter, R.W. retained Ms. Miller to represent her in the adoption proceedings. The parties disputed the circumstances leading up to execution of the retainer agreement. Ms. Miller contended that she provided R.W. with two copies of the retainer agreement, R.W. signed one of them, and M.W. delivered the signed retainer agreement to Ms. Miller’s office on July 7, 2015. Ms. Miller maintained that she had never visited R.W.’s home.

In contrast, R.W. testified that Ms. Miller brought the retainer agreement to her home on July 7, 2015, she signed the agreement, made a copy, and provided Ms. Miller with the copy. The hearing judge found R.W.’s testimony on this point more credible, because she introduced the original retainer agreement into evidence and rejected Ms. Miller’s account of the events. The retainer agreement indicated that Ms. Miller would charge $275 per hour and requested a $2,500 retainer. R.W. delivered a $2,500 cashier’s check to Ms. Miller to cover the retainer.

The retainer agreement also indicated that the adoption proceedings would -3- cost between $3,000 and $5,000 in total. R.W. testified that she and M.W. had set aside sufficient funds to cover the estimated cost of the adoption. The hearing judge found that, by August 15, 2015, Ms. Miller had prepared a “Petition for Adoption”, affidavits for both R.W. and M.W. to sign, a “Motion to Waive Publication”, a “Motion to Waive Investigation”, and the “Consent of Biological Parent to Adoption.” He also found that the papers and pleadings drafted by Ms. Miller “were not complex and generally contained boilerplate language.” Although Ms. Miller testified that she provided R.W. with the first monthly invoice, dated August 15, 2015, in a letter accompanying drafts of initial pleadings, R.W. testified that this letter did not contain a copy of the invoice. The hearing judge found R.W.’s testimony more credible and rejected Ms. Miller’s assertion.

On September 16, 2015, Ms. Miller emailed R.W. a draft of the adoption petition. She also advised R.W. that she required several documents to effectuate the adoption proceedings.3 On October 26, 2015, Ms. Miller, in an email correspondence, provided R.W. with a copy of the “Consent of Biological Parent to Adoption” that N.R.’s biological mother needed to sign. In that email, Ms. Miller indicated to R.W. that she required one final form “from the Department of Health,” and that, after they met with the biological mother and obtained her signature, the petition for adoption would be ready to file. The 3 Specifically, she advised R.W. that she required R.W. and M.W.’s 2014 tax returns, a certified copy of N.R.’s birth certificate, and statements of health concerning R.W. and M.W. signed by physicians. -4- hearing judge concluded that R.W. provided the documents necessary to file the adoption petition to Ms. Miller on or before December 10, 2015.

On December 10, 2015, Ms. Miller traveled to R.W.’s home to meet with the child’s biological mother. At this meeting, the child’s biological mother executed a consent to the petition for adoption and name change. Ms. Miller informed R.W. that she would file the petition for adoption and motions to waive a home visit and publication. Ms. Miller testified that she had mailed monthly invoices to R.W.’s home address and that she mentioned the outstanding balance to R.W. during the December 10, 2015 meeting.

Ms. Miller testified that R.W. told her she would pay the additional balance of $2037 after Christmas. The hearing judge found Ms. Miller’s testimony incredible and determined that R.W. was not aware of any outstanding balance as of December 10, 2015. Primarily, the hearing judge determined that Ms. Miller’s testimony, i.e. that she sent R.W. monthly invoices, was unsubstantiated. The hearing judge also rejected Ms. Miller’s testimony that she informed R.W. that she would not file the petition for adoption until after the outstanding balance had been paid.

The hearing judge also found that Ms. Miller failed to file a motion to waive home study as she had previously represented to R.W. Additionally, the hearing judge rejected Ms. Miller’s testimony that she and R.W. had a heated telephone conversation in February 2016, where Ms. Miller testified that she called R.W. to discuss payment. Ms. Miller testified that R.W. informed her that she did not intend to pay until Ms. Miller appeared on her behalf in court, and, when she requested payment in full, R.W. responded belligerently by raising her voice, cursing, and calling Ms. Miller names. The hearing judge determined that Ms. Miller’s testimony was again -5- unsubstantiated, because it was inconsistent with cordial text messages exchanged between R.W. and Ms. Miller on April 22, 2016 and R.W.’s testimony that no such dispute occurred. Between December 10, 2015 and April 22, 2016, R.W. contacted Ms. Miller by phone on several occasions.

In each phone call, R.W. inquired as to the date the adoption would be finalized. In response to her inquiry, Ms. Miller misled her to believe that the petition for adoption had been filed, and occasionally represented that she needed to visit the clerk’s office to check on the status of the case. The hearing judge determined that Ms. Miller did not request additional funds from R.W. at that time. Similarly, between April and October of 2016, Ms. Miller and R.W. exchanged several text messages in which Ms. Miller misled R.W. to believe that she had filed the petition for adoption.

Again, in the text messages, Ms. Miller represented to R.W. that she would visit the clerk’s office to determine the status of the case, but Ms. Miller ultimately failed to do so.4 Ms. Miller conceded that she intentionally misrepresented the status of the petition for adoption to R.W. to delay resolution of the case in hopes of receiving payment from R.W. R.W. only became aware of any outstanding balance from Ms. Miller on September 7, 2016 through an exchange of text messages. The hearing judge rejected Ms. Miller’s assertions that the two had three discussions regarding an outstanding balance that R.W. owed Ms. Miller. The hearing judge found that, as of mid-October 2016, Ms. Miller had 4 Ms. Miller misrepresented to R.W. that she would go to the clerk’s office to inquire as to the status of the adoption proceedings on at least four occasions: (i) May 5, 2016; (ii) August 17, 2016; (iii) September 7, 2016; and (iv) October 12, 2016. Ms. Miller, however, never filed the petition for adoption and therefore had no intention of visiting the clerk’s office to inquire about the status, because the case had not yet been filed. -6- not yet filed the petition for adoption on behalf of R.W. Thus, as a result of Ms. Miller’s delay, she required R.W. and M.W. to sign updated affidavits and provide additional tax returns.

