Attorney Grievance v. Bonner

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Keith M. Bonner, Miscellaneous Docket AG No. 51, September Term, 2020, Opinion by Booth, J. ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – DISBARMENT Respondent Keith M. Bonner violated the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct (“D.C. Rules”) 8.4 (a), (b), and (c) by misappropriating funds from his law firm over a period of several years and making numerous knowing and intentional misrepresentations to principals and employees at his law firm to conceal the misconduct. Considering the nature of Mr. Bonner’s misconduct and the various mitigating and aggravating factors present here, the Court of Appeals concluded that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No.: 484242-V Argued: November 8, 2021 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 51 September Term, 2020 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. KEITH M. BONNER Getty, C.J. *McDonald Watts Hotten Booth Biran Gould, JJ.

Opinion by Booth, J. Filed: March 3, 2022 *McDonald, J. now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. Pursuant to MD Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and 2022-03-03 14:27-05:00 adoption of this opinion. Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk “How much more grievous are the consequences of anger than the causes of it.” Aurelius, Marcus. 2014. Meditations.

Translated by Martin Hammond. Penguin Pocket Hardbacks. London, England: Penguin Classics. In this attorney grievance proceeding, we must determine the sanction to impose for an attorney’s misconduct involving misappropriation of funds from his law firm in which he was a founding partner and member for decades.

Respondent Keith Bonner freely admits to the facts of the misconduct and resulting violations of the professional ethical rules applicable to his misconduct. The case he presents to this Court in his defense relates almost exclusively to the mitigating factors that this Court should consider when imposing a sanction (in addition to one aggravating factor to which he excepts). Specifically, he asserts that he has shown sufficient mitigating circumstances to justify a deviation from our case law, which generally imposes the sanction of disbarment where an attorney’s misconduct involves theft or intentional misappropriation of funds. Prior to our consideration of the sanction, as we always do, we shall describe the procedural history, as well as the hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.

We shall then discuss our case law concerning sanctions where intentional misconduct involves theft or misappropriation, as well as Mr. Bonner’s argument that we should consider the emotional problems that he experienced during the period of his misconduct—anger, frustration, and feelings of entitlement and self-righteousness—as a mitigating factor in this case, along with the other mitigating factors that are present here, which he asserts warrant the imposition of a sanction less than disbarment. On November 30, 2020, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Commission”), acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“Petition”) against Respondent Keith M. Bonner, in connection with his misappropriation of funds from his former law firm. The Petition alleged that Mr. Bonner violated the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct 19-308.4(a), (b), (c) and (d).1 Thereafter, Bar Counsel filed an Amended Petition, asserting that, in the event that the Court determined that under the choice of law provisions set forth in Maryland Rule 8.5(b), the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct (“D.C. Rules”) applied to the underlying conduct, then Mr. Bonner’s conduct violated D.C. Rules 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d). Pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-722(a) and 19-727, this Court designated the Honorable Harry C. Storm of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (“hearing judge”) to conduct a hearing regarding the alleged violations and to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The hearing judge held an evidentiary hearing over Zoom for Government on April 26 and 27, 2021. Following the hearing, Bar Counsel withdrew the charge relating to a violation of D.C. Rule 8.4(d). Following the hearing, the hearing judge issued written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The hearing judge applied the choice of law provisions in Maryland 1 During much of the period relevant to this case, the ethical rules governing attorneys were entitled the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) and were codified in an appendix to Maryland Rule 16-812.

Effective July 1, 2016, the MLRPC were renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) and recodified in Title 19 of the Maryland Rules without substantive changes. See Maryland Rules 19-300.1 et seq. We shall use the current codification of those rules in this opinion. Additionally, for readability, we will use shortened references – i.e., Maryland Rule 19-301.1 will be referred to as “Maryland Rule 1.1.” 2 Rule 8.5(b)2 and determined that the D.C. Rules applied to Mr. Bonner’s conduct because the “predominant effect of the conduct” occurred in the District of Columbia.

The hearing judge concluded that Mr. Bonner violated D.C. Rules 8.4(a), (b), and (c). The hearing judge also made findings related to the presence of aggravating factors and mitigating factors for this Court’s consideration in devising the appropriate sanction. This Court has original and complete jurisdiction in attorney discipline proceedings and conducts an independent review of the record. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ambe, 425 Md. 98 , 122–23 (2012) (internal citations omitted).

We review the hearing judge’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. When no exceptions are filed to a hearing judge’s findings of fact, we accept them as established. Md. Rule 19- 2 Maryland Rule 8.5(b) states: In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this State, the rule of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows: (1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and (2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the attorney’s conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct.

An attorney shall not be subject to the discipline if the attorney’s conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the attorney reasonably believes the predominant effect of the attorney’s conduct will occur. (Emphasis added). The hearing judge correctly applied Maryland Rule 8.5(b) and determined that the D.C. Rules should apply to the conduct. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tatung, 476 Md. 45 (2021).

Bar Counsel initially filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s legal conclusion that the D.C. Rules applied. Prior to oral arguments in this case, Bar Counsel withdrew its exception. 3 740(b)(2)(A). Additionally, we “may confine [our] review to the findings of fact challenged by the exceptions.” Md. Rule 19-740(b)(2)(B). In this case, neither party filed any exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact.

