Attorney Grievance v. Collins

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Natalie Thryphenia Collins, Misc. Docket AG No. 6, September Term, 2021 ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – INDEFINITE SUSPENSION – This attorney grievance matter involves attorney who was subject of sixty-day definite suspension from practice of law in Maryland as result of unrelated disciplinary action. As result of information attorney alleged in petition for reinstatement and subsequent complaint, Bar Counsel filed new petition for disciplinary or remedial action against attorney. Bar Counsel dismissed allegations of misconduct in petition with respect to new complaint and proceeded on allegations in petition related to attorney’s allegedly false statements in petition for reinstatement and failure to respond to Bar Counsel’s requests for information concerning new complaint.

Although Court of Appeals determined that attorney violated Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) 3.3(a)(1) (Candor Toward Tribunal), 8.1(a) (False Statement of Material Fact), 8.1(b) (Failing to Respond to Lawful Demand for Information), 8.4(b) (Criminal Act), 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (Conduct that is Prejudicial to Administration of Justice), and 8.4(a) (Violating MARPC), Court concluded that, given nature of false statements at issue and developing caselaw, disbarment was not appropriate sanction. In numerous attorney disciplinary cases involving intentional dishonesty under MARPC 8.4(c) and knowingly made false statements under MARPC 3.3(a)(1) and 8.1(a), Court has not imposed sanction of disbarment and has not found pursuant to Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376 , 773 A.2d 463 (2001), existence of compelling extenuating circumstances to be “root cause” of misconduct to warrant lesser sanction. Given this line of cases, Court expressly recognized that holding in Vanderlinde no longer exclusively sets standard for imposition of sanction in cases involving intentional dishonesty. Court of Appeals indefinitely suspended attorney from practice of law in Maryland.

Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 24-C-21-001838 Argued: January 11, 2022 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 6 September Term, 2021 ______________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. NATALIE THRYPHENIA COLLINS ______________________________________ Getty, C.J. *McDonald Watts Hotten Booth Biran Gould, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Watts, J. ______________________________________ Filed: February 25, 2022 *McDonald, J. now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act Pursuant to MD Constitution, Article IV, Section (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 3A, he also participated in the decision and 2022-02-25 13:17-05:00 adoption of this opinion. Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk Natalie Thryphenia Collins, Respondent, a member of the Bar of Maryland, was admitted to the Bar in 1991 and from October 2019 to mid-June 2020 worked at a law firm on Ingleside Avenue in Baltimore, Maryland. On June 8, 2020, in an unrelated disciplinary matter, this Court suspended Collins from the practice of law in Maryland for sixty days, effective July 8, 2020, and ordered that she pay court costs.

On September 10, 2020, Collins filed in this Court a petition for reinstatement pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-751 stating that she had complied with her obligations under former Maryland Rule 19-742 (now Maryland Rule 19-741) and the requirements and conditions of her suspension, and that to the best of her “knowledge, information, and belief” no complaints were pending against her. Between June 8, 2020, the effective date of her suspension, and September 10, 2020, the date that she filed the petition for reinstatement, Collins had not provided any information to Bar Counsel under Maryland Rule 19-742. In addition, Collins had not paid court costs. On March 20, 2020, C.J. Irving filed a complaint against Collins with Bar Counsel.

Irving had been a party to a child custody case in which Collins represented the children’s other parent. Collins did not respond to requests from Bar Counsel for information during the investigation of the Irving complaint and represented in the petition for reinstatement that no complaints were pending against her. On April 21, 2021, on behalf of the Attorney Grievance Commission, Petitioner, Bar Counsel filed a “Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action” against Collins, charging her with violating Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) 3.3(a)(1) (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 4.1(a)(1) (False Statement to Third Person), 8.1(a) (False Statement of Material Fact), 8.1(b) (Failing to Respond to Lawful Demand for Information), 8.4(b) (Criminal Act), 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (Conduct that is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice), and 8.4(a) (Violating the MARPC).1 The charges stemmed from two grounds. First, based on the Irving complaint, Bar Counsel asserted that Collins engaged in misconduct during a telephone call with Irving.

Specifically, Bar Counsel alleged that on June 13, 2018, Irving, who was represented by counsel, filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County a complaint to modify custody against C. Davis, the father of her two minor daughters. Collins entered her appearance as counsel for Davis and filed an answer and other papers on his behalf. On May 9, 2019, the circuit court entered an emergency order for child access, returning the children to the primary physical custody of Davis and providing for Irving to have supervised access. On October 23, 2019, the circuit court entered a consent order for temporary child access, providing Irving with visitation.

On November 6, 2019, the circuit court granted a motion by Irving’s counsel to withdraw her appearance. On January 22, 2020, the circuit court entered an order granting joint legal and physical custody of the children as specified. According to the allegations in the petition, at some point after the January 22, 2020 award of custody, Collins telephoned Irving and “falsely identified” herself as calling from The MARPC previously were named the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional 1 Conduct, or MLRPC, and before that, were named the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, or MRPC. Effective July 1, 2016, the MLRPC were renamed the MARPC and renumbered without substantive change.