On October 26, 2016, Ms. Miller met with R.W. and M.W. at R.W.’s home and obtained M.W.’s signature on the updated affidavit. Two days later, Ms. Miller met with R.W. outside of her work and had R.W. sign her own updated affidavit. At this point, Ms. Miller apologized to R.W. for the delay in the proceedings and offered to draft wills for R.W. and M.W. free of charge to compensate them for the delay. Upon noticing that R.W. had purchased a new vehicle, Ms. Miller inquired as to when R.W. would make an additional payment.

R.W. indicated that she would provide the funds to Ms. Miller when she obtained a hearing date for the adoption. During October, R.W. apparently became suspicious of the delay and conducted her own investigation into the matter. She inquired with the clerk’s offices in Baltimore City and County and discovered that Ms. Miller had not filed the petition for adoption, as she had consistently represented to R.W. Ms. Miller testified that, in October 2016, she admitted to R.W. that she had not filed the petition for adoption. The hearing judge rejected her testimony based upon a December 5, 2016 text message in which R.W. stated “[g]ood morning, what’s the status on court date?” Therefore, the hearing judge concluded that R.W. was still under the false impression that Ms. Miller was still pursuing the petition for adoption in December of 2016.

The hearing judge found that, in December of 2016, Ms. Miller and R.W. spoke via telephone and Ms. Miller admitted that she had not filed the petition for adoption. During -7- this call, Ms. Miller informed her client that Ms. Miller would set a court date when she was paid in full. The hearing judge accepted R.W.’s testimony that this was the first instance she learned that Ms. Miller refused to take any action in the case until she received further payment. Throughout December of 2016, R.W. and Ms. Miller exchanged several phone calls.

R.W. referred to one of these calls as “rough” and indicated that she hung up on Ms. Miller, after Ms. Miller’s requests for additional payment, to avoid cursing at Ms. Miller. The hearing judge found R.W. was upset with Ms. Miller, because she felt that Ms. Miller had repeatedly misled her regarding the status of her case in efforts to obtain further payment. The hearing judge found that R.W. had sufficient capital to cover the adoption proceedings and that “money was never a factor.” Ms. Miller alleged that she had sent monthly invoices to R.W. between August 2016 and January 2017 and that R.W. failed to make any payment pursuant to these invoices. The hearing judge rejected Ms. Miller’s testimony and found that R.W. did not receive any invoices that Ms. Miller allegedly sent her between August 2015 and December 2016.

R.W. testified that she only received two invoices—one dated October 26, 2016 and the other dated January 23, 2017. In December, Ms. Miller called R.W. and apologized to her. R.W. initially refused to make further payment for Ms. Miller’s services, but later agreed to a revised payment agreement. Under this agreement, R.W. agreed to pay half of the outstanding balance when Ms. Miller provided her with proof that the petition for adoption was filed, and R.W. would then pay the remaining amount of the outstanding balance on the day of the hearing.

Between December of 2016 and January of 2017, R.W. sent several text messages to Ms. -8- Miller inquiring about the status of the case. Eventually, Ms. Miller responded that she was “waiting to be paid.” Because of Ms. Miller’s inability to prove that she filed the petition for adoption, R.W. then terminated her attorney-client relationship with Ms. Miller via email on January 19, 2017. In the email where R.W. indicated that she terminated the attorney-client relationship, R.W. requested a copy of her client file. On January 24, 2017, Ms. Miller met with R.W. at her home and provided her with some of the relevant documents and an invoice for an outstanding balance of $2,450, which R.W. did not pay.5 In January of 2017, R.W. hired another attorney to complete the adoption, paid that attorney $2,500 to complete it, and the adoption was completed on September 29, 2017.

Investigation by Bar Counsel In regard to Bar Counsel’s investigation of Ms. Miller’s underlying conduct, the hearing judge made several findings of fact, including the following: (i) That Ms. Miller knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to Bar Counsel that she had provided R.W. with monthly invoices and that R.W. refused to make additional payments. (ii) That R.W.’s client file that Ms. Miller provided to Bar Counsel included a copy of the June 23, 2015 retainer agreement that differed from the one she provided in her initial response to Bar Counsel’s inquiry. The second retainer agreement did not contain a clause that “payment is due immediately upon receipt of the invoice for attorney fees, costs[,] and expenses.”6 5 Ms. Miller provided R.W. with an original signed copy of the Consent of Biological Parent to the Adoption, the original documents R.W. provided to Ms. Miller, and an invoice charging R.W. $4,950 for the representation. Given the $2,500 retainer R.W. paid to Ms. Miller, the remaining balance was $2,450. 6 The hearing judge noted that Ms. Miller was unable to account for the differences between the two retainer agreements.

He explained that Ms. Miller seemed to suggest that she (cont’d . . .) -9- (iii) That the retainer agreement Ms. Miller provided to R.W. did not contain such a provision. (iv) That Ms. Miller, in response to Bar Counsel’s requests for documents relating to her representation of R.W., provided Bar Counsel with copies of the invoices she allegedly sent to R.W., but failed to submit copies of email and text message correspondences between her and R.W. (v) That Ms. Miller, in December 2015, in response to a request by Bar Counsel, submitted a document titled “Legal Services Performed for [R.W.] in the Matter of the Adoption of [N.R.]” which delineated sixteen and a half hours of work that Ms. Miller performed. Fees corresponding to these hours were included in the August invoice purportedly sent to R.W. The hearing judge concluded that the timesheet provided by Ms. Miller contradicted her earlier testimony concerning the invoices she allegedly sent to R.W. Ms. Miller conceded that she knew the timesheet she provided to Bar Counsel was inaccurate at the time she submitted it.

