Attorney Grievance Commission v. McDonald

HARRELL, J. John Mark McDonald was admitted to the Bar of this Court on 13 December 1995. After serving as an Assistant State’s Attorney in Kent, Talbot, and Queen Anne’s Counties, McDonald was appointed Deputy State’s Attorney for Queen Anne’s County in January 2003. On 12 September 2012, the Attorney Grievance Commission (the “Commission”), acting through Bar Counsel, filed against McDonald a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (the “Petition”), pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751(a)(l). The Petition alleged that McDonald engaged in a pattern of misconduct related to an “inappropriate relationship” between him and Melissa Knotts, the former office manager for the State’s Attorney’s Office for Queen Anne’s County (the “Office”), by using improperly his position to “fix” traffic citations issued to Knotts as a personal favor to Knotts, facilitating knowingly Knotts taking leave to which she was not entitled, interfering with the criminal investigation and prosecution of Knotts for embezzling funds from the Office, and deleting (without proper authority) emails from Knotts’s former work computer the day after her employment was terminated.

Based on the alleged pattern of misconduct, the Petition charged McDonald with violations of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 8.4(a), 1 8.4(b), 2 8.4(c),3 and 8.4(d).4 ⁷ The matter was referred to a judge who was specially assigned to the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County for hearing and the filing of findings of fact and proposed conclusions of law. An evidentiary hearing, spanning five nonconsecutive days of testimony and argument, commenced in the Circuit Court on 10 January 2013 and concluded on 31 January 2013. For reasons explained here, based on the evidence received during the evidentiary hearing, our due consideration of the hearing judge’s Memorandum of Findings of Fact and Proposed Conclusions of Law, and the Exceptions and Recommendations for Sanctions of the parties, we disbar McDonald from the practice of law in Maryland. I. A. The Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact The hearing judge filed a Memorandum of Findings of Fact and Proposed Conclusions of Law on 16 April 2013.

We summarize the hearing judge’s findings of fact based on the categories of misconduct alleged by Bar Counsel. 1. Ticket Fixing Bar Counsel’s admitted evidence (credited by the hearing judge) reflected that, on five occasions between December 2008 and April 2011, McDonald entered (or arranged for the entry of) dispositions of nolle prosequi for traffic citations issued to Knotts. During their respective consecutive tenures as the State’s Attorney for Queen Anne’s County, Frank M. Kratovil, Jr. (now a judge of the District Court of Maryland) and Lance G. Richardson maintained the same policy regarding motor vehicle citations or criminal charges involving employees of the office, which policy required immediate self- ⁸ reporting by any employee who received a citation or was charged, so that the State’s Attorney could determine whether the use of a special prosecutor was necessary, and “did not permit an attorney from abusing the office he or she holds by entering a nolle prosequi on charges or citations as a favor to employees.... ” Although McDonald cross-examined Richardson regarding exceptions to this policy against showing favoritism to employees, each of the instances brought up by McDonald were deemed to be “vastly different than what occurred with the citations issued to Knotts.” Any claim by McDonald that the Office had a policy of showing favoritism to employees in regards to citations or charges was found by the hearing judge to be “without merit.” McDonald’s explanation that he entered, or caused to be entered, nolle prosequi for Knotts’s citations in exchange for information she provided about ongoing drug investigations, in conformity with a policy or practice of the Office to encourage such exchanges, was not credible. In an email McDonald sent to Knotts on 29 April 2010, he listed favors he performed for her, including “[ijive fixed tickets.” The hearing judge found ultimately that “each nolle prosequi entered by the Respondent or at his behest for traffic citations issued to Knotts was done as a personal favor to her and without any legitimate business purpose.” Based on these findings, the hearing judge concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that McDonald violated MLRPC 8.4(a) and (d). 2.

Interference with the Prosecution of Knotts for Embezzlement The hearing judge considered Bar Counsel’s evidence regarding McDonald’s alleged interference with Knotts’s embezzlement prosecution by looking: first, at his alleged attempts to intimidate or corrupt the State’s witnesses against Knotts; next, at McDonald’s alleged attempts to influence Steven Trostle, the Special Prosecutor assigned to prosecute the case against Knotts; and, finally, at McDonald’s alleged obstruction of justice regarding the Knotts prosecution. ⁹ Attempts to intimidate or corrupt the State’s witnesses The hearing judge made three factual findings regarding Bar Counsel’s evidence tendered to prove McDonald’s alleged attempts to intimidate or corrupt the State’s witnesses against Knotts. The first finding was that McDonald’s choice to resign from the Office shortly before a murder trial he was scheduled to prosecute was not an attempt to influence Richardson by forcing him to choose between conceding to McDonald’s wishes regarding the Knotts prosecution or being left in the lurch on the murder trial. The hearing judge found credible McDonald’s explanation that he left the Office as Deputy when he did because he felt he could not return to the Office if he testified in support of Knotts’s anticipated Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement in the criminal case arising from her theft from the Office. Second, the judge found that certain text messages sent by McDonald to Richardson did not rise to the level of a threat.

