Attorney Grievance Commission v. Steinberg

HARRELL, Judge. The Attorney Grievance Commission (“Petitioner”), acting through Bar Counsel, filed with this Court a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (the “Petition”) against Andrew M. Steinberg (“Respondent”), alleging violations of the ³⁴³ Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) in his representation of two former clients. The first set of allegations arise from his representation of Christine A. Serabian in a will caveat proceeding, 1 for which Respondent is charged with violations of MRPC 1.1 (Competence), 2 1.2 (Scope of Representation), 3 1.3 (Diligence), 4 1.4 (Communication), 5 ’ 1.5 (Fees), 6 1.8 (Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific ³⁴⁴ Rules), 7 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation), 8 3.2 (Expediting litigation), 9 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel), 10 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to ³⁴⁵ others), 11 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 12 and 8.4 (Misconduct). 13 In the second matter, Bar Counsel charged Respondent with violations of MRPC 1.1 (Competence), 1.2 (Scope of Representation), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4 (Communication), 1.5 (Fees), 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), 14 3.2 (Expediting litigation), 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 15 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 16 and 8.4 (Misconduct) in the course of Respondent’s represen ³⁴⁶ tation of Ms. Annie Adeleye in efforts to avoid the foreclosure sale of her home. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752(a), we referred the matter to the Honorable Eric M. Johnson of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to conduct an evidentiary hearing and render findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law.

I. Procedural History Respondent was served personally with the Petition and a Writ of Summons on 8 November 2005, directing him to respond to the charges within 15 days following the date of service. 17 Also included among the papers served on Respondent at the same time were a Request for Production of Documents, Interrogatories, and a Request for Admissions. The Affidavit of Service filed in the record indicates that all of these documents were served by Dennis F. Biennas, an employee of Petitioner. Respondent failed to answer the Petition, and an order of default was entered on 9 December 2005. 18 Respondent filed a Motion to Vacate Default Judgment on 6 January 2006. The matter was set for hearing on 11 January 2006.

Respondent failed to appear. At that time, the hearing judge scheduled an ex parte hearing for 2 March 2006 when Petitioner would be permitted to present testimony in support of the Petition. The Respondent also failed to appear at this hearing. Finding the reasoning in Respondent’s motion unpersuasive, the hearing judge denied the Motion to Vacate and allowed Petitioner to make an evidentiary record regarding the complaints. ³⁴⁷ On 8 May 2006, Judge Johnson filed written findings of facts and conclusions of law.

Petitioner filed with this Court timely Exceptions to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Respondent filed Exceptions on 26 May 2006, 3 days after the deadline for doing so. 19 Petitioner filed a Motion to Strike (based on the late filing) and Response to Respondent’s Exceptions.

II

Findings of Fact 20 Complaint of Christine A. Serabian. Respondent was retained in March 2003 to represent Ms. Serabian in a will caveat proceeding in Calvert County. The representation was undertaken pursuant to a contingency fee agreement whereby Respondent was to receive an hourly fee if a recovery was obtained. This fee agreement was not reduced to writing.

In the course of the representation, Steinberg “not only failed to communicate with his client for extended periods of time,[ 21 ] but also failed to appear at scheduled meetings and deposition with his client in June, September, and October of 2003.” According to Ms. Serabian’s complaint, these omissions included failing to appear at a previously scheduled ³⁴⁸ meeting with her and arriving an hour late each for two court-ordered mediation sessions, and being unprepared for the latter one. Respondent also failed to explain the outcome of court-ordered mediation sessions, and failed to present to Ms. Serabian the content of an offer made by opposing counsel during the mediation process. 22 The most glaring deficiency in Respondent’s representation occurred in the days surrounding the 13 November scheduled deposition of Ms. Serabian. The deposition was scheduled for 13 November 2003 at the office of George E. Meng, Esquire, opposing counsel. On 12 November 2003, at approximately 5:15 p.m., Respondent called Mr. Meng and informed him that Ms. Serabian “refused” to attend the deposition.

This was a misrepresentation. After protracted dialogue with Respondent, Meng requested that Steinberg attempt to procure his client’s attendance at the deposition. Around 10:10 p.m., Steinberg informed Meng that his client’s position had not changed. Mr. Meng cancelled the deposition.

