Attorney Grievance v. Smith-Scott

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Arlene Adasa Smith-Scott, Misc. Docket AG Nos. 8 & 64, September Term, 2018. Opinion by Getty, J. ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE–SANCTION–DISBARMENT Respondent, Arlene Adasa Smith-Scott, violated several provisions of the Maryland Lawyer’s Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) and the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) through her self-representation before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland and unrelated representation of Crystal Combs, Angela Plater, Furrah Deeba, Benjamin Thomas, Jr., John Thomas Jones, Jr., and Theresa Saunders. Ms. Smith-Scott’s conduct violated the following rules of professional conduct: 1.1 (Competence); 1.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority); 1.3 (Diligence); 1.4 (Communication); 1.5 (Fees); 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information); 1.15 (Safekeeping Property); 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation); 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions); 3.2 (Expediting Litigation); 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal); 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Attorney); 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others); 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters); 8.4 (Misconduct); and 19-404 (Trust Account— Required Deposits).

This misconduct warrants disbarment. Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. CAE-18-23035 Argued: January 10, 2020 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG Nos. 8 & 64 September Term, 2018 ______________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. ARLENE ADASA SMITH-SCOTT ______________________________________ Barbera, C.J. McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Booth, Biran, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Getty, J. ______________________________________ Filed: June 29, 2020 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. Suzanne Johnson 2020-06-29 14:11-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk “A person who represents himself [or herself] has a fool for a client.”1 The instant attorney discipline case fortifies the import of this age-old adage often attributed to President Lincoln.

Regrettably, the underlying conduct involves an attorney’s overzealous self-representation in a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland (“Bankruptcy Court”). Over the course of the nearly three-year bankruptcy proceeding, among other things, the attorney filed countless frivolous pleadings, motions, and appeals, intentionally hindered the court- appointed trustee’s ability to administer the case, and knowingly made false statements of fact in filings and appeals before the Bankruptcy Court and United States District Court for the District of Maryland (“U.S. District Court”). Moreover, this attorney represented several clients in Maryland’s circuit courts, the Court of Special Appeals, and the Bankruptcy Court. In these instances, among other things, the attorney misappropriated client funds, made knowing misrepresentations to and intentionally concealed information from clients, and failed to prosecute clients’ motions and appeals.

This attorney’s conduct violated sixteen separate provisions of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”). For the reasons that follow, we hold that this attorney’s conduct merits disbarment. 1 This Court has had occasion to discuss this adage, often attributed to President Abraham Lincoln, in a previous attorney discipline case. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Trye, 444 Md. 201, 205 (2015); see also Marshall H. Tanick & Phillip J. Trobaugh, Lincoln’s Minnesota Legacy, 66 Bench & B. Minn. 25, 28 (Feb. 2009). BACKGROUND Procedural Context On June 27, 2018, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (the “Commission”), acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“Petition I”) with this Court alleging that Arlene Smith-Scott had violated the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC” or “Rules”).2 See Md. Rule 19-721.

On February 21, 2019, the Commission, acting through Bar Counsel, filed a second Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“Petition II”) with this Court alleging that Ms. Smith-Scott violated the MLRPC by conduct unrelated to Petition I. Petition I, which related to Ms. Smith-Scott’s actions during a nearly three-year long personal bankruptcy case, and Petition II, which concerned Ms. Smith-Scott’s unrelated representation of seven clients, together alleged that Ms. Smith-Scott violated the following Rules: 1.1 (Competence); 1.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority); 1.3 (Diligence); 1.4 (Communication); 1.5 (Fees); 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information); 1.15 (Safekeeping Property); 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation); 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions); 3.2 (Expediting Litigation); 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal); 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Attorney); 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others); 2 Effective July 1, 2016, the MLRPC were renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct and recodified in Title 19 of the Maryland Rules. Since Ms. Smith- Scott’s misconduct occurred before and after the effective date of the recodification of the rules of professional conduct, she committed violations of the same rules of professional conduct under both the MLRPC and the MARPC. For simplicity, and because there is no substantive difference in the two codifications of the rules, we shall use the shorter designations of the MLRPC, e.g., “Rule 1.1.” 2 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters); 8.4 (Misconduct); 19-403 (Duty to Maintain Account);3 and 19-404 (Trust Account—Required Deposits). We designated Judge Peter K. Killough (the “hearing judge”) of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County by Order dated June 28, 2018 to conduct a hearing concerning the alleged violations and to provide findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law.

See Md. Rule 19-722(a). In relation to Petition I, Ms. Smith-Scott was personally served with process on July 30, 2018 and filed her Answer to Petition I on September 4, 2018. Bar Counsel filed a Motion to Consolidate Petition I and Petition II on February 21, 2019. We consolidated the two Petitions on March 6, 2019 and referred Petition II to the hearing judge.

In relation to Petition II, Ms. Smith-Scott was personally served with process on April 1, 2019 and filed her Answer to Petition II on April 24, 2019. The evidentiary hearing spanned five days: June 17, 18, 19, 20 and 28, 2019. In this Court, Bar Counsel filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law on November 13, 2019. Likewise, Ms. Smith-Scott filed exceptions to the same on November 15, 2019.

This Court heard oral argument in this matter on January 10, 2020. We disbarred Ms. Smith-Scott and awarded costs against her by per curiam order dated January 10, 2020. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Smith- Scott, 466 Md. 543 , 543–44 (2020). We explain in this opinion the reasons for the per curiam order. 3 The hearing judge did not make any determination as to whether Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 19-403.

Bar Counsel did not except to the absence of the hearing judge’s determination on this alleged violation, so we shall not consider it in the discussion that follows. 3 Factual Findings We begin with a summary of the hearing judge’s factual findings. Ms. Smith-Scott was admitted to the Bar of the State of Maryland on February 2, 2012. Since then, she has maintained a law office—Strategic Law Group, LLC—in Prince George’s County, Maryland and has focused on representing individuals in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings. The instant matter involves Ms. Smith-Scott’s wrongdoing in her own personal bankruptcy case and multiple instances of misconduct spanning several different bankruptcy clients.

Personal Bankruptcy Case Ms. Smith-Scott filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11 of Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court on September 28, 2014. See In re: Arlene Smith- Scott, Case No. 14-25022. The case was assigned to the Honorable James F. Schneider.4 At the time of the bankruptcy petition, Ms. Smith-Scott held title to three investment properties: (1) 367-371 Main Street, Laurel, Maryland (mortgage held by Patapsco Bank) (“367 Main Street”);5 (2) 511 Main Street, Laurel, Maryland (mortgage held by Patapsco 4 The Honorable James F. Schneider served as an Associate Judge (1982–2001; 2005– 2017) and Chief Judge (2001–2005) of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland. 5 In 2015, Howard Bancorp acquired Patapsco Bancorp. Howard Bankcorp, Inc. Completes Acquisition of Patapsco Bancorp, Inc., Howard Bank https://www.howardbank.com/maryland-banking-blog/Howard-Bancorp-Inc-Completes- Acquisition-of-Patapsco-Bancorp-Inc (last visited June 26, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/K354-9YEC.

Therefore, while we begin by discussing mortgages held by Patapsco Bank, we shall reference Howard Bank, as successor-in-interest to Patapsco Bank, beginning with events that occurred in September 2015. 4 Bank) (“511 Main Street,” together with 367 Main Street the “Laurel Properties”) ; and (3) 10 Stanley Drive, Catonsville, Maryland (mortgage held by U.S. Bank) (“10 Stanley Drive”). All three properties had multiple residential tenants; the Laurel Properties also had commercial tenants. Ms. Smith-Scott maintained her law office at 367 Main Street. In March 2014, before Ms. Smith-Scott filed for bankruptcy, U.S. Bank exercised its contractual rights under an assignment of rents clause contained in its loan documents with Ms. Smith-Scott to collect rental income directly from the 10 Stanley Drive tenants.

U.S. Bank’s attorney, Bradley Swallow, contacted the tenants and instructed them to pay rent to U.S. Bank directly. Two days later, Ms. Smith-Scott wrote the tenants and instructed them to send rent to her directly or face eviction. In the letter, Ms. Smith-Scott claimed that U.S. Bank did not have a legal basis to collect the rent and instructed the tenants to file complaints against Mr. Swallow with the Commission. On April 10, 2014, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a lawsuit against U.S. Bank and Mr. Swallow in the U.S. District Court (the “U.S. Bank Action”) claiming violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

See Smith-Scott v. U.S. Bank, Case No. 1:14-cv-01157- JFM. In response, U.S. Bank filed a counterclaim to foreclose on the property at 10 Stanley Drive. The U.S. District Court appointed a receiver to collect the rental income based on Ms. Smith-Scott’s interference with U.S. Bank’s rent collection efforts (the “August 26 Order I”). In a separate order, the U.S. District Court ruled that “[Mr. Swallow] acted entirely within his rights and the rights of his client in sending the letter” regarding the collection of rent to Ms. Smith-Scott’s tenants (the “August 26 Order II,” together with August 26 Order I the “August 26 Orders”). 5 Along with Ms. Smith-Scott’s personal bankruptcy petition, filed on September 28, 2014, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Motion to Use Cash Collateral.