Third, she resolved that statements made by McDonald to Robert Penny, an investigator for the Office, and April Pyle, an administrative assistant for the Office, that the Office would “go down” if Knotts “went down,” were not threats, but were efforts to protect the Office from looking bad if Knotts’s defense attorney filed the anticipated Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement. The hearing judge concluded that “[ajlthough [McDonald] was clearly trying to influence the outcome of Knotts’s criminal case and acted inappropriately in his quest to do so, the testimony does not establish that he tried to intimidate or corrupt Richardson and Penny.” Attempts to influence Trostle The hearing judge reached a similar outcome regarding the evidence surrounding McDonald’s interactions with Trostle. In response to Bar Counsel’s allegations that McDonald urged Trostle to be lenient with Knotts and attempted to influence Trostle’s prosecutorial decision-making, the hearing judge concluded that “although [McDonald] attempted to influence the outcome of the Knotts prosecution, his actions in that regard — however inappropriate as they may have been — do not ¹⁰ rise to the level of attempting to intimidate or corrupt an officer of the court.” Alleged Obstruction of Justice The hearing judge made the following factual findings concerning whether McDonald’s actions regarding the embezzlement prosecution of Knotts constituted obstruction of justice. Promptly following McDonald’s meeting with Richardson and Penny on the day Knotts confessed to the embezzlement, at which meeting he agreed not to involve himself in Knotts’s prosecution, McDonald: (1) told Penny there was a problem with the Miranda advisements Penny gave Knotts; (2) called Penny to ask whether criminal charges would be filed and, when Penny answered in the affirmative, “asked Penny to call Richardson to dissuade him from filing charges and went so far as to suggest that the county’s human resources office be contacted and a meeting arranged to resolve the issues without the necessity of filing criminal charges”; and, (3) asked about the amount of restitution due.

On 6 July 2011, the day that criminal charges were filed against Knotts, McDonald called repeatedly the police sergeant who was on his way to serve Knotts with the criminal summons and also emailed Richardson to ask what would happen to the charges if restitution were paid immediately (implying that he thought Knotts could pay it right away). Between July 6 and July 15 of 2011, McDonald, while employed still as the Deputy State’s Attorney, asked R. Stewart Barroll, Esq., a local attorney, to represent Knotts in the embezzlement case. McDonald stated that he would see to it that any fees related to the representation would be paid. McDonald also represented to Barroll that a plea agreement had been reached already and, thus, his representation of Knotts would more than likely involve only the sentencing.

From 15 July 2011 until 8 September 2011 (the day McDonald resigned), McDonald had “daily or near-daily communications” with Richardson, Penny, and Pyle about the Knotts prosecution. “By way of example, [McDonald] sought information about the status of the case, questioned how the case ¹¹ would proceed and how the matter was being handled by the Special Prosecutor.” McDonald contacted Trostle to ask, among other things, if he would be seeking an indictment of Knotts and, if so, whether McDonald could be contacted at that time so he could assist Knotts in surrendering herself and being released as soon as possible. After learning that Tros-tle was considering an indictment, McDonald attempted to persuade Richardson and Penny to intervene and to persuade Trostle not to indict or, alternatively, appoint a new Special Prosecutor to the case. McDonald sent text messages later to Richardson suggesting that the payment of restitution should resolve the case, that further prosecution was mean-spirited, and that the indictment sought by Trostle would be “over the top.” The hearing judge found that “during this same time period, [McDonald] was in constant contact with Knotts and her criminal defense attorney.” McDonald “requested that Bar-roll have a subpoena issued for McDonald to testify as a character witness.” He also suggested possible defenses to Barroll. Additionally, during a pre-trial conference on 21 October 2011, McDonald called Trostle, after the Special Prosecutor refused to speak to McDonald on an earlier call on Barroll’s cell phone, and persisted in asserting that Richardson and Knotts reached previously a binding plea agreement.