Indeed, since the inception of Bar Counsel’s investigation, Mr. Bonner has admitted to the misconduct that forms the basis of the charges. We summarize these undisputed facts below. I Facts Mr. Bonner’s Education and Bar Admissions Mr. Bonner obtained a bachelor’s degree from Marquette University in 1976 and his law degree from Georgetown University Law Center in 1979. Immediately thereafter, he clerked in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

He was admitted to the District of Columbia Bar in 1980 and to the Maryland Bar in 1990. Mr. Bonner’s Partnership in Bonner Kiernan Trebach & Crociata, LLP Throughout his career, Mr. Bonner specialized in insurance defense, working at two law firms prior to forming Bonner Kiernan Trebach & Crociata LLP (“the Firm”) with three of his colleagues in 2001. Because Mr. Bonner’s surname generated name recognition (largely due to his father’s prominence associated with representing two government actors in the Watergate hearings), the partners decided to list Mr. Bonner’s name first in the Firm’s name. The Firm started with 42 attorneys, and grew to approximately 86 attorneys, including 12 equity partners, with offices in nine states.

The Firm’s largest office and the administrative headquarters is in D.C. The Firm primarily 4 represents corporations and insurance companies, focusing on defense litigation and risk management. From the Firm’s beginning and continuing to the present, Barry Trebach has functioned as the managing partner. Kevin McCarthy, CPA, is the Firm’s Chief Financial and Administrative Officer. Mr. Trebach and Mr. McCarthy both testified in this matter on behalf of Bar Counsel.

Under the Firm’s compensation system, the four founding partners were generally compensated equally within a compensation tier. However, after the implementation of a Compensation Committee in 2012, each equity partner had the opportunity to make a presentation on why an individual adjustment was appropriate. On an annual basis, each equity partner made a presentation to the Committee addressing the scope and status of his work, planned actions for client and business development, projections for the upcoming year, etc., and the Committee would decide whether to change that attorney’s compensation. Mr. Bonner was an important part of the Firm, and unquestionably a successful and respected attorney.

He worked hard, generated substantial business, and had strong client relationships. Christopher Hassell, a former partner of Mr. Bonner’s, testified that Mr. Bonner was an excellent trial lawyer who had the ability to spot strengths and weaknesses in cases.3 According to Mr. Hassell, Mr. Bonner was also a tremendous marketer, who kept his clients well informed. 3 The hearing judge noted that in 2016, Mr. Bonner was recognized by the District of Columbia Defense Lawyers Association as its “Lawyer of the Year.” 5 Notwithstanding the apparent success of both Mr. Bonner and the Firm, the relationship between Mr. Bonner and some of his partners was less than harmonious. Mr. Bonner believed that certain equity partners were not making the same efforts to contribute to the success of the Firm. For example, Mr. Bonner testified that, from the inception of the Firm, he was frustrated by what he perceived to be unequal contributions by some equity partners and asserted that a couple of his partners repeatedly billed approximately one-half of the hours that were expected of them.

Mr. Bonner described feeling alienated and isolated at the Firm. He testified that he was routinely not invited to lunch or other events, or he was invited after the fact, “as a kind of joke.” Mr. Bonner also recounted that, following a heart attack in June 2012, none of his partners came by to see how he was doing upon his return to the office. On another occasion, after he was injured on a client golf outing, no one came to check on him when he returned to the office. He testified that he felt like no one at the Firm cared about him.

According to Dr. Sidney Binks, a clinical neuropsychologist who testified on Mr. Bonner’s behalf, Mr. Bonner “felt edged out,” “like there was a move afoot to take [him] out of leadership.” In 2016, Mr. Bonner stepped down from the Firm’s Executive Committee. Mr. Bonner felt that he was not being appropriately compensated and deserved more money. In his mind, whether real or perceived, no one at the Firm was working the same number of hours or generating a comparable amount of business as him. Although he presented his case to the Compensation Committee for a number of years, he was kept in the same compensation tier as the other founding partners.

Mr. Bonner testified that he was frustrated and angry over the manner in which some partners treated him, and in 6 particular, what he perceived to be the inequity in the compensation structure. Rather than leaving the Firm, as he acknowledged he should have done, he determined that if he “wasn’t going to get paid any more[, he] would treat himself to certain things.” His misconduct followed. Mr. Bonner’s Misconduct 1. The 2012 Misconduct Mr. Bonner’s first acts of misconduct occurred in 2012, at a time when the Firm’s equity partners had an unwritten policy that legitimate business expenses would be reimbursed by the Firm.

The policy had been in effect since at least 2002. The Firm did not have a per diem for meals and travel; rather, it relied on the partners to be reasonable in their spending with the understanding that valid business expenses would be reimbursed by the Firm. On July 23, 2012, Mr. Bonner booked flights to Bermuda for himself, his wife, and their four children. One of the Firm’s primary clients, XL Catlin Insurance Company (“XL” or “XL Catlin”), maintained an office in Bermuda.