Ms. Smith-Scott sought authorization to use the rental income from the three properties for maintenance expenses. In the motion, Ms. Smith-Scott represented to the Bankruptcy Court that she was receiving rental income from all three properties. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to mention the U.S. District Court’s August 26 Orders. Two days later, on September 30, 2014, Ms. Smith-Scott informed the U.S. District Court in the U.S. Bank Action of her bankruptcy filing.

That same day, U.S. Bank filed an opposition to Ms. Smith-Scott’s Motion to Use Cash Collateral. Ms. Smith-Scott filed a reply, in which she argued that U.S. Bank was not the mortgage holder of the 10 Stanley Drive property because of a defect in the chain of title. This argument was unsupported by any facts and belied by the August 26 Orders. Nevertheless, Ms. Smith-Scott continued to assert this claim throughout her bankruptcy proceedings.

The U.S. District Court administratively closed the U.S. Bank Action without prejudice on October 2, 2014. On October 9, 2014, Patapsco Bank also filed a motion to oppose Ms. Smith Scott’s Motion to Use Cash Collateral. The Bankruptcy Court denied Ms. Smith-Scott’s motion by order dated October 29, 2014 (“October 29 Order”) and barred her from using cash collateral—i.e., rental income—from the Laurel Properties without the consent of Patapsco Bank or the court. 6 In January 2015, Patapsco Bank filed Motions for Relief from Stay6 asserting that Ms. Smith-Scott had defaulted on her loans and had failed to file monthly operating reports demonstrating that she had not used the rental income for any unauthorized purpose.7 Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition to Patapsco Bank’s motions on January 30, 2015. Ms. Smith-Scott provided operating reports for October, November and December 2014 on February 18, 2015.

Bank statements attached to the report showed that Ms. Smith-Scott ignored the October 29 Order and routinely used cash collateral for personal expenses without the permission of the court or Patapsco Bank during the reporting periods. Patapsco Bank filed a motion on February 24, 2015 to dismiss Ms. Smith-Scott’s Chapter 11 case or, alternatively, convert the case to Chapter 7 because of Ms. Smith- Scott’s unauthorized use of cash collateral in violation of the October 29 Order. Ms. Smith- Scott filed an opposition. On February 25, 2015, Patapsco Bank filed a Motion for Civil Contempt and Sanctions (the “Contempt Motion”) against Ms. Smith-Scott for violating 6 In Hoang v. Lowery, this Court explained the protections of the automatic stay imposed at the filing of a bankruptcy petition: The filing of a petition operates as a stay . . . of actions against the debtor.

See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a). The automatic stay applies to several types of actions, including “the commencement or continuation” of an action “to recover a claim against the debtor”; enforcement against the debtor or property of the bankruptcy estate of a judgment obtained pre-filing; and any act to obtain possession of property of the bankruptcy estate or from the estate or to exercise control over the property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a)(1)–(3). ___ Md. ___, ___ (2020). 7 See Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Fed. R. Bankr. Proc.”) 2015(a). 7 the October 29 Order. Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition to this motion as well, contending that she did not use cash collateral for any unauthorized purpose.

On March 8, 2015, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Motion for Contempt and Sanctions for Unreasonable and Vexatious Multiplication of Proceedings against Patapsco Bank. Ms. Smith-Scott argued that Patapsco Bank’s motions were in bad faith and that Patapsco Bank improperly enlarged its proof of claim. Additionally, Ms. Smith-Scott alleged that she suffered emotional distress from Patapsco Bank’s attempts to collect the mortgage payments and sought $5,000 in punitive damages. Later rulings of the Bankruptcy Court confirm that Patapsco Bank’s motions were not made in bad faith.

Instead, its claims were based on the terms of Ms. Smith-Scott’s Deed of Trust. By order on April 7, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court converted Ms. Smith-Scott’s case to a Chapter 7 proceeding (“April 7 Conversion Order”) because of Ms. Smith-Scott’s (1) violation of the October 29 Order prohibiting the unauthorized use of cash collateral; (2) failure to report on the operations of Strategic Law Group; (3) commingling of personal funds and rental income; and (4) untimely filing of financial reports. In ordering the conversion to a Chapter 7 proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court reasoned as follows: I’m very concerned at the various lapses that counsel has—and I say counsel because the debtor is an attorney, who actually is a bankruptcy lawyer, who evidenced today by her lack of knowledge of the Bankruptcy Code, the inability to properly proceed in this case. All of these things cause me to come to the conclusion that not only the creditors, but the debtor would be better off if this case were in a Chapter 7 because she will not then be in charge of the way this case is handled, which has been completely mismanaged from the beginning, to her own detriment, and to her possible violation of various statutes and criminal laws as well.

I don’t want to see her get in trouble in this case. And she’s going to be in big trouble if we don’t stop this now and get somebody in there who knows what he or she is 8 doing . . . . And finally, the violation of a court order and the terms of its use of cash collateral, which she’s been prohibited from doing, is the final straw that leads me to conclude that this case must have a Chapter 7 Trustee appointed. The case cannot continue in a Chapter 11, and the debtor has shown quite clearly her unable [sic] to properly manage this case from the very beginning.

(Emphasis and ellipsis in original). Ms. Smith-Scott appealed the April 7 Conversion Order to the U.S. District Court on April 8, 2015. See Smith-Scott v. Patapsco Bank, Case No. 1:15-cv-01013-RDB. Patapsco Bank filed Amended Motions for Relief from the Automatic Stay relating to the Laurel Properties on April 8, 2015.

Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition. The Bankruptcy Court heard arguments on June 18, 2015. Four days later, the court granted Patapsco Bank’s motions (the “June 22 Order”). The June 22 Order granted Patapsco Bank relief from the automatic stay, allowed it to foreclose on the Laurel Properties, and collect the rents.

Meanwhile, the Bankruptcy Court appointed George W. Liebmann, Esq. (“Trustee”) as the United States Chapter 7 Trustee to oversee Ms. Smith-Scott’s bankruptcy case. The Trustee filed an Application to employ his law partner, Orbie R. Shively, Esq. (“Mr. Shively”) as his attorney in his capacity as the Trustee.

On May 11, 2015, during a conversation between Ms. Smith-Scott and Mr. Shively, Ms. Smith-Scott indicated her intent to move forward with the U.S. Bank Action, even though the case had been administratively closed by the U.S. District Court. Mr. Shively advised Ms. Smith-Scott that the U.S. Bank Action was property of the bankruptcy estate. As such, the lawsuit was within the exclusive control of the Trustee. Mr. Shively further explained that only the 9 Trustee could proceed in the U.S. Bank Action—not Ms. Smith-Scott—and he requested that Ms. Smith-Scott provide him with relevant filings in the case.

Ms. Smith-Scott failed to comply with Mr. Shively’s request. During the same conversation, Ms. Smith-Scott requested a postponement of her § 341 meeting of creditors,8 which was originally scheduled for May 12, 2015. Mr. Shively consented, and postponed the meeting until May 26, 2015. However, Ms. Smith-Scott never appeared for the rescheduled meeting.

Yet, on May 26, 2015, Ms. Smith-Scott emailed Mr. Shively and again informed him of her intent to proceed in the U.S. Bank Action. On May 27, 2015, Mr. Shively responded by email and reminded Ms. Smith-Scott that the Trustee exclusively controlled the U.S. Bank Action and she had no right to proceed in the case. Notwithstanding Mr. Shively’s warnings, Ms. Smith-Scott filed three motions in the U.S. Bank Action on June 15, 2015: (1) Motion to Reopen Case; (2) Motion to Vacate Order Granting Receivership; and (3) Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint to Add Party and Due to New Evidence. However, because of the Trustee’s appointment, Ms. Smith-Scott lacked standing to file these motions.

Additionally, Ms. Smith-Scott failed to serve the Trustee or Mr. Shively with copies or notice of the filings. On June 17, 2015, the Trustee filed a Motion and Notice of Substitution of Trustee arguing that the Trustee was the real party in interest and that Ms. Smith-Scott lacked standing to proceed 8 11 U.S.C. § 341 requires that the Trustee “convene and preside at a meeting of creditors” in the debtor’s case. The debtor’s attendance is required. See 11 U.S.C. § 343 (a) (“The debtor shall appear and submit to examination under oath at the meeting of creditors under section 341(a) of this title.”). 10 in the case.

Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition on July 1, 2015, arguing, without support, that the Trustee’s motion was not ripe because the April 7 Conversion Order was pending on appeal. The Trustee filed a reply. The U.S. District Court denied Ms. Smith-Scott’s motions on June 17, 2015. Ms. Smith-Scott noted an appeal of the U.S. District Court’s order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

In response, the Trustee filed a Line Withdrawing with Prejudice Notice of Appeal. Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition to the Trustee’s line withdrawing the appeal on July 20, 2015. The U.S. District Court granted the Trustee’s Motion and Notice of Substitution on August 5, 2015. Ms. Smith-Scott filed a second appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

The appellate court consolidated the two appeals and, on November 5, 2015, dismissed the case on joint stipulation between the Trustee and U.S. Bank. Meanwhile, pursuant to the June 22 Order, Patapsco Bank sent letters to Ms. Smith- Scott’s tenants directing them to send rent payments directly to Patapsco Bank. Patapsco Bank copied Ms. Smith-Scott on each letter. On July 13, 2015, Ms. Smith-Scott sent letters to her tenants acknowledging that Patapsco Bank had the right to collect the rents; however, she informed the tenants that she would be unable to maintain the properties without rental income.

Ms. Smith-Scott instructed the tenants to remit their rent payments directly to her. On July 18, 2015, Patapsco Bank filed a Motion for Civil Contempt and Sanctions noting Ms. Smith-Scott’s efforts to obstruct Patapsco Bank’s rent collection. Patapsco Bank asserted that Ms. Smith-Scott continued to use rent payments in violation of the October 29 Order. Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition on July 20, 2015. 11 Patapsco Bank sent a second letter to Ms. Smith-Scott’s tenants on July 31, 2015, directing them to remit their rental payments to a property management company, Summerfield Investment Group, LLC.

On August 3, 2015, Ms. Smith-Scott sent another letter to the tenants falsely stating that Patapsco Bank did not have a court order to collect the rent; again, she directed the tenants to remit the rent payments directly to her. Ms. Smith-Scott directed the tenants to call 9-1-1 if any person came to the properties to collect the rents. Patapsco Bank filed a supplement to its earlier Motion for Civil Contempt and Sanctions on August 6, 2015. Ms. Smith-Scott, without authorization from the Bankruptcy Court or the Trustee, filed a lawsuit against Patapsco Bank (“Patapsco Bank Action”) in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on August 14, 2015.

See Smith-Scott v. Patapsco Bank, Case No. CAL15-20704. Because Ms. Smith-Scott’s complaint related to allegations and events occurring prior to the filing of her bankruptcy petition, the Patapsco Bank Action became a part of the bankruptcy estate; therefore, it fell under the exclusive control of the Trustee. The Trustee filed a Motion to Intervene as the real party in interest on November 25, 2015. The circuit court granted the Trustee’s motion, and the Trustee and Patapsco Bank settled the matter by stipulation. 12 On August 31, 2015, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the April 7 Conversion Order and the June 22 Order permitting Patapsco Bank to foreclose.9 Howard Bank, successor-in-interest to Patapsco Bank, filed an opposition on September 14, 2015.

In response to Ms. Smith-Scott’s failure to attend the rescheduled § 341 meeting of creditors, the Trustee filed, on September 2, 2015, a Motion for Order Compelling Debtor to Attend Rescheduled Meeting of Creditors. The Trustee requested that the court compel Ms. Smith-Scott’s attendance at another rescheduled meeting set for October 22, 2015. Ms. Smith-Scott filed a response on September 21, 2015, in which she alleged her case should not have been converted to Chapter 7 and that U.S. Bank did not hold the mortgage for 10 Stanley Drive based on a defect in the chain of title.10 Her response did not address the Trustee’s request to compel her presence at the October 22 meeting of creditors. The Bankruptcy Court granted the Trustee’s motion on September 24, 2015 (“September 24 Order”) and ordered Ms. Smith-Scott’s attendance at the October 22 meeting.

Nevertheless, Ms. Smith-Scott failed to appear. Indeed, after the April 7 Conversion Order, Ms. Smith-Scott refused to attend any of the required meetings of creditors. On September 29, 2015, on the Trustee’s motion, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order (“September 29 Order”) compelling Ms. Smith-Scott to turn over the following to the Trustee within ten days: (1) copies of all leases identified on Schedules E and G of the 9 The hearing judge’s findings of fact indicate a “June 23” order, but the circuit court entered its order permitting Patapsco Bank to foreclose on June 22, 2015—i.e., the June 22 Order. 10 Ms. Smith-Scott continued to assert this second argument despite the U.S. District Court’s ruling to the contrary. See supra at 6. 13 bankruptcy petition;11 (2) bank records showing the accounts where each of the tenants’ security deposits were deposited and subsequent bank statements to the present; (3) the tenants’ security deposits plus 3% interest; (4) the records showing each client of Strategic Law Group, amount and dates of legal services rendered constituting the pre-petition accounts receivable; (5) accounting, plus bank records, showing all of Ms. Smith-Scott’s collection or other receipts of pre-petition accounts receivable from September 28, 2014 to April 7, 2015; (6) accounting, plus bank records, showing all of Ms. Smith-Scott’s collection or other receipts of pre-petition accounts receivable from April 7, 2015 to the present; (7) copies of Ms. Smith-Scott’s 2013 federal and Maryland income tax returns; (8) copies of the 2014 federal and Maryland income tax returns; and (9) the pro rata portion (74%) of the total amount in 2014 tax refunds.

Ms. Smith-Scott provided her residential 11 “Schedules” in a bankruptcy petition indicate all assets, liabilities, and other information about a debtor for an accounting of what will become the bankruptcy estate. In 2015, at the time Ms. Smith-Scott filed her petition, Schedule E required debtors to list “Creditors Holding Unsecured Priority Claims,” and Schedule G required debtors to list “Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases.” See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Schedule E - Creditors Holding Unsecured Priority Claims (Superseded), https://www.uscourts.gov/forms/bankruptcy-forms/schedule-e-creditors-holding- unsecured-priority-claims (last visited June 26, 2020) archived at https://perma.cc/4QSF- VPSX; Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Schedule G - Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases (Superseded), https://www.uscourts.gov/forms/bankruptcy- forms/schedule-g-executory-contracts-and-unexpired-leases (last visited June 26, 2020) archived at https://perma.cc/Y8EY-X29M. Schedule E/F (“Creditors Who Have Unsecured Claims”) replaced the superseded Schedules E and G on December 1, 2015. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Schedule E/F: Creditors Who Have Unsecured Claims (Individuals), https://www.uscourts.gov/forms/individual- debtors/schedule-ef-creditors-who-have-unsecured-claims-individuals (last visited June 26, 2020) archived at https://perma.cc/LFN8-ZWPU. 14 leases and 2013 tax returns, but failed to turn over the remaining documentation ordered by the Bankruptcy Court.

On October 1, 2015, the Trustee filed a Motion for Sale of 10 Stanley Drive Free and Clear of Liens and Encumbrances. Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition and, again, asserted that U.S. Bank did not hold the mortgage for 10 Stanley Drive. The Trustee’s reply contended that Ms. Smith-Scott lacked standing to oppose the sale because the property had no equity and Ms. Smith-Scott was insolvent. The Bankruptcy Court heard arguments on November 5, 2015.

Before the hearing, the Trustee explained to Ms. Smith- Scott that she did not have standing to oppose the sale and that Ms. Smith-Scott’s accusations of fraud on the part of U.S. Bank were irrelevant to the validity of the mortgage. During the hearing, the Bankruptcy Court advised Ms. Smith-Scott that she lacked standing to challenge the sale of 10 Stanley Drive. The Bankruptcy Court granted the Trustee’s motion on November 6, 2015 (“November 6 Order”). Meanwhile, the U.S. District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s April 7 Conversion Order on October 8, 2015.

See Smith-Scott v. Patapsco Bank, Case No. 1:15- cv-01013-RDB. The U.S. District Court’s written opinion noted that, “the record in this case is replete with cause for conversion” and the Bankruptcy Court’s “findings of fact were not clearly erroneous.” The U.S. District Court continued, “the evidence in this case clearly supports [the bankruptcy court’s] findings that [Ms.] Smith-Scott is not competent to administer her case.” (First alteration in original). That same day, Ms. Smith-Scott filed an Amended Motion to Alter or Amend the Bankruptcy Court’s April 7 Conversion Order—the very order the U.S. District Court affirmed on appeal. Again, Ms. Smith-Scott 15 reiterated the same argument that U.S. Bank did not hold the mortgage for 10 Stanley Drive.

The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion on November 6, 2015 (“November 6 Denial”). On November 6, 2015, Ms. Smith-Scott appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s November 6 Order and November 6 Denial to the U.S. District Court. See Smith-Scott v. Howard Bank, et al., Case No. 1:15-cv-03423-RDB. During the pendency of the appeal, on November 17, 2015, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Motion to Reconsider November 6 Order.

