Attorney Grievance v. O'Neill

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Lawrence Daniel O’Neill, Misc. Docket AG No. 41, September Term, 2020. Opinion by Hotten, J. ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – DISBARMENT The Court of Appeals disbarred Lawrence Daniel O’Neill (“Respondent”) from the practice of law in Maryland. This Court found that Respondent violated Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) 19-301.1 (Competence), 19-301.15 (Safekeeping Property), 19-308.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 19-308.4 (Misconduct), 19- 407 (Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping), 19-408 (Commingling of Funds), and 19- 410 (Prohibited Transactions).

These violations stemmed from the failure to properly maintain client funds in an attorney trust account and the misappropriation of client funds for personal use. Respondent caused a negative balance to occur in the attorney trust account on multiple occasions by withdrawing client funds to pay monthly expenses. Respondent also failed to maintain accurate records of the attorney trust account. Respondent made knowingly and intentionally false statements to Bar Counsel, failed to timely and completely answer requests for financial records from Bar Counsel, and failed to participate in proceedings before the hearing judge.

In the aggregate, Respondent’s conduct warranted disbarment. Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County Case No. C-02-CV-20-002012 Argued: December 6, 2021 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 41 September Term, 2020 __________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. LAWRENCE DANIEL O’NEILL __________________________________ Getty, C.J., *McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, JJ. __________________________________ Opinion by Hotten, J. __________________________________ Filed: March 9, 2022 *McDonald, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. being recalled pursuant to Maryland 2022-05-27 Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he 14:59-04:00 also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk Attorneys have professional obligations to place client funds in a trust account until earned, to avoid commingling client, operational, and personal funds, and to maintain accurate financial records.

These obligations protect client funds from an attorney’s creditors, “provide peace of mind and order to disputing parties,” and generally “reinforce[] the public’s confidence in our legal system.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Calhoun, 391 Md. 532, 574 , 894 A.2d 518, 543 (2006) (citations omitted). “Establishing and maintaining an attorney trust account requires devoting time and attention to minute details[,]” which can “be dull and monotonous[,] . . . but is fundamental to complying with the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct [(“MARPC”)].” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Johnson, 472 Md. 491, 502 , 247 A.3d 767 , 774 (2021). The fundamental obligation to safeguard client funds applies regardless of where or how an attorney practices law. In the case at bar, Lawrence Daniel O’Neill (“Respondent”) maintained a law office in New York City, but was licensed to practice law in Maryland.1 Respondent repeatedly generated a negative balance on his attorney trust account by withdrawing client funds for personal use, commingled client and personal funds, and failed to maintain accurate accounting records. The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, acting through Bar Counsel (“Petitioner”), filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“the Petition”) with this Court pursuant to Md. Rule 19-721.2 1 Respondent was admitted to the Maryland Bar on December 19, 1975. 2 Maryland Rule 19-721(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part: “Upon approval or direction of the Commission, Bar Counsel, on behalf of the Commission, shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals.” By order dated October 21, 2020, this Court designated the Honorable Elizabeth S. Morris (“hearing judge”) of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to consider the matter against Respondent and render findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Following a hearing on July 26, 2021, and upon consideration of the evidence presented, the hearing judge found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated each rule of professional conduct as alleged by Petitioner: MARPC 19-301.1 (Competence), 19-301.15 (Safekeeping Property), 19-308.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 19-308.4 (Misconduct), 19-407 (Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping), 19-408 (Commingling of Funds), and 19-410 (Prohibited Transactions). We agree with the conclusions reached by the hearing judge and, for the following reasons, we disbar Respondent from the practice of law in Maryland. FINDINGS OF FACT We summarize the hearing judge’s findings of fact and the exhibits submitted at the hearing. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent maintained an office for the practice of law in New York City, but was not licensed to practice law in New York.

Respondent provided consulting services to international corporations regarding corporate affairs, tax issues, mergers, and acquisitions. The failure to abide by attorney accounting practices in New York eventually triggered Petitioner’s investigation of Respondent. Procedural History Following several failed service attempts, Respondent was served on March 26, 2021 with the Petition, Writ of Summons issued by the circuit court, Order of the Court of Appeals dated October 21, 2020, Petitioner’s First Request for Admissions of Fact and 2 Genuineness of Documents, Petitioner’s First Set of Interrogatories, and Petitioner’s First Request for Production of Documents. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss with the erroneous expectation that it stayed the time to answer the Petition.

