Attorney Grievance Commission v. Davis

HARRELL, Judge. I. Susan McMillan Davis, Respondent, was admitted to the Bar of this Court on 26 June 1985. On 7 December 2000, by an unreported Opinion and Order (Misc. Docket AG, No. 1, ¹³⁷ September Term, 2000), we suspended Respondent from the practice of law in the State of Maryland for a period of ninety days based on allegations separate from this proceeding. 1 Her suspension commenced on Monday, 8 January 2001.

The Attorney Grievance Commission, acting through Bar Counsel, filed a petition with this Court for disciplinary action against Respondent alleging violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct for conduct committed from May 1991 through December 2000. The Commission charged Ms. Davis with violating Rules 1.1 (Competence), 2 1.3 (Diligence), 3 1.4 (Communication), 4 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), 5 3.2 (Expediting Litigation), 6 8.1(b) (Disciplinary Matters), 7 ¹³⁸ 8.4(a) and (c) (Misconduct), 8 and 1.16(a) and (d) (Terminating Representation). 9 The charges stemmed from complaints by Mia Darbouze and Cher Harris. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752(a), 10 we referred the matter to Judge Paul A. Hackner ¹³⁹ of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact and proposed conclusions of law. Judge Hackner held an evidentiary hearing on 8 and 9 January 2003.

Petitioner was represented by Bar Counsel and Respondent was represented by counsel. After counsel was heard, the judge took the case sub curia. On 14 February 2003, Judge Hackner entered the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: “I. Background “This case was filed by the Petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“AGC”), through Bar Counsel, against the Respondent, Susan McMillan Davis. Ms. Davis was admitted to the Bar on June 26, 1985, and currently maintains a law office in Howard County.

The matter was called in open court on January 8 and 9, 2003. Testimony and exhibits were received. After counsel were heard, the Court held the case sub curia. The Court, having reviewed the testimony taken, all exhibits, and having considered the arguments of counsel, finds the following facts and makes the following conclusions of law: “II.

Findings of Fact “The Court finds the following facts have been established by clear and convincing evidence: “A. Complaint of Mia Darbouze “On May 21, 1991, Mia Darbouze employed Ms. Davis to represent her with respect to a workers’ compensation claim arising from a May 6, 1991 slip and fall accident that occurred during the course of her employment at Howard County General Hospital (the “Hospital”). (See Ex. 7). Before she retained Ms. Davis, Ms. Darbouze’s previous ¹⁴⁰ attorney had already filed a workers’ compensation claim on her behalf. “Between May 1991 and May 1993, Ms. Davis and Ms. Darbouze had regular contact regarding the status of the workers’ compensation claim. During that time, the two discussed the possibility of filing a third party claim could not be filed until the workers’ compensation case was concluded.

She also explained that normally, workers’ compensation is the only available remedy against an employer but there are limited situations in which an employee can recover from an employer in a third party claim. Ms. Davis and Ms. Darbouze also discussed the possibility of pursuing a third party claim against the Hospital’s cleaning company. Ms. Darbouze informed Ms. Davis that she thought the Hospital’s cleaning company on the date of her injury was called Marriott. Ms. Davis explained that any money awarded in the third party claim would be subject to a workers’ compensation lien and also analyzed Ms. Darbouze’s likelihood of success if her case went to trial. “When Ms. Darbouze retained Ms. Davis, she was an associate attorney with Cooper & Reuter, P.A. In May 1993, Ms. Davis left the Law Office of Jack Cooper (formerly Cooper & Reuter) and became a principal in the firm Reuter, Turna & Davis, P.A. On May 25, 1993, Ms. Darbouze signed a document discharging the former firm and authorizing Ms. Davis and her new firm to represent her.

(See Exs. 8 & 9). Ms. Darbouze’s file was transferred from Mr. Cooper’s office to Ms. Davis’s new office. “Ms. Davis continued to represent Ms. Darbouze before the Workers’ Compensation Commission. By order dated August 3, 1993, Ms. Darbouze was awarded permanent partial disability and Ms. Davis and her firm were awarded attorneys fees. (See Ex. 10). “After the conclusion of the workers’ compensation case, Ms. Davis and Ms. Darbouze had further discussions about filing a third party claim.