On July 25, 2012, Mr. Bonner emailed XL Catlin’s CEO, Michael McGavick,4 and asked Mr. McGavick if he would be in Bermuda during the time period of Mr. Bonner’s trip. Mr. McGavick replied that he would not be in Bermuda at that time. While in Bermuda, Mr. Bonner did not perform any work or client development associated with XL Catlin and improperly charged $3,070.11 to the Firm’s American 4 Mr. Bonner and Mr. McGavick are also close personal friends. They are the godparents of one another’s children. 7 Express credit card for his family’s personal hotel and restaurant expenses.

Mr. Bonner also submitted false time entries for August 15–18, 2012, which reflected eight hours of non-billable time each day with a description, “XL Group, Mike McGavick.” The hearing judge determined that Mr. Bonner made knowing and intentional misrepresentations that he had engaged in client development activities in Bermuda to conceal the personal nature of his expenses for which he was seeking reimbursement. On August 24, 2012, Mr. McCarthy asked Mr. Bonner for additional information regarding his Bermuda charges. Mr. Bonner replied in writing that, “Mike McGavick invited me to Bermuda last week. Bermuda charges are client dev. [sic] I ate a lot of charges.” On September 13, 2012, Mr. Bonner emailed the Firm’s equity partners with the subject line “XL Group - Status.” In this email, Mr. Bonner again falsely stated that he went to Bermuda at Mr. McGavick’s invitation, and summarized the trip as follows: I recently had the opportunity to travel to XL’s beautiful offices in Bermuda @ Mike McGavick’s invitation . . .

Mike has invited me a number of times previously, but I decided to go this time because we didn’t have a stellar beginning on our first case with them. I had struck out all summer trying to re-establish contact with Ginny Lloyd (VP Global Claims) and needed some “guidance” regarding getting back in the mix. Mike couldn’t have been nicer about it and brought up all of the good things [the Firm] had done for him and his companies in the past. He said he’d talk to Jim DiV. to see what could be done.

It was clear from our discussions (and there were many) that we needed to get in front of the adjusters and Ginny again. To make a long story short, I have spoken with Ginny (finally) and have reached out to some of the adjusters. I am going to meet with several on Sept 25 and actually play golf with them. While Ginny is not available, she says she will find time early next month for a face-to-face.

It’s almost like starting over again, but I think it’s the best path. The hearing judge determined that Mr. Bonner’s email to his partners contained knowing and intentional false statements, specifically, that: his trip to Bermuda was at Mr. 8 McGavick’s invitation; he visited XL’s office in Bermuda; and he engaged in client development while in Bermuda. The hearing judge determined that Mr. Bonner made these false statements to conceal the personal nature of his Bermuda trip that he was attempting to improperly pass off as a business trip for reimbursement purposes. Members of the Firm’s Executive Committee investigated the Bermuda charges and discovered Mr. Bonner’s July 25, 2012 email to Mr. McGavick, as well as the folio of Mr. Bonner’s hotel stay, which reflected charges for two hotel rooms to the Firm’s credit card.

Two of the Firm’s equity partners confronted Mr. Bonner about the charges. Mr. Bonner initially denied the allegations. Minutes later, he confessed, apologized, promised that the conduct would not be repeated, and offered to tender his resignation. The Firm took no official action but required that Mr. Bonner repay the $3,070.11 in trip expenses, which he repaid in full.

In response to this incident, on October 5, 2012, the Firm issued a written “Standardization of Bonner Kiernan Equity Partner Expense Policy” (the “Expense Policy”). The policy contained language confirming that the policy was not new and had been in existence since the Firm’s founding. The Expense Policy included the following: Petty Cash Expenses and Advances All petty cash funds should be supported by original receipts, similar to any other expense reimbursement. There are times when this is not practical (i.e. small cash tips of small cash payments for services), however receipts are generally available and need to be included.

For petty cash advances it is incumbent on the partner receiving an advance to substantiate the advance with actual receipts similar to any other expense reimbursement. Advances that are not substantiated within two weeks will be treated as a draw and reconciled with any true up distribution. 9 American Express and Other Credit Card Charges All charges on the firm American Express card (as well as personal credit card charges where you are seeking reimbursement) need to be supported with actual receipts, and not just notes on the credit card statement. In the case of the firm American Express card these receipts should be submitted to Beth Lavilla with a description of the charge within one week of your receiving a copy of the charges on the current month’s statement. For firm expenses on your personal card these receipts should be submitted with your reimbursement request. 2.

The 2015–2019 Misconduct In the fall of 2019, Mr. McCarthy noticed that Mr. Bonner had submitted reimbursement requests for two different activities that had taken place on the same evening. One reimbursement request was for the District of Columbia Defense Lawyers Association’s (“DCDLA”) annual banquet, and the other consisted of expenses incurred for an Argyle Country Club Independence Day Celebration, which Mr. Bonner attributed to “client development” with Mr. McGavick. Mr. McCarthy was suspicious of these charges and raised them with the Firm’s Executive Committee. The Committee tasked Mr. McCarthy with investigating both the charges in question, as well as Mr. Bonner’s other business expenses dating back to 2015.