Maryland Rule 19-725(c) prohibits a motion to dismiss during attorney grievance proceedings.3 Respondent failed to file an answer in compliance with Md. Rule 19-724(a).4 The hearing judge treated the failure to timely file an answer as a default pursuant to Md. Rule 19-724. Petitioner filed a Motion for Order of Default 3 Maryland Rule 19-725(c) provides in pertinent part: Motions to dismiss the proceeding and motions for summary judgment are not permitted. Committee note: Proceedings on a Petition . . . are conducted pursuant to the original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to regulate the practice of law . . . . Moreover, because the authority of the circuit court judge designated by the Court of Appeals pursuant to [Md.] Rule 19-722 is limited to taking evidence and making findings of fact and proposed conclusions of law, that judge is not empowered to dismiss a petition. . . . [O]nly the Court of Appeals has authority to dismiss all or part of a petition. 4 Maryland Rule 19-724 provides in pertinent part: (a) Timing.

The attorney shall file with the designated clerk and serve on Bar Counsel an answer to the petition: (1) within 15 days after service; or (2) by such other time specified by the Court of Appeals. *** (c) Failure to Answer. If the time for filing an answer has expired and the attorney has failed to file an answer in accordance with section (a) of this Rule, the court shall treat the failure as a default, and the provisions of [Md.] Rule 2-613 shall apply. 3 on April 29, 2021, and Respondent filed an opposition on May 3, 2021. The hearing judge issued an Order of Default against Respondent, and the clerk of the circuit court provided notice of the Order of Default to Respondent on June 24, 2021. On July 20, 2021, Respondent moved to vacate the Order of Default, but failed to state a legal or factual basis as required by Md. Rule 2-613(d).5 On July 25, 2021, Respondent filed a Motion for Continuance stating he was “currently out of the country attending to a family emergency and [was] unable to return to Maryland until the first week of August.” Respondent simultaneously filed a response to Petitioner’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but the hearing judge did not consider the response due to the Order of Default.

Respondent neither appeared nor participated during the hearing on July 26, 2021. Petitioner appeared and presented evidence. Pursuant to Md. Rule 2-424(b),6 Petitioner’s 5 Maryland Rule 2-613(d) provides: “The defendant may move to vacate the order of default within 30 days after its entry. The motion shall state the reasons for the failure to plead and the legal and factual basis for the defense to the claim.” 6 Maryland Rule 2-424 provides in pertinent part: (b) Response.

Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within 30 days after service of the request or within 15 days after the date on which that party’s initial pleading or motion is required, whichever is later, the party to whom the request is directed serves a response signed by the party or the party’s attorney. *** (d) Effect of Admission. Any matter admitted under this Rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment. The court may permit withdrawal or amendment if the court finds that it would assist the presentation of the merits of the action and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or (continued . . .) 4 Request for Admissions were deemed admitted and received into evidence. The hearing judge denied Respondent’s motion to vacate the Order of Default on August 3, 2021.

The hearing judge found the following facts to have been established by clear and convincing evidence. Overdrafts on Attorney Trust Account Respondent maintained an attorney trust account at JPMorgan Chase Bank (“Chase Bank”) at all times relevant hereto. On July 12, 2018, Respondent deposited a $1,000 check into the attorney trust account. The check was drawn from his personal checking account and made payable to “cash.” On July 13, 2018, the deposit was denied for insufficient funds leaving $1.96 in the attorney trust account.

That same day, Respondent made an electronic payment of $300 from his attorney trust account to pay personal expenses. This transfer caused an overdraft of -$300 from the attorney trust account.7 The hearing judge found that Respondent repeated this process and subsequently caused additional overdrafts on his attorney trust account on numerous occasions. On July 18, 2018, Respondent deposited a check in the amount of $900 dollars into his attorney trust account from his personal account, which was returned the next day for insufficient funds causing an overdraft of -$198.04 from the attorney trust account. On July 19, 2018, (. . . continued) amendment will prejudice the party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits. . . . 7 The hearing judge did not explain why the overdraft was for -$300, instead of -$298.04 (i.e., the difference between $1.96 and -$300). 5 Respondent made two electronic transfers from the attorney trust account to his operating account in the amounts of $200 and $150, which caused an overdraft of $-548.04.