(vi) That Ms. Miller falsified the hours she worked on R.W.’s case in an attempt to “justify not placing the $2,500 received from R.W. into an attorney trust account as required by Rule 1.15(c).” The Hearing Judge’s Conclusions of Law Based on the facts adduced at the hearing, the hearing judge made several conclusions of law, which we summarize as follows. Ms. Miller violated MARPC 1.3 by failing to act with reasonable diligence through her failure to file the petition for adoption on behalf of R.W. In fact, the hearing judge found that Ms. Miller deliberately delayed resolution in R.W.’s case for over a year. Ms. Miller violated MARPC 1.4(a) and (b), as she had conceded in her responses to Bar Counsel. More specifically, Ms. Miller violated MARPC 1.4(b) by failing to inform R.W.

(. . . cont’d) received a different copy of the retainer agreement from Bar Counsel, i.e. a copy of the agreement that R.W. provided to Bar Counsel. Ms. Miller, however, conceded that R.W. did not provide Bar Counsel with a copy of the retainer agreement. Instead, R.W. introduced her signed copy of the retainer agreement at the hearing. - 10 - that the petition for adoption had not been filed. In addition, Ms. Miller violated MARPC 1.4(a) by failing to keep R.W. informed as to any outstanding balances.

Ms. Miller violated MARPC 1.5(a), because the $4,950 she charged R.W. in attorney’s fees was unreasonable. The hearing judge found that, although the fee would ordinarily be reasonable, it was unreasonable because Ms. Miller consistently delayed taking any action in the case and “failed to provide R.W. with any services of value.” The hearing judge, however, did not find that Ms. Miller violated MARPC 1.15.7 Ms. Miller violated MARPC 8.1(a) in several ways: (i) misrepresenting to Bar Counsel that she sent monthly invoices to R.W.; (2) providing Bar Counsel with an altered retainer agreement; and (3) falsifying the timesheet she submitted to Bar Counsel. Similarly, Ms. Miller violated MARPC 8.1(b) by failing to comply with all of Bar Counsel’s lawful requests for documentation. Ms. Miller violated MARPC 8.4(a), because she violated other provisions of the MARPC.

Additionally, the hearing judge concluded that Ms. Miller violated MARPC 8.4(c) when she misrepresented to R.W. that she had filed the petition for adoption, misrepresented to R.W. that she had filed a motion to waive home study, misled R.W. as to the status of the adoption proceedings, provided R.W. with a falsified invoice dated October 26, 2016, and through her failure to comply with MARPC 7 MARPC 1.15 concerns an attorney’s safekeeping of property. Under its provisions, and relevant to the instant proceedings, attorneys are required to deposit advanced fees in attorney trust accounts. In his application of MARPC 8.1 to the facts, the hearing judge commented that he “rejects [Ms. Miller’s] testimony and finds that she knowingly and intentionally submitted the falsified timesheet to Bar Counsel and intentionally altered the hours she worked to justify not placing the $2,500 received from R.W. into an attorney trust account as required by Rule 1.15(c).” Despite this finding, he did not find that Ms. Miller violated MARPC 1.15. - 11 - 8.1(a) throughout Bar Counsel’s investigation. The hearing judge also concluded that Ms. Miller violated MARPC 8.4(d), because her conduct, in its entirety, brought the legal profession into disrepute.

The Hearing Judge’s Findings as to Mitigation and Aggravation Before the hearing judge, Ms. Miller made several arguments in favor of mitigation: (i) an absence of prior discipline; (ii) emotional problems; (iii) mental disability; (iv) timely good faith efforts to make restitution or rectify the consequences of her misconduct; (v) full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board; (vi) good character or reputation; (vii) the imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (viii) remorse; and (ix) that she would be unlikely to repeat the misconduct. First, the hearing judge rejected Ms. Miller’s contentions concerning the interplay between her mental illness and her misconduct in representing R.W. The hearing judge found that Ms. Miller’s mental health conditions did not meet the standard for mitigation established by this Court in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376 , 773 A.2d 463 (2001). Second, the hearing judge found that Ms. Miller’s return of R.W.’s funds was not made in good faith, because she did not return them until January 31, 2019, months after R.W. terminated her representation and Bar Counsel instituted its investigation. Instead, the hearing judge found that the refund was based on self-preservation.

Third, the hearing judge found that Ms. Miller’s good reputation in the legal community was a mitigating factor. Fourth, Ms. Miller argued that the mitigation standard concerning the imposition of other sanctions was met, because she returned R.W.’s funds. The hearing judge, based - 12 - on his earlier interpretation that the refund was not made in good faith, rejected her assertions of mitigation. Fifth, the hearing judge found that Ms. Miller’s remorse was feigned and not a mitigating factor, because she consistently blamed R.W. for her failure to file the petition for adoption.

Sixth, the hearing judge determined that the unlikelihood of repetition was not a mitigating factor. He determined that, it was too speculative to assume that Ms. Miller would not engage in similar conduct in the future, based on the evidence submitted. Accordingly, the only mitigating factor found by the hearing judge was that Ms. Miller maintained a good reputation within the legal community. In terms of aggravating factors, Bar Counsel alleged the existence of several: (i) a dishonest or selfish motive; (ii) a pattern of misconduct; (iii) multiple offenses; (iv) submission of false statements during the disciplinary process; and (v) substantial experience in the practice of law.