Although prior cases reference the MRPC or MLRPC, for consistency, we use “MARPC” throughout the opinion. -2- an elementary school about an issue with one of Irving’s children. Irving allegedly provided Collins with personal information, believing that she was speaking with a school employee, before Collins “confessed to being ‘opposing counsel.’” Bar Counsel charged that Collins engaged in dishonest conduct because, in the telephone call with Irving, she allegedly initially identified herself as associated with Irving’s child’s school, but later acknowledged that she was Davis’s attorney. In the petition, Bar Counsel did not indicate that Irving’s report of the telephone call had been corroborated in any way or refer to any investigation of Irving’s complaint other than correspondence that Bar Counsel sent to Collins that went unanswered. Also, the petition did not indicate that there were any ongoing proceedings between Irving and Davis at the time of the alleged telephone call or provide any reason for the call.

When the case was called for oral argument, in response to a question from this Court about the disposition of the Irving complaint, Senior Assistant Bar Counsel stated that the allegations in the petition concerning the Irving complaint were dismissed by Bar Counsel before the evidentiary hearing for “a number of reasons.”2 2 On the morning of the evidentiary hearing, before making an opening statement in the case, Assistant Bar Counsel advised: So before I provide a very brief opening, I just, for both [] Collins’[s] benefit and the Court’s benefit, Petitioner is formally withdrawing all charges associated with [Collins]’s communication with the complainant, [] Irving [], including withdrawing the Petitioner’s allegation that [] Collins violated [MARPC ]4.1. This was in Petitioner’s pre-trial statement. But just so that everybody’s on the same page. (Paragraph break omitted). -3- In the petition, Bar Counsel asserted that Collins had failed to respond to correspondence sent to her requesting a response to the Irving complaint.

Bar Counsel did not dismiss this aspect of the petition. Next, in the petition, Bar Counsel alleged that, in a petition for reinstatement, signed under the penalties of perjury, Collins falsely represented that she had complied with the requirements of Maryland Rule 19-742, that she had satisfied the requirements and conditions of her suspension, and that, to the best of her “knowledge, information, and belief,” she did not have any complaints or disciplinary proceedings pending against her. On April 23, 2021, we designated the Honorable Julie R. Rubin (“the hearing judge”) of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to hear this attorney discipline proceeding. On July 2, 2021, Collins filed an answer to the petition.

Bar Counsel filed notices of service of discovery material, stating that Bar Counsel had served Collins with interrogatories, a request for admission of fact and genuineness of documents, a request for production of documents, and a notice of deposition. On July 30, 2021, Bar Counsel filed a motion for sanctions and a motion to shorten time based on Collins’s failure to respond to the request for production of documents and failure to appear at a properly noticed deposition. Collins did not respond to the motion. On August 18, 2021, the hearing judge granted in part and denied in part the motion for sanctions.

The hearing judge precluded Collins from calling witnesses or presenting documents as evidence on her behalf at the disciplinary hearing and precluded Collins from testifying at the hearing except as to mitigation.3 3 The hearing judge denied the motion to shorten time as moot. -4- On August 23, 2021, the hearing judge conducted a hearing, at which Bar Counsel introduced thirty exhibits into evidence.4 Collins appeared at the hearing and testified as to mitigation. On September 14, 2021, the hearing judge issued an opinion including findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluding that Collins had violated MARPC 3.3(a)(1), 8.1(a), 8.1(b), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(a). The hearing judge also found that Bar Counsel established the existence of numerous aggravating factors, and that Collins failed to establish the existence of any mitigating factors. Oral argument in this Court was scheduled on January 11, 2022, and Collins failed to appear.5 For the below reasons, we indefinitely suspend Collins from the practice of law in Maryland.

BACKGROUND The hearing judge found the following facts, which we summarize. On June 20, 1991, this Court admitted Collins to the Bar of Maryland. From October 2019 to approximately June 15, 2020, Collins was employed by the Franklin Law Group. At all relevant times, Collins maintained the following contact information on file with Maryland’s Attorney Information System (“AIS”): (1) a business address located at the Franklin Law Group on Ingleside Avenue; (2) a personal address located on St. Paul Street in Baltimore; (3) an alternative address of a P.O. Box in Towson; (4) a business e- 4 Although Bar Counsel filed a motion for order of default, the hearing judge denied the motion because Collins had filed an answer to the petition, and Bar Counsel submitted a line withdrawing the motion for order of default.

This is not a case in which a default judgment was entered against an attorney. 5 Pursuant to the December 28, 2021 Eighth Administrative Order on Remote Oral Arguments, oral argument was scheduled to be held remotely via videoconferencing. -5- mail address at Franklin Law Group; and (5) a personal e-mail address at Yahoo.com. In January 2020, Collins used her personal Yahoo e-mail address to communicate with Bar Counsel about an unrelated disciplinary matter. Collins had used the P.O. Box to receive correspondence in the unrelated disciplinary matter. At the disciplinary hearing, Collins testified in mitigation that she maintained the Yahoo e-mail address until June 2020 and forwarded e-mails she received at that address to her work e-mail address at the Franklin Law Group.

Bar Counsel’s Communications with Collins Concerning the Irving Complaint On March 20, 2020, Irving filed a complaint against Collins with Bar Counsel. On March 31, 2020, Bar Counsel e-mailed Collins at her Yahoo address, attaching a copy of the complaint and a letter requesting a written response by April 21, 2020. Bar Counsel received an e-mail notification indicating that the March 31, 2020 e-mail had been delivered to Collins’s inbox. After receiving no response from Collins, on June 16, 2020, Bar Counsel wrote to Collins a second time requesting a response to the complaint.

Bar Counsel sent the letter by first-class mail to Collins’s business address at the Franklin Law Group on Ingleside Avenue and e-mailed a copy to her Yahoo address. Bar Counsel received an e-mail notification indicating that the e-mail had been delivered to Collins’s inbox. Collins did not respond. On August 5, 2020, Bar Counsel sent Collins a third letter requesting a response to the complaint.