On September 4, 2018, Respondent deposited a check in the amount of $900 into his attorney trust account from his personal account. The check was returned for insufficient funds on September 5, 2018. That same day, Respondent made two electronic transfers from his attorney trust account to his operating account and Chase credit card totaling $1,000, which caused an overdraft of -$195.30. On September 25, 2018, Respondent deposited a check in the amount of $800 into his attorney trust account, drawn from his personal account.

On September 26, 2018, the check was returned for insufficient funds, and Respondent made two transfers from his attorney trust account causing an overdraft in the amount of -$199.77. In total, the hearing judge found that Respondent’s attorney trust account had a negative balance on ten different occasions between July 1, 2018 and September 30, 2019. Commingling and Prohibited Transactions During this same time period, Respondent deposited personal funds into his attorney trust account on seventeen different occasions. Respondent also paid personal and business expenses from his attorney trust account.

Respondent directed Chase Bank to automatically debit funds from his attorney trust account to pay monthly personal credit card bills. Bar Counsel Investigation On July 25, 2018, Chase Bank notified the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection of the State of New York (“NY Client Protection Fund”) of Respondent’s overdraft arising 6 on July 13, 2018.8 The NY Client Protection Fund informed the Attorney Grievance Committee of the State of New York (“NY AGC”) of each overdraft notice that it received from Chase Bank pursuant to N.Y. Ct. R. § 1300.1.9 On October 15, 2018, the NY AGC wrote to the NY Client Protection Fund explaining that because Respondent had an office located in neither Manhattan nor the Bronx,10 nor was a member of the New York bar, the matter did not come within its jurisdiction. The NY AGC advised the NY Client Protection Fund that it was forwarding its correspondence to Petitioner. Bar Counsel received the first overdraft notice from the NY AGC on October 22, 2018.11 Approximately a month later, Bar Counsel wrote to Respondent to the business address on file with the Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland, enclosing the 8 Chase Bank sent additional notifications of Respondent’s subsequent overdrafts to the NY Client Protection Fund on July 27, September 3, and September 28. 9 New York Court Rules § 1300.1 provides in pertinent part: (b) An agreement to provide dishonored check and overdraft reports shall be filed with the [NY Client Protection Fund], which shall maintain a central registry of all banking institutions which have been approved in accordance with this section, and the current status of each such agreement.

The agreement shall apply to all branches of each banking institution that provides special bank accounts for attorneys engaged in the practice of law in this State, and shall not be cancelled by a banking institution except on 30 days’ prior written notice to the [NY Client Protection Fund]. 10 Respondent maintained an office in Manhattan, but the hearing judge did not explain why the NY AGC indicated otherwise. The NY AGC presumably declined to investigate because Respondent did not practice New York law at the Manhattan office. 11 The NY AGC forwarded to Bar Counsel the September 7, 2018 overdraft notification on December 20, 2018, and the September 28, 2018 overdraft notification on January 14, 2019. Bar Counsel enclosed these overdraft notifications in its correspondence with Respondent. 7 overdraft notices and requested a written response including “copies of client ledgers, deposit slips, canceled checks . . . and monthly bank statements for the period of June 2018 through August 2018.” On December 12, 2018, the letter was returned “not deliverable as addressed” and “unable to forward.” Bar Counsel sent a second letter to the address associated with Respondent’s attorney trust account, but it was returned as “not deliverable as addressed” and “unable to forward.” On January 3, 2019, Bar Counsel wrote to Respondent at his home address on file with the Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland, enclosed the overdraft notices, and requested a written response within ten days, including “copies of client ledgers, deposit slips, cancelled checks . . . and monthly bank statements from October 2018 through January 2019.” On January 17, 2019, Respondent wrote to Bar Counsel and stated that the overdrafts occurred when “several checks presented by clients in payment of fees were, returned unpaid, yet funds were withdrawn to pay expenses.” Respondent requested additional time to submit the financial records. The hearing judge found Respondent’s explanation for the overdrafts knowingly false, because the overdrafts occurred when checks from Respondent’s personal bank account were deposited into the attorney trust account and returned for insufficient funds.