On November 23, 2015, on the Trustee’s motion, the Bankruptcy Court struck Ms. Smith- Scott’s motion (“November 23 Order”) because it concerned “the same Order that [Ms. Smith-Scott] previously appealed to the United States District Court.” On November 17, 2015, the Trustee filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal in the U.S. District Court. See Case No. 1:15-cv-03423-RDB. Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition. The U.S. District Court granted the Trustee’s motion on March 18, 2016, affirmed the April 7 Conversion Order, and affirmed the November 6 Denial.

In its memorandum opinion, the U.S. District Court found that Ms. Smith-Scott lacked standing to challenge the sale of 10 Stanley Drive, and that “there [] remains substantial evidence supporting the issuance of the [April 7] Conversion Order and [the Bankruptcy Court’s] decision to uphold it.” (Alteration in original). On March 22, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the U.S. District Court’s ruling in part and dismissed the appeal in part on August 8, 2016. On November 22, 2015, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Motion to Remove Chapter 7 Trustee for Cause.

Ms. Smith-Scott alleged that the Trustee neglected his duties by 16 declining to investigate Ms. Smith-Scott’s claims against U.S. Bank and that the Trustee “purposely and knowingly conceal[ed] fraud” on the part of U.S. Bank. On November 25, 2015, before the Trustee could respond, the Bankruptcy Court denied the motion (“November 25 Order”) stating, “the motion has no merit whatsoever. No hearing is required.” That same day, Ms. Smith-Scott filed an appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s November 23 Order and November 25 Order. See Smith-Scott v. Liebmann, Case No. 1:15- cv-03637-RDB.

The Trustee filed a Motion to Dismiss on February 3, 2016. Ms. Smith- Scott did not file an opposition. The U.S. District Court entered an order on March 18, 2016 dismissing the appeal and affirming the November 25 Order. In its memorandum opinion, the U.S. District Court determined that the November 25 Order was not a final appealable order; therefore, it was not properly before the U.S. District Court and required dismissal.

The U.S. District Court further concluded that Ms. Smith-Scott’s appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s November 6 Order divested the Bankruptcy Court of jurisdiction to adjudicate her November 17 Motion to Reconsider. Ultimately, the U.S. District Court held that, “[w]ithout jurisdiction over the issue, [the Bankruptcy Court] properly struck [Ms. Smith-Scott’s] Motion to Reconsider.” (First and second alterations in original). The Trustee filed a Motion for Approval of Settlement and Compromise with Howard Bank on November 25, 2015. Ms. Smith-Scott did not file an opposition.

The Bankruptcy Court granted the Trustee’s motion on January 4, 2016 (“January 4 Order”). Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the January 4 Order on April 25, 2016. The Trustee filed an opposition. On September 26, 2016, the Bankruptcy Court denied 17 Ms. Smith-Scott’s motion, explaining that Ms. Smith-Scott failed to meet “the initial threshold for consideration [of the motion] pursuant to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] Rule 60(b).” (Alteration in original).

On December 21, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court found Ms. Smith-Scott in civil contempt for violating its October 29 Order, which prohibited Ms. Smith-Scott from using cash collateral. In response, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Motion to Recuse Judge Schneider on January 5, 2016, contending that Judge Schneider was partial and biased against her. The Trustee and United States Trustee—who had not participated in the case until this point— filed oppositions. Ms. Smith-Scott filed on May 16, 2016 a supplement to her Motion to Recuse.

The Bankruptcy Court issued an order on March 22, 2016 requiring Ms. Smith-Scott and Strategic Law Group to vacate the Laurel Properties on or before April 1, 2016 (“March 22 Order”). Ms. Smith Scott defied the March 22 Order and refused to vacate 367 Main Street. On April 12, 2016, Mr. Shively went to the Laurel Properties with a locksmith to change the locks. There, Mr. Shively encountered two Strategic Law Group employees; he informed them that they needed to vacate the property immediately.

One employee called Ms. Smith-Scott, who instructed the employees to stay in the office despite Mr. Shively’s instructions. Mr. Shively then told the employees that they had three days to vacate the property. Later that month, without notice or authorization from the Trustee, Ms. Smith-Scott changed the locks to her law office. On April 13, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott, on behalf of Strategic Law Group, filed an “Emergency Injunctive Relief as to and [sic] Motion to Alter and/or Amend Order dated 18 March 24, 2016.” Ms. Smith-Scott argued that the court did not have jurisdiction over Strategic Law Group and could not force it to vacate 367 Main Street.

The Trustee countered that the ownership of Strategic Law Group is an asset of the bankruptcy estate and the law firm had not paid rent in over a year to the detriment of the estate and the secured party. On April 19, 2016, as a result of Ms. Smith-Scott’s failure to vacate 367 Main Street in violation of the March 22 Order, the Trustee filed a Motion for Civil Contempt and Sanctions. Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition on May 5, 2016. Ms. Smith-Scott accused Mr. Shively of engaging in criminal conduct in an effort to secure possession of 367 Main Street.

On April 25, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a second Motion to Remove Chapter 7 Trustee. Both the Trustee and the U.S. Trustee filed oppositions. The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on May 16, 2016 where it found Ms. Smith- Scott in civil contempt of its March 22 Order and warned Ms. Smith-Scott that continued contempt may result in her incarceration (the “May 16 Contempt Order”). The Bankruptcy Court ordered that Ms. Smith-Scott pay the Trustee, within ten days, the following: $612 in locksmith costs and $100 per day from April 1, 2016 until she vacated 367 Main Street.

Ms. Smith-Scott did not pay the sanctions. Further, despite the contempt finding, Ms. Smith-Scott refused to vacate 367 Main Street. On May 19, 2016, the Trustee filed a Notice of Non-Compliance alerting the Bankruptcy Court of Ms. Smith-Scott’s continued refusal to comply with the March 22 Order. Ms. Smith-Scott noted an appeal of the May 16 Contempt Order to the U.S. District Court on May 20, 2016.

See Smith-Scott v. Howard Bank, et al., 1:16-cv-01572-RDB. In 19 her brief, Ms. Smith-Scott accused Mr. Shively of committing perjury during the May 16 hearing, alleged the Bankruptcy Court was violating her Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment by threatening incarceration, alleged a number of constitutional violations, and argued that “the Trial Court abused its discretion by failing to rule on [Ms. Smith-Scott’s] Motion to Recuse while allowing perjury and mortgage fraud to take place which would lead an objective observer to question the judge’s impartiality.” On September 20, 2016, the U.S. District Court affirmed the May 16 Contempt Order and dismissed Ms. Smith-Scott’s appeal. The U.S. District Court’s opinion rejected all of Ms. Smith-Scott’s arguments and held that Ms. Smith-Scott, “cites no facts which would support her [perjury] contentions but appears to rely upon the sheer audacity of her allegations” and that her allegations are “contradicted by signed submissions to the Court by counsel for [the Trustee.]” Concerning the Eighth Amendment challenge, the U.S. District Court held “[t]o be clear: [Ms. Smith-Scott] has not been incarcerated in conjunction with this case, and her Brief does not allege that she was . . . . [Ms. Smith- Scott’s] claim that her Eighth Amendment rights have been violated is premature.” (Ellipsis in original). On the judicial recusal challenge, the U.S. District Court held that Ms. Smith-Scott “cites no action or conflict which would warrant judicial disqualification—indeed, she alleges no facts involving Judge Schneider at all—but, again, relies only upon the audacity of her allegations.” As of June 8, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott still refused to vacate 367 Main Street, causing the Trustee to file a Second Notice of Non-Compliance with Contempt Order.

On June 20, 20 2016, the U.S. Trustee filed an Adversary Complaint against Ms. Smith-Scott. The U.S. Trustee requested an order denying discharge of Ms. Smith-Scott’s debts on the grounds that she (1) refused to comply with the court’s September 24 Order; (2) transferred and concealed estate property, i.e., the Patapsco Bank rents; (3) refused to comply with the court’s September 29 Order; (4) refused to comply with the court’s March 22 Order, and (5) intended to delay the Trustee’s administration of the estate by filing the Patapsco Bank Action. The Trustee filed a Motion to Sell 511 Main Street free and clear of liens and encumbrances on June 17, 2016. Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition.

On July 22, 2016, the Bankruptcy Court granted the Trustee’s motion. By June 27, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott still refused to vacate 367 Main Street, causing the Trustee to file a Third Notice of Non- Compliance with Turnover Order and with Contempt Order. On July 8, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court against the Trustee, Mr. Shively, and their law firm, Liebmann and Shively, P.A. (collectively, “Defendants”).

