Attorney Grievance v. Taniform

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Terence Taniform, Misc. Docket AG No. 40, September Term, 2021. Opinion by Gould, J. ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – INDEFINITE SUSPENSION The Supreme Court of Maryland sanctioned an attorney with an indefinite suspension with the right to reapply for reinstatement after 18 months for providing incompetent representation, failing to file necessary papers, which nearly caused a client to get deported, failing to communicate adequately with his clients, failing to promptly refund money, and making intentional misrepresentations to clients, clients’ families, counsel, and Bar Counsel. Such conduct violated Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), 1.15 (Safekeeping of Property), 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others), 8.1(a) and (b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct), and Maryland Rule 19-407 (Attorney Trust Account Record- Keeping).

Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No.: C-15-CV-21-000238 Argued: October 3, 2022 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND* Misc. Docket AG No. 40 September Term, 2021 ______________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. TERENCE TANIFORM ______________________________________ Fader, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Gould, J. Booth, J., concurs. Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this ______________________________________ document is authentic. 2023-06-15 12:49-04:00 Filed: December 16, 2022 Gregory Hilton, Clerk * At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022.

On November 17, 2021, pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-721, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (the “Commission”), acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (the “Petition”) against Terence Taniform. The Petition alleged that Mr. Taniform violated multiple provisions of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) and also violated the Professional Conduct for Practitioners governing federal immigration proceedings set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102 . In accordance with Maryland Rules 19-722(a) and 19-727, we assigned the Petition to the Honorable Theresa M. Chernosky of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (the “hearing judge”) to hold an evidentiary hearing and issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. The hearing was held on May 16 and 17, 2022.

At the beginning of the hearing, the parties presented the court with a joint exhibit of stipulated facts. Bar Counsel then presented its case with one witness and 31 exhibits. Mr. Taniform testified on his own behalf, called one character witness, and submitted no exhibits. On July 1, 2022, the hearing judge issued a written statement containing findings of fact and conclusions of law (the “findings”), concluding by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Taniform violated MARPC 1.1 (Competence), 1 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a) and (b) Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 1 (“MLRPC”) were renamed the MARPC and recodified without substantive modification in Title 19, Chapter 300 of the Maryland Rules.

Given that there are no material differences between the two versions and Mr. Taniform committed violations of said rules after their renaming, we will refer to all violations herein under their shorter designations as permitted by Rule 19-300.1(22)—e.g., “Rule 1.1” as opposed to “Rule 19-301.1.” (Communication), 1.15 (Safekeeping of Property), 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others), 8.1(a) and (b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct), and Maryland Rule 19- 407 (Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping).2 Mr. Taniform filed exceptions to the findings pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-728(b). Oral arguments were held before this Court on October 3, 2022. As explained below, we overrule Mr. Taniform’s exceptions, sustain the hearing judge’s findings, and determine that an indefinite suspension with the right to apply for reinstatement after 18 months is the appropriate sanction under the facts and circumstances of this case. BACKGROUND Factual Findings Mr. Taniform was born in Cameroon.

There, in 2003, he graduated from the University of Yaoundé II, with a bachelor’s degree in law. He subsequently emigrated to the United States in 2007, at the age of 24. He arrived in Sacramento, California, and planned to go to the University of the Pacific to obtain an LLM. At that point, he intended to eventually return to Cameroon.

He enrolled at the University of the Pacific but withdrew after he lost his financial support when his grandfather died. When he told his family that 2 As noted, Mr. Taniform was charged with violations of both the MARPC and the Professional Conduct for Practitioners governing federal immigration proceedings set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102 . The hearing judge determined that the charges under the Federal Immigration Rules of Professional Conduct and MARPC implicated substantively identical provisions, and that the factual findings made as to the latter would apply to the charges under the former. As neither party excepted to that determination, we shall not address the choice of law issues implicated in this matter. 2 he wanted to return to Cameroon for his grandfather’s funeral, he learned there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest in that country due to his political activity there while in college.

Mr. Taniform then moved to Maryland to be with an uncle and petitioned for asylum. In 2009, he was granted political asylum and became a U.S. citizen. In 2014, he was married with two children. He began law school at the University of Dayton in Ohio, but his family remained in Maryland.

While in law school, he was diagnosed with anxiety and depression, for which he was treated. During law school, Mr. Taniform interned for a Maryland immigration attorney, Kevin Tabe. His tasks included conducting initial client interviews and filling out asylum forms, green card applications, and other immigration forms. Mr. Taniform graduated law school in 2017 and was admitted to the Maryland Bar in December 2017.

During 2018, he stayed busy working on document review projects in the District of Columbia. He also worked for Mr. Tabe on a case-by-case basis, for which he had a limited role. According to Mr. Taniform, “we would discuss the case together, and I would tell him what, I would go through the case telling what difficulties I think might come up with the case, and then he would discuss with me on how to handle those.” Mr. Taniform’s assignments included visiting Mr. Tabe’s clients in detention centers around the country, interpreting for them at their preliminary hearings (master calendar hearings), and helping them complete the asylum forms. Eventually, Mr. Taniform began representing the clients at their final hearings.

In 2019, Mr. Taniform began representing his own clients. He maintained an office in Montgomery County, focusing his practice on immigration law. He was assisted by 3 Kuji Mundi, a paralegal in California working in immigration law. Mr. Mundi conducted initial client interviews and filled out asylum forms.

A. Representation of Fon Halley Fon On March 1, 2019, Fon Halley Fon, a citizen of Cameroon, entered the United States at the port of entry at San Ysidro, California. On April 23, the Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) formally charged him with removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act and served him with notice to appear in court. He was arrested by immigration authorities, detained in Mississippi for two months, and then transported to Louisiana. While in Louisiana, he hired Mr. Tabe to file an asylum petition on his behalf.