Bar Counsel mailed the letter to Collins’s P.O. Box. Collins did not respond. -6- Collins’s Suspension from the Practice of Law and Petition for Reinstatement On June 8, 2020, in an unrelated disciplinary matter, Collins was suspended from the practice of law in Maryland for sixty days, effective July 8, 2020. As part of the opinion and order, Collins was ordered to “pay all costs as taxed by the Clerk of this Court, including costs of all transcripts, pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-709(d)” and judgment was entered in favor of the Commission against Collins. The hearing judge stated that “[t]he Clerk of the Court for the Maryland Court of Appeals assessed costs against [Collins] in the amount of $4,878.75.” (Record citation omitted).

In a letter dated June 15, 2020, Bar Counsel advised Collins to review Maryland Rule 19-742 concerning her obligations subsequent to her suspension and stated that if Collins paid the judgment assessed against her by July 8, 2020, the Commission would not seek to collect interest on the judgment. Bar Counsel mailed the June 15, 2020 letter to Collins at the Franklin Law Group and the P.O. Box, and e-mailed a copy to her Yahoo address. On September 10, 2020, Collins filed in this Court a petition for reinstatement pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-751. In the petition, Collins’s signature block identified her mailing address as a location on St. Paul Street (different from her personal address on file with AIS) and her e-mail address as a Gmail address.

Collins signed the petition, affirming under the penalties of perjury that the contents were true to the best of her knowledge, information, and belief. At the disciplinary hearing, while testifying in mitigation, Collins acknowledged that, prior to filing the petition, she reviewed Maryland Rules 19-751 and 19-742. -7- In the petition, Collins stated that she had complied with Maryland Rule 19-742, but the hearing judge found that Collins had not done so. Specifically, the hearing judge found that Collins failed to file an affidavit with Bar Counsel within thirty days after the effective date of the suspension for the purpose of providing information and documentation required by Maryland Rule 19-742(c)(3)(B) and that she failed to provide Bar Counsel with the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of all of her current clients within fifteen days after the effective date of the suspension, as required by Maryland Rule 19- 742(c)(1)(B). The hearing judge found that Collins’s statement regarding compliance with Maryland Rule 19-742 “was knowingly and intentionally false.” In addition, the hearing judge found that Collins “misrepresented that she had complied with ‘all requirements and conditions specified in the suspension order[,]’” as Collins did not pay the judgment assessed against her in the “June 8 Opinion and Order.” The hearing judge noted that at the disciplinary hearing, while testifying in mitigation, Collins advised that she did not pay the judgment because she could not afford it.

In the petition, Collins stated that, to the best of her “knowledge, information, and belief no[] complaints or disciplinary proceedings [were] currently pending against the attorney.” The hearing judge found that this was a misrepresentation because, as of the date Collins filed the petition, she had received multiple forms of correspondence from Bar Counsel concerning Irving’s then-pending complaint. The hearing judge found that Collins had actual notice of the Irving complaint at the time that she filed the petition and that “she knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to the Court of Appeals that there were no pending complaints against her.” -8- On September 15, 2020, Bar Counsel e-mailed a letter to Collins at her Gmail address, attaching a copy of the Irving complaint and copies of Bar Counsel’s correspondence to her from March 31, 2020, June 15, 2020, June 16, 2020, and August 5, 2020. Bar Counsel requested a response to the Irving complaint and advised Collins that, contrary to the representations she made in the petition for reinstatement, she had not provided Bar Counsel with the records required by Maryland Rule 19-742 and had not paid the costs assessed against her. Bar Counsel requested that Collins provide the information and documentation required by Maryland Rule 19-742 and an explanation for her statement in the petition for reinstatement that there were no pending complaints against her.

Bar Counsel received an e-mail notification indicating that the e-mail had been delivered to Collins’s inbox. Collins did not respond to Bar Counsel. On the same day, Bar Counsel filed in this Court a motion for extension of time to respond to the petition for reinstatement, indicating that Collins failed to comply with Maryland Rule 19-742 and to pay the costs assessed against her, and that a complaint was pending against Collins. Bar Counsel sent a copy of the motion to Collins by e-mail to her Gmail address, by mail to the St. Paul Street address contained in the signature block in the petition, and via the Maryland Electronic Courts (“MDEC”) system.

The following day, September 16, 2020, this Court granted the motion. On September 21, 2020, Bar Counsel e-mailed Collins at her Gmail address, providing her a copy of the September 15, 2020 letter and attachments, and requesting a response. Bar Counsel received an e-mail notification indicating that the e-mail had been delivered to Collins’s inbox. Collins did not respond to Bar Counsel. -9- On October 1, 2020, Bar Counsel filed an objection to the petition for reinstatement, arguing that the petition should not be granted due to Collins’s failure to comply with Maryland Rule 19-742, pay costs, and respond to the pending Irving complaint, and based on Collins’s misrepresentations in the petition.

Bar Counsel attached to the objection copies of correspondence from Bar Counsel to Collins and a copy of the Irving complaint. The copies were redacted to identify Irving as “C.I.” Bar Counsel e-mailed the objection to Collins at her Gmail address and served it on her via the MDEC system. On October 15, 2020, Collins filed a response to the objection. In the response, Collins stated that she did not receive Bar Counsel’s September 15, 2020 correspondence.