The case was ultimately transferred to the Bankruptcy Court. In her complaint, Ms. Smith-Scott alleged that during the May 16 contempt hearing, Mr. Shively made four “negligent and willful misrepresentations” to the Bankruptcy Court intending to obtain a favorable ruling. She sought relief in the form of punitive damages in the amount of “$10,000 for each statement and from each Defendant.” Additionally, Ms. Smith-Scott falsely alleged that the Trustee engaged in unlawful entry and trespass when he changed the locks to her law office on April 12, 2016. Ms. Smith-Scott sought further damages in the amount of $215 to “re-key the lock” to her law office and punitive damages in the 21 amount of “$10,000 from each Defendant.” Ms. Smith-Scott’s complaint included several other unsubstantiated charges against the Trustee, Mr. Shively, and their law firm.

The Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on July 27, 2016. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to respond; therefore, the U.S. District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice on September 15, 2016. Also on July 8, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Motion to Withdraw Bankruptcy Case to the U.S. District Court requesting the U.S. District Court to take complete jurisdiction over her bankruptcy case. Ms. Smith-Scott claimed that she had “proven that the Chapter 7 Trustee has perjured himself in the United States Bankruptcy Court” and has “breached [his] fiduciary duty to the unsecured creditors.” (Alteration in original).

Ms. Smith-Scott made several arguments that her constitutional rights had been violated. On July 22, 2016, the Trustee filed an opposition. On September 29, 2017, the U.S. District Court denied the motion, noting that Ms. Smith-Scott moved to withdraw her case “a full twenty-one months after she voluntarily commenced the case in the bankruptcy court . . . where there were over 400 docket entries in the case, including three unsuccessful appeals to the District Court.” (Ellipsis in original). The U.S. District Court held that Ms. Smith-Scott’s motion “could be denied on timeliness grounds alone,” that her complaint was “devoid of claims premised on other federal laws,” and that the motion “appears to be an attempt by [Ms. Smith-Scott] to find a more favorable forum for her claims.” As of July 19, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott still refused to vacate 367 Main Street, causing the Trustee to file a Fourth Notice of Non-Compliance with Turnover Order and with Contempt Order.

On July 22, 2016, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order on its own 22 accord (“July 22 Order”) directing the U.S. Marshal to assist the Trustee in securing the property. The Bankruptcy Court’s order found: [Ms.] Smith-Scott, the debtor and a member of the bar of this Court, has failed and refused to comply with the lawful orders of this Court. It is apparent from the Trustee’s motion, notices of non-compliance and the record that the debtor is willfully disregarding court orders and refusing to allow the Trustee to undertake his statutory function to administer the assets of the estate. Ms. Smith-Scott, that same day, noted an appeal of the July 22 Order to the U.S. District Court directing the U.S. Marshal to assist the Trustee and the order approving the sale of 511 Main Street.

See Smith-Scott v. Liebmann, Case No. 1:16-cv-02658-GLR. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to file an appellate brief; therefore, the U.S. District Court dismissed the appeal on December 27, 2016. On August 11, 2016, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order denying Ms. Smith- Scott’s Motion to Recuse Judge (“August 11 Order”) and held, “the debtor’s allegations of bias are nothing more than ‘unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation’” and that “her dissatisfaction with the results obtained in the instant case does not entitle her to a change of judge.” The Bankruptcy Court entered another order on September 1, 2016, denying Ms. Smith-Scott’s second Motion to Remove Trustee (“September 1 Order”) and remarked, “the debtor has opposed every action by the Chapter 7 Trustee to administer this case. . . [t]he instant motion to remove the Trustee is without merit.” (Ellipsis and alterations in original). On September 6, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott noted an appeal to the U.S. District Court of the August 11 Order and September 1 Order.

Ms. Smith-Scott failed 23 to file the requisite appellate pleadings. On August 15, 2017, on the Trustee’s motion, the U.S. District Court dismissed the appeal. After the issuance of these orders, Mr. Shively, with the assistance of three Deputy U.S. Marshals, went to 367 Main Street to secure possession. The Strategic Law Group employees Mr. Shively encountered on April 12 were present at the office.

After making a phone call, the employees refused to vacate the premises. The U.S. Marshals advised the employees that they would be handcuffed; ultimately, the employees vacated the property. U.S. Marshals and the property manager packed the contents of Ms. Smith-Scott’s law office and moved the packed boxes to a parking lot behind the building. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Smith-Scott arrived with a moving truck.

Mr. Shively observed Ms. Smith-Scott load all the items from the parking lot into the moving truck and drive away. On January 23, 2017, the Bankruptcy Court entered summary judgment in favor of the U.S. Trustee in the Adversary Proceeding and found that “the Debtor in this case, did willfully disobey lawful Orders of this Court.” The Bankruptcy Court further entered a judgment denying Ms. Smith-Scott’s discharge (“Denial of Discharge Order”). On January 30, 2017, Ms. Smith-Scott again appealed the Denial of Discharge Order to the U.S. District Court. See Smith-Scott v. U.S. Trustee, Case No. 17-cv-00267-ELH.

The U.S. District Court affirmed the Denial of Discharge Order on January 25, 2018. Ms. Smith- Scott filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The Trustee filed a Motion of Sale of 367 Main Street on April 11, 2017 and an amendment thereto on April 26, 2017. Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition.

On June 11, 2017 the Bankruptcy Court approved the Trustee’s sale of 367 Main Street (“June 11 24 Order”). On June 27, 2017, Ms. Smith-Scott filed an untimely appeal to the U.S. District Court of the June 11 Order. On August 22, 2017, on the Trustee’s motion, the U.S. District Court dismissed the appeal due its untimeliness and Ms. Smith-Scott’s failure to file the required appellate pleadings. The U.S. Trustee approved the Trustee’s final accounting and final notice was sent to all parties on August 31, 2017.

Bar Counsel Investigation I Bar Counsel wrote to Ms. Smith-Scott on September 23, 2016 and requested an explanation by October 14, 2016 for her failure to comply with the Bankruptcy Court’s March 22 Order. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to respond to Bar Counsel in any manner. On October 18, 2016, Bar Counsel again wrote to Ms. Smith-Scott and requested a response to its September 23 letter within ten days. Ms. Smith-Scott informed Bar Counsel on November 4, 2016, by telephone, that she would hand-deliver a response on November 7, 2016.

Ms. Smith-Scott failed to do so. Bar Counsel notified Ms. Smith-Scott on December 6, 2016 that the matter had been docketed for further investigation and requested a response to the September 23 and October 18 letters by December 21, 2016. Ms. Smith-Scott submitted a response to Bar Counsel on January 17, 2017, wherein she knowingly and intentionally misrepresented the following: “The Chapter 7 Trustee began to sale [sic] property by omitting facts and misrepresenting other facts, which caused the Bankruptcy Judge to rule in [the Chapter 7 Trustee’s] favor which included an order of contempt and being threatened with 25 incarceration.” Ms. Smith-Scott provided no other explanation for the Bankruptcy Court’s contempt finding or her refusal to comply with the March 22 Order. Representation of Crystal Combs Ms. Crystal Combs retained Ms. Smith-Scott and Strategic Law Group in October 2015.

Ms. Combs sought to remove her ex-husband’s name from the deed to her home (“2603 Vicarage Court”). At that time, Bank of America held the mortgage to the home, which was in default. However, Bank of America offered Ms. Combs a loan modification on the condition that Ms. Combs’ ex-husband—since his name remained on the deed— either become a party to the modification or his name be removed from the deed. Ms. Combs agreed to pay Ms. Smith-Scott on an hourly basis, at the rate of $225 per hour.

On October 14, 2015, Ms. Combs paid Ms. Smith-Scott $2,500 for the representation. Of that, $1,000 was for legal services Ms. Smith-Scott had already provided. The remaining $1,500 constituted a retainer against which Ms. Smith-Scott would bill future legal services. Ms. Combs paid Ms. Smith-Scott by credit card; Ms. Smith-Scott entered the credit card number in Square and charged the card.12 Ms. Smith- Scott failed to deposit and maintain the funds in an attorney trust account until earned for fees or used for expenses.

Ms. Smith-Scott failed to obtain Ms. Combs’ informed consent in writing to deposit the funds in an account other than an attorney trust account. On May 19, 2016, at Ms. Smith-Scott’s request, Ms. Combs’ paid an additional $1,850 towards the representation by credit card. Therefore, by May 18, 2016, Ms. Combs 12 “Square” is a credit card processing service. 26 had paid Ms. Smith-Scott a total of $4,350. However, at no time during the representation of Ms. Combs did Ms. Smith-Scott provide an invoice reflecting how such fees were incurred.

Ms. Smith-Scott successfully removed Ms. Combs’ ex-husband from the 2603 Vicarage Court deed and Ms. Combs successfully completed her Bank of America loan modification. At the time Ms. Combs retained Ms. Smith-Scott, Ms. Combs also owned an investment property (“9904 Doubletree Lane”). Ms. Combs was defending a foreclosure action against this property in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. See Brown, et al. v. Combs, Case No. CAE10-20522.