Mr. Tabe filed the petition, but on August 13, the immigration judge found Mr. Fon removable as charged, denied his petition, and ordered him to be deported to Cameroon. On Mr. Fon’s behalf, Mr. Tabe appealed the case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”). On January 13, 2020, the BIA denied the appeal and gave Mr. Fon 30 days to petition for a review of the denial. While Mr. Fon remained in detention in Louisiana, he authorized his aunt, Dorothy Fongum, to find counsel on his behalf.

By happenstance, upon the recommendation of someone (not Mr. Tabe), Ms. Fongum retained Mr. Taniform on Mr. Fon’s behalf to file a motion to reopen the BIA appeal and, according to Mr. Fon, to also file the necessary paperwork to secure his release on parole or bond. The deadline for filing the motion to reopen was February 12. 4 On January 28, 2020, Mrs. Fongum signed a retainer agreement on behalf of Mr. Fon, agreeing to pay Mr. Taniform $5,000, with an initial deposit of $1,500. Ms. Fongum advanced the $1,500 by check. Mr. Taniform testified that Ms. Fongum provided him with documents to file the motion to reopen.

He also testified that he reached out to Mr. Mundi for assistance. After he retained Mr. Taniform, Mr. Fon spoke with him by phone. Mr. Taniform told Mr. Fon that he would seek to reopen the case to introduce new evidence based on a change in conditions in Cameroon. Mr. Taniform also agreed to seek Mr. Fon’s parole or release from detention.

Approximately two weeks after he retained Mr. Taniform, Mr. Fon called Mr. Taniform to tell him that ICE wanted Mr. Fon to sign a deportation form because he had lost his appeal. Mr. Taniform advised Mr. Fon to tell ICE that he had a lawyer taking care of his case. He also told Mr. Fon not to worry because he would file the motion to reopen by February 10. On February 3, 2020, Ms. Fongum attempted to reach Mr. Taniform by phone.

Mr. Taniform sent her a text message saying that he would call her back. When he did not, on February 5, Ms. Fongum left another message for Mr. Taniform, asking why he was not returning her calls. In February, Mr. Fon met with and told an ICE officer that he had retained counsel to reopen his case. The officer agreed to give Mr. Fon additional time before scheduling his deportation. 5 Between February and May 2020, Mr. Taniform had multiple phone conversations with Mr. Fon and Ms. Fongum regarding the status of Mr. Fon’s case.

Each call was initiated by either Mr. Fon or Ms. Fongum. Mr. Fon called Mr. Taniform weekly to find out what was happening with his case; each time, Mr. Taniform told him that he was working on his case and that Mr. Fon need not worry. On February 10, Mr. Taniform told Mr. Fon that the motion to reopen had been filed and that he was waiting for a response from the BIA. Mr. Taniform testified that Mr. Taniform said that he believed what he had said because, he claimed, that’s what Mr. Mundi had told him.

Mr. Taniform did not in fact file the motion to reopen before the February 12 deadline or anytime thereafter. On February 26, 2020, fourteen days after the motion to reopen was due, Mr. Taniform deposited Ms. Fongum’s $1,500 check into his attorney trust account. After February 10, Mr. Fon continued to contact Mr. Taniform weekly to inquire whether there had been any update from the BIA; each time, Mr. Taniform led Mr. Fon to believe that the motion had been filed and that he had not received an update from the BIA. On March 24, Ms. Fongum sent Mr. Taniform a text message asking whether he had contacted the court to verify its receipt of Mr. Fon’s appeal documents.

Mr. Taniform testified that he had directed Mr. Mundi to file a “skeletal” motion by the February 12 deadline advising the BIA that Mr. Fon was seeking to reopen the case, and that he intended to subsequently file a supplemental motion stating the basis for the request. Mr. Taniform claimed that each time he told Mr. Fon or Ms. Fongum that the motion was pending, he was referring to the “skeletal” motion. He acknowledged that he never informed Mr. Fon or Ms. Fongum of his plan to first file a “skeletal” motion and 6 then to file a supplemental one. He admitted that he never drafted or filed a supplemental motion and never directed Mr. Mundi to do so.

In contrast to his testimony at the hearing, when he responded to Bar Counsel’s investigation, Mr. Taniform never made any claim about “skeletal” or supplemental motions. In early April, ICE officers again met with Mr. Fon to schedule his deportation. He told them that he was represented by a lawyer and was contesting his deportation. Mr. Fon believed that he would be putting his life in jeopardy if he signed his deportation papers.

After that meeting, Mr. Fon called Mr. Taniform who said that the motion was pending, that he did not know why he was unable to get any updates, that Mr. Fon should not sign any deportation papers, and that he would call the BIA to check on the status of the case. When Mr. Fon next called Mr. Taniform, Mr. Taniform stated that he learned that, because of the coronavirus pandemic, everything had been delayed. Mr. Taniform told Mr. Fon to be patient. In fact, Mr. Taniform never contacted the BIA regarding the status of Mr. Fon’s case.

At his hearing, Mr. Taniform testified that Mr. Mundi told him that things may have been delayed because of the pandemic. Throughout April, Ms. Fongum made multiple requests for information regarding the status of Mr. Fon’s case, and each time, Mr. Taniform failed to respond. In mid-May, an ICE officer met again with Mr. Fon. The officer told him that he needed to sign the deportation paperwork because his file indicated that no motion had been filed with the BIA and that no attorney had entered an appearance on his behalf.

As a result, Mr. Fon had no choice but to sign the deportation paperwork, which he said felt was like he was signing his “death paper.” Mr. Fon had Ms. Fongum call ICE, which 7 confirmed that nothing in their system indicated that Mr. Fon was contesting his deportation. Mr. Fon called and told Mr. Taniform what the ICE had said. Mr. Taniform said their information was not correct and that he would find out from BIA what was going on. He told Mr. Fon not to worry.