Addressing McDonald’s assertion that the prosecution of Knotts violated an enforceable plea agreement reached with her on the day she confessed the embezzlement to Richardson and Penny, the hearing judge found that McDonald’s “conduct in actively and intentionally interfering in the Knotts prosecution is not mitigated or justified by his belief that an enforceable plea agreement to a misdemeanor charge had been reached between Richardson and Knotts,” because, “[e]ven if a plea agreement had been reached, any attempt to enforce the plea agreement rightly belonged with Knotts’s defense attorney, not [McDonald].” The judge also found that “no justification [existed] for [McDonald] involving himself in the matter due to his belief that the amount of restitution paid was more than it should have been. That, again, was a matter to be ¹² addressed by Knotts’s defense counsel, not [McDonald].” She concluded that McDonald’s “actions ran afoul of what was appropriate behavior for a senior member of [the State’s Attorney’s Office] — an office that coincidentally was the victim of Knotts’s embezzlement,” and that “[t]here is no getting around the fact that the Respondent’s personal feelings for Knotts clouded his judgment and caused him to inappropriately involve himself in her prosecution.” 3. Alleged Falsification of Timesheets and Abetting a Fraud Bar Counsel’s evidence (credited by the hearing judge) revealed that the Office required employees to submit time-sheets, on a bi-weekly basis, indicating the amount of hours worked and leave taken. Knotts would submit all employees’ timesheets to Richardson at the end of each period for his approval and signature.

In early 2011, Richardson discovered inaccuracies in Knotts’s timesheets. When Richardson confronted Knotts about the inaccuracies, she indicated that McDonald “donated” non-sick leave to her. As it turned out, McDonald and Knotts devised an arrangement in which McDonald would complete and sign two timesheets on his behalf for a single pay period, with one sheet reflecting his actual hours worked and another indicating that he had used non-sick leave on certain days. Knotts would submit the second timesheet if she chose not to work on a day in which McDonald indicated that he took leave.

For that same time-period, Knotts would complete her own timesheet showing that she had worked on days when she had not worked in fact. When Richardson discovered their arrangement, he told McDonald and Knotts that he did not approve of it, and, to his knowledge, the practice was not repeated again. The hearing judge concluded from this that the Commission did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that McDonald falsified timesheets, violated a county policy, or abetted Knotts in committing a fraud. ¹³ k. Alleged Unauthorized Access by McDonald to Knotts’s Office Computer The hearing judge made the following factual findings regarding the allegations of McDonald’s unauthorized access to Knotts’s office computer.

McDonald accessed Knotts’s computer the day after her employment was terminated and began deleting personal emails. Richardson confronted McDonald in the process, told him that Knotts’s former office was a crime scene, and requested that McDonald leave. After informing Richardson he had been deleting personal emails and moving them to the “trash bin” on her computer, McDonald apologized and departed the office. The hearing judge inferred also that McDonald “did not access [Knotts’s] computer to delete or change any documents related to the office’s bank accounts or financial ledgers” because the testimony showed that Knotts kept the financial records in hard-copy, not electronically, a fact widely known in the Office.

The hearing judge rejected Bar Counsel’s arguments that: (1) because McDonald was subpoenaed as a character witness for Knotts in her criminal case, the email communications between them could have been relevant in her case; and, (2) her emails could contain information regarding her spending habits, which would be relevant to the investigation: The court notes that [McDonald] accessed Knotts’s computer the day after her employment was terminated — there was no evidence that [McDonald] knew at that time that he would be subpoenaed as a character witness in a case for which charges had not as yet been filed. Secondly, Knotts confessed her theft to Richardson and Penny the day before. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, no evidence was presented that the office employees, including [McDonald], were put on notice that her office and/or her computer was, in fact, a designated crime scene. There was credible evidence presented that the attorneys in the office would, on a fairly regular basis, have access to Knotts’s computer to retrieve templates for forms and other documents necessary for their work as Assistant State’s Attorneys.

Although [McDonald’s] reasons for entering her of ¹⁴ fice on the day in question were admittedly for a different purpose, it has not been satisfactorily proven to the court that the access to her computer was wholly impermissible. The hearing judge concluded that “[although [McDonald’s] decision to enter Knotts’s office and to delete personal emails from her office computer may not have been the wisest decision,” the evidence did not prove sufficiently that McDonald’s “actions amounted to criminal behavior as alleged by [Bar Counsel].” B. The Hearing Judge’s Proposed Conclusions of Law The hearing judge concluded that Bar Counsel proved by clear and convincing evidence that McDonald’s ticket fixing and “unjustified and intentional interference with the prosecution of Knotts’s criminal case” were prejudicial to the administration of justice and, thus, violated MLRPC 8.4(d). Based on that conclusion, the hearing judge also found that McDonald violated MLRPC 8.4(a). As to the charged violations of MLRPC 8.4(b) and 8.4(c), the hearing judge concluded that the Commission did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that McDonald’s conduct rose “to the level of obstruction, corruption or criminal behavior,” or that it constituted “a finding of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” II.

