Maryland case law › Attorney Grievance v. Wemple

Attorney Grievance v. Wemple

479 Md. 167 (2022) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: OtherHotten, J.✓ Good law
HoldingThe Attorney Grievance Commission filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Mark David Wemple, alleging violations of the Maryland Attorneys' Rules of Professional Conduct (MARPC) in five client matters.

Attorney Grievance Commission v. Mark David Wemple, Misc. Docket AG No. 69, September Term, 2020. Opinion by Hotten, J. ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – DISBARMENT The Court of Appeals of Maryland disbarred Mark David Wemple (“Respondent”) from the practice of law in Maryland. The Court found that Respondent violated Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct 19-301.1 (Competence), 19-301.3 (Diligence), 19-301.4 (Communication), 19-303.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), 19-303.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 19-304.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others), 19-304.4 (Respect for Rights of Third Persons), 19-305.5 (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multi- Jurisdictional Practice of Law), and 19-308.4 (Misconduct).

These violations stemmed from the failure to provide adequate representation to several clients, the abuse of the legal process to intimidate an opposing party witness, and the making of knowingly false statements to the circuit court regarding an associate’s unauthorized practice of law. Respondent provided incompetent representation by failing to communicate his appearance to a client until the day before trial, failing to advise a client of fee arrangements, and by repeatedly failing to appear at clients’ hearings. Respondent abused the legal process by intentionally serving an unenforceable subpoena to coerce an opposing party witness to appear at a deposition and baselessly threatening to hold the opposing party witness in contempt for failing to answer questions. Respondent made knowingly false statements to the circuit court by intentionally misrepresenting that his associate, suspended from the practice of law in Maryland, was a specially admitted out-of-state attorney.

Finally, Respondent submitted false evidence and statements during the disciplinary proceedings. In the aggregate, Respondent’s conduct warranted disbarment. Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No. 484761-V Argued: April 4, 2022 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 69 September Term, 2020 __________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. MARK DAVID WEMPLE __________________________________ *Getty, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, McDonald, Robert N.

(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. __________________________________ Opinion by Hotten, J. __________________________________ Filed: June 16, 2022 *Getty, C.J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. being recalled pursuant to Maryland 2022-06-21 11:38-04:00 Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, acting through Bar Counsel (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“the Petition”) against Mark David Wemple (“Respondent”) with this Court pursuant to Md. Rule 19-721.1 By order dated February 5, 2021, this Court designated the Honorable Christopher C. Fogleman (“hearing judge”) of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to consider the matter against Respondent and render findings of fact and conclusions of law. Following a hearing on December 1, 2021, and upon consideration of the evidence presented, the hearing judge found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) 19-301.1 (Competence), 19-301.3 (Diligence), 19-301.4 (Communication), 19-303.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), 19-303.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 19-304.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others), 19-304.4 (Respect for Rights of Third Persons), 19-305.5 (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multi-Jurisdictional Practice of Law), and 19-308.4 (Misconduct). We agree with the conclusions reached by the hearing judge and, for the following reasons, we disbar Respondent from the practice of law in Maryland.

FINDINGS OF FACT We summarize the hearing judge’s findings of fact that have been established by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent was admitted to the Maryland Bar on June 20, 1 Maryland Rule 19-721(a)(1) provides: “Upon approval or direction of the Commission, Bar Counsel, on behalf of the Commission, shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals.” 2001. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent worked as an independent contractor for DC Law Group, LLC (“the firm”) in Montgomery County. Respondent maintained a separate home office for the practice of law in Howard County.

Representation of Sida Qiao On October 19, 2018, Sida Qiao was charged in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Montgomery County, with reckless driving and related traffic offenses. Mr. Qiao met with Sandy Y. Chang, an attorney with the firm, and signed a retainer agreement. Mr. Qiao was unaware that Ms. Chang was a suspended Maryland attorney.2 Mr. Qiao paid a $1,500 retainer to be billed against a $350 hourly rate for attorneys and $120 for legal assistants. Respondent entered his appearance in Mr. Qiao’s case on October 31, 2018.