Ms. Darbouze always desired to file such a claim. On several occasions, Ms. Davis advised Ms. Darbouze she would be responsible for advancing costs ¹⁴¹ if the action was filed. (See Exs. C & D).

However, Ms. Davis never definitively advised Ms. Darbouze that she would not file the claim without an advance on fees or that she would decline to represent her without such an advance. Indeed, Ms. Davis eventually undertook to file suit without an advance of costs. “On May 5,1994, one day before the statute of limitations was to run, Ms. Davis filed suit on behalf of Ms. Darbouze in the Circuit Court for Howard County. The civil complaint named the Hospital and “ABC Corp. (name to be supplied) Unidentified Business, Corporation or Partnership” as defendant. Ms. Davis did not conduct any research into whether she could proceed against the Hospital in a third party claim.1 ”1 An action pursuant to the Workers Compensation Act is generally the exclusive remedy for an employee against an employer.

Md. Code Ann., Labor & Employment, § 9-509(a). There are limited exceptions where a third party suit can be maintained against an employer, for example, where an employer fails to secure compensation in accordance with the title, or if the employer’s deliberate act caused the injury. Id., § 9-509(c). “Ms. Davis did not name Marriott as a defendant. Ms. Davis believed that she could have amended the complaint after the statute of limitations expired to substitute the name of the cleaning company for ABC Corporation.2 Ms. Davis contacted the Maryland State Department of Assessments and Taxation and was unable to find a cleaning service with the name of Marriott. ”2 Under Maryland law, it is unlikely that the complaint could have been amended after the statute of limitations had run in order to substitute the name of the cleaning company.

See, e.g., Williams v. Hofmann Balancing Techniques, Ltd., 139 Md.App. 339, 365 , 776 A.2d 4 (2001) (clarifying that an amendment to a pleading to add a new defendant is allowed after the statute of limitations runs if it corrects the name of an original party who ha notice of the pending case, but not to add a new party who had no notice of the claim); Nam v. Montgomery County, 127 Md.App. 172, 186 , 732 A.2d 356 (1999) (holding "John Doe” pleading cannot be amended to correct the name of a defendant if that person had no notice of the suit before the statute of limitations runs). “The docket entries for Ms. Darbouze’s case indicate that the original summons for the Hospital was issued on May 6, ¹⁴² 1994. The Hospital was not served with that summons. Another summons was issued on October 24, 1994, but that one was also not served. Ms. Davis wrote the court on November 17, 1994 to request another summons.

On the same date, Ms. Davis wrote Ms. Darbouze a letter and apologized for not getting back to her sooner and advised that she was waiting for a summons to be issued to serve the Hospital. (See Ex. 11). The Hospital was served by certified mail on December 12, 1994. (See Ex. 6).

Ms. Davis did not offer any explanation at trial as to why the Hospitál was not. served until seven months after suit was filed. “After the Hospital was served, its attorneys contacted Ms. Davis several times to ask her to voluntary dismiss because the suit was barred by the Workers Compensation Act. See Exs. 18 & 19. Ms. Davis did not respond to counsel and did not voluntarily dismiss the claim against the Hospital. On January 17, 1995, the Hospital filed a motion to dismiss.

Ms. Davis testified that she does not recall doing any research to respond to the motion to dismiss, and her file did not disclose any such research. Ms. Davis did not file a response to the motion to dismiss and did not inform her client that the motion had been filed, In fact, Ms. Davis and Ms. Darbouze had no contact regarding the case from November 17,1994 through February 1995. “Ms. Darbouze did not learn about the motion to dismiss until Ms. Davis’s office forwarded to her a copy of a February 23, 1995 order granting the motion. The Circuit Court for Howard County dismissed the claim against the Hospital and imposed sanctions in the amount of $250.00 against Ms. Darbouze. See Ex. 12.