The hearing judge found that Ms. Miller acted with a dishonest or selfish motive, committed multiple violations of the MARPC, submitted false statements to Bar Counsel throughout the investigation, and had substantial experience in the practice of law. The hearing judge did not, however, find that Ms. Miller engaged in a pattern of misconduct, because the allegations of misconduct stemmed from a single incident. The hearing judge submitted his findings of fact and conclusions of law to this Court on July 3, 2019. DISCUSSION Ms. Miller’s Exceptions to the Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact We have reiterated the well settled proposition that - 13 - this Court exercises original jurisdiction over attorney discipline proceedings.

We conduct an independent review of the record, accepting the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. We will not disturb the factual findings of the hearing judge if they are based on clear and convincing evidence. Our review of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law is de novo. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Christopher, 383 Md. 624, 638 , 861 A.2d 692, 700 (2004) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gore, 380 Md. 455, 468 , 845 A.2d 1204, 1211 (2004)).

See also Md. Rule 19-741 (“The Court of Appeals shall review de novo the circuit court judge’s conclusions of law.”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tanko, 408 Md. 404, 419 , 969 A.2d 1010, 1019 (2009) (“If the hearing judge’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the conclusions drawn from them are supported by the facts found, exceptions to conclusions of law will be overruled.”). The clearly erroneous standard also applies in situations where an attorney files exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Marcalus, 414 Md. 501, 512 , 996 A.2d 350, 356 (2010) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mba-Jonas, 402 Md. 334, 344 , 936 A.2d 839, 844 (2007)). This standard is met where the hearing judge’s factual findings are supported by “any competent material evidence[.]” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Robbins, 463 Md. 411, 443 , 205 A.3d 1034, 1052 (2019), reconsideration denied (May 16, 2019) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McDonald, 437 Md. 1, 16 , 85 A.3d 117, 125 (2014)).

Having established the applicable standard of review, we now turn to Ms. Miller’s exceptions. Ms. Miller makes a multitude of exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. We will examine them individually, beginning with her exceptions - 14 - to the hearing judge’s findings of fact. A substantial number of Ms. Miller’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact may be stylized as contesting Judge Dorsey’s credibility determinations.

Therefore, we must first briefly review this Court’s precedent on the central role a hearing judge occupies in determining the credibility of witnesses in the attorney grievance context. Generally, a hearing judge maintains a great deal of discretion in determining which evidence to rely upon. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Woolery, 462 Md. 209, 230 , 198 A.3d 835, 847 (2018); Md. Rule 19-741 (indicating that this Court “shall give due regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses.”). Further, “[i]n making his or her findings of fact, [t]he hearing judge is permitted to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon from [the] conflicting array [of facts presented].” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Merkle, 440 Md. 609 , 626–27, 103 A.3d 679, 690 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The underlying justification for our deference to the hearing judge’s credibility determinations is based on the premise that the hearing judge is “in the best position to assess the credibility of a witness.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Pak, 400 Md. 567, 595 , 929 A.2d 546 , 562–63 (2007) (citing Md. Rule 16-759(b)(2)(B) and Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50 , 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006)). See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kepple, 432 Md. 214, 226 , 68 A.3d 797, 803 (2013), (noting that “the hearing judge was in the best position ‘to evaluate the veracity of the respondent’s explanation’ regarding the alleged violation of the [MARPC].” (quoting Tanko, 408 Md. at 420 , 969 A.2d at 1020 )), reinstatement granted sub. nom., In re Reinstatement of Kepple, - 15 - 434 Md. 318 , 75 A.3d 322 (2013). As evident, we afford a great deal of deference to the hearing judge’s credibility determinations. We now begin our analysis of Ms. Miller’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact.

Exception One First, Ms. Miller takes exception to the hearing judge’s factual findings that Ms. Miller only sent R.W. two invoices throughout the representation and that the thirteen additional invoices proffered by Ms. Miller were falsely created. She argues that the hearing judge “gave great weight” to the fact that the invoices were addressed to “R.R.- W.” with the W. indicating her husband’s surname.8 Ms. Miller posits that, the August 15, 2015 invoice, which R.W. conceded she received was addressed in a similar fashion, and this demonstrates that Ms. Miller addressed all of her correspondences in that manner. Before the hearing judge, Ms. Miller testified that she had sent fifteen invoices in total. R.W. testified that she had only received two.

Before this Court, Ms. Miller contends, based on the conflicting testimony set forth at the hearing, the hearing judge could not have found by clear and convincing evidence that R.W. received only two invoices.9 Ms. Miller characterizes this action by the hearing judge as impermissibly shifting the burden of proof to her and therefore argues that this factual finding was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. 8 At the start of Ms. Miller’s representation of R.W., prior to her marriage to M.W., her name was actually “R.R.” All of the invoices Ms. Miller allegedly sent to R.W., before and after her marriage to M.W., were addressed to “R.R.-W.” 9 Ms. Miller fails to identify any precedent in support of the proposition that the hearing judge is not permitted to credit the testimony of one witness over another. - 16 - The hearing judge, in the instant attorney grievance proceedings, stated that he “accept[ed] R.W.’s testimony and reject[ed] [Ms. Miller’s]” in making this finding. Clearly, the hearing judge found R.W.’s testimony more credible than that provided by Ms. Miller. Although the hearing judge pointed out Ms. Miller’s failure to provide the court with the original electronic versions of the invoices to demonstrate the date they were made, the hearing judge did not impermissibly shift the burden to Ms. Miller. Instead, this aspect, and that concerning the inclusion of R.W.’s maiden name, merely constitute the grounds, in part, upon which the hearing judge determined R.W.’s testimony was more credible than that of Ms. Miller.

In addition, Ms. Miller’s contentions are contradicted by evidence contained within the record. Specifically, her testimony that she sent R.W. monthly invoices conflicts with a text message she sent to R.W. on August 3, 2016. In that message, Ms. Miller stated, “[by the way] I sent you a second bill. When are you paying it?