The next day, Ms. Serabian arrived at Meng’s office at the scheduled time to be deposed. She professed to have no knowledge of the cancellation and had not represented to Respondent that she refused to attend the deposition as scheduled. The deposition was rescheduled between counsel to 22 January 2004. Despite Respondent’s knowledge of the new date, he did not communicate the new date to Ms. Serabian.

When she failed to appear on 22 January, the Orphans’ Court presiding over the caveat proceeding, upon opposing counsel’s motion, directed her to pay various monetary sanctions to the opposing parties, and scheduled a further hearing to allow the personal representative and legatees to present ex parte proof concerning the testator’s competency and lack of undue influence relating to the execution of the challenged will. “Following an inexplicable lack of communication with his client, Ms. Serabian finally terminated the Respondent’s rep- ³⁴⁹ reservation in or about February 2004. Despite his termination, and despite repeated requests by Ms. Serabian to have her file returned to her, Respondent failed to timely withdraw his appearance and failed to timely return Ms. Serabian’s file after his discharge.” Respondent made repeated representations to Ms. Serabian and opposing counsel that he filed the motion to withdraw before he actually did. Respondent’s motion to strike his appearance was not filed until 13 August 2004, approximately 6 months after termination of the representation. Additionally, Ms. Serabian made several attempts over the following months to obtain the files relating to her ongoing case, including several phone calls to Respondent, all going unreturned.

It was not until Respondent received a letter from the Petitioner, requiring that he return the file, that Steinberg finally complied. Lastly, in a document dated 5 October 2004, Respondent sought to have Ms. Serabian execute a release of any malpractice claims, and to have her withdraw her disciplinary complaint in this matter. After termination of Steinberg’s representation, Ms. Serabian continued pro se to pursue the caveat and, in that capacity, sought reconsideration of the ex parte sanctions entered against her as a result of the deposition debacle. In connection therewith, she sought an affidavit from Respondent stating that he never informed her of the 22 January rescheduled deposition date.

When she arrived at his house to obtain the affidavit, he presented her with a “Release in Full,” which purported to release Respondent from any liability arising out of his representation of her in the will caveat. Steinberg neither advised her to obtain independent legal advice with respect to signing this document nor did he provide any reasonable opportunity to do so. Complaint of George E. Meng, Esquire. George E. Meng, Esquire, represented the personal representative throughout the bulk of the will caveat proceeding in opposition to Ms. Serabian.

On 12 March 2003, Meng initially learned that Respondent represented Ms. Serabian and her brother. He attempted to contact Respondent in order to ³⁵⁰ discuss the case. Respondent did not answer his phone. After the voice message he left went unreturned, Meng left another detailed voice message on 18 March 2003 concerning a Status Conference in the Orphans’ Court scheduled for 23 April 2003.

When Respondent did not respond timely to that message, the Status Conference date was confirmed without Steinberg’s input. Respondent finally placed a return phone call in response to Meng’s voice mail messages on 23 March 2003. After attempts failed at mediation of the caveat proceeding, Meng attempted to contact Steinberg on 8 July, 15 July, and again on 10 September 2003, in order to schedule depositions, including the deposition of Ms. Serabian. In addition to repeated phone calls, Mr. Meng sent a letter on 17 September 2003 outlining potential dates for the depositions.

He received no response from Respondent, and Ms. Serabian’s deposition was noted for 22 October 2003, again without the input of Steinberg. On the eve of the scheduled 22 October 2003 deposition, Steinberg faxed Meng and counsel for the legatees, stating that “... due to unforeseen circumstances, [Respondent was] unavailable for the deposition scheduled ... for October 22 of 2003.” Based on this cryptic message, the deposition was rescheduled for 13 November 2003. Meng did not hear from Steinberg again until the 12 November 2003 misrepresentations previously discussed in the findings of fact as to Ms. Serabian’s complaint. Respondent informed Meng on 9 February 2004 that he had been discharged by Ms. Serabian.

In addition to Ms. Serabian’s repeated requests to Respondent to strike his appearance, Mr. Meng also made several attempts to urge Steinberg to file a formal Motion to Withdraw. Despite repeated efforts, including calls directed to Respondent on 9 February, 19 February, 16 March, 18 March and again on 8 June, Respondent did not initiate action to withdraw his appearance. On June 8, Meng finally was able to reach Respondent, at which time Respondent misrepresented to him that a Motion to ³⁵¹ Withdraw had been filed. As noted earlier, the motion was not filed until 13 August 2004.