The claim against ABC Corporation was not affected by the order of dismissal. “After receiving the order, Ms. Darbouze contacted Ms. Davis’s office and was informed by either Ms. Davis or her secretary that Ms. Davis would pay the $250 sanction. Ms. Davis does not recall whether she ever paid the sanction. There being no other activity reflected in the court file, the ¹⁴³ Circuit Court for Howard County closed the case on March 8, 1996.3 (See Ex. 6). ”3 Although the record does not indicate why the file was closed by the circuit court, more than one year had transpired from the last activity in the case and it is likely that the case was closed by operation of Md. Rule 2-507. “Between late 1995 and 1999, Ms. Darbouze contacted Ms. Davis’s office several times regarding the status of her case against the cleaning company. Ms. Darbouze also contacted Ms. Davis regarding several other matters, including her bankruptcy, conflicts with her job, and problems with her marriage.

None of these other contacts or conversations pertained to any litigation involving Ms. Darbouze. “Telephone message logs from Ms. Davis’s office indicate lengthy periods of time during which Ms. Davis did not return Ms. Darbouze’s phone calls. (See Joint Ex. I). Ms. Davis conceded that she did not return Ms. Darbouze’s calls’ call for call.’ A phone log dated TO/25 to 11/15’ with an unknown year, contains messages from Ms. Darbouze on October 27, October 31, November 9 and November 14.

(See id.). In each message, Ms. Darbouze was calling about the status of her case and asking Ms. Davis to call her back. (Id.). Another log in an unknown year for the time period ‘3/1 to 3/16’ includes three messages from Ms. Darbouze requesting the status of her case.

(Id.). A ten-day span is also indicated by messages dated October 31 and November 9, 1995. Again, Ms. Darbouze was requesting an update on her case. Id. “Sometime in 1997, Ms. Darbouze contacted Ms. Davis to say that she was ill and wanted to do whatever was possible to settle her case.

At this time, Ms. Davis advised Ms. Darbouze that her case was still active and set up an appointment with her. Ms. Darbouze’s testimony on this point is consistent with a telephone message dated September 8, 1997, indicating there was an appointment scheduled for September 18 at 12 p.m.4 ”4 According to Ms. Davis, this took place sometime in 2000. As discussed later in the Court's conclusions of law, whether this conversation took place in 1997 or 2000 has no bearing on the conclusion. ¹⁴⁴ “At one point in 1998 or 1999, Ms. Darbouze contacted Ms. Davis’s office and a secretary named Debbie informed her the case had been closed. However, soon after, Ms. Davis called Ms. Darbouze back and said that her case was not closed. “Ms. Davis also informed Ms. Darbouze several times after late 1995 that the court file was in a retired judge’s chambers.

Ms. Darbouze’s testimony on this point is consistent with an April 29, 1998 message from Ms. Darbouze: ‘she wants to know what is happening with her case. Said she spoke with you 8 months ago. Her case is from 91. Has the judge changedV (See Joint Ex.

I) (emphasis added). “After April 29, 1998, Ms. Davis was again delinquent in returning Ms. Darbouze’s calls for nearly a month. Ms. Darbouze left another message on May 4, 1998. Again on May 18, 1998, Ms. Darbouze left a message asking for her case number and the date the case was filed. On May 21, 1998, Ms. Davis left another message inquiring what court her case was filed in, the date filed and the docket number.

(See Joint Ex. I). It is clear that in all of these messages, Ms. Darbouze was calling about the status of the case against the cleaning company. The Court concludes that Ms. Davis did not return Ms. Darbouze’s calls in each instance where there was another message asking for the same information within a few days of a prior message. “In October 1999, Ms. Darbouze went to the clerk’s office at the circuit Court for Howard County and learned her file was on the ‘shelf and that there had been no activity in the case since the claim against the Hospital was dismissed on February 28, 1995.

A few days later, Ms. Darbouze asked Ms. Davis if there was still a case pending against the cleaning company, and Ms. Davis assured her that there was. “In late 2000 or early 2001, Ms. Darbouze requested a copy of her file from Ms. Davis. Ms. Davis got in touch with Ms. Darbouze and advised her that the file would be available in mid-January 2001. Ms. Darbouze still had not ¹⁴⁵ received the file in early February, so she left a message for Ms. Davis stating that if she did not receive the file, she would file a complaint with the AGC. Ms. Darbouze still did not receive the file from Ms. Davis and she filed a complaint with the AGC on February 13, 2001.