By April 24, 2019, Bar Counsel had yet to receive the requested records. Bar Counsel Investigator Charles E. Miller, IV, wrote to Respondent, enclosing previous correspondence, and again requested the financial records. On July 31, 2019, Bar Counsel had not received a response and notified Respondent that the matter had been docketed for further investigation and requested a written explanation for each overdraft on the attorney 8 trust account by August 12, 2019. Bar Counsel also requested all financial record-keeping documents for his attorney trust account between July 1, 2018 and July 1, 2019, “including all monthly statements, deposit and disbursement records, cancelled checks (front and back), and any client matter records that were maintained.” On September 4, 2019, Respondent wrote to Bar Counsel, including a spreadsheet purporting to be an “accounting for the IOLTA account[]” from January 2018 through July 2018.

Respondent provided no other records for the requested time period and again “falsely stated that ‘. . . all overdrafts relate to checks from clients that were returned unpaid.’” On October 8, 2019, Respondent emailed Bar Counsel with attached monthly bank statements for his attorney trust account for July 1, 2018 through July 1, 2019. No other requested financial records were submitted. On October 11, 2019, pursuant to a subpoena, Bar Counsel obtained records from Chase Bank for Respondent’s attorney trust account from July 1, 2018 through September 30, 2019. Contrary to Respondent’s written statements to Bar Counsel, the records demonstrated that the overdrafts resulted from Respondent’s personal checks being returned for insufficient funds.

Bar Counsel took Respondent’s statement under oath on January 27, 2020. The hearing judge found that Respondent falsely testified that he maintained client ledgers in conformance with the Maryland Rules. Respondent also admitted under oath that (1) he deposited personal funds into the attorney trust account, (2) he paid personal expenses from his attorney trust account, and (3) he deposited personal funds into the attorney trust 9 account because he either improperly removed client funds or attempted to avoid an overdraft. For at least one client, Peter Varty, Respondent admitted that he deposited client funds into his personal checking account on six occasions before allegedly attempting to transfer the funds into the attorney trust account.

Respondent contended that he received Mr. Varty’s permission to deposit the funds into a personal account, but the hearing judge found no evidence of Mr. Varty’s written, informed consent. When Respondent allegedly attempted to deposit the funds into a trust account, the bank dishonored the checks, which the hearing judge found as additional evidence of the misappropriation of Mr. Varty’s funds. The hearing judge found that Respondent knowingly and intentionally failed to deposit and safekeep Mr. Varty’s funds in an attorney trust account, and Respondent knowingly and intentionally deposited personal funds into his attorney trust account to pay business or personal expenses.12 12 On September 16, 2021, after failing to meaningfully participate in the disciplinary proceedings, Respondent filed a “Response to Petitioner’s Recommendation for Sanction” (capital letters removed) that asserted at least two of the hearing judge’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous. First, “[t]here was never any intermingling of client funds in the trust account as at no time during the period under investigation were there client funds in that account.” Second, Respondent claimed that the “charge of misappropriation of funds from Mr. Varty is impossible.” Respondent claimed that he represented Mr. Varty pro bono in a matter in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Respondent secured a settlement of $5,000, and according to Respondent, these funds were used to cover, in part, litigation expenses. Respondent attached an affidavit from Mr. Varty authorizing a payment of $5,000 to Respondent to offset out of pocket expenses incurred during his case. Respondent attempted to submit the affidavit to this Court. This evidence was not presented to the hearing judge.

Accordingly, we decline to consider facts and evidence that are outside the record. 10 While under oath, Respondent stated that the discrepancies between his “IOLTA accounting spreadsheet” and the Chase Bank records subpoenaed by Bar Counsel were “errors.” The hearing judge found that the nineteen discrepancies were not merely “errors[]” but intentional misrepresentations to conceal his misconduct. Following the statement under oath, Respondent agreed to provide additional documentation of specific client matters and transactions. Respondent failed to provide the requested documentation. Bar Counsel requested the materials to be submitted by April 17, 2020.