Collins also stated: “[T]he first time I am aware that a Complaint has been filed against me by C.I. is with the filing of the AGS’s [sic] Objection.” Collins stated: “I still cannot respond to the Complaint because the AGS’s [sic] Exhibit is redacted and I cannot ascertain the Complainant.” The hearing judge found these statements to be misrepresentations. The hearing judge stated that she “accord[ed] no credibility to, and d[id] not believe, the proposition that Collins received Bar Counsel’s objection via e[-]mail [at her Gmail address] but did not receive Bar Counsel’s other communications sent to the same e[-]mail address.” The following day, October 16, 2020, Bar Counsel e-mailed Collins at her Gmail address, providing her with an unredacted copy of the Irving complaint and requesting a response. Bar Counsel received an e-mail notification indicating that the e-mail had been delivered to Collins’s inbox. On October 26, 2020, Bar Counsel received a letter from Collins dated October 22, 2020, responding to the Irving complaint.

In the letter, Collins - 10 - stated that she “did not receive notice of an outstanding complaint against [her] until [she] read the Attorney Grievance Commission’s response to” the petition for reinstatement. According to the hearing judge, Collins’s statement was a knowing and intentional misrepresentation. On October 21, 2020, this Court denied the petition for reinstatement. Collins remains suspended from the practice of law in Maryland.

STANDARD OF REVIEW We review a hearing judge’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. See Md. R. 19-740(b)(2)(B); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Slate, 457 Md. 610, 626 , 180 A.3d 134, 144 (2018). Where neither party excepts to any of the hearing judge’s findings of fact, we “may treat the findings of fact as established.” Md. R. 19-740(b)(2)(A). In an attorney discipline proceeding, we review without deference a hearing judge’s conclusions of law.

See Md. R. 19-740(b)(1). We determine whether clear and convincing evidence establishes that a lawyer violated an MARPC. See Md. R. 19-727(c). DISCUSSION (A) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Neither party excepts to the hearing judge’s findings of fact or conclusions of law.

We conclude, with one variation, that the hearing judge’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. To the extent the hearing judge found that payment of the costs assessed against Collins in connection with her earlier disciplinary proceeding was a condition of reinstatement and that Collins misrepresented that she had complied with the condition, the record does not support the finding. - 11 - As to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, to which Collins has not excepted, upon our de novo view of the record, we conclude that Collins has indeed violated MARPC 3.3(a)(1), 8.1(a), and 8.4(c), but we do not sustain a violation of the MARPC based on Collins stating that she had complied with the conditions of her suspension when she had not paid court costs. Other than this, we determine that all of the hearing judge’s conclusions that Collins violated MARPC 3.3(a)(1), 8.1(a), 8.1(b), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(a) are supported by clear and convincing evidence. MARPC 3.3(a)(1) (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 8.1(a) (False Statement of Material Fact), and 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation) MARPC 3.3(a)(1) provides that “[a]n attorney shall not knowingly [] make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the attorney[.]” In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Steinhorn, 462 Md. 184, 197 , 198 A.3d 821, 828 (2018), we stated that “[w]hat matters for purposes of finding an M[A]RPC 3.3(a)(1) violation is whether an attorney knows that the information he or she presents to the tribunal is incorrect.” (Citation omitted).

MARPC 8.1(a) provides that “[a]n applicant for . . . reinstatement to the bar, or an attorney . . . in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not[] knowingly make a false statement of material fact[.]” In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Page, 430 Md. 602 , 634- 35, 62 A.3d 163, 182-83 (2013), a case in which, among other things, an attorney was found to have knowingly made false statements of fact in a petition for reinstatement, we stated that we have held that MARPC “3.3 and 8.1 are violated when a lawyer makes an admission to a tribunal he or she knows is untrue and makes false statements to induce Bar - 12 - Counsel to believe the lawyer did not violate the M[A]RPC.” (Citations omitted). In Page, id. at 633 , 62 A.3d at 181 , while the attorney was suspended from the practice of law, he continued to represent a client and filed a motion on her behalf in the trial court. Yet, in a petition for reinstatement, the attorney stated that he had abided by what is now Maryland Rule 19-741 and that he did not have any cases pending before any court. See id. at 633 , 62 A.3d at 181 .

MARPC 8.4(c) provides that “[i]t is professional misconduct for an attorney to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]” In Steinhorn, 462 Md. at 198-99 , 198 A.3d at 829 , we observed that “[t]here is significant overlap between M[A]RPC 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c). Indeed, a lawyer that violates M[A]RPC 3.3(a) generally violates M[A]RPC 8.4(c) as well.” (Cleaned up). In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ambe, 466 Md. 270, 295, 297 , 218 A.3d 757 , 771-72 (2019), we concluded that an attorney’s statements to Bar Counsel and the Immigration Court, which violated MARPC 3.3(a)(1) and 8.1(a), “also constitute[d] violations of MARPC []8.4(c), as they [were] misrepresentations.” In this case, the hearing judge did not clearly err in finding that Collins made knowing and intentional misrepresentations in the petition for reinstatement by stating that to the best of her knowledge no new disciplinary complaints were pending against her, and in her October 15, 2020 response to Bar Counsel’s objection to her petition for reinstatement and October 22, 2020 letter to Bar Counsel, by stating in both that she did not know of the Irving complaint until receiving Bar Counsel’s response to her petition for reinstatement, i.e., on more than one occasion, Collins falsely denied having knowledge of - 13 - the Irving complaint. It is a far closer question as to whether Collins violated the charged MARPC by stating in the petition for reinstatement that she had complied with Maryland Rule 19-742 and the requirements and conditions of the suspension.