Complaint of Annie M. Adeleye. Annie M. Adeleye retained Respondent on 9 April 2003 to represent her in efforts to avoid the foreclosure sale of her home. The representation was secured by an advance fee in the sum of $1,000.00. Respondent was to file a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petition in order to protect the home.

Respondent subsequently represented to Ms. Adeleye that he had filed the petition when, in fact, he had not. Ms. Adeleye received a letter from the law firm conducting the foreclosure sale notifying her that the sale would be held on 29 May 2003. She informed Respondent of the foreclosure sale date in a telephone call and, accompanied by her brother, visited Respondent’s law office with the letter in order to confirm with Steinberg the sale date. Steinberg again assured Adeleye that he had filed the petition and that her house would be protected from the impending sale.

Respondent neither filed the Chapter 13 Petition nor took any other preventative action to forestall the foreclosure sale. The day following the sale, Steinberg filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland, Greenbelt Division, without the consent or the signature of his client. Respondent took no further action on behalf of Ms. Adeleye until 1 October 2003, four months following the sale, when he filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County a “Motion to Reconsider Ratification and Confirmation of Trustees Sale and to Set Aside Sale of May 29, 2003.” Respondent supported this Motion by asserting falsely that his client did not receive notice of the foreclosure sale.

III

Factual Exceptions The hearing judge entered an order of default, at Petitioner’s request, when Respondent failed to file a responsive pleading to the Petition. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16- ³⁵² 754(c), 23 failure to file a timely response may be treated as a default. Under Maryland Rule 2-323(e), 24 the averments set forth in the Petition are deemed admitted unless denied in a timely responsive pleading. In this case, because the averments in the Petition were not denied by Respondent in a timely filed responsive pleading, the averments and the testimony from the ex parte hearing were treated properly as admitted.

See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lee, 390 Md. 517, 523-24 , 890 A.2d 273, 277 (2006). This Court conducts an independent review of the record and generally accepts a hearing judge’s findings of fact unless we determine that they are clearly erroneous. Lee, 390 Md. at 524 , 890 A.2d at 277 ; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50 , 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Stolarz, 379 Md. 387, 397, 842 A.2d 42, 47 (2004); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Culver, 371 Md. 265, 274 , 808 A.2d 1251, 1256 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harrington, 367 Md. 36, 49 , 785 A.2d 1260, 1267 (2001)(“The ‘hearing court’s findings of fact are prima facie correct and will not be disturbed unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous.’ ”) (internal citations omitted); see also Md. Rule 16-759(b)(2)(B) (“This Court shall give due regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses.”). After a thorough review of the record, we find that, to the extent not challenged by the parties, the hearing ³⁵³ judge’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, as they are supported by the record evidence adduced during the proceedings. 25 A. Exceptions filed by Petitioner.

Petitioner in this case challenges Judge Johnson’s findings as to Ms. Serabian’s actual knowledge of the scheduling of the 13 November 2003 deposition in Mr. Meng’s office. Specifically, the hearing judge found that Ms. Serabian was not apprised of the date and time of the deposition. Ms. Serabian testified at the ex parte hearing that, while visiting her daughter in Hampton, Virginia, on 12 November 2003, she checked her telephone messages around midnight. She stated that Respondent left a message at approximately 5:15 p.m., informing her of the deposition scheduled to take place the following morning.

Ms. Serabian therefore drove overnight, during a heavy rainstorm, in order to arrive on time at Mr. Meng’s office for the deposition. We sustain the Petitioner’s exception in this regard. In addition to this relatively minor factual exception taken by Petitioner, the Commission also requests that this Court conclude that MRPC 8.1 was violated. It appears that the hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated Rule 8.1, but made no express findings of fact to support this conclusion.

Upon our examination of the record, there is ample evidentiary support to conclude that Respondent violated this Rule. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 255 , 760 A.2d 1108, 1119 (2000), we held that “[t]he practice of law carrie[s] with it special responsibilities of self-regulation, and attorneyf’s] cooperation with disciplinary authorities is of the utmost importance to the success of the process and the ³⁵⁴ integrity of the profession.” Rule 8.1 provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or knowingly fail to respond to lawful demands for information from the disciplinary authority (the Commission and Bar Counsel in this situation) in connection with a disciplinary matter. Petitioner made several requests of Respondent for information regarding the three complaints in this case, including numerous written requests. Petitioner sent letters to Stein-berg on 9 August 2004, 7 September 2004, 1 October 2004, 3 November 2004, and 24 November 2004 requesting responses to Ms. Serabian’s complaint.