(See Ex. 13). “Ms. Darbouze eventually received a copy of her file from Ms. Davis in April 2001. Upon review of the file, Ms. Darbouze found a copy of a March 23, 1995 letter addressed to her. It stated, in pertinent part: ‘This letter will confirm our recent meeting wherein it was decided that we would not proceed against the cleaning company. Therefore at this time I will be closing my file.... ’ (See Ex. 14). “While there is no direct evidence, circumstantial evidence leads the court to the conclusion that Ms. Davis created the March 23, 1995 letter after Ms. Darbouze filed her complaint with the AGC.5 Ms. Darbouze never received this letter and she does not recall any meeting with Ms. Davis in March of 1995.

Ms. Darbouze maintained her own file of correspondence and case information and did not have a copy of this letter. Ms. Darbouze’s actions after March 1995 are consistent with not having received the letter. If Ms. Darbouze had been informed that her case was closed, it is unlikely that she would have contacted Ms. Davis repeatedly over several years to inquire about the status of her case. ”5 The Court cannot be certain how the letter was created, but realizes that it could have been by a number of possible means. “Ms. Davis contends that the letter was written on March 23, 1995. She states that the letter could not have been after the fact because Turna & Davis, the firm she was with in 1995, has disbanded sometime in 1997 and all letterhead was discarded at that point.

Additionally, Ms. Davis contends that she does not possess the computer skills to create Turna & Davis letterhead. “Ms. Davis’s actions, however, are inconsistent with her position. On more than one occasion after March 1995, Ms. Davis represented to Ms. Darbouze that her case was still ¹⁴⁶ open. If Ms. Davis had sent the letter and closed her file in March of 1995, she would not have led Ms. Darbouze to believe her case still active, rather she would have reminded Ms. Darbouze that her case had been closed or sent a copy of the March 1995 letter. “Ms. Davis testified that she personally typed a letter dated April 4, 2001 to the AGC. (See Ex. 15).

The Court notes that the font in this letter is the same as that in the March 23, 1995 letter. (Compare id. with Ex. 14). But, other letters from Ms. Davis in 1994 and 1995 contain a different font. (See Exs. 11 and 14). “Additionally, when Ms. Davis wrote to the AGC in April 2001 in response to the complaint filed by Ms. Darbouze, she did not mention or attach the March 23, 1995 letter.

(See Ex. 15). Since the letter would have been critical documentary evidence in support of Ms. Davis’s response to the complaint, logic dictates that she would not have omitted a reference to the letter if it had existed. “After Ms. Darbouze filed her complaint, an AGC investigator, Sterling Fletcher, met with Ms. Davis on June 1, 2001 regarding both the Darbouze and Harris matters.6 At that meeting, Mr. Fletcher renewed his request by a telephone call to Ms. Davis. Mr. Fletcher still had not received the file by July 18, 2001 and he wrote Ms. Davis on that date and again requested the file. (See Ex. 16).

Ms. Davis wrote back on July 30, 2001 and advised that she would provide the file. (See Ex. 17). Ms. Davis has never provided the Darbouze file to Mr. Fletcher or to the AGC. ”6 The Harris matter is discussed in Section B. “B. Complaint of Cher Harris “In January 2000, Cher Harris, who was in the early stages of an out-of-wedlock pregnancy, retained Ms. Davis to represent her with respect to establishing the paternity of her unborn child and any relating claim for child support after the child’s birth. At that time, Ms. Harris paid Ms. Davis a retainer fee. ¹⁴⁷ “When she initially met with Ms. Davis, Ms. Harris told her that the father of the child was William Leonard Mahoney.

Ms. Harris explained that she met Mr. Mahoney when he was her client at Total Body Images, where she worked as a licensed massage therapist. During the course of their relationship, Mr. Mahoney went to Ms. Harris’s home, where she gave him topless massages. Ms. Harris considered Mr. Mahoney to be her boyfriend. At all times during the course of their relationship, Mr. Mahoney was married with three children.7 ”7 Mr. Mahoney is still married. “Ms. Harris explained that Mr. Mahoney worked for a family owned business and that she believed he received compensation or cash ‘under the table’ in addition to the income that would be shown on his pay stubs.