Respondent had not spoken with Mr. Qiao, and the trial was scheduled for December 20, 2018. The hearing judge found that the case was assigned to Respondent because Ms. Chang was suspended. The hearing judge also found that Ms. Chang, with Respondent’s knowledge and authorization, communicated with Mr. Qiao and provided him legal advice. On December 19, 2018, someone at the firm advised Mr. Qiao for the first time that he needed to appear in court the following day.

Mr. Qiao also learned for the first time that Respondent would represent him. The same day, Mr. Qiao texted Respondent that he 2 Ms. Chang was admitted to practice law in Virginia, the District of Columbia, and Maryland. The District of Columbia suspended Ms. Chang from the practice of law in 2014, and this Court suspended Ms. Chang for two years in a reciprocal matter. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Chang, 440 Md. 409 , 102 A.3d 1188 (2014) (suspending Ms. Chang for incompetence and failure to adequately supervise a non-attorney).

Ms. Chang remains suspended in Maryland and the District of Columbia. 2 expected neither to appear at trial, nor to be represented by someone other than Ms. Chang. Respondent replied, “Yes. Please show up tomorrow.” Mr. Qiao appeared, but Respondent arrived late, and the District Court postponed the trial until January 24, 2019. Respondent requested and received another postponement until March 7, 2019 because of a scheduling conflict.

Ms. Chang advised Mr. Qiao of the postponement. During the hearing on March 7, Mr. Qiao pleaded guilty to reckless driving and not guilty to the other charges. The District Court ordered Mr. Qiao to pay a fine and court costs. On March 26, 2019, Mr. Qiao received an invoice from the firm for $3,736.50.

Mr. Qiao was unaware that the firm’s fee would exceed $1,500. Mr. Qiao wrote a letter to Ms. Chang and Respondent disputing the amount and asserting that Respondent and Ms. Chang provided conflicting information regarding the legal consequences of entering a guilty plea. In a subsequent communication with Ms. Chang, Mr. Qiao “admittedly lost his temper and cursed at Ms. Chang.” On May 3, 2019, Ms. Chang filed a Petition for Peace Order against Mr. Qiao in the District Court, claiming that he had threatened and harassed her. Following a hearing, the District Court entered a final peace order against Mr. Qiao, who appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on June 6, 2019.

The parties appeared for a de novo trial. On July 17, 2019, Ms. Chang, pro se, and Respondent, on the firm’s behalf, sued Mr. Qiao for unpaid legal fees and damages allegedly resulting from his harassment of Ms. Chang. The parties reached a settlement whereby Mr. Qiao agreed to pay $5,000 in full and final settlement of the firm’s and Ms. Chang’s claims of unpaid legal fees and harassment. 3 On August 18, 2019, Ms. Chang executed a release in connection with the settlement both individually and on behalf of the firm. On or about November 14, 2019, Ms. Chang, individually and on behalf of the firm, filed a Notice of Dismissal.

The hearing judge did not find clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Chang engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by executing a release on her behalf and on behalf of the firm. The hearing judge was unpersuaded that the “mere presence in Respondent’s file” of the dismissal notice signed by Ms. Chang was evidence of Respondent assisting Ms. Chang in the negotiation of a settlement. Therefore, the hearing judge found that Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent assisted Ms. Chang in the unauthorized practice of law by permitting her to negotiate a settlement and sign a release in an individual capacity and on behalf of the firm. Huaimin Long Representation In December 2017, Ms. Huaimin Long retained the firm in a divorce matter.

On January 5, 2018, Respondent entered his appearance and filed an Answer to a complaint for absolute divorce filed by Ms. Long’s then-husband Pien Sheng Mo in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The trial was postponed due to Respondent’s illness. On June 26, 2019, Respondent filed a Motion for Special Admission of Out of State Attorney 4 requesting that Ms. Chang be specially admitted pursuant to Md. Rule 19-217.3 In the motion, Respondent knowingly and intentionally misrepresented that Ms. Chang was an out-of-state attorney and failed to mention that Ms. Chang was suspended from the practice of law in Maryland. The circuit court granted the motion and admitted Ms. Chang pro hac vice.