On August 9, 2016, the circuit court entered an order permitting the secured creditor to proceed with the foreclosure (“Foreclosure Order”). On August 12, 2016, Ms. Combs retained Ms. Smith-Scott to represent her in the foreclosure action. That same day, Ms. Smith-Scott entered her appearance and filed an Emergency Motion to Reconsider the Foreclosure Order. The secured creditor scheduled a foreclosure sale for September 13, 2016.

On August 26, 2016, prior to the circuit court’s adjudication of the Emergency Motion to Reconsider, Ms. Smith-Scott appealed the Foreclosure Order to the Court of Special Appeals. Ms. Smith-Scott explained to Ms. Combs that an appeal of the Foreclosure Order would delay the foreclosure. With the Notice of Appeal, Ms. Smith- Scott filed in the circuit court a Motion to Stay the proceeding pending appeal. On September 7, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott filed an unsigned Civil Appeal Information Report in the Court of Special Appeals.

On September 21, 2016, the Clerk of the Court of Special Appeals requested Ms. Smith-Scott provide a signed copy of the report. Ms. Smith-Scott 27 failed to respond and otherwise failed to pursue Ms. Combs’ appeal in any manner. The Court of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal on November 15, 2016. Ms. Combs agreed to pay Ms. Smith-Scott on an hourly basis for her representation in the circuit court and Court of Special Appeals.

On August 15, 2016, Ms. Combs paid Ms. Smith-Scott $1,000 by credit card. Ms. Combs paid another $500 by credit card on August 25, 2016. Ms. Combs provided Ms. Smith-Scott with the credit card number either over the phone or in person. Ms. Smith-Scott and Ms. Combs did not execute a written retainer agreement for the representation.

At no point throughout the representation or at its conclusion did Ms. Smith-Scott provide Ms. Combs with an invoice reflecting the legal fees that Ms. Combs incurred. In early September 2016, with the September 13, 2016 foreclosure sale looming, Ms. Combs elected to file for bankruptcy. On September 12, 2016, Ms. Combs retained Ms. Smith-Scott to represent her in the bankruptcy proceedings and agreed to pay a flat fee of $4,200 for the representation. That same day, Ms. Combs met with Ms. Smith-Scott and made an initial payment of $1,500 by credit card.

Ms. Smith-Scott advised Ms. Combs that once Ms. Combs paid the bankruptcy filing fee, which she agreed to pay in four monthly installments of $75 dollars, Ms. Combs could pay the remainder of Ms. Smith- Scott’s legal fee. Ms. Combs paid the $300 bankruptcy filing fee. On September 12, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Voluntary Chapter 13 Petition in the Bankruptcy Court on behalf of Ms. Combs. See In re: Crystal A. Combs, Case No. 16-22230.

That same day, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Disclosure of Compensation of Attorney for Debtor, which disclosed the fee arrangement Ms. Smith-Scott reached with Ms. Combs. 28 On October 7, 2016, the secured creditor for 9904 Doubletree Lane moved for relief from the automatic stay. On October 17, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition to the motion and the Bankruptcy Court scheduled a hearing for November 3, 2016. Prior to the hearing date, Ms. Smith-Scott misinformed Ms. Combs that the hearing had been rescheduled and that she need not appear on November 3. However, the hearing had not been rescheduled.

The Bankruptcy Court held the November 3 hearing and neither Ms. Smith-Scott nor Ms. Combs appeared. The Bankruptcy Court granted the secured creditor’s motion to lift the automatic stay on November 10, 2016. The Bankruptcy Court entered the order on November 14, 2016, permitting the secured creditor to proceed with foreclosure proceedings. Ms. Combs received a copy of the Bankruptcy Court’s order and immediately requested Ms. Smith- Scott file a Motion for Reconsideration.

Ms. Smith-Scott agreed to file the motion. Before December 12, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott represented to Ms. Combs that she had filed the Motion for Reconsideration when she had not. On December 12, 2016, believing Ms. Smith-Scott filed the motion, Ms. Combs emailed Ms. Smith-Scott and inquired whether the court had issued a ruling. On December 28, 2016—six weeks after the Bankruptcy Court lifted the automatic stay—Ms. Smith-Scott filed an untimely Emergency Motion for Reconsideration.

Ms. Smith-Scott filed an Amended Emergency Motion on January 4, 2017. On January 9, 2017, the Bankruptcy Court denied Ms. Smith-Scott’s Amended Emergency Motion (“January 9 Order”). Respondent then filed an appeal of the January 9 Order to the U.S. District Court. Yet, before Ms. Smith-Scott could complete any 29 substantive work, Ms. Combs elected to dismiss the appeal.

On January 17, 2017, 9904 Doubletree Lane sold at a foreclosure sale. On February 1, 2017, the secured creditor filed a Report of Sale in the circuit court foreclosure action. On February 2, 2017, Ms. Smith- Scott filed Exceptions to the Foreclosure Sale. Ms. Combs met with Ms. Smith-Scott at her law office on February 2, 2017.

At Ms. Smith-Scott’s request, Ms. Combs paid $2,500 toward the $4,200 flat fee for the bankruptcy representation by credit card. Therefore, by February 2, Ms. Combs had paid $4,000 of the agreed upon $4,200 flat fee. Bankruptcy Rule 2016(b) obligated Ms. Smith- Scott to inform the Bankruptcy Court of her receipt of additional legal fees, yet she failed to do so. At the February 2 meeting, Ms. Smith-Scott presented Ms. Combs with an invoice for services purportedly rendered.

Ms. Combs reviewed the invoice and noticed inaccuracies. Ms. Combs requested Ms. Smith-Scott send a corrected invoice via email. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to do so. In February 2017, Ms. Combs and Ms. Smith-Scott began to disagree about the most effective legal strategy to reclaim 9904 Doubletree Lane.

Ms. Combs acquired sufficient funds to reclaim the property and asked Ms. Smith-Scott to request permission from the circuit court to deposit the funds in the court’s escrow account. Ms. Combs expressed a desire to make the request promptly—i.e., before the circuit court ratified the foreclosure sale. In an email on February 18, 2017, Ms. Combs memorialized her request and suggested that Ms. Smith-Scott withdraw her appearance in the foreclosure action if she declined to take the requested action. That same day, Ms. Smith-Scott notified Ms. Combs 30 by email that she would be withdrawing her appearance in both the foreclosure and bankruptcy actions.

On February 21, 2017, unsure whether Ms. Smith-Scott continued to represent her, Ms. Combs emailed Ms. Smith-Scott and alerted her to filing deadlines in the pending bankruptcy appeal and a scheduled hearing in Bankruptcy Court. Ms. Smith-Scott agreed to attend the hearing and stated to Ms. Combs, “I will need to be paid and I am withdrawing from both cases.” Ms. Combs did not know how much she owed Ms. Smith-Scott because she never received a revised invoice. Ms. Combs sent Ms. Smith-Scott a second email on February 21 and requested that she dismiss the bankruptcy case and withdraw her appearance in the foreclosure action. On February 22, 2017, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Motion to Dismiss Voluntary Chapter 13 Case in the bankruptcy action.

The next day the Bankruptcy Court dismissed and closed Ms. Combs’ bankruptcy action. On February 23, 2017, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Line striking her appearance in Ms. Combs’ foreclosure action. On February 22, 2017, Ms. Smith-Scott emailed Ms. Combs two invoices. The invoices showed that Ms. Combs owed Ms. Smith-Scott a total of $4,986.13.

Ms. Smith- Scott’s email further informed Ms. Combs that she had an outstanding balance of $1,686.13 and an additional $3,300 in legal fees had accrued. The first invoice, labeled “Invoice #23,” was dated February 1, 2017 and contained twenty-six entries. Most of the entries pertained to Ms. Smith-Scott’s work on the bankruptcy action, for which Ms. Smith-Scott had already been paid $4,000 of the $4,200 total fee. Invoice #23 incorrectly reflected that on February 1, 2017, Ms. Combs paid (1) $216.25 toward the balance; and (2) $2,283.76 31 toward another invoice, Invoice #22.

Ms. Smith-Scott acknowledged to the hearing judge below that Invoice #23 was entirely inaccurate. Likewise, Ms. Combs never owed Ms. Smith-Scott the $1,686.13 balance. The second invoice attached to Ms. Smith-Scott’s email, labeled “Invoice #31,” was dated February 22, 2017 and contained entries related to the bankruptcy appeal in the U.S. District Court. Despite agreeing to represent Ms. Combs on appeal for a flat fee, Invoice #31 contained hourly billing entries for work purportedly performed on the appeal.

However, as noted supra, Ms. Combs elected to dismiss the appeal before Ms. Smith-Scott undertook any substantive work. Prior to sending Invoice #31, Ms. Smith-Scott never informed Ms. Combs that she would charge on an hourly basis if Ms. Combs chose not to pursue the appeal. The billing entries in Invoice #31 were not accurate and Ms. Combs did not owe the $3,300 balance to Ms. Smith-Scott. Ms. Combs reviewed these invoices and emailed Ms. Smith-Scott on February 23, 2017 at 6:13 a.m., to express her concern that they contained inaccuracies and failed to account for previous payments.