Ms. Harris also stated that Mr. Mahoney frequently gave her expensive gifts and large amounts of cash. For these' reasons, Ms. Harris requested that Ms. Davis conduct discovery or otherwise attempt to uncover Mr. Mahoney’s assets and income. “After she met with Ms. Harris, Ms. Davis contacted Mr. Mahoney’s attorney, Paul Newhouse. From one or more of the letters she received from Mr. Newhouse, Ms. Davis learned that the details of the parties’ relationship would be presented at the child support hearing and that the relationship would be portrayed as one of prostitution. Ms. Davis forwarded to Ms. Harris copies of all the letters from Mr. Newhouse.

Ms. Davis advised Ms. Harris that the circumstances surrounding her relationship with Mr. Mahoney and the fact that he was married and had three other children might have an effect on the amount of child support awarded.8 ”8 Ms. Davis further explained that these facts would only have an effect if the parties’ income was high enough to exceed the maximum support guidelines, so that the amount of child support would be within the discretion of the judge or master. See Md.Code Ann., Fam. Law § 12-204(d). “On August 11, 2000, Ms. Harris gave birth to a daughter. Within a few days of the birth, Ms. Harris stopped into Ms. Davis’s office and urged her to move forward with the ¹⁴⁸ paternity and child support proceedings.

On or around August 18, 2000, Ms. Davis learned from Mr. Newhouse that a paternity test would be necessary. On August 22, 2000, Ms. Davis filed a “Petition to Establish Paternity and Child Support” (the ‘petition’) on behalf of Ms. Harris in the Circuit Court for Howard County. Mr. Mahoney’s answer was filed on or around September 28, 2000. “Ms. Harris attempted to unsuccessfully contact Ms. Davis a number of times during the course of her representation. There was not always a secretary or receptionist at Ms. Davis’s office, so Ms. Harris usually left voice mail messages at the office or on Ms. Davis’s cellular phone.

Ms. Davis returned some, but not all, of the calls. If Ms. Davis was in the office when Ms. Harris called, she would take her call. Ms. Harris also stopped into Ms. Davis’s office several times. Ms. Davis was not always there, but if she was available, she would meet with Ms. Harris. “In mid-October 2000, Ms. Davis attempted to schedule a paternity test with a mobile testing company, but this arrangement was unacceptable to Ms. Harris.

Ms. Davis then contacted a lab in Baltimore and tentatively scheduled a test for Ms. Harris and her daughter for November 4, 2000. Ms. Harris called the lab and changed the date to one that was more convenient for her. The results of the paternity test established that Mr. Mahoney was the father of Ms. Harris’s daughter. There was no unreasonable delay in scheduling the paternity testing. “Ms. Davis never filed any written discovery or noted any depositions in the action.

She did informally receive copies of Mr. Mahoney’s pay stubs. In December 2000, Ms. Davis related to Ms. Harris that a settlement proposal had been made by Mr. Newhouse under which Mr. Mahoney would pay $1000 per month in child support. Ms. Davis believed that this was a reasonable offer based on the income reflected in Mr. Mahoney’s pay stubs and in light of the evidence that could be introduced at the child support hearing. ¹⁴⁹ “Ms. Harris was not satisfied with this offer and requested Ms. Davis to counter-propose that Mr. Mahoney also pay for the child’s health insurance. Ms. Harris reiterated to Ms. Davis that she did not want to accept $1000 a month until discovery was conducted. “On December 7, 2000, the Court of Appeals suspended Ms. Davis from practicing law in the State of Maryland for a period of 90 days, effective Monday, January 8, 2001.

Ms. Davis did not notify Ms. Harris of her impending suspension between December 7, 2000 and January 8, 2001. Additionally, Ms. Davis did not strike her appearance in Ms. Harris’s case during this time or after the commencement of her suspension. “Despite Ms. Harris’s rejection of the proposed settlement terms, Ms. Davis sent Ms. Harris a letter and proposed consent order on December 13, 2000, which contained the same terms.9 (See Pl.’s Ex. 1). There was no mention of the suspension in the letter. ”9 The Court is not convinced that Ms. Davis failed to present the counter proposal to Mr. Newhouse, as alleged by the AGC. Ms. Davis testified that she submitted the counter proposal to Mr. Newhouse and he rejected it and that she relayed the information to Ms. Harris.