He also stated that he would file a motion to stay the deportation. After that, Mr. Fon tried numerous times to call Mr. Taniform, but Mr. Taniform would not take his calls. At that time, Mr. Fon was scheduled to be deported in early November. In May, Mr. Taniform told Ms. Fongum that he would file a motion to reopen Mr. Fon’s appeal and stay his deportation.

Mr. Taniform testified that when he said this, he was referring to the supplemental motion he intended to file. Mr. Fon then retained a new lawyer, Ruth Hargrove. On July 2, when contacted by Ms. Hargrove, Mr. Taniform stated that he had filed a motion to reopen the appeal and promised to send her a copy. Ms. Hargrove followed up her phone conversation with an email and a text message requesting copies of the motion and the motion to stay Mr. Fon’s deportation.

Of course, Mr. Taniform had nothing to send to Ms. Hargrove, so he didn’t. When Mr. Taniform did not respond to Ms. Hargrove, she contacted the BIA which informed her that Mr. Taniform had filed neither a motion to reopen Mr. Fon’s case nor a motion to stay his deportation. On July 6, Ms. Hargrove emailed and texted Mr. Taniform, repeating what the BIA had told her and requesting a response from him within 24 hours. Mr. Taniform responded that he had “been in and out of the ER for the last two days” and would reply to her later that day.

Mr. Taniform never contacted Ms. Hargrove again. 8 On July 9, Ms. Hargrove sent Mr. Taniform an email summarizing his misrepresentations to Mr. Fon and Ms. Fongum and demanding a refund of the $1,500 retainer Ms. Fongum had paid. Mr. Taniform never responded. On October 2, 2020, Ms. Hargrove filed a motion to reopen Mr. Fon’s case. Meanwhile, ICE proceeded with Mr. Fon’s deportation; they put him on a plane from Louisiana to Texas, and began arranging his deportation to Cameroon.

They gave him a plane ticket and scheduled to deport him on November 10. At that time, Mr. Fon was “living in fear and pain, knowing that anything could happen” if he was returned to Cameroon. On November 5, Ms. Hargrove filed an emergency motion to stay Mr. Fon’s deportation. The BIA granted the motion on November 9.

On November 24, ICE released Mr. Fon from detention subject to GPS monitoring. Subsequently, Ms. Hargrove filed a motion to reopen the case, which the BIA granted, based on both Mr. Taniform’s and Mr. Tabe’s ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Fon had a master calendar hearing scheduled for October 2022. The outcome of that hearing is not part of the record in this matter.

At his hearing, Mr. Taniform testified that Mr. Mundi would typically provide him with draft motions to approve and sign, but he could not explain why this did not happen in Mr. Fon’s case. Mr. Taniform maintained that he had asked Mr. Mundi for a copy of the filed motion on numerous occasions, and even though there had been problems with Mr. Mundi’s work in the past, Mr. Taniform did nothing further to ensure that the motion had been filed in Mr. Fon’s case. Mr. Taniform neither called Mr. Mundi as a witness nor 9 offered corroborating evidence that he had tasked Mr. Mundi with preparing Mr. Fon’s motion. B. Representation of Clovis Tangmoh Fozao Clovis Tangmoh Fozao (“Clovis”), a citizen of Cameroon, entered the United States in or about 2019.

On February 11, 2020, an immigration court denied his asylum petition, and he was detained by immigration authorities in Louisiana. On February 28, Clovis’s brother, Felix Fozao (“Felix”),3 acting on Clovis’s behalf, retained Mr. Taniform to represent Clovis to appeal the immigration court’s decision and to file an application for parole.4 Mr. Taniform agreed to represent Clovis for a fee of $3,250, with an initial deposit of $2,000. Felix paid $1,000 on February 28 and another $1,000 on March 2, which Mr. Taniform deposited into his operating account without his client’s consent. On March 5, he transferred $1,050 of those funds into his attorney trust account.

On March 6, Mr. Taniform entered his appearance in Clovis’s case and noted an appeal. The Notice of Appeal form warned that “[the BIA] may summarily dismiss your appeal if you do not file a brief or statement within the time set in the briefing schedule.” The deadline for filing the brief or statement was May 27. 3 We intend no disrespect by using the first names of Clovis Fozao and his brother Felix Fozao. We do this only for purposes of clarity. 4 Mr. Taniform testified that he agreed to file the application for parole on a pro bono basis. 10 Sometime between February 28 and April 8, Felix sent a text message to Mr. Taniform stating: “It’s been [a while]. I just wanted to find out about the appeal case of Fozao Clovis Tangmoh[.] Also, to find out how we can apply for parole and or bond for him[.]” Mr. Taniform replied: “[a]ppeal notice has been received.

We are waiting [for] a briefing order[.] Call me on Thursday 10 am and let’s talk about the parole and or bond[.]” On April 28, Felix sent a text message to Mr. Taniform emphasizing the urgent need to file the request for parole. Mr. Taniform responded by text message that day, stating that he was working on the motion and attaching a picture of it. Felix sent Mr. Taniform text messages on April 29 and May 20 in which he identified errors in the motion, including Clovis’s name, but Mr. Taniform never responded. On May 22, Felix sent a text message to Mr. Taniform stating: “I just had a call from my brother Fozao Clovis Tangmoh informing me that some documents have been sent to you from the court that require your action on or before May 27th 2020[.] I was calling so that we could talk about them.” Mr. Taniform never responded.

On June 15, Felix sent multiple text messages to Mr. Taniform requesting information about the status of Clovis’s case. In response, Mr. Taniform falsely told Felix that he was in the process of filing Clovis’s appeal. Mr. Taniform failed to file a brief by the May 27 deadline or at any time thereafter. Mr. Taniform testified that he never filed the appeal brief because he procrastinated and believed a brief could be filed late and still be accepted by the court.