Thanks[.]” R.W. responded, “[w]e did not receive a second bill. The only information we received on this case is answers to questions we initiate[d]. According to you[,] nothing else has been done. Have no problem paying for services.[ ] Hope you are feeling better.” Clearly, this text message is entirely inconsistent with Ms. Miller’s testimony that she provided R.W. with monthly billing invoices.

If she had provided R.W. with monthly invoices, then this would have been the eleventh invoice Ms. Miller sent to R.W. Accordingly, the hearing judge was justified in rejecting Ms. Miller’s testimony that she sent R.W. monthly invoices. Given this Court’s deference to a hearing judge’s credibility determinations, and a hearing judge’s discretion in accepting or rejecting conflicting - 17 - testimony, we conclude that the hearing judge’s factual finding on this point was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we overrule Ms. Miller’s first exception to the hearing judge’s findings of fact. Exception Two Second, Ms. Miller takes exception to the hearing judge’s finding that only one copy of the retainer agreement was signed by the parties at R.W.’s home on July 7, 2015.

She argues that her signature on the retainer agreement provided by R.W. is signed “Anne M. Miller[,]” while the retainer agreement provided by Ms. Miller is signed “Anne Miller.” She also implicitly contends that the retainer agreement was not signed at R.W.’s house. To this end, Ms. Miller argues that, in the text messages between her and R.W. on December 10, 2015, arranging a meeting at R.W.’s home between Ms. Miller, R.W., and the child’s biological mother, R.W. informed Ms. Miller of R.W.’s address. Ms. Miller contends, had she previously visited R.W.’s home, these directions would be superfluous. As set forth above, a hearing judge maintains a great deal of latitude in determining the credibility of witnesses.

With regard to the dispute over the retainer agreement, the hearing judge commented that he found “R.W.’s testimony to be more credible than [that of Ms. Miller] because at the hearing, R.W. produced the original retainer agreement in her possession, a copy of which was admitted into evidence.” Moreover, the hearing judge noted that Ms. Miller submitted two differing copies of the retainer agreement to Bar Counsel throughout its investigation and was unable to explain the inconsistency between the two. Therefore, we overrule Ms. Miller’s second exception. - 18 - Exception Three Third, Ms. Miller takes exception to the hearing judge’s finding that, throughout Bar Counsel’s investigation, Ms. Miller knowingly and intentionally misrepresented that she had sent R.W. monthly bills. This exception is exceedingly similar to Ms. Miller’s first exception and arises out of Ms. Miller’s position that the hearing judge erred in crediting R.W.’s testimony while finding Ms. Miller’s testimony incredible. As we have already determined that the hearing judge’s credibility determination concerning the number of invoices Ms. Miller sent to R.W. was not clearly erroneous, we need not analyze this exception further due to the overlapping nature of the two exceptions.

As with Ms. Miller’s first exception, the hearing judge’s finding was not clearly erroneous. Therefore, we overrule Ms. Miller’s third exception to the hearing judge’s findings of fact. Exception Four Fourth, Ms. Miller contends that the hearing judge’s conclusion that the retainer agreement did not include the phrase “[p]ayment is due immediately upon receipt of the invoice for attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses” was made in error. As with a majority of her exceptions, Ms. Miller’s relies solely upon her own testimony.

Ms. Miller argues that she testified she had mistakenly printed two copies of the retainer agreement and that, when R.W. requested an estimate of the total fee be included in the retainer agreement, she inadvertently deleted the “payment is due” clause. The hearing judge noted that Ms. Miller failed to substantiate her testimony and did “not provide any evidence in support of her testimony, claiming that her former attorney did not return to her the original client file.” As evident, the hearing judge found R.W.’s testimony concerning the signing of the - 19 - retainer agreement, along with the copy admitted into evidence which contained the “payment is due” language, more credible than the unsubstantiated testimony of Ms. Miller. Given that R.W.’s testimony was supported by evidence in the record, and Ms. Miller was unable to substantiate her version of events, we conclude that the hearing judge did not clearly err in making this finding and overrule Ms. Miller’s exception. Exception Five Fifth, Ms. Miller argues that the hearing judge was clearly erroneous in finding that she produced and submitted a fraudulent timesheet to Bar Counsel.10 Primarily, the hearing judge found that Ms. Miller created this timesheet in an attempt to justify her depositing the $2,500 retainer she received from R.W. into her operating account instead of an attorney trust account.

Again, Ms. Miller points to her own testimony in an attempt to contradict the hearing judge’s factual finding. At the hearing, however, Ms. Miller acknowledged that the timesheet she submitted to Bar Counsel was not accurate and that she was aware of the inaccuracy at the time she submitted it to Bar Counsel. The timesheet and invoices submitted by Ms. Miller to Bar Counsel throughout these proceedings play a central role in the alleged violations of the MARPC and the hearing judge’s credibility determinations. Largely, Ms. Miller offered conflicting accounts of the hours of work she performed on behalf of R.W. during the underlying adoption proceedings.

Accordingly, Ms. Miller’s testimony, the invoices, and the 10 Ms. Miller identifies two different exceptions as “Exception No. 4[.]” To accommodate for this error, we stylize this exception, the second fourth exception, as exception five and adjust the subsequent exceptions accordingly. - 20 - timesheet she submitted require a greater level of scrutiny to reveal the extent of the discrepancies and to better ascertain the deception committed by Ms. Miller. Such scrutiny will immediately follow. As mentioned above, Ms. Miller alleged that she sent R.W. monthly invoices throughout the entirety of the representation. The invoices submitted by Ms. Miller covering a period between August 15, 2015 and November 15, 2015 are generally identical and contain the following enumeration of work performed: Task Hours11 Research 6 Meetings & telephone calls 2 Preparation of pleadings 7.5 Total 16.5 Accordingly, as to the first alleged invoice, dated August 15, 2015, Ms. Miller represented to R.W. that she performed fifteen and a half hours of work.