A. Our Standard of Review We recently explained our standard of review applicable to attorney disciplinary cases: This Court has original and complete jurisdiction over attorney discipline proceedings in Maryland. We review the hearing judge’s conclusions of law under a non-deferential standard. The hearing judge’s findings of fact will be deemed correct if (1) they are not clearly erroneous, or (2), at the Court’s option, if neither party filed exceptions to them. If determined to be established, the findings of fact are then used to determine the legal propriety of the legal conclusions of law and the appropriate sanction.

We must ¹⁵ determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the hearing judge’s legal conclusions, by a clear and convincing standard of proof. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kremer, 432 Md. 325, 334 , 68 A.3d 862, 867-68 (2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). B. The Parties’ Exceptions Both parties filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s Findings of Fact and Proposed Conclusions of Law. Bar Counsel takes no exceptions to the hearing judge’s factual findings, but raised four exceptions to the proposed conclusions of law.

McDonald raised initially fourteen numbered Exceptions, and later filed four numbered Supplemental Exceptions, challenging several of the hearing judge’s factual findings, procedural issues arising before, during, and after McDonald’s merits hearing, and the hearing judge’s proposed conclusions of law as to his having violated Rules 8.4(a) and 8.4(d). 5 Additionally, each party filed responses to the other party’s exceptions. We address first McDonald’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s factual findings, before addressing, in turn, McDonald’s exceptions concerning procedural matters and both parties’ exceptions to the proposed conclusions of law. 1. McDonald’s Exceptions to the Factual Findings McDonald’s original Exceptions numbered 5, 6, and 8 through 11 contest factual findings of the hearing judge. Underlying our analysis of those Exceptions is the “fundamen ¹⁶ tal principle that the factual findings of the assigned judge in an attorney disciplinary proceeding ‘are prima facie correct and will not be disturbed on review unless clearly erroneous.’” Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 17 , 741 A.2d 1143, 1152 (1999) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 470 , 671 A.2d 463, 474 (1996)).

A hearing judge’s factual finding is not clearly erroneous “[i]f there is any competent material evidence to support [it].” YIVO Inst. for Jewish Research v. Zaleski, 386 Md. 654, 663 , 874 A.2d 411, 416 (2005). We conclude that each of the Exceptions, for the reasons set forth below, shall be overruled. Exceptions Numbered 5 and 6 McDonald’s fifth and sixth Exceptions concern the hearing judge’s factual findings regarding the entry of nolle prosequi dispositions by McDonald as to Rnotts’s motor vehicle citations. In his fifth exception, McDonald argues that the hearing judge erred by finding that the nolle prosequi entries were personal favors, and without a legitimate business purpose.

In the first part of Exception numbered 5, McDonald claims that the hearing judge misconstrued the evidence by finding that Richardson and Kratovil did not have reason to believe Knotts was a confidential source of information. According to McDonald’s interpretation of the evidence, Kratovil and Richardson testified merely that they had no knowledge whether she was a confidential source of the Office. Respondent continues that Richardson’s and Kratovil’s lack of knowledge as to whether Knotts was a confidential source was not inconsistent with McDonald’s assertion that he entered nolle prosequi dispositions for her benefit in exchange for information because, in his position as a Deputy State’s Attorney in charge of illegal drug prosecutions, McDonald worked with confidential sources of whom other people in the Office, including the two State’s Attorneys, were unaware. We do not agree that the hearing judge misconstrued the evidence.

Kratovil was asked whether he had reason to believe that Knotts was a confidential source. He replied “I had no knowledge of that.” Kratovil testified also that he ¹⁷ would have wanted to know if one of his employees was a confidential source. Similarly, Richardson testified that he “would absolutely need knowledge” of the favorable disposition of public charges of one of his employees because of the potential repercussions. It would be McDonald’s responsibility, as his Deputy State’s Attorney, he continued, to inform him of any such dispositions.

The witness maintained that the notion of Knotts having been a confidential source of information is “absolutely absurd.” Although McDonald testified, as outlined in his relevant Exception, that he had confidential sources of whom the others were unaware, the only testimony to support his assertion that Knotts was one of those sources, and that he entered nolle prosequi dispositions for five of her citations in exchange for providing information on drug investigations, was Knotts’s arguably self-serving testimony. Knotts testified on direct-examination that she provided information in exchange for the nolle prosequi entries; however, on cross-examination, she admitted that she did not provide any information with the intent that McDonald would enter a nolle prosequi on her behalf, and that he never told her that he would enter a nolle prosequi for her only if she provided information on drug investigations. We find no error in the hearing judge’s conclusion that the evidence did not support McDonald’s claim that his nolle prosequi entries were made in exchange for information from Knotts. The testimony of Richardson and Kratovil on that subject was found to be more credible than McDonald’s and Knotts’s testimony.