He contended that he told Felix and Clovis that everything was fine because he believed that he could fix the problem. 11 On July 2, the BIA dismissed Clovis’s appeal because “statements were not provided on the Notice of Appeal that meaningfully apprise[d] the Board of the specific reasons underlying the challenge to the Immigration Judge’s Decision.” That same day, the BIA sent Clovis a notice of its decision and informed him that any petition for review of the decision must be filed within 30 days. Nonetheless, on July 7, Mr. Taniform knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to Felix that Clovis’s appeal and his application for parole were going well. When Felix told Mr. Taniform that Clovis’s appeal had been dismissed, Mr. Taniform replied that this was not true. On July 13, Felix terminated Mr. Taniform’s representation of Clovis and requested a refund of the $2,000.

Mr. Taniform did not respond to that request. C. Bar Counsel’s Investigation 1. The Fon Matter On July 15, 2020, Ms. Fongum filed a complaint with Bar Counsel. On July 22, Bar Counsel wrote to Mr. Taniform, enclosed the complaint, and requested a written response.

In response, Mr. Taniform refunded the $1,500 to Ms. Fongum on September 15. On September 18, he responded to Bar Counsel with the following statement: When I assured Mrs. Fongum and Ms. Hargrove that everything was ok, I was under the impression that the motion had been filed because the file had been moved to another section of the cabinet that had all completed files that had already been treated. At his hearing, Mr. Taniform acknowledged that he never looked at Mr. Fon’s client file because he knew that it did not contain a copy of the motion to reopen. 12 On September 23, Mr. Fon also filed a complaint with Bar Counsel against Mr. Taniform. 2. The Fozao Matter On July 24, 2020, Felix filed a complaint with Bar Counsel.

On July 30, Bar Counsel wrote to Mr. Taniform, enclosed Felix’s complaint, and requested a written response. In response, Mr. Taniform refunded the $2,000 to Felix on September 15. On September 18, he responded to Bar Counsel with the following statement, similar to his response to Bar Counsel in its investigation of Ms. Fongum’s complaint: When I assured Mr. Felix that everything was ok, I was under the impression that the brief had been filed because some files including Mr. Clovis Fozao’s file had been mistakenly moved to another section of the cabinet that had all completed files. On November 6, Bar Counsel wrote to Mr. Taniform and requested, in part, Mr. Taniform’s complete client file and his attorney trust account records relating to his representation of Clovis.

Mr. Taniform failed to provide this information. When questioned about the transfer of the retainer from Mr. Taniform’s operating account to his trust account, Mr. Taniform stated to Bar Counsel that: Since my bank does not accept bank transfers and deposits into a trust account, I had to withdraw the money and deposit it into the trust account. The reason why I only deposited $1,50.00 [sic] is because I began the appeal process by filing a notice of intent to appeal coupled with a request for fee waiver for [Clovis]. Lastly, as noted on my last response to the board, I had agreed to file an application for parole with immigration and customs Enforcement [sic] pro bono. 13 STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court has original jurisdiction over attorney discipline proceedings and conducts an independent review of the hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hamilton, 444 Md. 163, 178 (2015). We review the hearing judge’s conclusions of law without deference. Md. Rule 19-740(b)(1). We may treat any facts not challenged by exceptions as established.

Md. Rule 19-740(b)(2)(A). “If exceptions are filed,” we determine “whether the findings of fact have been proved by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rule 19-727(c).” Md. Rule 19-740(b)(2)(B). Under Rule 19-727(c), Bar Counsel must prove its allegations of misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. In contrast, the respondent must prove any affirmative defenses and any mitigating or extenuating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.

DISCUSSION Either party may file exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact or conclusions of law. Md. Rule 19-728(b). Here, Bar Counsel did not file any exceptions. Mr. Taniform, on the other hand, excepts to multiple findings of fact and conclusions of law, each of which we address below.

A. Exceptions to the Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact 1. The Fon Matter Mr. Taniform excepts to the court’s findings that he (1) made “knowing and intentional misrepresentations” to Mr. Fon and Ms. Fongum that he had filed the motion to reopen the case; and (2) misrepresented to Ms. Hargrove that he would send her a copy of the motion to reopen the case. He also excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he 14 was not credible. While Mr. Taniform concedes that his statements to Mr. Fon, Ms. Fongum, and Ms. Hargrove were inaccurate and misleading, he contends the hearing judge’s findings are not justified because his statements were not made for personal gain.

At his hearing, Mr. Taniform blamed Mr. Mundi for failing to both file the motion and send a copy to Ms. Hargrove. According to Mr. Taniform, his only errors were that he failed to follow up with Mr. Mundi, failed to obtain a copy of the motion from Mr. Mundi, and failed to verify that the motion was filed. He contends that these failures evidence incompetence and a lack of diligence, not dishonesty or fraud. A hearing judge’s findings of fact are generally accepted unless they are clearly erroneous.

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Whitehead, 405 Md. 240, 253 (2008). We defer to the credibility findings of the hearing judge because “[t]he hearing judge is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and to decide which one to believe and, as we have said, to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Barton, 442 Md. 91, 122 (2015) (quotation omitted). Here, the hearing judge had ample reasons to conclude that Mr. Taniform’s explanations were not credible and that he had knowingly and intentionally misled Mr. Fon, Ms. Fongum, and Ms. Hargrove.5 Among other things, despite his representations to the contrary, Mr. Taniform had to have known that he had never signed a “skeletal” motion, never prepared and filed a supplemental motion, never called the BIA to check on the status of the matter, and never had any basis for leading Mr. Fon to believe that he was on top of 5 Notably, Mr. Taniform does not except to the finding that he told Mr. Fon numerous times that he would check with BIA about the status of the motion but never did. 15 the matter. Accordingly, we overrule Mr. Taniform’s exception to the hearing judge’s finding that he made multiple misrepresentations in the Fon matter and that his testimony was not credible. 2.