Ms. Miller, however, provided conflicting accounts of the number of hours she worked throughout her deposition and testimony at the hearing. For instance, Ms. Miller stated in her response to Bar Counsel that “[b]y July 7, 2015, [she] had already expended nearly 10 hours on the case.” In contrast, however, Ms. Miller testified that she “completed about 16 hours of work between June 23 and middle 11 Ms. Miller conceded during her deposition that the hours listed add up to fifteen and a half hours. She attributes the sixteen-and-a-half-hour total to sloppiness or an arithmetic error. - 21 - of July[.]” This inconsistency between the number of hours Ms. Miller testified that she worked on the case and the invoices, allegedly sent to R.W., becomes increasingly clear upon consideration of the timesheet that Ms. Miller submitted to Bar Counsel. The timesheet contained the following: Date Legal Services Performed Hours Running totals 06/23/15 Client meeting 0.7 0.7 06/23/15 Legal research 3.5 4.2 06/26/15 Legal research 2.5 6.7 07/03/15 Drafted pleadings 3.0 9.7 07/06/15 Client meeting 0.1 9.8 07/08/15 Calls to [the Department of Mental Health and 0.6 10.4 Hygiene] 08/15/15 Letter to client 0.2 10.6 08/27/15 Letter to client 0.1 10.7 09/14/15 Emails to client 0.1 10.8 09/16/15 Email to client 0.1 10.9 10/28/15 Email to client 0.1 11.0 12/03/15 File and document review; revised pleadings 4.2 15.2 12/10/15 Meeting with birth mother 1.5 16.7 12/10/15 Client meeting 1.0 17.7 08/05/16 Amended pleadings 0.1 17.8 10/28/16 Client meeting 0.2 18.0 Total 18.0 18.0 As indicated by the timesheet Ms. Miller submitted, she performed 10.6 hours of work as of August 15, 2015.

This is consistent with her statement to Bar Counsel that she completed ten hours by July 7, 2015.12 Nonetheless, the timesheet is inconsistent with Ms. Miller’s testimony that she performed sixteen hours of work by the middle of July 2015. 12 As noted, the timesheet indicates that Ms. Miller performed 9.8 hours of work by July 7, 2015. - 22 - In contrast, the invoices Ms. Miller allegedly sent to R.W., in monthly intervals, indicate that she performed fifteen and a half hours of work by August 15, 2015. The invoices in the three subsequent months (September, October, and November) are identical to the August 15, 2015 invoice and also indicate that Ms. Miller performed fifteen and a half hours of work. Additionally, in her deposition Ms. Miller testified that she did not perform any work between August and November 2015. The alleged December 15, 2015 invoice indicates that Ms. Miller, at that point in time, had performed eighteen hours of work on the case.

Nonetheless, the timesheet submitted by Ms. Miller shows that she did not perform eighteen hours of work in the matter until October 28, 2016. Although Ms. Miller characterized the timesheet she submitted to Bar Counsel as “not completely accurate[,]” she stated that it is “a reasonable approximation” despite being “sloppily created[.]” Regardless of the propriety of the timesheet, the conflicting testimony and exhibits adduced by Ms. Miller give rise to an inference that Ms. Miller engaged in subterfuge throughout her representation of R.W. and Bar Counsel’s investigation. In the correspondence Ms. Miller sent to Bar Counsel, to which the timesheet was attached, Ms. Miller did not acknowledge that the contents of it were inaccurate or that it was “an artifact created to comply with Bar Counsel’s request” as she now contends before this Court. Moreover, a review of her testimony, the invoices allegedly sent to R.W., and the timesheet provide conflicting accounts of the number of hours Ms. Miller worked within the period and substantiate the hearing judge’s finding that Ms. Miller intentionally submitted a fraudulent timesheet to Bar Counsel. - 23 - Ms. Miller’s lack of candor throughout this process had far reaching implications before the hearing judge.

As previously demonstrated, the hearing judge found R.W.’s testimony credible and Ms. Miller’s testimony incredible in several instances. Based on the conflicting accounts provided by Ms. Miller, the hearing judge’s finding regarding her credibility was not erroneous. The record contains sufficient indication that Ms. Miller made misrepresentations to both R.W. and Bar Counsel. Those misrepresentations, in turn, substantially impair her credibility.

Accordingly, the hearing judge’s factual finding was not clearly erroneous. We therefore overrule Ms. Miller’s exception to the hearing judge’s findings of fact. Exception Six Sixth, Ms. Miller takes exception to the hearing judge’s factual finding that the adoption proceedings did not contain novel or contested issues and that the pleadings and papers drafted by Ms. Miller were not complex.13 Ms. Miller contends that the only testimony offered on this point was her own. She argues further that, any finding on this point requires expert testimony from a family law practitioner.

Ms. Miller fails to identify any precedent in support of this proposition. Contrary to Ms. Miller’s position before this Court, she conceded at the hearing that the pleadings she prepared on behalf of R.W. contained “boilerplate” language. Her testimony substantiates the hearing judge’s factual finding. We have previously agreed 13 Ms. Miller contends that the adoption contained novel or complex issues, because N.R.’s biological mother was addicted to drugs, suffered from mental health issues, and the biological father’s identity was unknown. - 24 - with a hearing judge’s determination that a prenuptial agreement was not complex or novel, based upon the hearing judge’s experience and knowledge alone, without requiring supporting expert testimony.