We address first the hearing judge’s finding that Collins falsely stated that she had complied with her obligations under Maryland Rule 19-742. The conclusion that Collins violated the MARPC by stating that she had complied with Maryland Rule 19-742 hinges on the hearing judge’s finding of fact that Collins’s statement regarding compliance with the Rule “was knowingly and intentionally false.” Given the exhibits presented at the disciplinary hearing by Bar Counsel and Collins’s testimony in mitigation, the hearing judge’s finding with respect to Collins’s state of mind is not clearly erroneous. At the disciplinary hearing, Collins testified: In mitigation, I have never, until June the 8th, ever been disciplined. And when I was disciplined, I took every effort not to violate the Court again.

I thought I was doing right. I did not -- I am remorseful, but I did not fully read and understand the law that required me to file an affidavit. But I thought that at the time, that giving the cases and allowing the clients to agree to some other attorneys to handle the cases was sufficient. That I had adequately prepared, prepared and made sure that the two clients that I have privately at the time were taken care of and were not left hanging.

In mitigation, it was not my intent to lie to the Court. In fact, I knew I had not filed the affidavit. And in reviewing in mitigation, you’ll see that I did not say that I had filed an affidavit. Because I knew I had not filed the affidavit as required.

Although Collins’s testimony in mitigation does not foreclose the possibility that she was, as she indicated, confused about the requirements of Maryland Rule 19-742 and of the opinion that she was not required to submit to Bar Counsel information under Maryland - 14 - Rule 19-742, Collins was precluded from giving testimony as to the merits in her own defense and the hearing judge’s assessment of her mitigation testimony is not clearly erroneous. Generally, though, where an attorney expresses an opinion about a matter and the opinion is wrong or the attorney’s logic is faulty, that is not a ground for a finding of dishonesty or a finding that the attorney has made a false statement. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Neverdon, 473 Md. 631, 699 , 251 A.3d 1157, 1198 (2021) (“Where an attorney gives a response to Bar Counsel that is ‘more a matter of opinion than fact[,]’ we have concluded that the attorney’s statement does not form the basis of a violation of MARPC 8.1(a).” (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sperling, 472 Md. 561, 608 , 248 A.3d 224, 251 (2021) (alteration in original))). In determining whether to seek the Commission’s authorization for the filing of a petition for disciplinary or remedial action alleging that an attorney has knowingly made a false statement in connection with a petition for reinstatement, Bar Counsel must be watchful for cases in which attorneys are doing nothing more than filing a petition for reinstatement and stating their views with respect to having satisfied all of the necessary prerequisites as opposed to attorneys who are knowingly making false statements in a petition for reinstatement.

In this case, the hearing judge’s finding that Collins made knowingly false statements of material fact to this Court in the petition for reinstatement concerning compliance with Maryland Rule 19-742 is supported by the record. Maryland Rule 19- 742(c)(1)(B) required that, within fifteen days after the effective date of the order of discipline, a suspended or disbarred attorney supply Bar Counsel with “(i) the names, - 15 - addresses, and telephone numbers of all of the attorney’s current clients and (ii) identify, by client name, tribunal, and docket reference, all client matters pending in any court or other tribunal or agency[.]”6 Maryland Rule 19-742(c)(2)(B) required that, as soon as practicable but within thirty days after the effective date of the order of discipline, a suspended or disbarred attorney “inform current clients, in writing, that the client may obtain another attorney, and that it may be necessary for the client to obtain another attorney depending upon the status of the client’s case or legal matter.”7 And, Maryland Rule 19-742(c)(3)(B) required a suspended or disbarred attorney to file with Bar Counsel within thirty days of the effective date of the order of discipline an affidavit that stated or was accompanied by: (i) the manner and extent to which the attorney has complied with the order and this Rule; (ii) all actions taken by the attorney pursuant to subsection (c)(2)(A) and (B) of this Rule; (iii) the names of all State and Federal jurisdictions in which and administrative agencies before which the attorney has been admitted to practice; (iv) the residence and other addresses of the attorney to which future communications may be directed; (v) the name and address of each insurer that provided malpractice insurance coverage to the attorney during the past five years, the policy number on each policy, and the inclusive dates of coverage; and (vi) a copy of each letter sent pursuant to subsection (c)(2)(B) of this Rule.[8] 6 This provision is now located at Maryland Rule 19-741(c)(1)(B). 7 This provision is now located at Maryland Rule 19-741(c)(2)(B). 8 This provision is now located at Maryland Rule 19-741(c)(3)(C). - 16 - There is no indication in the record that Collins complied with Maryland Rule 19- 742(c)(3)(B) by submitting an affidavit to Bar Counsel. Although Collins had been precluded from presenting evidence in her defense, the hearing judge noted that, at the disciplinary hearing, Collins testified in mitigation that she knew she had not provided the affidavit required under Maryland Rule 19-742(c)(3)(B) but testified that she had not affirmatively stated in the petition that she had filed the affidavit. The hearing judge determined that this distinction was “immaterial[.]” The hearing judge found that Collins falsely stated in the petition that she had complied with Maryland Rule 19-742, despite knowing that she had not fulfilled the obligation under Maryland Rule 19-742(c)(3)(B) to file with Bar Counsel an affidavit describing the extent of her compliance with the Rule.