Respondent and Ms. Chang served as co-counsel during trial. The circuit court granted the complaint for absolute divorce. On June 6, 2018, Respondent filed a complaint, on Ms. Long’s behalf, against Mr. Mo’s daughter for fraud and unjust enrichment in connection with real property. That same day, Respondent filed a complaint alleging similar claims of fraud and unjust enrichment against Mr. Mo, Pei C. Hsieh, and Chin Yuan Hsieh.

The circuit court granted the parties’ motion to consolidate the two cases for trial on July 30, 2019. On July 29, 2019, Respondent filed an Emergency Motion to Continue Trial and a Motion to Shorten Time. The motions were signed “Mark Wemple by Sandy Chang.” The hearing judge found that Respondent authorized Ms. Chang to sign the motions on his behalf. The Emergency Motion stated that Respondent was in New York with his hospitalized mother and could not attend trial the next day.

Counsel for Mr. Mo opposed 3 Maryland Rule 19-217(a)(1) provides in pertinent part: A member of the Bar of this State who [] is an attorney of record in an action pending . . . may move that an attorney who is a member in good standing of the Bar of another state be admitted to practice in this State for the limited purpose of appearing and participating in the action as co-counsel with the movant. (Emphasis added). 5 the motion and stated that Ms. Chang, as Respondent’s associate, was adequately prepared to proceed with the case. On July 30, 2019, Ms. Chang appeared in the circuit court with Respondent’s knowledge and authorization to request a postponement. The circuit court contacted Respondent by telephone regarding his absence.

The hearing judge found that Respondent knowingly and intentionally failed to inform the circuit court about Ms. Chang’s suspension and unauthorized practice of law. The circuit court granted the postponement request and rescheduled trial for August 19, 2019. On August 19, 2019, Respondent and Ms. Chang appeared before the circuit court regarding the fraud and unjust enrichment claim, and Respondent argued that Ms. Chang was permitted to appear because of her admission pro hac vice in the related divorce matter. Respondent stated that Ms. Chang was not a Maryland attorney and that “[the circuit court previously] ordered my partner to be in the [divorce] case.” The hearing judge found that these statements were knowingly and intentionally false and misleading because the circuit court never ordered Ms. Chang’s appearance and Ms. Chang was not Respondent’s law partner.

The hearing judge found that these knowingly false statements were made to conceal Respondent’s assistance of Ms. Chang in the unauthorized practice of law. The circuit court orally permitted Respondent to admit Ms. Chang pro hac vice and directed Respondent to formally file a written motion. In the motion, Respondent intentionally misrepresented that Ms. Chang was an “out-of-state attorney who is a member in good standing of the Bar of Virginia.” Both Respondent and Ms. Chang served as co- 6 counsel in the fraud and unjust enrichment trial. At the close of the plaintiff’s case, the circuit court granted opposing counsel’s motion for judgment and dismissed the case.

Sihan Gao Representation Sihan Gao constructed a fence between his property and that of his neighbor, Joanne Costes Fradkin. Ms. Fradkin complained to the Montgomery County Department of Permitting Services (“DPS”) that Mr. Gao had not acquired a necessary permit. Mr. Gao applied for a retroactive permit, which DPS granted on June 11, 2018. Ms. Fradkin appealed the issuance of the permit to the Board of Appeals for Montgomery County.

Mr. Gao retained Respondent and the firm in the matter. On July 25, 2018, Charles L. Frederick, counsel for the County, moved to dismiss and for summary disposition. On July 27, 2018, Respondent improperly served Ms. Fradkin a subpoena to compel her appearance at a deposition at Respondent’s office on August 14, 2018. The subpoena was improper because only the Board of Appeals, upon a showing of good cause, can order a deposition in a permit matter.

The subpoena was further invalid because it was not accompanied by a notice of deposition, and it incorrectly identified Ms. Fradkin as the plaintiff and the State as the defendant. Respondent also failed to serve a copy on counsel for the County. Ms. Fradkin appeared at Respondent’s office on August 14, 2018 for the deposition. The hearing judge found that Respondent knowingly and intentionally falsely stated that Ms. Fradkin was obligated to answer questions or face a contempt charge, even though “Respondent, by his own admission, knew that the subpoena was invalid,” and therefore, 7 Ms. Fradkin could not be held in contempt.