The Fozao Matter Mr. Taniform excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that “the Respondent knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to Felix that Clovis’s appeal and his application for parole were going well.” Here again, according to Mr. Taniform, although his statements were inaccurate and misleading, they were not made for personal gain. He contends that he was justified in making these statements because he intended to file the brief late and ask the court’s permission to accept it late. Had that occurred, he contends, Clovis’s case would have been “back on track.” For self-evident reasons, Mr. Taniform’s attempt to rationalize his actions in this manner only substantiates the hearing judge’s finding. Accordingly, we overrule his exception to the hearing judge’s finding that he made knowing and intentional misrepresentations in the Fozao matter. 3.

Bar Counsel’s Investigation Mr. Taniform excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he made a knowingly false and intentionally misleading statement to Bar Counsel by attempting to rationalize his misrepresentations to Ms. Fongum and Ms. Hargrove—that the motion had been filed— on the basis that Mr. Fon’s file had been placed in the completed files cabinet. According to Mr. Taniform, his answer was merely incomplete because he did not tell Bar Counsel 16 that he had assigned responsibility for the motion to Mr. Mundi. Again, we are not persuaded. The hearing judge determined that Mr. Taniform’s attempt to shift responsibility to Mr. Mundi was self-serving, unsupported, and not credible.

Moreover, as the hearing judge observed “[a]t trial, [Mr. Taniform] acknowledged that he never looked at Mr. Fon’s client file because he knew that it did not contain a copy of the motion to reopen.” There is, therefore, ample evidence to support the hearing judge’s finding that Mr. Taniform intentionally and knowingly misled Bar Counsel. Similarly, Mr. Taniform excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he made a knowingly and intentionally false statement to Bar Counsel when he rationalized his failure to file the brief in Clovis’s matter on the same basis—that the file had mistakenly been moved to the completed files cabinet. Mr. Taniform contends that his misrepresentation to Bar Counsel stemmed from his inadvertent cutting and pasting of the same language he used in his response to Bar Counsel in the Fon matter, and was therefore not intentional. Again, the hearing judge had an adequate evidentiary basis to conclude that because Mr. Taniform knew that no brief had been filed, his statement to Bar Counsel was knowingly and intentionally false.

We therefore overrule Mr. Taniform’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings that he knowingly and intentionally misled Bar Counsel during its investigation. B. Exceptions to the Hearing Judge’s Findings on Mitigating Factors We recognize the following mitigating factors in considering the appropriate sanction: 17 (1) the absence of prior attorney discipline; (2) the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) personal or emotional problems; (4) timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify the misconduct’s consequences; (5) full and free disclosure to [Bar Counsel] or a cooperative attitude toward the attorney discipline proceeding; (6) inexperience in the practice of law; (7) character or reputation; (8) a physical disability; (9) a mental disability or chemical dependency, including alcoholism or drug abuse, where: (a) there is medical evidence that the lawyer is affected by a chemical dependency or mental disability; (b) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct; (c) the lawyer’s recovery from the chemical dependency or mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and (d) the recovery arrested the misconduct, and the misconduct’s recurrence is unlikely; (10) delay in the attorney discipline proceeding; (11) the imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (12) remorse; (13) remoteness of prior violations of the M[A]RPC; and (14) unlikelihood of repetition of the misconduct. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Allenbaugh, 450 Md. 250, 277-78 (2016) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shuler, 443 Md. 494, 506-07 (2015)). The hearing judge found that Mr. Taniform proved by a preponderance of the evidence the mitigating factors of: (1) absence of prior attorney discipline, (2) personal or emotional problems, (3) inexperience in the practice of law, and (4) unlikelihood of repetition of the misconduct.

As to the mitigating factor of personal or emotional problems, the hearing judge explained that, during law school, Mr. Taniform suffered from mental health issues for which he sought professional help and was diagnosed with anxiety and depression. The hearing judge noted that Mr. Taniform had been treated with medication and counseling. Mr. Taniform excepts to the hearing judge’s failure to find: (1) an absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, (2) timely effort to make restitution, (3) cooperative attitude towards the attorney disciplinary proceeding, (4) character or reputation, and (5) remorse. 18 The short answer is that, as explained above, the hearing judge was in the best position to assess the credibility and persuasiveness of Mr. Taniform’s and his character witness’s testimony, see Barton, 442 Md. at 122 , and the hearing judge cannot be faulted for not finding these mitigating factors here. Given Mr. Taniform’s repeated misrepresentations to his clients, their families, and Bar Counsel, his failure to return the fees after demand by his clients, his failure to take any action to rectify his omissions while he was still representing Mr. Fon and Clovis, and his efforts to shift responsibility for his misconduct to Mr. Mundi, the hearing judge was well within her discretion when she declined to find these additional mitigating factors.6 We therefore overrule Mr. Taniform’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s failure to do so.

C. Exceptions to the Hearing Judge’s Findings on Aggravating Factors The Court considers the following aggravating factors: (1) prior attorney discipline; (2) a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple violations of the [MARPC]; (5) bad faith obstruction of the attorney discipline proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the Maryland Rules or orders of this Court or the hearing judge; (6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the attorney discipline proceeding; (7) a refusal to acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful nature; (8) the victim’s vulnerability; (9) substantial experience in the practice of law; (10) indifference to making restitution or rectifying the misconduct’s consequences; (11) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled substances; and (12) likelihood of repetition of the misconduct. 6 Mr. Taniform’s character witness, Yomba Yokwan, a close friend who considered Mr. Taniform like a brother, testified that Mr. Taniform was dependable, hard-working, kind, a good friend, a good father, and conscientious. While obviously complimentary, we do not question the hearing judge’s failure to include character and reputation as a mitigating factor based solely on the testimony of one very good friend. 19 Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sperling, 459 Md. 194, 275 (2018). The hearing judge found that Bar Counsel proved by clear and convincing evidence: (1) a dishonest or selfish motive, (2) a pattern of misconduct, and (3) vulnerability of the victims. Mr. Taniform excepts to each of these findings. 1.