The investigation uncovered a pattern of misconduct by Mr. Bonner beginning in 2015. Mr. McCarthy determined that Mr. Bonner had improperly submitted the Argyle Country Club charges described above, and he also identified dozens of other questionable charges, which were ultimately determined to be personal expenses that Mr. Bonner was attempting to masquerade as business expenses. The Executive Committee reviewed Mr. McCarthy’s findings and presented them to the equity partners. 10 On November 4, 2019, Mr. McCarthy, along with two of the Firm’s equity partners, John Kiernan and Alan Block, confronted Mr. Bonner with the findings of the investigation. Mr. Kiernan advised Mr. Bonner that he could resign or face expulsion at a meeting scheduled for the following week.

Mr. Bonner pleaded with Messrs. Kiernan and Block to reconsider his expulsion without success. Mr. Bonner was given a notice barring him from the Firm’s premises and was escorted from the office. Mr. Bonner retired from the Firm effective November 9, 2019.

In March 2020, Mr. Bonner and the Firm finalized the details surrounding his retirement. Through an offset of his capital account balance, he paid the Firm the sum of $35,000, which the Firm agreed “constitute[d] full restitution by Bonner for any allegedly improper expenses, including the costs of the investigations related thereto.” The Firm’s Disciplinary Complaint Against Mr. Bonner The Firm filed a complaint with the D.C. Office of Disciplinary Counsel and with the Commission. As it pertains to the charges in the Petition filed by the Commission, the Firm’s complaint included the $3,070.11 charge from Mr. Bonner’s 2012 Bermuda trip, and over $20,000 that the Firm contended Mr. Bonner improperly charged from 2015– 2019. Mr. Bonner cooperated with the investigation, responded to the complaint, and provided substantial detail regarding the allegations.

On March 24, 2020, Mr. Bonner submitted a lengthy narrative response to Bar Counsel. Although Mr. Bonner contended that some of expenses identified in the complaint were proper business expenses, he acknowledged that much of the conduct identified in the complaint violated his ethical obligations. He also conveyed remorse. 11 Summary of Improper Expenses and Misconduct Related Thereto The hearing judge found “that Mr. Bonner engaged in a pattern of misconduct that involved expensing personal items” to the Firm and by “making a variety of false statements to cover up the true nature of those expenses by characterizing them as client development.” The hearing judge determined that “[h]e engaged in this behavior once in 2012 and on approximately 35 occasions between 2015 and 2019. In doing so, [Mr. Bonner] improperly expensed $3,070.11 in 2012 and $11,184.84 [between 2015 and 2019], for a total of $14,254.95.” The hearing judge summarized the improper charges submitted during the 2015–2019 time period as follows. 1.

Improper Country Club Expenses. The hearing judge found that Mr. Bonner submitted “illegitimate charges” related to the Argyle Country Club, on four days in 2018 and 2019, totaling $639.86. In each instance, the charges were for personal use, and Mr. Bonner, through notations on reimbursement requests, knowingly and intentionally mispresented that they were for “client development.” 2. Improper Personal Charges to the Firm’s Credit Card (Without Any Explanation by Mr. Bonner) The hearing judge found that between 2015–2019, Mr. Bonner knowingly and intentionally charged personal expenses to the Firm’s credit card for meals at D.C. restaurants on 13 occasions without any explanation, totaling $1,449.68. 3.

Improper Personal Charges to the Firm’s Credit Card (With Accompanying Knowing and Intentional Misrepresentations) 12 On 14 occasions, Mr. Bonner improperly charged personal expenses to the Firm’s American Express credit card, totaling $7,967.30, and in doing so, made knowing and intentional misrepresentations about the nature of the charges. With respect to these charges, the hearing judge found that “on numerous occasions,” Mr. Bonner made intentional misrepresentations “to cover up that the expenses were actually personal in nature.” These misrepresentations included handwritten notes on credit card statements and receipts falsely attributing expenses to “client development.” For some charges, Mr. Bonner created false calendar entries and false time entries in a further effort to conceal the improper nature of the charges. For example, Mr. Bonner took his wife to see the Broadway musical, “Hamilton” in New York City between September 13–14, 2016, and improperly charged $1,156.82 to the Firm’s credit card for transportation, meals, and hotel expenses. To conceal the improper nature of these charges, Mr. Bonner created false calendar entries for those dates indicating that he was scheduled to engage in client development activities in New York City with two different clients from 8:00 a.m. through 6:00 p.m. each day.