Respondent later admitted the deposition was frivolous, unrelated to the appeal, and intended to intimidate Ms. Fradkin. On September 5, 2018, the parties appeared before the Board of Appeals. Mr. Frederick appeared on behalf of the County, and Ms. Fradkin appeared pro se. Respondent did not appear due to an alleged conflict, so David Van Eyken, another attorney at the firm, appeared on behalf of Mr. Gao.

Ms. Fradkin testified about the deposition, and Mr. Van Eyken acknowledged that the subpoena and deposition were improper. The Board of Appeals granted the motion to dismiss and admonished Mr. Van Eyken for the “totally inappropriate” procedure Respondent had utilized. Charles David Booker Representation On or about April 5, 2019, Charles David Booker was arrested and charged with attempted second-degree murder and related handgun offenses. The Office of the Public Defender paneled Mr. Booker’s case to Respondent because of a conflict of interest.

Respondent requested that someone from the Office of the Public Defender cover for his absence at a scheduling hearing on June 14, 2019. Allen E. Wolf, District Public Defender for Montgomery County, agreed and appeared at the scheduling hearing. A pretrial status hearing was scheduled for August 16, 2019, and trial for October 21, 2019. Respondent failed to appear for the pretrial status hearing due to an alleged illness.

Respondent advised neither his client nor the circuit court of his absence. The circuit court attempted to contact Respondent by telephone and email but did not receive a response. Mr. Wolf eventually appeared on Mr. Booker’s behalf and requested a postponement, which the circuit court granted, and the hearing was postponed to August 22, 2019. 8 Respondent appeared at the August 22 hearing. On September 19, 2019, Mr. Booker pleaded guilty to first-degree assault as part of a plea agreement.

Ahmad Smallwood Representation On September 27, 2018, Ahmad Smallwood was indicted on charges of second- degree assault and fourth-degree sex offense. Ronald Gottlieb, an assistant public defender represented, Mr. Smallwood between September and December 2018. Mr. Gottlieb requested a panel attorney to take over representation due to his retirement. Respondent agreed and entered his appearance on December 17, 2018.

Mr. Gottlieb wrote to Respondent to confirm, to which Respondent replied on the same day, “Yes, I am now in the case.” Mr. Smallwood entered a plea agreement with the State on December 21, 2018. According to the plea agreement, if Mr. Smallwood submitted to a sex offender evaluation and was determined to be “low risk to reoffend,” the State would not oppose probation before judgment for the sex offense. The sentencing hearing was scheduled for March 4, 2019. Respondent failed to make any effort to coordinate the sex offender evaluation prior to the sentencing hearing, so the circuit court rescheduled the sentencing hearing for April 15, 2019, so the evaluation could be completed.

Respondent failed to notify Mr. Smallwood of the rescheduling, and Mr. Smallwood and his family appeared for the March 4 sentencing. Respondent also failed to coordinate Mr. Smallwood’s sex offender evaluation. On April 15, 2019, Mr. Smallwood and the State appeared for sentencing, but Respondent failed to appear. Mr. Smallwood had attempted to contact Respondent but did 9 not receive a response.

The hearing was postponed until June 13, 2019, and the circuit court emailed Respondent for an explanation for his failure to appear and his failure to arrange the sex offender evaluation. Respondent replied the next day and stated that he “had the wrong date on my calendar[, and] I’m currently arranging the evaluation for Mr. Smallwood.” Respondent coordinated the sex offender evaluation and represented Mr. Smallwood at the sentencing hearing on June 13, 2019. Disciplinary Proceedings Petitioner filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Respondent on February 2, 2021.4 Respondent was served with original process, Petitioner’s First Set of Interrogatories, and Petitioner’s First Request for Production of Documents on April 9, 2021. After conferring with the parties, the hearing judge scheduled the hearing for December 1 & 2, 2021.