A Dishonest or Selfish Motive The hearing judge found that Mr. Taniform had a selfish or dishonest motive: when he made repeated knowing and intentional misrepresentations to Mr. Fon, Ms. Fongum, and Ms. Hargrove in an effort to conceal his failure to file the motion to reopen. The Respondent demonstrated a dishonest and selfish motive in the Fozao matter when he intentionally misrepresented to Felix that everything was “ok” with Clovis’s case, despite having failed to draft or file the brief by the May 27 deadline. In both the Fon and Fozao matters, the Respondent agreed to the representation, accepted funds, and then failed to perform the work for which he was retained essentially abandoning the clients. While there doesn’t seem to be a selfish motive for failing to do this work as requested, the selfish motive comes in when Respondent fails to answer honestly and fails to respond at all to the inquires in order to avoid the problem or deflect the responsibility.

According to Mr. Taniform, Bar Counsel did not prove a dishonest or selfish motive by clear and convincing evidence. Our independent review of the record confirms that the hearing judge had a sufficient evidentiary basis for finding a dishonest and selfish motive; accordingly, we overrule Mr. Taniform’s exception to that finding. 2. A Pattern of Misconduct The hearing judge found that Mr. Taniform engaged a pattern of misconduct. The hearing judge explained: There is also a pattern of misconduct present in these situations.

Not only does Respondent fail to file petitions in both the Fon and Fozao matter, but he then repeatedly is dishonest in saying that he has filed them. He fails to admit his error and continues to deny. At some point in both cases, he follows 20 the denials with being nonresponsive to his clients and their families who are looking to determine the status of the filings. Mr. Taniform excepts to this finding because, he contends, these two matters occurred during the same five-month period.

A pattern of misconduct can be demonstrated “by multiple violations over time, or a series of acts with one goal.” Sperling, 459 Md. at 276 . In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Coppola, 419 Md. 370, 406 (2011), we found that Mr. Coppola’s “series of acts clearly formed a pattern of misconduct, albeit with one goal in mind. One goal, though, does not obviate that Coppola engaged in a series of acts over a number of days.” See also Shuler, 443 Md. at 500 (finding a pattern of misconduct evidenced by the failure to appear or by appearing late at multiple hearings, all in one case over a three-month period). Here, Mr. Taniform engaged in a series of wrongful acts over a period of five months with two different clients.

Although arguably over a short period of time, Mr. Taniform nonetheless made multiple misrepresentations to Mr. Fon, Mrs. Fongum, and Ms. Hargrove to hide the fact that he completely neglected Mr. Fon’s case. Similarly, in the Fozao matter, on multiple occasions, Mr. Taniform made misrepresentations to Felix, again to hide the fact that he had neglected to file a brief on Clovis’s behalf. Citing to Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Riely, 471 Md. 458, 500-01 (2020), Mr. Taniform claims that this Court should not look at how many acts the attorney committed, but instead how many “‘episodes’ those violations relate to.” According to Mr. Taniform, the record shows that he committed only two “episodes” during the same time frame. 21 Mr. Taniform’s reliance on Riely is misplaced. In Riely, we overruled Bar Counsel’s exception to the hearing judge’s failure to find the aggravating factor of a pattern of misconduct.

There, we stated: Mr. Riely had what appears to be a high-volume immigration practice that, for the prior 30 years, had apparently been without incident. We decline to characterize these two matters as a “pattern of misconduct.” Id. at 501, n.21 . Unlike in Riely, Mr. Taniform’s misconduct cannot be juxtaposed against a 30-year, otherwise unblemished career. Rather, as Mr. Taniform acknowledges, he had only two years of experience.

Further, it warrants pointing out that where one hearing judge may find that Bar Counsel proved the factor by clear and convincing evidence, another hearing judge presented with the same evidence may reasonably find otherwise. Just because we declined in Riely to find fault in a hearing judge’s failure to find this aggravating factor does not imply that a hearing judge presented with similar facts in another case would not be entitled to find this factor. Accordingly, we overrule Mr. Taniform’s exception to the hearing judge’s finding of the aggravating factor of a pattern of misconduct. 3. The Victim’s Vulnerability Based on the evidence, the hearing judge was not inclined to find victim vulnerability as an aggravating factor because both Mr. Fon and Clovis had help from family members to retain and communicate with counsel, both clients were able to communicate with Mr. Taniform when they could reach him, and both were neither of a vulnerable age nor lacking in cognitive abilities.

The hearing judge nevertheless felt 22 constrained to find this aggravating factor because, in Riely, we stated that “[i]mmigrants, especially those at risk of removal from the United States, are a marginalized group that this Court has recognized as vulnerable victims of professional misconduct.” 471 Md. at 500 . The hearing judge reasonably interpreted this as a per se rule that immigration clients are automatically deemed vulnerable. Mr. Taniform excepts to the hearing judge’s finding of this factor, and urges us to reject such a per se rule. According to Mr. Taniform, If immigrant clients are to be considered vulnerable victims in every case, lawyers specializing in immigration law will always be subject to an aggravating factor in attorney grievance matters.

That alone could be a chilling effect for those wishing to pursue immigration law as a practice area. While the immigrant clients in these matters were certainly vulnerable in that they faced removal, they were not vulnerable within the class of immigrant clients – as the Court below noted. Neither of the clients at issue were especially young or senior nor were they laboring under a disability that would make them particularly vulnerable. Bar Counsel did not prove this aggravating factor by clear and convincing evidence and the Court below should not have made this finding of fact.