He also submitted false time entries for those dates.5 Mr. Bonner also charged similar improper personal expenses, making similar knowing and intentional misrepresentations (through false calendar entries and false time 5 In Mr. Bonner’s false time entries for September 13–14, 2016, Mr. Bonner misrepresented that he spent 4 hours of travel time to New York City “for client meetings”; 1 hour of client development with “QBE”; 4.5 hours of client development for “meeting and lunch” with “XL Carlin [sic] in New York City”; and 10 hours of client development time with “Berkley and AIG”, and return travel to Washington, D.C. 13 entries) associated with a family trip to San Francisco in March 2017,6 a vacation in Nashville in September 2017,7 a trip to see a Broadway show in New York City in September 2018,8 a trip to Boston and Maine in July 2019,9 as well as several personal meals at D.C. restaurants. In connection with trips to San Francisco and Nashville, Mr. Bonner sent emails to the Firm’s equity partners describing client development activities and meetings that never happened. With respect to the restaurant expenses, Mr. Bonner knowingly and intentionally misrepresented that the personal expenses were associated with “client development” on the credit card statements and/or receipts. Some of the 6 In connection with the family vacation in San Francisco, in addition to creating false calendar entries and false time entries, Mr. Bonner sent an email to the Firm’s equity partners in which he knowingly and intentionally misrepresented that he had engaged in client development activities during his trip, describing a meeting that never happened. 7 The primary purpose of the vacation was for the Bonners to see one of their daughters perform at the Grand Ole Opry.

While in Nashville, Mr. Bonner stopped by the office of one of his clients for approximately one hour and dropped off a box of donuts. He did not engage in any other client development while in Nashville, and improperly charged $1,638.66 to the Firm’s credit card for airfare, car rental, meals, and hotel expenses. Similarly, he submitted false time entries for client development, including “meetings” and “dinner.” He followed up with an email to the Firm’s equity partners on September 25, 2017, in which he knowingly and intentionally mispresented that he engaged in client development activities during his Nashville trip, describing in detail client development and meetings that did not happen. 8 Mr. Bonner improperly charged the Firm credit card $1,949.90 for train tickets, meals, hotel, parking, and transportation expenses. Like the other expenses, Mr. Bonner created false calendar entries and false time sheets to conceal the improper nature of these charges, misrepresenting that he spent 4.5 hours traveling to New York for “meeting with AIG, Berkley, XL and Zurich,” 3 hours of client development and meetings with XL, and 8 hours of client development meetings and lunch with AIG. 9 The hearing judge found that Mr. Bonner traveled to Boston, where he met with partners at the Firm’s Boston office for a few hours, and then continued to Maine for a vacation with his wife.

The hearing judge determined that Mr. Bonner improperly charged $742.07 to the Firm’s credit card for airfare, meals, and hotel expenses. 14 restaurant expenses were accompanied by false calendar entries indicating that he was having meals with clients. 4. Misappropriation of Amtrak Vouchers On three occasions between 2018 and 2019, Mr. Bonner improperly used vouchers totaling $878.00 issued by Amtrak for cancelled tickets previously charged to the Firm’s credit card for personal travel by his daughters, his wife, and himself. 5. Misappropriation of Petty Cash Between 2015 and 2019, Mr. Bonner received petty cash advances from the Firm totaling $5,770. Mr. Bonner admits that he improperly used the Firm’s petty cash on four occasions, totaling $250.

On those occasions, he withdrew petty cash for trips that he anticipated would involve client development but on which he spent little or no client development time. Mr. Bonner never returned the funds to the Firm, which he admitted was improper. Other than the $250 described above, the hearing judge determined that there was no evidence that Mr. Bonner improperly spent other petty cash advances or had a general practice of doing so.10 10 The hearing judge accepted Mr. Bonner’s testimony that he routinely used petty cash for incidentals such as tipping volunteers at the Firm’s annual golf outings, waitstaff at the Firm’s annual holiday parties, and hotel staff while traveling. Mr. Bonner provided records and details corroborating these instances, which were also confirmed by Mr. Hassell.

Although the hearing judge determined that these expenses were not improper, he nonetheless determined that “[t]he record establishes that Mr. Bonner did not provide receipts substantiating his petty cash expenditures and that this violated the Firm’s internal policy.” 15 II Conclusions of Law The hearing judge determined that Mr. Bonner violated D.C. Rule 8.4(a), (b), and (c). We conduct a de novo review of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law. Md. Rule 19- 740(b)(1). Neither party filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.

Based upon our independent review of the record, we agree with the hearing judge’s conclusions that Bar Counsel established a violation of these rules by clear and convincing evidence. D.C. Rule 8.4(a) D.C. Rule 8.4(a) provides: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) [v]iolate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct[.]” As discussed below, because we determine that Mr. Bonner violated D.C. Rule 8.4(b) and (c), we conclude that he also violated D.C. Rule 8.4(a). D.C. Rule 8.4(b) D.C. Rule 8.4(b) provides: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (b) [c]ommit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects[.]” The hearing judge concluded that, between 2012 and 2019, Mr. Bonner engaged in a “pattern of misconduct” in which he “intentionally misappropriated more than $14,000 from the Firm in about 35 separate transactions.” The hearing judge determined that “Mr. Bonner used deception and false pretenses—conduct amounting to theft11 despite the absence of criminal charges—by misrepresenting either 11 The District of Columbia Theft statute is found at D.C. Code § 22-3211 and provides: 16 directly, or by omission, that charges and expenses were legitimate business expenses.” Based upon our independent review of the record, we agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion. D.C. Rule 8.4(c) D.C. Rule 8.4(c) provides: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (c) [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation[.]” We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Mr. Bonner violated D.C. Rule 8.4(c) through his actions taken in an effort to conceal the personal nature of expenses that he submitted to the Firm for reimbursement, including: falsely reporting “client development” time through entries on expenses receipts and statements and by falsely creating calendar entries and time entries identifying time spent with clients.