On November 23, 2021, Respondent moved for a continuance, which was denied by this Court. On November 29, 2021, the hearing judge held a status conference, at which Respondent failed to appear. The next day, Respondent emailed the hearing judge and Bar Counsel: I’ve attached a Doctor’s note from my Hospital stay at Carroll County. I have pneumonia, a chest infection, an [sic] sinus infection, mastoiditis and an active covid infection.

I’m on a minimum of 7 days bed rest. As I’m unsure of a continuance I’m requesting at minimum to be held harmless as it’s impossible for me to participate. 4 While the hearing judge did not describe what prompted Bar Counsel’s investigation or the extent thereof, the record contains complaints made against Respondent. Ms. Fradkin submitted a letter to Petitioner recounting her experience being improperly subpoenaed and deposed. Another letter on behalf of the circuit court, described several occurrences of Respondent’s unexcused absences for hearings in addition to habitual tardiness. 10 Bar Counsel requested from Respondent treatment records of the hospital stay.

Respondent provided the requested documentation, but the medical records did not indicate a “hospital stay,” an order for bed rest, or any diagnosis apart from mastoiditis (an ear infection). Respondent failed to appear for the hearing, held by Zoom for Government, on December 1, 2021. Petitioner entered several exhibits into evidence and called Mr. Qiao, Ms. Fradkin, Mr. Frederick, and Mr. Wolf as witnesses. THE HEARING JUDGE’S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.1 (Competence), 19-301.3 (Diligence), 19-301.4 (Communication), 19- 303.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), 19-303.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 19- 304.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others), 19-304.4 (Respect for Rights of Third Persons), 19-305.5 (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multi-Jurisdictional Practice of Law), and 19-308.4 (Misconduct).

MARPC 19-301.1 (Competence) MARPC 19-301.1 provides: “An attorney shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” The hearing judge found that Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.1 in the Qiao, Long, Booker, and Smallwood matters. Respondent provided incompetent representation to Mr. Qiao by failing to have any substantive communication prior to the first court appearance and by failing to advise Mr. Qiao of the fee arrangement. 11 The hearing judge also found that Respondent provided incompetent representation by failing to appear for trial on June 11, 2019 and July 30, 2019 for the Long matters, failing to appear for the pretrial status hearing on August 16, 2019 for the Booker matter, and failing to appear for sentencing on April 15, 2019 for the Smallwood matter. MARPC 19-301.3 (Diligence) MARPC 19-301.3 provides: “An attorney shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” The hearing judge found that Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.3 in the Qiao, Long, Booker, and Smallwood matters for reasons stated with respect to MARPC 19-301.1, supra, and MARPC 19-301.4, infra.

MARPC 19-301.4 (Communication) MARPC 19-301.4 provides: (a) An attorney shall: (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in [MARPC] 19-301.0 (f) (1.0), is required by these Rules; (2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; (3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and (4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the attorney’s conduct when the attorney knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. (b) An attorney shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. (Bold lettering removed). 12 The hearing judge concluded that Respondent failed to adequately communicate with his clients in violation of the rule. In Mr. Qiao’s case, Respondent failed to communicate his appearance and to provide any substantive information regarding the case or the fee structure.

In the Long, Booker, and Smallwood matters, Respondent failed to advise his clients that he would not appear for scheduled court dates. Respondent also failed to advise Mr. Smallwood that the March 4, 2019 sentencing was postponed. MARC 19-303.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions) MARPC 19-303.1 provides: An attorney shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes, for example, a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. An attorney may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the moving party’s case be established.

The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated MARPC 19-303.1 by improperly deposing Ms. Fradkin in the Gao matter. Respondent knowingly and falsely advised Ms. Fradkin that she was deposed “under a court order[]” and could be held in contempt by failing to answer questions. Respondent admitted the deposition was frivolous and that Ms. Fradkin was not under a court order and could not be held in contempt. MARPC 19-303.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal) MARPC 19-303.3 provides in pertinent part: “(a) An attorney shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the attorney[.]” (Bold lettering and spacing removed). 13 The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated MARPC 19-303.3(a) in the Long matters by seeking Ms. Chang’s special admission in the circuit court as an “out-of- state” attorney even though Ms. Chang was a suspended Maryland attorney.