Based on the exhibits admitted into evidence by Bar Counsel and Collins’s testimony that she knew she had not provided Bar Counsel an affidavit under Maryland Rule 19-742, the hearing judge’s conclusion that Collins’s statement in the petition for reinstatement that she had complied with Maryland Rule 19-742 “was knowingly and intentionally false” and therefore a violation MARPC 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c) is supported by the record. We decline, however, to uphold the hearing judge’s determination that Collins made a misrepresentation in the petition for reinstatement by stating that she had complied with the requirements and conditions of the June 8, 2020 suspension order as the evidence does not establish that payment of the costs was a condition or requirement of reinstatement. On June 8, 2020, this Court issued an opinion concluding that Collins violated MARPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 3.4(d), 8.4(a), and 8.4(d) and suspending her from the practice of law for sixty days. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Collins, 469 Md. 134, 149, 153 , 229 A.3d 171 , - 17 - 180, 182 (2020).

In the opinion, in imposing the sanction, we stated that “[a] 60-day suspension under these circumstances is appropriate. The suspension shall begin 30 days after the date on which this opinion is filed.” Id. at 153 , 229 A.3d at 182 . There were no terms or conditions of suspension specified in the opinion. In the mandate, as is customary in attorney disciplinary cases, and in most cases resolved by this Court with a written opinion, costs were assessed.

In Collins’s case, the mandate stated: “It is so ordered; Respondent shall pay all costs as taxed by the Clerk of this Court, including costs of all transcripts, pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-709(d) for which sum judgment is entered in favor of the Attorney Grievance Commission against Natalie Thryphenia Collins.” Id. at 153-54 , 229 A.3d at 182 (bolding and some capitalization omitted). No separate order was issued by the Court concerning the costs and the opinion did not condition Collins’s reinstatement on payment in full of the costs. The hearing judge found that, at the disciplinary hearing, Collins admitted that, at the time she filed the petition for reinstatement, she knew she had not paid the court costs assessed against her. In mitigation, as the hearing judge noted, Collins testified that she failed to pay the costs assessed against her because she could not afford to do so at the time.

In addition, however, Collins testified: “I didn’t pay the Attorney Grievance Commission’s, but I did not take that as having to comply with the Suspension Order.” In her opinion, the hearing judge did not address whether the payment of costs was indeed a requirement or condition of Collins’s suspension or whether at the time that she filed the petition for reinstatement Collins, in fact, believed the payment of costs to be a requirement or condition of her suspension and had nonetheless filed the petition falsely stating that she - 18 - had fulfilled the condition. It appears that the hearing judge implicitly accepted Bar Counsel’s representation that payment of the costs was a condition or requirement of Collins’s suspension. Maryland Rule 19-752, the Rule applicable to attorneys who have been disbarred, suspended indefinitely, or suspended for a fixed period longer than six months and are seeking reinstatement, sets forth criteria for reinstatement in section (h). Maryland Rule 19-752(h)(2) provides that the “Court may order reinstatement if the attorney meets each of the following criteria or presents sufficient reasons why reinstatement should be ordered in the absence of satisfaction of one or more of those criteria[.]” One criterion set forth in (h)(2)(H) is that the attorney has complied with all financial obligations required by these Rules or by court order, including (i) reimbursement of all amounts due to the attorney’s former clients, (ii) payment of restitution which, by court order, is due to the attorney’s former clients or any other person, (iii) reimbursement of the Client Protection Fund for all claims that arose out of the attorney’s practice of law and satisfaction of all judgments arising out of such claims, and (iv) payment of all costs assessed by court order or otherwise required by law.

Maryland Rule 19-751, applicable to attorneys like Collins, who have been suspended for a fixed period of time not exceeding six months and who seek reinstatement, contains no such provision.9 In short, although the hearing judge’s finding that Collins did not pay the 9 Maryland Rule 19-709(d), the provision referenced in the mandate of the June 8, 2020 opinion suspending Collins from the practice of law for sixty days, provides: “Costs of proceedings under this Chapter, including the costs of all transcripts, shall be assessed by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals and included in the order as a judgment. On motion, the Court may review the action of the Clerk.” Maryland Rule 19-709(c), concerning costs related to reinstatement proceedings, provides that “[i]n proceedings for reinstatement - 19 - costs assessed against her is accurate, the evidence does not show that Collins’s reinstatement was conditioned on payment of the costs or that payment of the costs was a requirement or condition of the June 8, 2020 opinion suspending Collins. Accordingly, we do not sustain a violation of the MARPC on this ground. Next, in concluding that Collins violated the MARPC, the hearing judge found that Collins falsely stated in the petition that to the best of her “knowledge, information, and belief” there were no disciplinary complaints pending against her, despite Bar Counsel’s correspondence to her on numerous occasions concerning the Irving complaint.

This aspect of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law is easily supported by clear and convincing evidence. The hearing judge’s findings of fact and the record show that, as of September 10, 2020, the date that Collins filed the petition, Bar Counsel had sent Collins multiple letters and e-mails concerning the Irving complaint. On March 20, 2020, Irving filed the complaint against Collins with Bar Counsel. Over the course of more than four months, before Collins filed the petition for reinstatement, Bar Counsel sent Collins three letters about the complaint—on March 31, 2020, June 16, 2020, and August 5, 2020.