The hearing judge correctly determined that each false and dishonest statement made in connection with these personal expenses constituted a violation of D.C. Rule 8.4(c). (a) For the purpose of this section, the term “wrongfully obtains or uses” means: (1) taking or exercising control over property; (2) making an unauthorized use, disposition, or transfer of an interest in or possession of property; or (3) obtaining property by trick, false pretense, false token, tampering, or deception. The term “wrongfully obtains or uses” includes conduct previously known as larceny, larceny by trick, larceny by trust, embezzlement, and false pretenses. (b) A person commits the offense of theft if that person wrongfully obtains or uses the property of another with intent: (1) To deprive the other of a right to the property or a benefit of the property; or (2) To appropriate the property to his or her own use or to the use of a third person. 17 III Legal Questions Involving the Choice of Law Provisions (Maryland Rule 8.5(b)) As noted above, neither party filed exceptions to the findings of fact or conclusions of law as found by the hearing judge and summarized above.

The key dispute in this case involves the appropriate sanction that this Court should impose for Mr. Bonner’s admitted misconduct. Before we turn to sanctions, we address two legal issues raised in this case that pertain to the hearing judge’s application of the D.C. Rules to Mr. Bonner’s misconduct, one of which is raised by Bar Counsel in the form of exceptions, and the other of which is asserted by Mr. Bonner in connection with his sanction argument. We address Bar Counsel’s exception first. 1. Bar Counsel’s Exception to the Hearing Judge’s Failure to Apply Both the D.C. Rules and the Maryland Rules to the Same Underlying Misconduct Under Rule 8.5(b) As noted above, Bar Counsel initially charged Mr. Bonner with violating Maryland Rule 8.4 (a)–(d).

Bar Counsel subsequently amended its petition by charging Mr. Bonner with violating D.C. Rule 8.4(a)–(d), as an alternative to the charges filed under the corresponding Maryland Rule, in the event that this Court determined that the D.C. Rules applied under the choice of law provisions of Maryland Rule 8.5(b). Based upon charges filed, the hearing judge correctly applied Maryland Rule 8.5(b) and determined that, because the predominant effect of Mr. Bonner’s misconduct occurred in the District of Columbia, the D.C. Rules should apply to the underlying conduct. The hearing judge proceeded to make conclusions of law pertaining only to the D.C. Rules, and 18 found violations of D.C. Rule 8.4 (a), (b), and (c). The hearing judge did not make any legal conclusions pertaining to D.C. Rule 8.4(d) because Bar Counsel dismissed that charge.

Nor did the hearing judge make conclusions pertaining to the corresponding Maryland Rule for the same underlying misconduct. Although Bar Counsel initially excepted to the hearing judge’s application of the D.C. Rules to the underlying conduct, Bar Counsel withdrew its exception, presumably based upon our decision in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Tatung, 476 Md. 45, 74 (2021). Notwithstanding the fact that Bar Counsel is no longer excepting to the application of the D.C. Rules, Bar Counsel nonetheless asserts that the hearing judge erred in failing to make legal conclusions under both the Maryland Rules and the D.C. Rules that were pleaded in the alternative, which pertain to the same underlying misconduct. We overrule Bar Counsel’s exceptions for the reasons set forth herein.

We recently described the genesis of Maryland’s choice of law rule that applies to allegations of an attorney’s professional misconduct—Maryland Rule 8.5(b)—in Tatung. 476 Md. at 74 . It was added by a rules order of this Court in February 2005 in light of changes that were made in 2000 to the ABA Model Rules. Id. Maryland Rule 8.5(b) “establishes the set of professional conduct rules that apply when an attorney practices in more than one jurisdiction—either by virtue of their physical presence or contacts with a particular jurisdiction, or their license to practice in more than one jurisdiction.” Id. at 77 .

Maryland Rule 8.5(b) states: In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this State, the rule of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows: 19 (1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and (2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the attorney’s conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. An attorney shall not be subject to the discipline if the attorney’s conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the attorney reasonably believes the predominant effect of the attorney’s conduct will occur. (Emphasis added). Under the plain language of the rule, the rule specifically contemplates that one set of professional rules should apply to a particular act or acts of conduct.

The reasons for the Rule are described in the comments.12 Comment 2 explains that “[a]n attorney may be potentially subject to more than one set of rules of professional conduct that impose different obligations.” Maryland Rule 8.5, cmt. 2. The choice of law provisions established by Rule 8.5(b) recognize that “[t]he attorney may be licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction with differing rules, or may be admitted to practice before a particular court with rules that differ from those of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which the attorney is licensed to practice. Additionally, the attorney’s conduct may involve significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction.” Id. Comment 3 explains that subsection (b) “seeks to resolve such potential conflicts” in the professional conduct rules between the jurisdictions based upon the “premise . . . that minimizing conflicts between rules, as well as uncertainty about which rules are applicable, 12 As we pointed out in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tatung, 476 Md. 45, 75 (2021), our Rule 8.5(b) and our comments to our rule are “substantially similar” to ABA Model Rule 8.5(b), as well as the ABA comments to that rule. 20 is in the best interest of both clients and the profession (as well as the bodies having authority to regulate the profession).” Accordingly, subsection (b) takes the approach of (i) providing that any particular conduct of an attorney shall be subject to only one set of rules of professional conduct, (ii) making the determination of which set of rules applies to particular conduct as straightforward as possible, consistent with recognition of appropriate regulatory interests of relevant jurisdictions, and (iii) providing protection from discipline for attorneys who act reasonably in the face of uncertainty.