In the latter half of his fifth exception and in his sixth exception, McDonald argues that the hearing judge committed clear error and abused her discretion by finding credible the testimony of Richardson regarding the propriety of the entries of nolle prosequi by McDonald on Knotts’s behalf. McDonald’s argument consists mostly of meritless finger-pointing and personal attacks on Richardson, propped-up by snippets of testimony (devoid of context) and the reiteration of arguments that were, in our view, rejected properly by the hearing judge. The lack of merit in McDonald’s argument is highlighted by his assertion that it was clear error for the hearing ¹⁸ judge to find credible Richardson’s testimony on the subject of the Office policy or practice regarding nolle prosequi dispositions, in part, because “it is the only matter of substance that the trial court found Mr. Richardson testified credibly about.” The latter part of McDonald’s assertion is not only disingenuous, 6 it would be unavailing in support of the claim of clear error, even if it were true, because, in assessing credibility, the hearing judge “was entitled to accept-or reject-all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness.” Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Walter, 407 Md. 670, 678 , 967 A.2d 783, 788 (2009) (emphasis added); see also Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Usiak, 418 Md. 667, 687 , 18 A.3d 1, 13 (2011) (“The judge is at liberty to pick and choose what evidence to believe and what evidence to disbelieve, as well as what weight to give (or not) to any piece of evidence.”). In other words, the hearing judge could find permissibly Richardson credible on the subject of the nolle proseguís, even if the judge found that Richardson’s testimony on all other subjects was not credible.

We overrule Respondent’s Exceptions numbered 5 and 6. Exception Numbered 8 In his Exception numbered 8, McDonald argues that “[t]he Court’s finding that [McDonald] called an officer repeatedly while the officer was on his way to serve a summons is not supported by the evidence and is, thus, clear error.” Respondent submits the following assertions in support of his clear error argument: (1) Bar Counsel offered no evidence that McDonald attempted to prevent Sergeant Bruce Layton ¹⁹ (“Sgt. Layton”), the officer at issue, from serving a criminal summons on Knotts; (2) Bar Counsel did not call Sgt. Layton as a witness; (3) Bar Counsel presented no evidence that McDonald knew Sgt.

Layton was serving a summons on Knotts; (4) Robert Penny’s testimony that Sgt. Layton showed him McDonald’s name as the caller identification for a single phone call was insufficient support for the hearing judge’s factual finding; and, (5) Sgt. Layton is the only person who could testify concerning the number of calls he received and whether the contact number in his phone’s memory associated with McDonald “is a number belonging exclusively to [McDonald].” Declaring victory, McDonald concludes that the hearing judge’s finding is “based upon nothing more than speculation and conjecture.” We disagree with McDonald’s assessment of the evidence. The hearing judge’s factual finding is based apparently upon the following testimony elicited from Penny concerning his trip with Sgt.

Layton, on 6 July 2011, to serve a criminal summons on Knotts: Sergeant Layton and I got in his unmarked police cruiser and we began heading north and we were probably in the car three to five minutes and in those police cars, Your Honor, the center console is, basically, a metal box. It’s not like your standard luxury car, per se. It’s like a metal box and as we’re heading out of town, I can hear what sounded like his phone vibrating and it would go through a ring cycle and then it would stop and then it would immediately start again. It went through this cycle three, four, five times so I made a comment to Sergeant Layton do you need to get that.

Sergeant Layton ... grabbed the phone. I observed Sergeant Layton look at it and then he turned the screen to me so I could see it and I don’t know how he had the contact listed, if it was just John Mark or John Mark McDonald, but I could clearly draw the conclusion that it was Mr. McDonald ringing the phone. So I, basically, told Sergeant Layton we’re continuing with the mission at hand and just keep going. ²⁰ It is also worth noting Penny’s additional testimony that McDonald called him (Penny) earlier on 6 July 2011 to ask if criminal charges would be filed that day against Knotts and became upset when Penny responded in the affirmative. Respondent proceeded to make several requests to prevent the charges from being filed, with which either Penny declined to, or could not, comply.