At 7:55 a.m., Ms. Smith-Scott, without having addressed any of Ms. Combs’ concerns, charged Ms. Combs’ credit card through Square in the amount of $4,986.13. Twenty minutes later, Ms. Smith-Scott responded to Ms. Combs’ email. Ms. Smith-Scott made several threatening statements to Ms. Combs and threatened to disclose confidential information about Ms. Combs to adverse parties. Ms. Smith- Scott’s email concluded by stating, “But, don’t call me or prevent my payment in full.

We all have a day of reckoning!” 32 The hearing judge acknowledged that the issue of whether Ms. Combs authorized Ms. Smith-Scott to charge her credit card presents two separate, but related questions. First, did Ms. Combs give Ms. Smith-Scott her credit card information on February 23, 2017? Second, did Ms. Combs authorize payment in the amount of $4,986.13 on February 23, 2017? On the first question, the hearing judge found for Ms. Smith-Scott, i.e., that there lacked clear and convincing evidence to show that Ms. Smith-Scott converted Ms. Combs’ credit card number.

On the second question, the hearing judge found that clear and convincing evidence supported Bar Counsel’s account that Ms. Combs did not authorize payment in the amount of $4,986.13. On February 27, 2017, Ms. Combs disputed the charge with her bank, Wells Fargo. That same day, Wells Fargo returned the full amount to Ms. Combs’ account and notified Ms. Smith-Scott of the dispute. Wells Fargo conducted an investigation into the disputed charge.

As part of the investigation, Ms. Smith-Scott submitted a written explanation to the bank (“Wells Fargo Letter”) in which she stated that Ms. Combs gave verbal authorization over the phone to make the charge. With the Wells Fargo Letter, Ms. Smith- Scott attached Invoice #23 and Invoice #31 for support, despite knowing the inaccuracies in each invoice. Neither invoice reflected the $4,000 Ms. Combs had already paid toward the bankruptcy case. Moreover, the hearing judge credited Ms. Combs’ testimony that she spoke to Ms. Smith-Scott by telephone on February 28, 2017, and expressly informed her that she did not authorize a charge in the amount of $4,986.13.

After the call, Ms. Combs emailed Ms. Smith-Scott and requested an invoice “on any unpaid balance as of” February 28, 2017. Ms. Combs stated, “[i]t is still my intent and desire to come to an agreement and 33 conclusion on this matter.” (Alteration in original). On March 1, 2017, Ms. Smith-Scott emailed Ms. Combs and threatened to put her into an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding so that she could get paid as a creditor. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to provide Ms. Combs with a revised invoice in response to Ms. Combs’ earlier requests.

On April 12, 2017, Ms. Combs paid Ms. Smith-Scott the remaining $200 installment toward the $4,200 bankruptcy fee by money order. Ms. Combs testified that she made the final installment payment because she wanted to make a good faith attempt to fulfill her end of the contract with Ms. Smith-Scott to pay $4,200 for the bankruptcy representation. At the time Ms. Combs made the $200 payment, Wells Fargo had returned the $4,986.13 to Ms. Combs’ account based on the February 27 dispute. However, after the investigation, Wells Fargo ultimately resolved the dispute in Ms. Smith-Scott’s favor.

Consequently, Wells Fargo removed $4,986.13 from Ms. Combs’ account on May 18, 2017. On April 16, 2017, Ms. Smith-Scott sent Ms. Combs a letter acknowledging the $200 payment. In the letter, Ms. Smith-Scott advised that, while Ms. Combs did not owe any legal fees, she intended to keep the $200. In part, the letter read: However, due to your attempt at disputing your payment and the hardship that I had to endure, the Two Hundred Dollars will be used to cover the expense of protecting myself from your manipulative behavior.

Ms. Smith-Scott never returned the $200 to Ms. Combs. Ms. Smith-Scott testified that, despite the inaccuracies in Invoice #23 and Invoice #31, Ms. Combs still owed at least $4,986.13 in unpaid legal fees, and that she communicated that balance to Ms. Combs. The hearing judge did not credit this testimony. In rejecting Ms. Smith-Scott’s testimony, the hearing judge noted that (1) Ms. Smith-Scott 34 did not present any documentary evidence to support her contention that Ms. Combs owed $4,986.13; (2) much of Ms. Smith-Scott’s testimony regarding her billing of Ms. Combs was contradicted by other testimony, the documentary record, or her statements to Bar Counsel during its investigation; and (3) Ms. Smith-Scott admitted at the hearing that, were she to do it all over again, she would have handled the billing of Ms. Combs’ account differently.

Specifically, the hearing judge discussed this example: [Ms. Smith-Scott] testified at the hearing that Ms. Combs gave her explicit permission to charge her credit card in the amount of $4,986.13 and that Ms. Combs understood that the payment was “conditional.” But there is no contemporaneous evidence indicating that [Ms. Smith-Scott] advised Ms. Combs that the $4,986.13 payment was conditional and she never advised Wells Fargo that the disputed payment was “conditional.” Moreover, when given an opportunity to explain herself to Bar Counsel during its investigation, [Ms. Smith-Scott] did not make such a claim. Bar Counsel Investigation II Ms. Combs filed a complaint with the Commission against Ms. Smith-Scott on May 26, 2017. The focus of Ms. Combs’ complaint centered on Ms. Smith-Scott’s unauthorized charge of Ms. Combs’ credit card. Ms. Smith-Scott responded to the complaint on July 5, 2017.

Ms. Smith-Scott attached the Wells Fargo Letter to her response, which included the false representation that Ms. Combs authorized her to charge the credit card in the amount of $4,986.13. The Wells Fargo Letter did not indicate that the charge was conditional. Additionally, Ms. Smith-Scott attached Invoice #23 and Invoice #31, which she knew to be inaccurate. Ms. Smith-Scott’s response to Bar Counsel likewise omitted 35 any representation that Ms. Combs authorized her to charge the credit card in the amount of $4,986.13 or that the charge was “conditional.” Ms. Smith-Scott sought to intentionally mislead Bar Counsel into believing the charge was authorized by submitting the Wells Fargo Letter.

On October 19, 2017, Ms. Smith-Scott submitted a second response to Bar Counsel wherein she intentionally gave Bar Counsel the false impression that the $4,986.13 amount was accurate and owed, despite her knowledge that it was not an accurate figure reflecting legal fees that Ms. Combs owed. Again, Ms. Smith-Scott did not state in the second response that the $4,986.13 charge was somehow “conditional.” Representation of Angela Plater In October 2014, foreclosure proceedings were instituted against Ms. Angela Plater in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. See WBGLMC v. Angela Plater, Case No. CAEF14-27671. The foreclosure action related to Ms. Plater’s home.

As a result, Ms. Plater retained Ms. Smith-Scott to assist in saving the home from foreclosure. Ms. Plater and Ms. Smith-Scott did not execute a written retainer agreement. In early 2015, Ms. Smith-Scott represented Ms. Plater at a foreclosure mediation. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to advise Ms. Plater of the basis or rate of her legal fee prior to the start of the mediation.

At the conclusion of the mediation, Ms. Smith-Scott requested payment from Ms. Plater, which she promptly made. At no point during the representation in the foreclosure action did Ms. Smith-Scott advise Ms. Plater of her hourly rate. The mediation did not result in an agreement. 36 On March 24, 2015, the circuit court entered an order permitting the foreclosure of Ms. Plater’s home. The creditor subsequently scheduled the foreclosure sale for October 20, 2015.

Ms. Plater received notice of the sale and contacted Ms. Smith-Scott to inform her that October 20 was her birthday. Ms. Plater asked that Ms. Smith-Scott assist in postponing the foreclosure so that it would not occur on Ms. Plater’s birthday. To achieve a postponement, Ms. Smith-Scott suggested that Ms. Plater file a bankruptcy petition. Ms. Plater agreed to file for bankruptcy solely for the purpose of delaying the foreclosure sale, but advised Ms. Smith-Scott that she had no intention of pursuing the bankruptcy through to a liquidation or reorganization of her debts.

Ms. Plater further agreed to pay Ms. Smith- Scott a flat fee of $1,500 to file the bankruptcy petition. Ms. Plater met Ms. Smith-Scott at her law office to prepare the bankruptcy petition on October 19, 2015. Aware that Ms. Plater did not actually intend to pursue bankruptcy, Ms. Smith-Scott advised that she could file a “skeleton form.” By “skeleton form,” Ms. Smith-Scott meant that she could file the bare minimum bankruptcy petition and intentionally omit other required documentation. Ms. Smith-Scott advised Ms. Plater that without the required documentation, the Bankruptcy Court would dismiss the petition within two to three weeks.