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Camus, 425 Md. 417, 432 , 42 A.3d 1, 9 (2012). Furthermore, the adoption in this case was consented to by the child’s mother, which is generally less complex than adoptions to which the child’s parent does not consent. Additionally, a substantial majority of the motions and accompanying documents completed by Ms. Miller and submitted to Bar Counsel were, in fact, modified Maryland forms. The motion prepared by Ms. Miller titled “Consent of Parent to an Independent Adoption of [N.R.]” is based entirely on Maryland Form 9-102.4.

In fact, there are only slight differences between that form and the motion drafted by Ms. Miller. These differences are found solely in instances where the form contains blanks for attorneys to fill-in.14 The only petitions or motions independently drafted by Ms. Miller were: (i) the petition for adoption and name change; (ii) the motion to waive home study; (iii) the affidavits of R.W. and M.W.; (iv) the motion to waive publication; and (v) the accompanying draft orders. In total, these papers contain only seven pages of substantive 14 In her correspondence with Bar Counsel that included the pleadings and motions, Ms. Miller did not include metadata for the documents she drafted and submitted to the court. She did, however, provide the metadata of certain Maryland forms.

The accompanying metadata indicates that a majority of these forms were reviewed for one minute. The metadata of one form, however, indicates that Ms. Miller or her staff edited the document for 200 minutes. This is inherently puzzling considering that the form did not contain any independent contributions from Ms. Miller. - 25 - material independently drafted by Ms. Miller.15 As evident, the hearing judge’s conclusion that the adoption proceedings were neither novel nor complex was not clearly erroneous. Therefore, we overrule this exception.

Exception Seven Ms. Miller next excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that R.W. was not aware of any outstanding balance that she owed Ms. Miller and that Ms. Miller had not requested additional payments from R.W. This exception is inherently intertwined with Ms. Miller’s first exception, where she took exception to the number of invoices the hearing judge found she had sent to R.W. Again, the primary thrust of Ms. Miller’s argument is that the hearing judge erred in finding R.W.’s testimony more credible than her own. As indicated supra, the hearing judge is in the best position to ascertain the credibility of a witness and we generally defer to the hearing judge’s credibility determinations. See Guida, 391 Md. at 50 , 891 A.2d at 1095 . With this in mind, our independent review of the record reveals that the hearing judge’s credibility determination was not clearly erroneous.

We therefore overrule Ms. Miller’s exception. Exception Eight Eighth, Ms. Miller takes exception to the hearing judge’s factual finding that an alleged heated conversation between her and R.W. did not occur in February of 2016. In support of her claim, Ms. Miller contends that the record clearly demonstrates that this exchange occurred based on several pieces of testimony: (i) testimony by Ellen Kay 15 This total excludes the certificates of service and proposed draft orders. - 26 - Tannen and Dr. Christine Tellefsen corroborating Ms. Miller’s account of the exchange; 16 (ii) Ms. Miller’s testimony and deposition; (iii) R.W.’s testimony that the two had “several . . . rough conversations[;]” and (iv) the break in communication between R.W. and Ms. Miller from February through April of 2016. According to Ms. Miller’s testimony, sometime within the first week of February, she and R.W. participated in a phone conversation where Ms. Miller informed R.W. that she would not file the adoption papers until she received further payment.

According to Ms. Miller, R.W. became irate, called her expletives, and one of the two hung up the phone. In her testimony before the hearing judge, Ms. Tannen testified that Ms. Miller was “triggered” by R.W. She clarified that “at one point, the trigger was when [R.W.] became really angry and started cursing at her.” Dr. Tellefsen testified that the relationship between R.W. and Ms. Miller was going well until, “she brought up the idea that she needed to be paid for her time before finishing the case, like a retainer, like being paid ahead of time [to R.W.]” and that R.W. “just turned on [Ms. Miller] and became, you know, in her perception, became very aggressive and hostile.”17 In contrast, R.W. provided slightly differing testimony: [R.W.]: We had several conversations, rough conversations, and things would be—I was so angry that I just had to hang up on her because, at that 16 Ms. Tannen is a psychotherapist and licensed clinical professional counselor holding a Bachelor of Arts in psychology from the University of Maryland and a Master of Arts in counseling. Dr. Tellefsen is a forensic psychiatrist holding a Bachelor’s degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a M.D. from the University of Illinois in Chicago. 17 Both Ms. Tannen’s and Dr. Tellefsen’s testimony concerning the dispute were based on Ms. Miller’s recitation of the events to them. - 27 - point, I really got emotional and I didn’t want to say anything or do anything that’s going to hurt my case . . . with this case going through, so I just hung up on her. R.W. also testified that a heated phone call occurred in December of 2016: [R.W.]: When she said to me that she was not going to—I wouldn’t get a court date until I paid in full, I was real angry.

I was very angry and it was taking me to a level that I didn’t want to go at. Like I didn’t—a whole bunch of profanity was getting ready to come out of me because I was very angry because I’m like, all this time, we could have had this done because money was never a factor because we had the money. Regarding the alleged heated exchange, the hearing judge rejected Ms. Miller’s testimony and found that “the February 2016 heated phone call between [Ms. Miller] and R.W. is not substantiated.” Primarily, the hearing judge determined that the allegations concerning the occurrence of a heated telephonic dispute ran contrary to subsequent exchanges of text messages between Ms. Miller and R.W. Ms. Miller testified that, after the alleged February 2016 phone call, she did not speak to R.W. until she received a text from R.W. on April 22, 2016. In this message, R.W. stated “[g]ood evening Mrs. Miller, just checking in.

Have a great weekend.” The hearing judge determined that this text message was inconsistent with Ms. Miller’s versions of events—that a heated telephone conversation occurred in February of 2016, in which R.W. cursed at and insulted Ms. Miller. As detailed above, a hearing judge is authorized to make credibility determinations and to “pick and choose” between conflicting testimony. Merkle, 440 Md. at 626–27, 103 A.3d at 690 . Obviously, the hearing judge found Ms. Miller’s testimony regarding the dispute incredible and R.W.’s testimony credible.