In light of Penny’s testimony, the bases for McDonald’s argument that the hearing judge’s finding was in clear error suggests that McDonald fails to recognize “the use of inferences in the fact-finding process,” in which judges, when acting as the finder of fact, “routinely apply their common sense, powers of logic, and accumulated experiences in life to arrive at conclusions from demonstrated sets of facts.” In re Gloria H., 410 Md. 562, 577 , 979 A.2d 710, 718 (2009) (quoting Robinson v. State, 315 Md. 309, 318 , 554 A.2d 395, 399 (1989)). The hearing judge, acting as the fact-finder in this case, could infer rationally that the repeated calls received by Sgt. Lay-ton’s phone, occurring one after the other, all came from the same caller, and that the number associated with McDonald’s name in Sgt. Layton’s phone’s memory was being used, in fact, by McDonald, particularly in light of McDonald’s attempt earlier that day (not to mention on other occasions) to intervene in the criminal charging process of Knotts.

Exception Numbered 9 McDonald’s Exception numbered 9 challenges the hearing judge’s finding that “[ajfter the Knotts case was assigned to Trostle, Richardson removed himself from any further control over the prosecution” of Knotts. McDonald argues that the hearing judge’s finding is “completely contradicted by the evidence and testimony in this case,” and relies on three pieces of evidence and testimony in support of this argument. First, McDonald refers to an email sent by Richardson to Trostle, on 19 September 2011, asking him to agree not to oppose probation before judgment if Knotts agreed not to say harmful things about the operation of the Office under Rich ²¹ ardson’s tenure. McDonald posits that this email contradicts Trostle’s testimony that Richardson “stood down” and did not influence thereafter the Special Prosecutor.

Furthermore, McDonald asserts that the original plea offer from Trostle, according to the testimony of Knotts’s attorney (Barroll), did not include an offer of probation before judgment, and that at that time Knotts was considering filing a Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement that “would have included evidence that, not only did Mr. Richardson violate the plea agreement, but he knowingly overcharged the restitution owed in the case.” The email from Richardson to Trostle does not support a determination of clear error. First, the text of the email indicates that Richardson floated the probation before judgment idea to Trostle as a suggestion, not as a demand, and then only if Knotts’s attorney requested it. Second, McDonald points to no evidence in the record to demonstrate that Richardson’s suggestion influenced Trostle actually. Third, whether Knotts was planning to file a particular motion in her criminal case, and what the factual allegations in that motion would be, have no bearing on our consideration of the present case.

The second piece of evidence McDonald relies on is what he alleges to be testimony that Richardson contacted McDonald, Michael Pappafotis, and Jane Miller 7 in an attempt to persuade each of them not to testify on Knotts’s behalf regarding the alleged plea agreement. Yet again, McDonald advances a very liberal interpretation of the actual testimony in this case. As to Pappafotis, Richardson testified, in the portion of the transcript McDonald refers us to, that he did call Pappafotis, but denied that he did so in an effort to persuade him not to testify on behalf of Knotts. Additionally, Pappafotis testified, in response to McDonald’s counsel asking if Richardson tried to dissuade him from testifying, “I wouldn’t say that [Richard ²² son] tried to dissuade me.” As to Miller, McDonald refers us to portions of the transcript where she testified that Richardson called her and, among other things, “had a discussion with [her] about how in Mrs. Knotts’s case that the plea wasn’t really a plea, and that [Miller] must have misunderstood.” Moreover, Richardson testified “No” in response to McDonald’s counsel questioning him about whether he tried to dissuade Miller from testifying.

McDonald does not point to evidence in the record suggesting that Richardson tried to dissuade McDonald from testifying. The testimony McDonald refers us to does little to convince us that the hearing judge’s finding that Richardson relinquished control over Knotts’s prosecution was “completely contradicted” by the evidence in this case. Finally, McDonald relies on his own testimony that Richardson directed Penny to send an email to Trostle asking that the Knotts case stay in the District Court (as opposed to the Circuit Court), and that the email must have been removed from the State’s Attorney’s file that was subpoenaed. This testimony does not demonstrate that the hearing judge’s finding is clear error.

Competent and material evidence was before the hearing judge on which to find that Richardson surrendered control of Knotts’s prosecution to Trostle. Bar Counsel elicited testimony from Trostle that, although Richardson had communications with him, Trostle, as the Special Prosecutor, had control over the case and was not influenced by Richardson. Accordingly, the relevant finding was not clearly erroneous. Respondent’s Exception numbered 9 is overruled.