Mr. Taniform traces our statement in Riely about the vulnerability of immigration clients to Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brisbon, 422 Md. 625, 642 (2011) (quotation omitted), where we recognized that the Maryland Immigration Consultant Act was enacted to “offer simple protection to extremely vulnerable people, largely unable or unwilling as a practical matter to defend themselves, from being preyed on.” According to Mr. Taniform, our recognition that immigration clients are generally vulnerable and need protection does not translate to a blanket rule that the aggravating factor of the victim’s vulnerability must automatically be found. 23 We recently addressed an argument similar to Mr. Taniform’s in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Moawad, 475 Md. 424, 484-85 (2021), where one of the immigration client victims was an “accomplished medical doctor” who made a career in the United States as an emergency medical technician. We rejected the argument that the vulnerability of the victim factor should not be considered, stating: This Court has emphasized a need to protect the public by “impress[ing] upon . . . lawyers, the importance of diligent representation and adequate communication in immigration cases.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Landeo, 446 Md. 294 , 352–53, 132 A.3d 196 (2016); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thomas, 440 Md. 523, 558 , 103 A.3d 629 (2014). Although the circumstances of Mr. Togbetse, Dr. Hao, and Ms. Liang may differ from many immigrants’ experiences, this fact does not prevent each of the clients in this case from being classified as vulnerable. Mr. Moawad’s actions in this case caused substantial prejudice that risked impacting his clients’ ability to maintain jobs and homes in the United States.

The potential to be removed from the country is a grave risk that is specific to immigrants who do not have permanent status within the United States, thereby making them vulnerable regardless of what occupation or socioeconomic status they have attained. Attorneys play an important role in protecting this vulnerable class, and hence attorneys who provide substandard services to immigrants should, in turn, face significant consequences. Id. at 485. Time will ultimately tell whether we spoke too broadly in Moawad and in prior cases, but we are not persuaded on these facts that Mr. Taniform’s clients should not be deemed vulnerable for purposes of this aggravating factor.

Accordingly, we overrule Mr. Taniform’s exception to the hearing judge’s finding of this factor. D. The Hearing Judge’s Conclusions of Law From the foregoing factual findings, the hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Taniform violated MARPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.15, 24 1.16(d), 4.1, 8.1(a) and (b), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d), and Maryland Rule 19-407. Mr. Taniform admits to violating MARPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), and 8.4(a) and (d), and Rule 19-407, but excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he violated MARPC 1.15, 1.16(d), 4.1, 8.1(a) and (b), and 8.4(c). We review all conclusions of law de novo, even if no exceptions are taken.

As discussed below, we conclude that the hearing judge’s findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence. We will first discuss the uncontested conclusions of the hearing judge, and then address the conclusions to which Mr. Taniform excepts. 1. Violations that Mr. Taniform Concedes a. MARPC 1.1 (Competence) MARPC 1.1 requires attorneys to provide competent representation to all clients.

To do so, an attorney must apply “appropriate knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation to the client’s issues.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brooks, 476 Md. 97, 131 (2021) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rheinstein, 466 Md. 648, 709 (2020), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 370 (2020)). An attorney can violate this rule by failing to file necessary motions or failing to appear at a hearing, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Walker-Turner, 428 Md. 214, 226-28 (2012); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brigerman, 441 Md. 23, 35 (2014) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shakir, 427 Md. 197, 205 (2012)), or by failing to act in a timely manner, causing harm to the client, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brown, 426 Md. 298, 319 (2012). 25 Clear and convincing evidence supports the conclusion that Mr. Taniform did not provide competent representation to his clients as required under Rule 1.1. b. MARPC 1.3 (Diligence) MARPC 1.3 requires an attorney to “act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” This Rule can be violated when an attorney fails to communicate with the client or fails to “advance the client’s cause or endeavor[.]” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bah, 468 Md. 179, 208 (2020) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Edwards, 462 Md. 642, 699 (2019)); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Smith-Scott, 469 Md. 281, 340 (2020) (noting that the same justifications for finding a violation of MARPC 1.1 for incompetence can support a finding of a violation of 1.3). The hearing judge found that Mr. Taniform violated this Rule in the Fon matter when he failed to file a motion and failed to check with the BIA as to whether the motion was filed.

The hearing judge found that Mr. Taniform violated this Rule in the Fozao matter when he failed to timely file the brief and failed to file a motion after the appeal was dismissed. Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s finding that this Rule was violated. c. MARPC 1.4 (Communication) MARPC 1.4 provides: (a) An attorney shall: (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 19- 301.0 (f) (1.0), is required by these Rules; (2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; 26 (3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and (4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the attorney’s conduct when the attorney knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. (b) An attorney shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

MARPC 1.4 can be violated if a client has made several “reasonable requests for information, which may include a general status update or for documents pertaining to the case[,]” to no avail. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Planta, 467 Md. 319, 349 (2020); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dailey, 474 Md. 679, 705 (2021). An attorney also violates this Rule when he misrepresents a case’s status to a client. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Fox, 417 Md. 504, 517 (2010).

The hearing judge concluded that Mr. Taniform violated MARPC 1.4(a) when he “failed to adequately communicate with or respond to requests for information from his clients and his clients’ family members in the Fon and Fozao matters.” Mr. Taniform made misrepresentations to Mr. Fon, Ms. Fongum, and Ms. Hargrove about the status of the Fon matter, and to Felix about the status of the Fozao matter. The hearing judge concluded that Mr. Taniform violated Rule 1.4(b) by his “failure to advise Mr. Fon that he had not filed the motion to reopen” and “repeated misrepresentations to the contrary” that “prevented Mr. Fon from making informed decisions regarding his immigration matter[.]” Similarly, in the Fozao matter, the hearing judge found that Mr. Taniform’s misrepresentations “prevented Felix and Clovis from making informed decisions about [Clovis’s] immigration matter[.]” 27 Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s finding that this Rule was violated. d. MARPC 8.4 (Misconduct) MARPC 8.4, in relevant part, states: It is professional misconduct for an attorney to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; * * * (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.] When an attorney’s actions “bring the legal profession into disrepute[,]” he has committed a violation of MARPC 8.4(d). Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Plank, 453 Md. 446, 465 (2017) (citation omitted).