Maryland Rule 8.5, cmt. 3 (emphasis added). The overarching principle behind Maryland Rule 8.5(b) is to ensure the consistent application of one set of ethics rules where the misconduct is potentially subject to two sets of rules. To that end, comment 6 states: If two admitting jurisdictions were to proceed against attorney [sic] for the same conduct, they should, applying this Rule, identify the same governing ethics rules. They should take all appropriate steps to see that they do apply the same rule to the same conduct, and in all events should avoid proceeding against an attorney on the basis of two inconsistent rules.

In this case, it was appropriate for Bar Counsel to file charges under the D.C. Rules, and for the hearing judge to apply the same, given that the predominant effect of Mr. Bonner’s misconduct occurred in the District of Columbia. However, given Bar Counsel’s filing of charges under the D.C. Rules (albeit pleaded “in the alternative” to the Maryland Rules), and the hearing judge’s correct application of those rules, it was unnecessary for the hearing judge to also render legal conclusions under the corresponding Maryland Rule based upon the same underlying misconduct. The comments to the Rules expressly contemplate that only one set of ethics rules will apply to particular acts of misconduct. Where particular misconduct is identified and charged, the conduct should be subject to the application of only one set of professional rules.

To hold otherwise would be to create 21 situations where more than two sets of rules apply to the same discrete acts of misconduct, and with potentially inconsistent results, particularly where the professional rules are not identical. Indeed, the charges filed “in the alternative” by Bar Counsel in this case—under D.C. Rule 8.4(d) and Maryland Rule 8.4(d)—highlight this very point. Maryland Rule 8.4(d) appears to be a watered-down version of D.C. Rule 8.4(d). Compare Maryland Rule 8.4(d) (“[i]t is professional misconduct for an attorney to: [] engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[]”) with D.C. Rule 8.4(d) (“[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: [] engage in conduct that seriously interferes with the administration of justice[]”).

(Emphasis added). Bar Counsel withdrew its charge under D.C. Rule 8.4(d) presumably because it is not identical to Maryland Rule 8.4(d) as far as the nature and degree of misconduct required to prove a violation. Having withdrawn the charge under D.C. Rule 8.4(d), Bar Counsel asserts that the hearing judge erred by failing to render legal conclusions concerning Maryland Rule 8.4(d). To permit Bar Counsel to charge, and a hearing judge to apply, in a mix and match fashion, two sets of professional rules to the same acts of misconduct is inconsistent with the plain language and purpose of Maryland Rule 8.5(b)—which is to apply one set of professional rules to particular misconduct.13 Having correctly determined that the D.C. Rules applied to Mr. Bonner’s 13 In support of its argument that the hearing judge erred in failing to make legal conclusions pertaining to the violations of the Maryland Rules, Bar Counsel cites to Maryland Rule 19-727(e), which provides that the hearing judge is required to “prepare and file a written statement which shall contain [] findings of fact and conclusion of law as to each charge.” Although Bar Counsel correctly cites to the legal rule concerning the hearing judge’s obligation, that rule must be read consistently with the choice of law provisions contained in Maryland Rule 8.5(b), which requires that one set of professional rules apply to the misconduct alleged.

It would be inconsistent with the plain language of 22 acts of misconduct, the hearing judge did not err in failing to make conclusions of law pertaining to the same acts of misconduct under the corresponding Maryland Rules. 2. Mr. Bonner’s Legal Argument that this Court Should Apply D.C. Sanctions Jurisprudence We next turn to Mr. Bonner’s legal argument that arises from the application of the choice of law provisions set forth in Maryland Rule 8.5(b). Mr. Bonner argues that, because the D.C. Rules applied to the misconduct, this Court should similarly apply the District of Columbia’s case law when fashioning an appropriate sanction. Although Mr. Bonner admits that there is no case law that supports his position,14 he directs us to Maryland Rule 8.5(b) and points out that the express goal of the choice of law rules is to “ensure a single set of applicable rules, minimizing uncertainty for both courts and attorneys and providing the latter with sufficient notice of their ethics obligations.” According to Mr. Bonner, “it makes little sense to apply a foreign jurisdiction’s rules on the choice of law provisions contained in Maryland Rule 8.5(b) for the hearing judge to apply the D.C. Rules and the Maryland Rules to the same underlying misconduct.