Exception Numbered 10 McDonald argues in this Exception that the hearing judge lacked evidence from which to find that McDonald “contacted Steven Trostle during the first week of August of 2011 ... [and] told Trostle that [McDonald] would be receiving a subpoena to testify [requested by Knotts’s lawyer so that he could be a character witness on Knotts’s behalf],” because neither Trostle nor McDonald, the only two parties to the ²³ conversation, testified to that as a fact. McDonald contends the evidence shows that McDonald “was giving Mr. Trostle the courtesy of letting him know that he may be a character witness for Ms. Knotts,” and that a subpoena was not issued until after Trostle opined that it would be improper for McDonald to be a character witness for Knotts. The transcript of Trostle’s testimony, however, reveals the following colloquy between Trostle and McDonald’s counsel concerning Trostle’s first conversation with McDonald: Q Okay. Can you place that first conversation in time?

A I believe it was in the first week of August [2011]. Q So it was after you got this August 2nd letter, if you got it? A I can’t say. Keep in mind, that letter may have just been provided to me, not so much by mail to my office, but it may have been printed, put in the file and sent to me with the file.

I believe I received the file, also, in that first week of August. Q At that point, he did tell you that he was being subpoenaed as a character witness on [Knotts’s] behalf, is that correct? A When you say he, you’re referring to your client? Q Mr. McDonald.

A He did indicate that, I believe. This testimony undercuts McDonald’s recollection of the evidence, and demonstrates that the hearing judge’s finding was not clearly erroneous. This Exception is overruled. Exception Numbered 11 McDonald argues that the evidence contradicts the hearing judge’s finding that “at all relevant times,” during the investigation and prosecution of Knotts, McDonald was Deputy State’s Attorney.

We disagree again with McDonald’s interpretation of the evidence. Although it is correct that some of the events relevant to McDonald’s misconduct in relation to the Knotts case occurred after his last day working physically in the State’s Attorney’s Office (on 8 September 2011), an ²⁴ email from an employee of that Office’s Human Resources Department, which was admitted into evidence, confirms that McDonald’s actual separation date was pushed back until 1 December 2011, after the relevant events took place (Knotts pled guilty and was sentenced on 21 October 2011). Accordingly, the hearing judge’s finding was not clearly erroneous. This Exception is overruled. 2.

McDonald’s Exceptions Concerning Procedural Matters Exception Numbered 1 In his opening Exception, McDonald argues that the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action filed by Bar Counsel should be dismissed because “no evidence was introduced that establishes Bar Counsel had the authority to bring this action.” McDonald grounds this argument on his general denial, in his Answer to the Petition, that Bar Counsel was authorized or directed by the Commission to bring the case against him, and that Bar Counsel failed to prove such authority at trial. McDonald relies on In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 , 88 S.Ct. 1222 , 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968), for the proposition that “[d]ue process applies to attorney disciplinary proceedings.” That case, however, does not advance McDonald’s position. Rujfalo stands for the proposition that an attorney facing disbarment is “entitled to procedural due process, which includes fair notice of the charge.” 390 U.S. at 550 , 88 S.Ct. at 1226 , 20 L.Ed.2d 117 . There is no question that the Petition was sufficient to put McDonald on notice of the charges against him.

McDonald offers no legal authority supporting the proposition that a lack of demonstrative proof regarding Bar Counsel’s actual authority to file the Petition constitutes a deprivation of procedural due process. Bar Counsel averred in the Petition that it was filed upon direction from the Commission to Bar Counsel on 28 June 2012, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16 — 751(a)(1). At a minimum, this established apparent authority and a presumption of propriety. We agree with Bar Counsel that McDonald’s mere denial of the averment does not overcome the presumption nor does it establish ²⁵ affirmatively that Bar Counsel lacked authorization from the Commission to file the petition.

Accordingly, McDonald’s Exception is overruled. Exception Numbered 2 and Like Numbered Supplemental Exception McDonald argues here that the hearing judge committed clear error by granting Bar Counsel’s Motion in Limine prohibiting McDonald from “cross-examining Petitioner’s witnesses regarding bias.” McDonald complains that he was prejudiced by not being allowed to conduct cross-examination (or admit impeachment evidence) concerning: (1) complaints filed with the Commission against other attorneys; (2) alleged extra-marital affairs of Bar Counsel’s witnesses; (3) Richardson’s and Penny’s alleged motive to lie for political reasons; and (4) Richardson’s and Penny’s alleged interference with McDonald’s private practice clients and/or potential clients. McDonald seeks remand of the case to re-open the records for further cross-examination and impeachment evidence. McDonald’s Exception lacks merit for four reasons.