This includes “acts of dishonesty and incompetence, [and even] intentional representations to Bar Counsel[.]” Dailey, 474 Md. at 710 . The hearing judge found that Mr. Taniform’s other rule violations also constituted violations of MARPC 8.4(a). The hearing judge found that Mr. Taniform violated MARPC 8.4(d) when he “undertook the representation of two immigration clients, failed to perform the work for which he was retained, and made knowing and intentional misrepresentations to the client and the client’s family members regarding the status of their cases.” Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s finding that sections (a) and (d) of Rule 8.4 were violated. 28 e. Maryland Rule 19-407 (Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping) Rule 19-407 provides that: (a) Creation of Records.

The following records shall be created and maintained for the receipt and disbursement of funds of clients or of third persons: (1) Attorney Trust Account Identification. An identification of all attorney trust accounts maintained, including the name of the financial institution, account number, account name, date the account was opened, date the account was closed, and an agreement with the financial institution establishing each account and its interest-bearing nature. (2) Deposits and Disbursements. A record for each account that chronologically shows all deposits and disbursements, as follows: (A) for each deposit, a record made at or near the time of the deposit that shows (i) the date of the deposit, (ii) the amount, (iii) the identity of the client or third person for whom the funds were deposited, and (iv) the purpose of the deposit; (B) for each disbursement, including a disbursement made by electronic transfer, a record made at or near the time of disbursement that shows (i) the date of the disbursement, (ii) the amount, (iii) the payee, (iv) the identity of the client or third person for whom the disbursement was made (if not the payee), and (v) the purpose of the disbursement; (C) for each disbursement made by electronic transfer, a written memorandum authorizing the transaction and identifying the attorney responsible for the transaction.

(3) Client Matter Records. A record for each client matter in which the attorney receives funds in trust, as follows: (A) for each attorney trust account transaction, a record that shows (i) the date of the deposit or disbursement; (ii) the amount of the deposit or disbursement; (iii) the purpose for which the funds are intended; (iv) for a disbursement, the payee and the check number or other payment identification; and (v) the balance of funds remaining in the account in connection with the matter; and (B) an identification of the person to whom the unused portion of a fee or expense deposit is to be returned whenever it is to be returned to a person other than the client. (4) Record of Funds of the Attorney. A record that identifies the funds of the attorney held in each attorney trust account as permitted by Rule 19-408 (b). 29 (b) Monthly Reconciliation.

An attorney shall cause to be created a monthly reconciliation of all attorney trust account records, client matter records, records of funds of the attorney held in an attorney trust account as permitted by Rule 19-408 (b), and the adjusted month-end financial institution statement balance. The adjusted month-end financial institution statement balance is computed by adding subsequent deposits to and subtracting subsequent disbursements from the financial institution’s month-end statement balance. (c) Electronic Records. Whenever the records required by this Rule are created or maintained using electronic means, there must be an ability to print a paper copy of the records upon a reasonable request to do so.

(d) Records to be Maintained. Financial institution month-end statements, any canceled checks or copies of canceled checks provided with a financial institution month-end statement, duplicate deposit slips or deposit receipts generated by the financial institution, and records created in accordance with section (a) of this Rule shall be maintained for a period of at least five years after the date the record was created. The hearing judge found that Mr. Taniform violated this Rule by failing to provide Bar Counsel with the requested client records. Mr. Taniform does not contend otherwise.

Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s finding that this Rule was violated. 2. Violations to Which Mr. Taniform Excepts Mr. Taniform excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusions that he violated Rules 1.15, 1.16(d), 4.1, 8.1(a) and (b), and 8.4(c). We overrule each exception. a. MARPC 1.15 (Safekeeping of Property) Rule 1.15 provides, in relevant part, that: (a) An attorney shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in an attorney’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the attorney’s own property.

Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 19, Chapter 400 of the Maryland Rules, and 30 records shall be created and maintained in accordance with the Rules in that Chapter. Other property shall be identified specifically as such and appropriately safeguarded, and records of its receipt and distribution shall be created and maintained. Complete records of the account funds and of other property shall be kept by the attorney and shall be preserved for a period of at least five years after the date the record was created. * * * (c) Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a different arrangement, an attorney shall deposit legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance into a client trust account and may withdraw those funds for the attorney’s own benefit only as fees are earned or expenses incurred. An attorney violates Rule 1.15 when, without the client’s consent, he either fails to deposit client funds into an attorney trust account or deposits client funds into a personal or operating account before those funds are earned.

Smith-Scott, 469 Md. at 350 (citation omitted); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Van Nelson, 425 Md. 344, 355-56 (2012). The hearing judge found that Mr. Taniform violated this Rule because he failed to safeguard Felix’s funds until they were earned. According to the hearing judge, without his client’s consent, Mr. Taniform deposited the $2,000 retainer into his operating account before it was earned and then transferred $1,050 of those funds into his attorney client trust account at a time when no fees were due and owing. At his hearing, Mr. Taniform insisted that he had earned the $950 left in his operating account.

The hearing judge found that Mr. Taniform had only done “some minimal work” on Clovis’s case and that he failed to provide any records, including timesheets or invoices, to substantiate his claim that he had earned that fee. 31 Mr. Taniform contends that, even in the absence of timesheet records, “it is clear that [he] had obviously met with the client, reviewed the status of the case and filed pleadings with the immigration court” and that he had earned the money he retained in his operating account. To the contrary, given that the evidence establishes that Mr. Taniform filed only an appearance and notice of appeal, did not file the appeal brief that he had been hired to file, and did not file the application for parole he had agreed to file, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that Mr. Taniform violated Rule 1.15. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thomas, 409 Md. 121, 163-65 (2009); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Stinson, 428 Md. 147, 172 (2012). b. MARPC 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation) MARPC 1.16(d) provides: Upon termination of representation, an attorney shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of another attorney, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred.

The attorney may retain papers