Regarding Mr. Meng’s complaint, a letter request was mailed to Respondent on 29 July 2004. Similar written requests for information related to Ms. Adeleye’s complaint were mailed on 27 April 2005 and 10 May 2005, which Respondent finally answered on 25 May 2005 (5 days after the response deadline established by Petitioner). The requests in these letters, introduced as Petitioner’s exhibits, went unanswered for the most part. In each letter, Petitioner clearly communicated to Respondent that failure to respond within a reasonable time could be deemed a violation of MRPC 8.1.

Either Respondent did not believe Bar Counsel, or did not care. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brown, 353 Md. 271, 287 , 725 A.2d 1069 (1999) (holding that repeated failures to answer requests for information is a violation of 8.1(b)); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. David, 331 Md. 317, 323-24 , 628 A.2d 178, 181 (1993) (holding that it was a violation of Rule 8.1 when attorney failed to answer Bar Counsel’s requests for information regarding three separate complaints). Furthermore, the record shows that Petitioner attempted to contact Respondent several times by phone regarding Ms. Serabian’s complaint, including calls on 11 November 2004, 17 November 2004, and 22 November 2004. Like the letters, the phone calls largely went unreturned.

We therefore sustain Petitioner’s exceptions as to the hearing judge’s failure to state expressly the factual underpinning of Respondent’s lack of cooperation with Bar Counsel’s investigative efforts, and conclude that Respondent Steinberg violated Rule 8.1 by ³⁵⁵ failing to respond timely to Petitioner’s requests for information relating to the three complaints. Exceptions filed by Respondent. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-758(b), within 15 days after service of notice that the disciplinary hearing record has been filed, each party may file written exceptions to the findings of fact and conclusions of law rendered by the hearing judge. Judge Johnson filed his written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 8 May 2006.

Any exceptions, therefore, had to be filed on or before 23 May 2006. Petitioner timely filed its Exceptions and Recommendation for Sanction on 23 May 2006. Respondent, however, did not file his Exceptions until 26 May 2006. Petitioner filed a motion to strike Respondent’s Exceptions on 23 June 2006, 7 days after apparently being served with a copy of Respondent’s Exceptions via the U.S. mail. 26 In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Stolarz, we held that “Maryland Rule 16-759 requires this Court, when exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings are taken properly, to determine whether the findings of fact have been proven by the requisite standards of proof set out in Rule 16 — 757(b).” 379 Md. at 397 , 842 A.2d at 47 (emphasis added).

By the same token, if exceptions to the findings of fact and conclusions of law are not taken properly, such as not timely filed, this Court may choose not to consider them. When asked at oral argument for an explanation as to why his Exceptions were filed untimely, Steinberg explained that he had in hand a motion for leave of court to file late when he arrived at our Court Clerk’s office to file his Exceptions. A “rather tall” man ³⁵⁶ working at the front desk informed him, “Oh you don’t have to worry about filing this. It is only 2 or 3 days late.

You’re not going to have a problem.” Further, Steinberg claimed that the “rather tall man” declined to accept the motion. When asked by the Court, Respondent could not recall the name of the person he had spoken to, nor was he able to produce the unfiled motion. We take judicial notice that there were only two male employees in our Court Clerk’s office on or about 26 May 2006. One of them is highly unlikely to be described by a person of normal perception as “rather tall.” The other, Alexander Cummings, Esquire, the Clerk of this Court, would not excuse a late filing, as apparently claimed by Respondent, nor is he empowered to do so, in any event.

Respondent's explanation is wholly unbelievable. Notwithstanding the procedural defect in Respondent’s filing of his Exceptions, Steinberg’s exceptions are unpersuasive on their “merits.” In his Exceptions, Steinberg does not raise any challenges to the express findings of fact made by the hearing judge; instead, he makes several legal assertions which boil down to two primary contentions. The first involves whether it was an abuse of discretion for the hearing judge to enter an Order of Default. The second relates to whether Respondent was given a fair opportunity to represent himself at the 2 March 2006 ex parte proof hearing.