Considering that Dr. Tellefsen’s and Ms. Tannen’s testimony about - 28 - the exchange resulted entirely from Ms. Miller’s reporting, the hearing judge’s finding was not clearly erroneous. Therefore, we overrule this exception to the hearing judge’s findings of fact. Exception Nine Ms. Miller next takes exception to the hearing judge’s finding that R.W. had agreed to pay one half of the remaining balance due once Ms. Miller filed the adoption petition, and she would pay the remaining funds on the day of the hearing. Again, Ms. Miller’s ninth exception is rightfully stylized as arguing that the hearing judge erred in finding R.W.’s testimony more credible than her own.

R.W. testified that, after discovering Ms. Miller had misled her as to where she had filed the petition for adoption, the two came to an agreement concerning payment. According to R.W.’s testimony, under the revised agreement, R.W. agreed to pay Ms. Miller half of the outstanding balance when Ms. Miller provided proof that the petition for adoption had been filed and would pay the remaining balance when the court held a hearing. In contrast, Ms. Miller testified that R.W. agreed to pay half of the amount immediately and would pay the remaining half on the day of the hearing. The hearing judge commented that he “accepts R.W.’s testimony on this point and rejects [Ms. Miller]’s testimony.” Clearly, the hearing judge made an implicit determination concerning the credibility of Ms. Miller’s testimony and found it lacking.

Given the discretion we afford to the hearing judge’s credibility determinations, along with the evidence before him, we are satisfied that the hearing judge did not clearly err in making this factual finding. See supra at 15–16. Accordingly, we overrule Ms. Miller’s exception. - 29 - Exception Ten Next, Ms. Miller excepts to the hearing judge’s factual findings that she was not remorseful and that her apologies were feigned. Ms. Miller points to several aspects in support of her position that she was, in fact, remorseful: (i) the October 26 invoice which indicated that Ms. Miller did not intend to charge R.W. for attending the hearing; (ii) Ms. Miller refunding $2,500 to R.W. on August 9, 2018; (iii) an apology letter Ms. Miller mailed to R.W. on January 31, 2019; (iv) apologies Ms. Miller made in her deposition and while testifying before the hearing judge; and (v) Dr. Tellefsen and Ms. Tannen’s testimony that they believed Ms. Miller was remorseful.

As repeatedly mentioned above, a hearing judge maintains a great deal of discretion in determining the credibility of witness testimony. In this case, the hearing judge did not find Ms. Miller to be remorseful, because she generally failed to atone for her actions. At the hearing, she continually blamed R.W. for Ms. Miller’s failure to take action in the adoption proceedings. She contended that “the only delay was caused by [R.W.’s] refusal to honor her agreement to pay me.” Second, when R.W. initially made the complaint against Ms. Miller, R.W.’s subsequent counsel offered Ms. Miller the opportunity to forego an investigation by Bar Counsel by returning the $2,500.

Ms. Miller refused and eventually refunded R.W.’s funds a little over three months prior to the circuit court holding a hearing. Third, rather than accept responsibility for her actions in deceiving R.W., Ms. Miller, before this Court, attempts to relitigate many issues within the case. The hearing judge’s determination that Ms. Miller’s actions were self-serving and do not evidence remorse was - 30 - not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we overrule this exception to the hearing judge’s findings of fact.

Exception Eleven Eleventh, Ms. Miller takes exception to the hearing judge’s finding that she provided Bar Counsel with a falsified timesheet. According to Ms. Miller, the timesheet is “an artifact created to comply with Bar Counsel’s request” and that, in submitting that document, she did not intend to deceive Bar Counsel. Ms. Miller argues that she initially provided Bar Counsel with copies of the invoices she allegedly sent to R.W. In response, Bar Counsel requested her entire client file including timesheets. Ms. Miller testified that she did not have an electronic or codified system for tracking the hours she worked on matters.

Instead, she recorded the hours she worked on slips of paper, which she would then transform into client invoices. Ms. Miller points out that three years transpired between her representation of R.W. and her eventual creation of the timesheet in response to Bar Counsel’s request. She avers that, based on this delay, she could not be expected to accurately reconstruct the hours she worked on R.W.’s case. While this may be true, Ms. Miller submitted the timesheet to Bar Counsel without qualification.

She did not indicate that the timesheet was constructed to the best of her ability, based on the delay between her representation of R.W. and these disciplinary proceedings. Nor did she indicate that the timesheet may be inaccurate. Instead, she submitted the timesheet to Bar Counsel in a manner that suggested that its contents were true. As explained above, this was not the case.

See supra at 21–24. For - 31 - these reasons, the hearing judge did not clearly err in making this finding, and we therefore overrule this exception. Exception Twelve Under Ms. Miller’s twelfth exception to the hearing judge’s findings of fact, she argues that the hearing judge erred in determining that the adoption was relatively routine and did not contain novel or contested issues. She contends that there were numerous issues that she had to address throughout the adoption proceedings: (i) the biological father was unknown; (ii) the adoptive parents were unmarried at the time; (iii) they sought to change N.R.’s name prior to R.W. and M.W.’s marriage, and thus R.W. would assume M.W.’s surname; and (iv) the biological mother was mentally ill and addicted to drugs.

This exception largely overlaps with Ms. Miller’s sixth exception to the hearing judge’s findings of fact, which we have overruled. As noted above, when the hearing judge inquired as to whether the forms she completed in furtherance of the adoption were “boilerplate,” Ms. Miller responded affirmatively. Before this Court, however, she contends that, in answering affirmatively, she meant that some of the forms completed were boilerplate, but the petition for adoption itself was not. Despite Ms. Miller’s representations, a majority of the materials she completed for this case were, in fact,