The Court finds that it is just as likely that Ms. Davis submitted the counter proposal to Mr. Newhouse and that his response was in the negative. “Ms. Harris contacted Ms. Davis to let her know that the proposed consent order was unacceptable. Ms. Davis testified that, shortly thereafter, she began to draft interrogatories and requests for production of documents, but these were not presented at the hearing of this case. Ms. Davis did not explain how she anticipated handling discovery requests, given that the responses would have been due during the period of her suspension. “There is no evidence that Ms. Davis did anything else to preserve Ms. Harris’s interests after that point. Ms. Davis knew that her suspension was pending, yet she did not inform Ms. Harris.

Moreover, Ms. Davis did not immediately refer Ms. Harris to another attorney, which would have been particularly important to preserve the momentum of the case. ¹⁵⁰ “During the period of Ms. Davis’s representation, Ms. Harris filed a claim for assistance with the Department of Social Services (‘DSS’). DSS initiated a separate child support case and a hearing was scheduled for Friday, January 5, 2001. Ms. Harris went to Ms. Davis’s office on or around January 2, 2001 to ask her to attend the hearing and to request that she contact the State’s Attorney who would be prosecuting the matter. Ms. Davis did not inform Ms. Harris during that meeting of her impending suspension.

Ms. Davis did not contact the State’s Attorney and could not attend the hearing because she had a hearing in another matter at the same time. “Sometime in early to mid-January 2001, Ms. Harris contacted the AGC to inquire about filing a grievance against Ms. Davis. Ms. Harris then learned for the first time of Ms. Davis’s suspension. On January 21, 2001, Ms. Harris filed a complaint with the AGC. (See Ex. 3). “Before she filed the complaint with the AGC, Ms. Harris wrote Ms. Davis to terminate her representation by letter dated January 15, 2001.

(See Ex. 2). In that letter, Ms. Harris included the contact information for her new attorney, Stuart Snyder. (Id.). Upon receipt of the letter, Ms. Davis wrote to Ms. Harris and advised that her file was available to be picked up.

Neither Ms. Harris nor her attorney ever picked up the file from Ms. Davis. “It did not occur to Ms. Davis until after her suspension began that she should write her clients to advise them of the suspension. The only evidence that Ms. Davis informed Ms. Harris of her suspension is a letter dated January 22, 2001. (See Ex. 4). This letter was sent after Ms. Davis’s suspension began and after she had already been terminated by Ms. Harris. “If Ms. Harris had learned of the suspension earlier, it is reasonable to conclude that she would have terminated Ms. Davis sooner and would have employed another attorney in order to prosecute her case without interruption. ¹⁵¹ III.

Conclusions of Law “At a hearing on a petition filed by the AGC pursuant to Md. Rule 16-757, the AGC has the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, the averments of the petition. A respondent attorney must only establish an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or extenuation by a preponderance of the evidence. “A. Mia Darbouze “In connection with her representation in the Darbouze matter, the AGC has charged that Ms. Davis engaged in professional misconduct by violating the following Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 3.1, 3.2, 8.4 and 8.1. [Footnotes 10-16 omitted]. “The Court finds that the AGC has established by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Davis violated Rules 1.1 and 1.3. Ms. Davis did not provide Ms. Darbouze with competent and diligent representation when she filed suit without having a viable basis for a cause of action against the Hospital and by failing to investigate the real name of the cleaning company. “Ms. Davis also violated Rules 1.1 and 1.3 when she waited nearly nine months from the conclusion of the workers’ compensation claim to file suit. There was no evidence presented to establish that such a delay was warranted.

Additionally, by delaying the filing until the day prior to the expiration of the limitations period, Ms. Davis created the likelihood that a subsequent amendment to add the name of the cleaning company would have been unsuccessful. Furthermore, once suit was filed, three summonses were issued before the Hospital was finally served, which was more than seven months after suit was filed.17 The Court also finds that Ms. Davis failed to act with diligence with regard to paying the sanction imposed against Ms. Darbouze because there is no evidence it was ever paid. ”17 As evidenced by the fact that Hospital was ultimately served by certified mail, it does not appear there was any difficulty in accomplishing service of process so as to explain the delay in service. ¹⁵² “The Court finds that Ms. Davis violated Rule 3.1, by filing suit against the Hospital without having a good faith basis to proceed and by naming ABC Corporation without making a reasonable investigation to determine the true defendant. “The Court finds that Ms. Davis violated Rule 3.2 because she made no efforts to expedite the third party suit. After filing the case, she merely allowed it to languish in the court system. “The Court also finds that Ms. Davis violated Rule 1.4 during the course of her representation of Ms. Darbouze. Ms. Darbouze’s calls went unanswered, sometimes for more than a month at a time.