Respondent first argues that he was not served by Petitioner’s employee, Mr. Dennis F. Biennas, on 3 November 2005, with all of the documents purported to have been served upon him, i.e., the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, Writ of Summons, and various discovery documents. Respondent claims that the packet of documents actually received from the process server contained only the discovery documents, but did not contain the Petition and Summons. Respondent, therefore, argues that the hearing judge improperly entered the Order of Default following Steinberg’s failure to file a Maryland Rule 16 — 754(c) responsive pleading because he was served improperly. ³⁵⁷ Respondent, following service by Mr. Biennas, filed a naked Certificate of Service with the Clerk’s office in the Circuit Court stating that he had responded to the Petitioner’s Request for Admission of Facts. The actual responses were mailed to Petitioner on or about 3 December 2005.

Nestled in the body of Respondent’s unilluminating response to the Request for Admissions was a statement that Respondent “... ha[d] not received the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action.” According to Respondent, “[t]his response put the Attorney Grievance Commission on notice of Respondent’s claim that he had not received said Petition,” and that it was improper for Petitioner to “just file[ ] the Request for Default Judgment” without inquiring further, properly serving a copy of the Petition, or otherwise taking action to contact Respondent regarding the alleged defective service. 27 This argument is unavailing. We hold, instead, that it was not an abuse of discretion by the hearing judge to enter the Order of Default. Maryland Rule 16-754(a) states that “[djefenses and objections to the petition, including insufficiency of service, shall be stated in the answer and not by preliminary motion.” It is well-settled that ³⁵⁸ Maryland Rule 2-401(d)(2). 28 An attorney with “over 20 years experience as a litigator,” such as Respondent claims to be, knows that requests for discovery and the responses thereto are not served concurrently on the court presiding over the case. Instead, the responses are served solely on the party requesting discovery, and only a copy of the Certificate of Service regarding the responses is filed with the clerk of the court.

Even were we to accept Respondent’s claim on its face, which we do not, Respondent clearly had notice that a disciplinary action had been filed against him, given that, consistent with his contention, discovery documents had been served upon him, to which he responded in part. Without a responsive pleading in the court file, however, asserting the insufficiency of service claim, it was not an abuse of discretion for the hearing judge to enter an order of default because he had no knowledge, prior to signing the order, of the alleged defect. 29 ³⁵⁷ [ejxcept as otherwise provided in these rules or by order of court, discovery material shall not be filed with the court. Instead, the party generating the discovery material shall serve the discovery material on all other parties and promptly shall file with the court a notice stating (A) the type of discovery material served, (B) the date and manner of service, and (c) the party or person served. The party generating the discovery material shall retain the original and shall make it available for inspection by any other party.

This section does not preclude the use of discovery material at trial or as exhibits to support or oppose motions. ³⁵⁸ Service of the Petition and Summons upon Respondent was supported by the Affidavit of Service of Mr. Biennas filed in the court file. The affidavit expressly stated, under the penalties of perjury, that Respondent Steinberg was served personally with the Writ of Summons and Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action. This affidavit, by itself, was sufficient to support the order of default entered by Judge Johnson. Holly Hall Publ’ns, Inc. v. County Banking & Trust Co., 147 Md.App. 251 , 259 n. 6, 807 A.2d 1201 , 1206 n. 6 (2002) (“The court may rely on affidavits in determining whether to enter a default judgment.”). ³⁵⁹ On 6 January 2006, Respondent filed a Motion to Vacate Default Judgment.

Finding the reasoning in that motion unpersuasive, the hearing judge denied it on 10 February 2006, and proceeded with the ex parte proof hearing originally scheduled for 2 March 2006. Because a judge has broad discretion in ruling on a motion to vacate an order of default, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ward, 394 Md. 1, 19-20 , 904 A.2d 477, 488-89 (2006) (filed 2 August 2006), we shall not hold in this case that Judge Johnson abused his discretion. An attorney’s failure to answer a Petition For Disciplinary or Remedial Action may result in an order of default judgment pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-754(c). According to that Rule, Maryland Rule 2-613 governs vacation of such an order after issuance.