Respondent missed the deadline and requested an extension. On April 24, 2020, Respondent emailed Bar Counsel claiming that the requested documents would be contained in a “dropbox[.]”13 Respondent never shared the documents nor created a “dropbox[.]” The hearing judge found that Respondent intentionally failed to send any requested documents to Bar Counsel. On April 27, 2020, Bar Counsel requested the materials via email, and Respondent promised he would provide the materials electronically, but again failed to do so. On May 1, 2020, Respondent emailed Bar Counsel that a computer malfunction prevented transmission of the files: Unfortunately on Monday evening my computer crashed.

Looks like the motherboard gave up the ghost. All the file[s] as are backed up on the cloud. As the [A]pple [S]tore is closed[,] I have sent it away to be repaired and have been told that I will have it Monday. I have arranged to borrow a friend[’]s spare computer which I will pick up tomorrow so one way or the other you “Dropbox” is a “cloud-based document sharing service that permits users to share 13 documents with other users without the need . . . to maintain a local file-sharing server.” Timothy S. Faith, Virtuality – The Lawyer That Is Almost Really There, 47 Md. B.J. 12, 18 (Dec. 2014). 11 will have the Dropbox on Monday.

Tried to use my iPad as a[n] alternative but it just does not work or at least I can’t figure it out. The hearing judge found that Respondent’s statements were knowingly false, and that Respondent did not maintain accurate records for the receipt, maintenance, and disbursement of client funds, or the funds of the client held in trust. The hearing judge further found that Respondent did not perform monthly reconciliations of his attorney trust account records, nor did Respondent provide the documents as requested several times by Bar Counsel. THE HEARING JUDGE’S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.1 (Competence), 19-301.15 (Safekeeping Property), 19-308.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 19-308.4 (Misconduct), 19-407 (Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping), 19-408 (Commingling of Funds), and 19-410 (Prohibited Transactions).

MARPC 19-301.1 (Competence) MARPC 19-301.1 provides: “An attorney shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” A lawyer violates MARPC 19- 301.1 by “failing to maintain funds in an attorney trust account without a client’s consent to some other arrangement.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Haley, 443 Md. 657, 668 , 118 A.3d 816, 822 (2015) (citation, quotation, and other markings omitted). 12 The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.1 by failing to deposit client funds into an attorney trust account. Respondent admitted that he deposited Mr. Varty’s funds into his personal account without consent. The hearing judge rejected Respondent’s claim that he received Mr. Varty’s permission to deposit the funds in his personal account.

The hearing judge also rejected Respondent’s “unsubstantiated claim” that his personal checks were dishonored because Mr. Varty’s payments were returned for insufficient funds. MARPC 19-301.15 (Safekeeping Property) MARPC 19-301.15 provides in relevant part: (a) An attorney shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in an attorney’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the attorney’s own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 19, Chapter 400 of the Maryland Rules, and records shall be created and maintained in accordance with the Rules in that Chapter. . . . Complete records of the account funds and of other property shall be kept by the attorney and shall be preserved for a period of at least five years after the date the record was created.

(b) An attorney may deposit the attorney’s own funds in a client trust account only as permitted by [Md.] Rule 19-408 (b). (c) Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a different arrangement, an attorney shall deposit legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance into a client trust account and may withdraw those funds for the attorney’s own benefit only as fees are earned or expenses incurred. The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.15(a), (b), and (c). Respondent failed to deposit and maintain client funds in his attorney trust account and failed to create and maintain appropriate financial records in violation of MARPC 19- 301.15(a).

The hearing judge also found that Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.15(b) 13 by routinely commingling personal funds with client funds. Finally, Respondent withdrew client funds from the attorney trust account without the informed, written consent by the client in violation of MARPC 19-301.15(c). MARPC 19-308.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters) MARPC 19-308.1 provides: An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or an attorney in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or (b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by [MARPC] 19-301.6 (1.6). An attorney violates MARPC 19-308.1(a) when they have “knowingly misrepresented material facts in response to Bar Counsel’s requests for information.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Yi, 470 Md. 464, 497 , 235 A.3d 963, 982 (2020).