With Ms. Plater in the office, Ms. Smith-Scott prepared a Disclosure of Compensation of Attorney for Debtor form, 13 in which Ms. Smith-Scott 13 The Disclosure of Compensation of Attorney for Debtor is filed contemporaneously with a bankruptcy petition. In completing the form, an attorney certifies the “compensation paid . . . within one year before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, or agreed to be paid . . . , for services rendered or to be rendered on behalf of the debtor.” See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Disclosure of Compensation of Attorney for 37 represented that Ms. Plater agreed to pay a flat fee of $4,200 for the representation. Ms. Plater questioned Ms. Smith-Scott about the $4,200 figure because it did not comport with her understanding of the agreed upon fee arrangement. Ms. Smith-Scott responded by misrepresenting to Ms. Plater that the form must be submitted to the Bankruptcy Court in that format.

On October 19, 2015, Ms. Plater paid Ms. Smith-Scott $1,500 to file the petition. That same day, Ms. Smith-Scott filed Ms. Plater’s Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. See In re: Angela M. Plater, Case No. 15-24508-TJC. The bankruptcy petition was without substantial justification because Ms. Smith-Scott filed it solely for the purpose of preventing the foreclosure sale from occurring.

Ms. Smith-Scott had no intention of completing the required filings to ensure that the case would move forward. Moreover, Ms. Smith-Scott filed the Disclosure of Compensation of Attorney for Debtor with a knowingly false statement that Ms. Plater agreed to pay a flat fee of $4,200. On October 20, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court notified Ms. Smith-Scott that Ms. Plater’s petition lacked several required documents. The Bankruptcy Court further explained that if the documents were not submitted by November 2, 2015, the case would be dismissed.

Because Ms. Smith-Scott knew that Ms. Plater did not intend to pursue bankruptcy relief, she took no action in response to the notice and did not discuss the notice with Ms. Plater. On November 6, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed Ms. Plater’s Debtor, https://www.uscourts.gov/forms/bankruptcy-forms/disclosure-compensation- attorney-debtor-0 (last visited June 26, 2020) archived at https://perma.cc/636P-YZCG. 38 bankruptcy case for failure to file the required documents. As a result of the dismissal, the automatic stay lifted. Ms. Smith-Scott did not discuss the dismissal with Ms. Plater.

On December 9, 2015, Ms. Smith-Scott entered her appearance in Ms. Plater’s pending foreclosure case. That same day, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Motion to Stay and/or Dismiss the Foreclosure Proceedings. The circuit court denied the Motion on January 5, 2016 because it (1) failed to state a valid defense or present a meritorious argument; (2) was not submitted under oath or supported by affidavit as required by Maryland Rule (“Md. Rule”) 14-211(a)(3)(A); and (3) failed to comply with Md. Rule 14-211(a)(3)(C). Ms. Plater’s home sold at a foreclosure sale on January 5, 2016.

Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Motion to Vacate Foreclosure Sale on February 5, 2016. Ms. Plater, acting pro se, filed Exceptions of Sale on February 22, 2016. The circuit court denied both motions on March 22, 2016. Ms. Plater then retained Ms. Smith-Scott to file an appeal of the circuit court’s two orders to the Court of Special Appeals.

Ms. Smith- Scott agreed to handle the appeal for a flat fee of $4,000. Ms. Smith-Scott advised Ms. Plater that she could pay the fee in installments, but did not provide a date by which the total fee became due. Ms. Plater and Ms. Smith-Scott did not execute a written retainer agreement for the representation. Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal in the circuit court on April 19, 2016.

For these filings, Ms. Smith-Scott charged and received an additional $500. Ms. Plater paid this amount by check on April 7, 2016. Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Civil Appeal Information Report in the Court of Special Appeals 39 on May 2, 2016. For this filing, Ms. Smith-Scott charged and received an additional $50.

Ms. Plater paid this amount by check on April 22, 2016. On July 5, 2016, the circuit court granted Ms. Plater’s Motion to Stay on the condition that she post a supersedeas bond in the amount of $25,000. Ms. Smith-Scott convinced Ms. Plater that there existed a meritorious legal argument that would obviate the need for Ms. Plater to post a bond. Accordingly, Ms. Smith-Scott argued to the circuit court that, since Ms. Plater was a bona fide purchaser, she was not required to post a bond.

For this filing, Ms. Smith-Scott charged and received an additional $250. Ms. Plater paid this amount by check on July 12, 2016 when the Motion to Reconsider had been completed. Ms. Smith-Scott did not advise Ms. Plater that she had an outstanding balance or that future legal fees would accrue. In late August 2016, one of Ms. Smith-Scott’s employees contacted Ms. Plater and asked whether she wanted to pursue her appeal.

Ms. Plater confirmed that she wanted to pursue the appeal. By that time, the Court of Special Appeals had notified Ms. Smith-Scott that Ms. Plater’s appellate brief must be submitted by September 29, 2016. Ms. Smith- Scott’s employee informed Ms. Plater about the filing deadline. On September 7, 2016, Ms. Plater paid Ms. Smith-Scott the first installment for the appeal in the amount of $1,000.

Ms. Plater paid by check; the notation “toward brief” appeared in the memo line. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to deposit and maintain the funds in an attorney trust account until earned or expenses incurred. On September 22, 2016, Ms. Plater paid Ms. Smith-Scott a second installment for the appeal in the amount of $1,000. Ms. Plater again paid by check; the notation “payment toward appeal” appeared in the memo line.

Ms. Smith-Scott failed 40 to deposit and maintain the funds in an attorney trust account until earned or expenses incurred. After Ms. Smith-Scott received Ms. Plater’s funds, Ms. Smith-Scott did not perform any meaningful legal work on Ms. Plater’s appeal. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to prepare or submit Ms. Plater’s appellate brief by the September 29 filing deadline. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to request an extension of time.

During a conversation with Ms. Smith-Scott in the first week of October 2016, after the deadline had expired, Ms. Smith-Scott intentionally misrepresented to Ms. Plater that she intended to file the appellate brief within one week. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to file the brief and intentionally concealed her inaction from Ms. Plater. The Court of Special Appeals dismissed Ms. Plater’s appeal on October 19, 2016 as a result of Ms. Smith-Scott’s failure to file an appellate brief. Thereafter, for approximately six weeks, Ms. Smith-Scott concealed the dismissal order from Ms. Plater.

Throughout early October, Ms. Plater attempted to contact Ms. Smith-Scott on several occasions to find out the status of the appeal, but Ms. Smith-Scott failed to respond. Ms. Plater reached out in the middle of October and scheduled a meeting with Ms. Smith-Scott for the end of the month. On the day of the meeting, Ms. Smith-Scott called Ms. Plater and cancelled. Still, in that conversation, Ms. Smith-Scott did not inform Ms. Plater that the appeal had been dismissed.

Ms. Plater emailed Ms. Smith-Scott on November 14, 2016 requesting a copy of her appellate brief. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to respond. Ms. Plater emailed Ms. Smith-Scott again on November 30, 2016, again requesting a copy of her appellate brief. Ms. Smith- 41 Scott failed to respond.

By November 30, neither Ms. Smith-Scott, nor any member of her staff, had informed Ms. Plater that the appeal had been dismissed. In late November, Ms. Plater contacted the Court of Special Appeals and learned, for the first time, that her appeal had been dismissed. Ms. Plater spoke with Ms. Smith-Scott by telephone in early December 2016. During the conversation, Ms. Smith-Scott still did not inform Ms. Plater of the dismissal.

Ms. Plater scheduled a meeting with Ms. Smith-Scott for the middle of December. On the day of the appointment, Ms. Plater went to Ms. Smith-Scott’s law office, yet Ms. Smith- Scott failed to appear. An employee called Ms. Smith-Scott so that she could speak with Ms. Plater. On this call, six weeks after the dismissal of Ms. Plater’s appeal, Ms. Smith- Scott informed Ms. Plater of the dismissal for the first time.

Ms. Plater immediately requested that Ms. Smith-Scott return her money. Ms. Smith-Scott agreed, but explained that she would need three weeks to do so. A few weeks later, Ms. Plater went to Ms. Smith-Scott’s law office to collect her refund. Ms. Smith-Scott was not there.

An employee informed Ms. Plater that Ms. Smith- Scott went to the bank to get a check. Ms. Plater waited approximately thirty minutes to an hour for Ms. Smith-Scott to return; however, Ms. Smith-Scott never arrived. In January 2017, Ms. Plater returned to Ms. Smith-Scott’s office a second time to collect her refund. While Ms. Smith-Scott was present in the office, an employee presented Ms. Plater with a check in the amount of $1,025.

Ms. Plater immediately disputed the amount of the check and requested a full refund of $2,000. Despite having performed no meaningful work on Ms. Plater’s appeal, Ms. Smith-Scott refused to refund the full $2,000. Ms. Smith-Scott 42 failed to describe the legal work or otherwise provide Ms. Plater with an invoice detailing the legal services purportedly rendered that