First, neither Bar Counsel’s Motion in Limine nor the hearing judge’s ruling on that Motion effected a blanket exclusion, as McDonald suggests, on McDonald’s admission of evidence regarding bias of Bar Counsel’s witnesses. The hearing judge ruled that McDonald would not be permitted to offer or elicit the following evidence: (1) testimony regarding the alleged extra-marital affairs of any witnesses, (2) testimony regarding any person’s motivation for filing a grievance with the Commission, and (3) information regarding McDonald’s peer review hearing. The hearing judge found that these areas of possible inquiry were not relevant, but stated that other issues concerning the credibility of Bar Counsel’s witnesses would be “fair game.” Second, we do not conclude that the hearing judge committed clear error in excluding, on the ground of relevance, the information regarding the motivations behind grievances filed against other attorneys and the alleged extra ²⁶ marital affairs of any witnesses. Although attorneys are afforded wide latitude in cross-examination concerning matters of credibility, a judge has discretion to prevent the admission of evidence that is irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial to the witness.

See Md. Rule 16-757(a) (“The hearing of a disciplinary or remedial action is governed by the rules of evidence and procedure applicable to a court trial in a civil action tried in a circuit court.”); Md. Rules 5-401 to -404 (defining relevance and its general scope); see also State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173, 178 , 468 A.2d 319, 321 (1983). It was permissible for the hearing judge to conclude that evidence of grievances concerning other attorneys and romantic relationships of the witnesses concerned collateral matters that are not probative significantly of the witnesses’ character for truth or veracity. Third, McDonald’s complaints that he was prohibited unfairly from exploring Richardson’s and Penny’s alleged motivations to lie for political reasons or their alleged interference with McDonald’s private practice clients appear to us to be baseless. The hearing judge’s ruling did not preclude McDonald from attempting to explore those areas on cross-examination or through other impeachment evidence.

Furthermore, McDonald does not direct our attention to any portions of the record where the hearing judge prevented him otherwise from offering or admitting such evidence. Fourth, the hearing judge’s ruling excluded properly evidence regarding McDonald’s proceedings before a peer review panel in the present case. 8 Peer review hearings are ²⁷ confidential, and speech, conduct, or writings made as part of a peer review hearing are privileged. Md. Rule 16 — 723(a). Therefore, the hearing judge concluded appropriately that evidence from McDonald’s peer review hearing was irrelevant.

Usiak, 418 Md. at 682 n. 9, 18 A.3d at 10 n. 9 (“[EJvidence that was presented to the Peer Review Panel, and its assessment of that evidence, is irrelevant to our review of the evidence presented at Respondent’s actual disciplinary evidentiary hearing.”). Accordingly, McDonald’s Exception numbered 2 is overruled. In his Supplemental Exception numbered 2, McDonald seeks to bolster the bias argument from Exception numbered 2 by submitting email exchanges between Richardson and Assistant Bar Counsel in this matter that McDonald received, after the evidentiary hearing, in response to a Maryland Public Information Act request. McDonald argues that the emails demonstrate a personal relationship between Assistant Bar Counsel and Richardson revealing evidence of bias.

Not only are the emails irrelevant because they were exchanged after the record was closed in the present case, but the content of them appear to consist only of jokes having no bearing on the substance of the case nor do they indicate that any improper bias was present at the time of McDonald’s evidentiary hearing. McDonald’s Supplemental Exception numbered 2 is overruled. Exception Numbered Ip and Supplemental Exception Numbered 1 In Exception numbered 4, McDonald perceives that the hearing judge erred in denying his motion to strike Richardson’s testimony for alleged sequestration violations. As Bar Counsel points out, however, McDonald’s attorney never moved actually to have testimony stricken based on violation of a sequestration order. 9 The record reflects that Richardson ²⁸ was called as a rebuttal witness by Bar Counsel, and indicated, during cross-examination by McDonald’s attorney, that he read in a newspaper that other witnesses in the case alleged during their testimony that Richardson engaged in misconduct by “fixing” tickets for family and friends.

McDonald’s counsel then asked Richardson whether any specific person told him about McDonald’s testimony during the hearing, and Richardson replied “Nobody told me what his testimony was.” Richardson explained that he was asked by Assistant Bar Counsel whether he knew who Joe Gilberto and Andrew Langer were, who happened to be the people for whom Richardson allegedly “fixed” tickets, and that he “put[] two and two together.” McDonald’s attorney complained subsequently, at a bench conference, that the judge’s sequestration order had been “grossly violated,” but indicated that he did not know who violated it, and could not offer any specific evidence of the alleged violation. Assistant Bar Counsel explained that Richardson was asked about the allegations against him for the purpose of preparing his rebuttal testimony, but that Richardson was not told about any specific testimony that occurred during the hearing. Additionally, when Assistant Bar Counsel expressed umbrage at the suggestion she was implicated in a sequestration violation, McDonald’s counsel explained that he was not