In the objection to the petition for reinstatement, which was admitted into evidence at the under Rules 19-751 or 19-752, the attorney shall pay all court costs and costs of investigation and other proceedings on the petition, including the costs of physical and mental examinations, transcripts, and other reasonable expenditures necessary to evaluate the petition.” Neither provision requires that the costs assessed and included in the order as a judgment pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-709(d) be paid by an attorney as a condition of reinstatement or otherwise indicates that an attorney must pay the judgment before seeking reinstatement. Where a suspension of less than six months is involved, each case must be reviewed individually to determine whether the payment of costs is a condition of the suspension. - 20 - disciplinary hearing, Bar Counsel outlined and attached as exhibits the various correspondence sent to Collins with respect to the Irving complaint both before and after the petition for reinstatement was filed—on March 31, 2020, June 16, 2020, August 5, 2020, September 15, 2020, and September 21, 2020. On March 31, 2020, Bar Counsel sent a letter to Collins at her Yahoo e-mail address, the personal e-mail address on file with AIS, attaching a copy of the Irving complaint and requesting a written response by April 21, 2020. The letter was addressed to Collins at the Franklin Law Group and stated that it was sent by e-mail only to Collins at her Yahoo e- mail address.

The letter advised that Bar Counsel was making a preliminary inquiry into the Irving complaint. Bar Counsel received a confirmation that the e-mail had been delivered to Collins’s Yahoo e-mail address stating the following: “Delivery to these recipients or groups is complete, but no delivery notification was sent by the destination server: [Collins’s Yahoo e-mail address].” (Paragraph break omitted). In response to Bar Counsel’s objection, Collins stated that she did not receive the March 31, 2020 letter from Bar Counsel that was sent to her employer’s address, and advised that she worked from home, not in the office, from March 20, 2020 through June 20, 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In so stating, Collins apparently overlooked that the March 31, 2020 letter, although addressed to her at the Franklin Law Group, states that it was sent “VIA EMAIL ONLY” to Collins’s Yahoo e-mail address.

On June 16, 2020, Bar Counsel sent Collins a second letter, enclosing a copy of the Irving complaint as well as the March 31, 2020 correspondence, and requested a written response by June 30, 2020. In the letter, Bar Counsel stated that if Collins failed to respond - 21 - by that date, Bar Counsel might docket the complaint for investigation without a response. The letter was sent by first-class mail to Collins at the Franklin Law Group, her business mailing address on file with AIS, and e-mailed to Collins at her Yahoo e-mail address. Bar Counsel received the same notification indicating that the June 16, 2020 e-mail had been delivered to Collins at her Yahoo e-mail address.

On August 5, 2020, Bar Counsel wrote to Collins and advised that the Irving complaint had been docketed for investigation, enclosed a copy of the complaint, and requested a written response by August 24, 2020.10 The letter was sent to Collins at her P.O. Box in Towson, the alternative mailing address on file with AIS. The hearing judge determined that Collins received Bar Counsel’s correspondence concerning the Irving complaint, “that she had actual notice and knowledge of its pendency at the time of her petition, and that her sworn misrepresentation to the contrary was knowing and intentional.” The hearing judge specifically found that Collins received Bar Counsel’s e-mails of March 31, 2020 and June 16, 2020 that were sent to Collins’s Yahoo e-mail address. The hearing judge noted that, at the disciplinary hearing, Collins testified in mitigation that she maintained the Yahoo address until June 2020 and forwarded e-mails from that address to her work e-mail address. The hearing judge apparently determined that Bar Counsel’s receipt of e-mail notifications indicating that the e-mails were delivered, 10 Pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-711(d)(1), generally, once a complaint is docketed, “Bar Counsel shall complete an investigation within 120 days after docketing the complaint.” “Upon written request by Bar Counsel and a finding of good cause by the Commission, the Commission may grant an extension for a specified period.” Md. R. 19- 711(d)(2)(A). - 22 - along with Collins’s acknowledged use of the Yahoo e-mail address, provided a sufficient basis on which to find that Collins received the e-mails and would have been aware of their content.

In the absence of any other evidence, this was a reasonable inference for the hearing judge to make. It would be reasonable to infer that an attorney in Collins’s position, who identified the Yahoo address on file with AIS as her personal e-mail address and who had used the Yahoo address to communicate with Bar Counsel just months earlier (in January 2020) in an unrelated disciplinary matter, would pay attention to messages delivered to that inbox, particularly messages from Bar Counsel. The hearing judge’s conclusion that Collins violated MARPC 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c) by knowingly making a false statement in the petition for reinstatement that there were no pending disciplinary complaints against her is supported by clear and convincing evidence. The hearing judge also found that Collins knowingly made false statements of fact in the response to Bar Counsel’s objection to the petition for reinstatement and her letter of October 22, 2020 to Bar Counsel by stating that she did not receive Bar Counsel’s correspondence of September 15, 2020, and that she only became aware of the Irving complaint when Bar Counsel’s objection was filed.

The record reflects that, on September 15, 2020, Bar Counsel sent a letter to Collins at the e-mail address that Collins had identified in the petition for reinstatement—namely, her Gmail address. Bar Counsel enclosed copies of the March 31, 2020, June 16, 2020, and August 5, 2020 correspondence to Collins concerning the Irving complaint and requested that she explain her statement in the petition that there were no pending complaints against her. In addition, on September - 23 - 21, 2020, Bar Counsel sent an e-mail to Collins at her Gmail address attaching a copy of the September 15, 2020 correspondence and requested a response as soon as possible.11 With each of the e-mail deliveries to Collins, first to her Yahoo address and then to her Gmail address, Bar Counsel received a receipt stating that delivery to the recipient was complete, but no delivery notification was sent by the destination server. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it was reasonable for the hearing judge to infer that Bar Counsel’s receipt of e-mails stating that the deliveries were complete, rather than that they were undeliverable or returned, meant that Collins had received the e-mail messages.