To be sure, if a petition involves charges involving separate acts of misconduct, each separate act of misconduct may involve the application of a separate set of professional rules. For example, in Tatung, we applied the federal professional immigration rules to the attorney’s conduct arising from his representation of clients in federal immigration proceedings and applied the Maryland Rules to separate allegations of misconduct arising from the disciplinary proceeding itself. See Tatung, 476 Md. at 92–93. It was appropriate in Tatung to apply the Maryland Rules to the separate acts of alleged misconduct related to the Maryland disciplinary proceeding.

In disciplinary matters arising under Maryland Rule 8.5(b), Bar Counsel should identify the discrete act or acts of misconduct and apply one set of professional rules to the particular act or acts of misconduct. 14 At oral argument, in response to questions from the Court concerning whether Maryland Rule 8.5(b) requires the Court to apply another jurisdiction’s sanctions jurisprudence, counsel for Mr. Bonner admitted that “we haven’t found any cases that squarely address this question in Maryland or elsewhere.” 23 liability, only to then revert to Maryland’s rules on sanction.” For the reasons outlined below, we disagree with Mr. Bonner’s analysis of Maryland Rule 8.5(b). We do not find any support for his argument in the plain language of the rule or our case law. Although the Commission correctly charged Mr. Bonner under the D.C. Rules, and the hearing judge correctly applied them, it does not follow that we apply the sanctions jurisprudence of the District of Columbia. The plain language of Maryland Rule 8.5(b) specifically addresses the “rule of professional conduct to be applied” when the conduct in question may be subject to more than one set of professional rules.

The rules of conduct identify the conduct that is and is not permitted. Once a rule violation is found to have occurred, we consider the imposition of sanctions based upon the aggravating and mitigating factors proven and our case law. The professional rules do not address sanctions, rather, that body of law has been developed and applied through our case law. There is nothing in the plain language of Maryland Rule 8.5, its comments, or our case law, that requires or even hints at a suggestion that we would apply the District of Columbia’s sanction jurisprudence when devising the appropriate sanction for the misconduct.

And as we explain below, there is good reason for the absence of such a suggestion. This Court’s Original Jurisdiction and Duty to Uphold the Purpose of Maryland Sanctions “The Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction over attorney discipline matters.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thomas, 440 Md. 523, 544 (2014). Although we “refer petitions for disciplinary actions to a circuit court judge to act as our hearing officer, for 24 that judge to receive evidence and thereafter present to the Court findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law,” this Court retains complete jurisdiction over the matter, including the sanction to be imposed. Id. at 545 .

In Maryland, the “chief purpose of the sanction is to protect the public.” Id. at 556 . We have explained that it is our duty to ensure that the purpose underlying the imposition of sanctions is properly served. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Weiss, 389 Md. 531, 548 (2005). In upholding that duty, we have recognized that the public interest is served when this Court imposes a sanction which demonstrates to members of the legal profession the type of conduct that will not be tolerated.

Moreover, such a sanction represents the fulfillment by this Court of its responsibility to insist upon the maintenance of the integrity of the bar and to prevent the transgression of an individual lawyer from bringing its image into disrepute. Therefore, the public interest is served when sanctions designed to effect general and specific deterrence are imposed on an attorney who violates the disciplinary rules. Id. at 548 (cleaned up). Our duty with respect to upholding the purpose underlying the imposition of sanctions is paramount and is reflected in our approach to sanctions in reciprocal discipline cases.

Although this is not a reciprocal discipline case (and therefore, in our view, we have even less justification to apply the sanctions jurisprudence of another jurisdiction), our approach to sanctions in such cases illustrates the importance that we place on the independent exercise of our duty. In reciprocal discipline cases, “we have held that, ordinarily, when the purpose for the discipline in the original jurisdiction is congruent with ours, we follow the original jurisdiction’s sanction.” Id. at 547 (emphasis in original). In Weiss, we noted that: 25 “When the Court considers the appropriate sanction in a case of reciprocal discipline, we look not only to the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction but to our own cases as well. The sanction will depend on the unique facts and circumstances of each case, but with a view toward consistent dispositions for similar misconduct.” Id. at 548 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Parsons, 310 Md. 132, 142 (1987)).

We observed that “[t]his standard is in agreement with our duty to protect the public, gives appropriate deference to our sister jurisdictions and ensures that every member of the Maryland Bar is subject to the same sanctions for similar conduct.” Id. at 548. We noted that “[i]n reciprocal discipline cases where we impose the original jurisdiction’s sanction, we usually find that the same discipline would be given in Maryland.” Id. at 549. After conducting a survey of some reciprocal discipline cases, we pointed out that, “[a]s these cases illustrate, although we usually do not deviate from the original jurisdiction’s sanction, we will do so when the conduct involved is of such nature that it would not be tolerated from any member of the Bar in this State if the conduct occurred here.” Id. at 552. Our professional rules governing reciprocal discipline incorporate the potentially competing objectives of giving deference to a sister jurisdiction, but also ensuring that members of the Maryland Bar are subject to the same sanctions for similar conduct.

See Md. Rule 19-737(e) (“Reciprocal discipline shall not be ordered if Bar Counsel or the attorney demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that . . . (4) the conduct established . . . warrants substantially different discipline in this State.”). When