This clearly shows a failure to communicate on the part of Ms. Davis. Ms. Davis also violated Rule 1.4 when she failed to keep Ms. Darbouze reasonably informed about the status of her case. “Additionally, Ms. Davis violated both Rules 1.4 and 8.4(c) by misrepresenting the status of Ms. Darbouze’s case to her. Ms. Davis knew or should have known that the court had actually closed the case on March 8, 1996, yet she led Ms. Darbouze to believe that the claim was still active. “Furthermore, the Court is led to the inescapable conclusion that Ms. Davis created the March 23, 1995 letter (See Ex. 14) sometime after March 1995 to make it appear as if she had previously advised Ms. Darbouze that they would not be pursuing a claim against the cleaning company. Ms. Davis, therefore, violated Rule 8.4 by creating a false document.

Lastly, the Court finds that Ms. Davis violated Rule 8.1 by knowingly failing to respond to the AGC’s request to provide a copy of the Darbouze file. “B. Cher Harris “In connection with her representation in the Harris matter, the AGC has charged that Ms. Davis engaged in professional misconduct by violating the following Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16(a) and (d). [Footnotes 18-20 omitted]. ¹⁵³ “The Court finds that Ms. Davis violated Rule 1.3 by failing to conduct discovery when she had specific information that Mr. Mahoney’s pay stubs likely were not an accurate representation of his income.21 The Court also finds that Ms. Davis violated Rule 1.4 when she failed to advise Ms. Harris of her impending suspension.22 ”21 At trial, the AGC argued that Ms. Davis violated this rule in other ways during the course of the Harris representation, however, the Court does not conclude that the evidence supports such a finding. ”22 Insofar as the AGC alleges that Ms. Davis violated Rule 1.4 in other ways, the Court concludes Ms. Davis did not. “The Court further finds that Ms. Davis violated Rule 1.16(a). Under Rule 1.16(a)(1), a lawyer shall withdraw from the representation of a client if the representation will result in a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. Although Ms. Davis did not actively represent Ms. Harris during her suspension „(i.e., by going to court on her behalf), she continued to technically represent her because she held herself out as her attorney and her appearance remained entered in her case. Ms. Davis also violated subsection (a)(3) of the rule when she did not strike her appearance after Ms. Harris terminated her. “Rule 1.16(d) sets forth what an attorney must do upon termination of representation.

Ms. Davis’s 90-day suspension was a termination of her representation because she was not allowed to practice law or represent clients during that time period. Ms. Davis violated Rule 1.16(d) because she failed to protect Ms. Harris’s interests by giving her reasonable notice and to allow time for her to employ another attorney.23 See id. at 327 (noting that a suspension terminates ethical representation and thus, Rule 1.16(d) becomes operative). ”23 The Court does not find that Ms. Davis violated this rule insofar as she did not forward Ms. Harris or her attorney a copy of her file, because she had advised Ms. Harris that the file was available, but it was never retrieved. “IV. Conclusion “Wherefore, it is this 4th day of February, 2003, found by the Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County, for the reasons ¹⁵⁴ set forth herein, that the Respondent, Susan McMillan Davis, has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, §§ 1.1, 1.3,1.4,1.16(a) and (d), 3.1, 3.2, 8.1 and 8.4.” Bar Counsel took no exceptions to Judge Hackner’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommended disbarment as a sanction for Ms. Davis’s conduct. 11 Bar Counsel finds Respondent’s history of dishonesty in the practice of law to be of particular importance and urges us to find her morally unfit to continue in the practice of law. We previously suspended Ms. Davis, by unreported opinion, for ninety days for engaging in other conduct violating Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(b) and 8.4(c) and (d) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Davis, Misc. AG No. 1, September Term, 2000. She failed to act with requisite competence and diligence in her representation of a client with a potential workers’ compensation claim by not filing any claim. Davis, slip