A violation of MARPC 19-308.1(b) occurs when an attorney fails to timely respond to lawful requests for information from Bar Counsel. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Butler, 441 Md. 352, 359 , 107 A.3d 1220, 1224 (2015). The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated MARPC 19-308.1(a) and (b). Respondent violated MARPC 19-308.1(a) by falsely stating in his January 17 and September 4, 2019 responses to Bar Counsel that the overdrafts on his attorney trust account resulted from “clients’ checks that were returned unpaid[,]” when the overdrafts arose from Respondent’s personal transactions.

Respondent further violated the rule by 14 intentionally misrepresenting transactions on his “IOLTA accounting spreadsheet[.]” Respondent violated MARPC 19-308.1(b) by failing to provide the documentation requested by Bar Counsel on November 28, 2018, and January 3, April 24, and July 31, 2019. Respondent additionally violated the rule by knowingly failing to provide information and documentation requested by Bar Counsel during the statement under oath and in a letter from Bar Counsel dated April 3, 2020. MARPC 19-308.4 (Misconduct) MARPC 19-308.4 provides in relevant part: It is professional misconduct for an attorney to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the [MARPC], knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; *** (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; [or] (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.] The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated MARPC 19-308.4(a) because he violated several other rules of professional conduct. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Framm, 449 Md. 620, 664 , 144 A.3d 827, 853 (2016) (“We have held that, when an attorney violates a rule of professional conduct, the attorney also violates [MARPC 19-30]8.4(a).[14]”) (citation and internal quote omitted).

Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 14 (“MLRPC”) were renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (i.e., MARPC) and re-codified in Title 19 of the Maryland Rules, without substantive change. 15 The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated MARPC 19-308.4(c) by failing to deposit Mr. Varty’s funds in an attorney trust account and misappropriating the funds for his own use. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gisriel, 409 Md. 331, 383 , 974 A.2d 331, 361 (2009); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McLaughlin, 456 Md. 172, 200 , 171 A.3d 1205, 1221 (2017) (“We have consistently found that attorneys violate [MARPC 19-308.4(c)] by making false statements to Bar Counsel.”) (citation omitted). The hearing judge also concluded that Respondent violated MARPC 19-308.4(d) because his failure to respond to requests from Bar Counsel was prejudicial to the administration of justice. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brigerman, 441 Md. 23, 40 , 105 A.3d 467, 477 (2014) (concluding that an attorney violated MARPC 19-308.4(d) for “repeatedly fail[ing] to respond in a timely manner to Bar Counsel’s inquiries[.]”) (citation omitted).

MARPC 19-407 (Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping) MARPC 19-407 provides in relevant part: (a) Creation of Records. The following records shall be created and maintained for the receipt and disbursement of funds of clients or of third persons: (1) Attorney Trust Account Identification. An identification of all attorney trust accounts maintained, including the name of the financial institution, account number, account name, date the account was opened, date the account was closed, and an agreement with the financial institution establishing each account and its interest-bearing nature. (2) Deposits and Disbursements.

A record for each account that chronologically shows all deposits and disbursements, as follows: (A) for each deposit, a record made at or near the time of the deposit that shows (i) the date of the deposit, (ii) the amount, (iii) the identity of the client or third person for whom the funds were deposited, and (iv) the purpose of the deposit; 16 (B) for each disbursement, including a disbursement made by electronic transfer, a record made at or near the time of disbursement that shows (i) the date of the disbursement, (ii) the amount, (iii) the payee, (iv) the identity of the client or third person for whom the disbursement was made (if not the payee), and (v) the purpose of the disbursement; (C) for each disbursement made by electronic transfer, a written memorandum authorizing the transaction and identifying the attorney responsible for the transaction. [Cross reference omitted.] (3) Client Matter Records. A record for each client matter in which the attorney receives funds in trust, as follows: (A) for each attorney trust account transaction, a record that shows (i) the date of the deposit or disbursement; (ii) the amount of the deposit or disbursement; (iii) the purpose for which the funds are intended; (iv) for a disbursement, the payee and the check number or other payment identification; and (v) the balance of funds remaining in the account in connection with the matter; and (B) an identification of the person to whom the unused portion of a fee or expense deposit is to be returned whenever it is to be