The hearing judge found that Respondent made intentional misrepresentations regarding Ms. Chang’s status as a suspended Maryland attorney with the intent to deceive the circuit court. MARPC 19-304.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others) MARPC 19-304.1 provides in pertinent part: “(a) In the course of representing a client an attorney shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person[.]” (Bold lettering and spacing removed). The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated this rule by knowingly and falsely stating that Ms. Fradkin was “under a court order[]” and could be held in contempt if she refused to answer deposition questions. MARPC 19-304.4 (Respect for Rights of Third Persons) MARPC 19-304.4(a) provides: “In representing a client, an attorney shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.” (Bold lettering removed).

The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated this rule by serving an invalid subpoena on Ms. Fradkin and subjecting Ms. Fradkin to a deposition under the knowingly false pretense of a binding court order and the threat of contempt charges. The hearing judge also found that Respondent violated the rule by using these tactics to intimidate Ms. Fradkin. 14 MARPC 19-305.5 (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multi-Jurisdictional Practice of Law) MARPC 19-305.5 provides in pertinent part: “An attorney shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction or assist another in doing so.” (Bold lettering removed and emphasis added). The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated this rule by assisting Ms. Chang in practicing law while her license was suspended and by misleading the circuit court into granting out-of-state practice privileges, pro hac vice, through knowingly false statements concerning Ms. Chang’s status as a suspended Maryland attorney. MARPC 19-308.4.

(Misconduct) MARPC 19-308.4 provides in pertinent part: It is professional misconduct for an attorney to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rule of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; *** (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.] (Bold lettering removed). The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated MARPC 19-308.4(a) because he violated several other rules of professional conduct. 15 The hearing judge also concluded that Respondent violated MARPC 19-308.4(c) in the Long matter by falsely stating to the circuit court that Ms. Chang was an out-of-state attorney and concealing her suspended status. The hearing judge further concluded that Respondent’s conduct in all of the client matters violated MARPC 19-308.4(d) because of “repeated dishonest conduct, [] pattern of failing to appear in court[,] . . . delays in his clients’ cases[, and] . . . intentionally dilatory tactics[.] . . .” (Citations omitted). “Taken as a whole,” the hearing judge found that “Respondent’s conduct in each of these matters brings the legal profession into disrepute and is therefore prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Aggravating and Mitigating Factors We now address the conclusions of the hearing judge regarding the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors. In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shuler, 443 Md. 494 , 117 A.3d 38 (2015), we articulated the following aggravating factors that should be considered in an attorney disciplinary proceeding: (1) prior attorney discipline; (2) a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple violations of the M[A]RPC; (5) bad faith obstruction of the attorney discipline proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the Maryland Rules or orders of this Court [ ]; (6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the attorney discipline proceeding; (7) a refusal to acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful nature; (8) the victim’s vulnerability; (9) substantial experience in the practice of law; (10) indifference to making restitution or rectifying the misconduct’s consequences; (11) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled substances; and (12) likelihood of repetition of the misconduct. 16 Id. at 506–07, 117 A.3d at 46 (alterations in original omitted).

Petitioner has the burden of proving aggravating factors by clear and convincing evidence. Md. Rule 19-727(c). Petitioner alleged the existence of the following aggravating factors, as articulated by this Court in Shuler: (1) prior discipline; (2) dishonest or selfish motive; (3) pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple violations; (5) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rule or orders of the disciplinary agency; (6) submission of false evidence and false statements during the disciplinary proceeding; (7) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct; and (8) substantial experience in the practice of law. The hearing judge found clear and convincing evidence to establish each of the alleged aggravating factors.

This Court previously reprimanded Respondent on June 13, 2017 for violating “Rules 1.4 [Communication] and 1.15(a) and (c) ([Safekeeping Property)] of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct.” Respondent exhibited a dishonest and selfish motive by assisting Ms. Chang in the unauthorized practice of law and knowingly and intentionally misrepresenting Ms. Chang’s status as a suspended Maryland attorney to the circuit court. The hearing judge observed a pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses from

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