Based on the evidence, the hearing judge’s conclusion that Collins made false statements in the response to Bar Counsel’s objection, in violation of MARPC 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c), and in the October 22, 2020 letter to Bar Counsel, in violation of MARPC 8.1(a) and 8.4(c), by stating that she had not received notice of the pending Irving complaint until she received Bar Counsel’s objection to the petition for reinstatement is supported by clear and convincing evidence. MARPC 8.1(b) (Failing to Respond to Lawful Demand for Information) MARPC 8.1(b) provides: An applicant for . . . reinstatement to the bar, or an attorney . . . in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not . . . knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from a[] disciplinary authority, except that this Rule 11 Also on September 21, 2020, Bar Counsel sent via FedEx overnight delivery to Collins at the St. Paul Street address that she had identified as her mailing address in the petition for reinstatement a letter enclosing the September 15, 2020 correspondence and requesting that Collins provide the requested information and documentation as soon as possible. Delivery was attempted on September 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, and 29, 2020. In the response, Collins stated that she was unaware of any FedEx delivery or attempted delivery between September 22 and 29, 2020. - 24 - does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by [MARPC] 1.6[].

An attorney violates MARPC 8.1(b) by failing to respond to Bar Counsel’s lawful requests for information and documentation. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hensley, 467 Md. 669, 686 , 226 A.3d 41, 51 (2020); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gracey, 448 Md. 1, 26-27 , 136 A.3d 798, 813-14 (2016) (We concluded that an attorney violated MARPC 8.1(b) where the attorney “failed to timely respond to the initial complaint and failed to provide copies of the client file for the [clients] and trust account records.”). In this case, between March and September 2020, Bar Counsel sent five lawful requests for information to Collins on March 31, 2020, June 16, 2020, August 5, 2020, September 15, 2020, and September 21, 2020, and Collins failed to respond to any of the requests. The record supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that Collins, in fact, received the requests and knowingly failed to respond to Bar Counsel in violation of MARPC 8.1(b).

MARPC 8.4(b) (Criminal Act) “It is professional misconduct for an attorney to . . . commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the attorney’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as an attorney in other respects[.]” MARPC 8.4(b). To establish a violation of MARPC 8.4(b), “Bar Counsel must prove two elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) [the attorney] committed a criminal act; and (2) that criminal act reflects adversely on [the attorney’s] honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Katz, 443 Md. 389, 403 , 116 A.3d 999, 1007 (2015) (citations omitted). “We have consistently held that so long as there is clear and convincing evidence of facts - 25 - constituting a criminal offense, there need not be a criminal conviction in order to find that an attorney violated M[A]RPC 8.4(b).” Id. at 403 , 116 A.3d at 1008 (cleaned up). Under Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 2012 Repl.

Vol.) (“CR”) § 9-101(a), it is a criminal offense to willfully and falsely make a false oath or affirmation as to a material fact.12 A person who violates CR § 9-101(a) “is guilty of the misdemeanor of perjury[.]” CR § 9-101(b). We have explained that, “[t]o be willful, the false oath must be deliberate and not the result of surprise, confusion or bona fide mistake.” Furda v. State, 421 Md. 332, 353 , 26 A.3d 918, 930 (2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 991 (2012) (cleaned up).13 Although Collins was not charged with perjury, clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that Collins committed the criminal offense by affirming under the penalties 12 CR § 9-101(a) provides: A person may not willfully and falsely make an oath or affirmation as to a material fact: (1) if the false swearing is perjury at common law; (2) in an affidavit required by any state, federal, or local law; (3) in an affidavit made to include a court or officer to pass an account or claim; (4) in an affidavit required by any state, federal, or local government or governmental official with legal authority to require the issuance of an affidavit; or (5) in an affidavit or affirmation made under the Maryland Rules. 13 The criminal pattern jury instruction for perjury by affidavit, i.e., deliberately making a false affidavit, provides that to convict the defendant of perjury by affidavit, the State must prove, among other things, “that the defendant provided the false information willfully, that is, intentionally, rather than as a result of confusion or reasonable mistake[.]” MPJI-Cr 4:26.1. - 26 - of perjury that the content of the petition for reinstatement was true to the best of her knowledge, information, and belief. Arguably, Collins’s affirmation under the penalties of perjury, i.e., the false oath, may have been provided as a result of confusion or mistake and not willfully done. However, as Collins was precluded from testifying at the disciplinary hearing except as to mitigation, based on the exhibits admitted into evidence, the hearing judge’s findings that Collins’s “statements were false when made and she knew they were false when made[,]” are not clearly erroneous.

As such, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that Collins violated MARPC 8.4(b) by committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on her honesty and trustworthiness. MARPC 8.4(d) (Conduct that is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice) “It is professional misconduct for an attorney to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]” MARPC 8.4(d). “Generally, a lawyer violates M[A]RPC 8.4(d) where the lawyer’s conduct would negatively impact the perception of the legal profession of a reasonable member of the public.” Slate, 457 Md. at 645 , 180 A.3d at 155 (cleaned up). Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that Collins violated MARPC 8.4(d). Collins’s conduct, including knowingly making false statements of fact in connection with the petition for reinstatement and her failure to respond to Bar Counsel’s lawful requests for information, would negatively impact the perception of the legal profession of a reasonable member of the public.

MARPC 8.4(a) (Violating the MARPC) “It is professional misconduct for an