Rule 2-613(d) provides that “[t]he [Respondent] may move to vacate the order of default within 30 days after its entry. The motion shall state the reasons for the failure to plead and the legal and factual basis for the defense to the claim.” Md. Rule 2-613(d) (emphasis added); see also Carter v. Harris, 312 Md. 371 , 539 A.2d 1127 (1988) (holding that Rule 2-613(d) requires that the party moving to vacate state the legal and factual basis for vacating the default judgment). Rule 2-613(e), furthermore, provides that “[i]f the court finds that there is a substantial and sufficient basis for an actual controversy as to the merits of the action and that it is equitable to excuse the failure to plead, the court shall vacate the order.” One factor in determining whether to vacate an order of default is whether the respondent presents “a satisfactory explanation ... why he failed to answer the initial complaint within the time allowed.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Middleton, 360 Md. 34, 45 , 756 A.2d 565, 571-72 (2000) (quoting Director of Finance v. Harris, 90 Md.App. 506, 515 , 602 A.2d 191, 195 (1992)); Banegura v. Taylor, 312 Md. 609, 617-21 , 541 A.2d 969, 973-75 (1988) (applying Maryland Rule 2-613(d)). In the present case, the Affidavit of Service of Mr. Biennas, the process server, clearly stated, under the penalties of perjury, that he personally served on Respondent the ³⁶⁰ Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, the Writ of Summons, Request for Production of Documents, Interrogatories and Request for Admission of Facts and Genuineness of Documents.

Respondent’s Motion to Vacate Default Judgment, however, contained only his bald and conclusory assertion that “Respondent was never served with a Writ of Summon or Petition.” Respondent’s motion was not accompanied by any affidavit or oath bolstering his claim that he had not been served properly. A reasonable hearing judge could conclude, from the totality of the circumstances here, that Steinberg did not proffer an adequate reason for his failure to file a responsive pleading. Respondent’s assertion that he never received proper service was unsupported by any evidence in the record, other than his bare allegation. Petitioner, on the other hand, provided an Affidavit of Service which specifically indicates that proper service was made.

Mr. Biennas, furthermore, was called as a witness at the 2 March 2006 evidentiary hearing, where he testified, consistent with his affidavit, as to the contents of the packet of documents served on Respondent. Accordingly, we hold that it was not an abuse of discretion for the hearing judge to deny the motion to vacate. Respondent further argues that he was not able adequately to appear and represent himself at the 2 March 2006 hearing because he was out of the country in the weeks prior to and surrounding the hearing. Specifically, Steinberg contends that, on 18 February 2006, he filed a Motion for Continuance of Hearing scheduled for 2 March 2006, because he would be in Southeast Asia for reasons of business and pleasure from 20 February 2006 through 3 March 2006.

Before the hearing judge ruled on this motion, Respondent left the country knowing that the continuance request had not been acted on. Steinberg told us at oral argument that he left his office staff on “high alert” looking for a ruling, and that he was prepared to terminate his vacation early in order to return in time for the hearing if the continuance request was denied. He further claimed that, had the motion been decided ³⁶¹ earlier (instead of on 1 March 2006 when it was denied), he could have made it back in time to defend his interests at the ex parte hearing, and could have represented himself adequately. We are not persuaded, and hold that his failure to appear at the hearing is inexcusable.

In Cruis Along Boats, Inc. v. Langley, 255 Md. 139, 143 , 257 A.2d 184, 187 (1969), we held that the grant of a continuance due to the anticipated absence of counsel from a proceeding is not automatic. Additionally, “the granting or withholding of a continuance is discretionary with the trial court, and ... [the judge’s] action in this respect, unless arbitrary, will not be reviewed on appeal.” Cruis Along Boats, Inc., 255 Md. at 142 , 257 A.2d at 186 ; see also Greenstein v. Meister, 279 Md. 275 , 368 A.2d 451 (1977) (holding that whether a matter constituted a proper grounds for continuance is within the discretion of the court). 30 That Respondent spent a significant sum of money on plane tickets and the like does not entitle him automatically to a continuance. Respondent knew that his continuance request had not yet been decided and nevertheless chose to leave the country with the matter unresolved. It was not an abuse of discretion for the hearing judge to conclude that Respondent’s trip to Asia, whether for business or pleasure, was an insufficient reason to delay the proceedings further.

Accordingly, we overrule the Respondent’s exceptions.

IV

Review of the Conclusions of law As to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, this Court has the ultimate authority to decide whether a lawyer has violated the MRPC. Harrington, 367 Md. at 49 , 785 A.2d at 1267 -68 (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 392 , 692 A.2d 465, 469 (1997); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Breschi, 340 Md. 590, 599 , 667 A.2d 659, 663 (1995)). Accordingly, “our consideration is essentially de ³⁶² novo, even where default orders and judgments have been entered at the hearing level. ” Harrington, 367 Md. at 49 , 785 A.2d at 1267-68 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shaw, 354 Md. 636, 646 , 732 A.2d 876, 881 (1999) (“This Court has original and complete jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary proceedings. Accordingly, the ultimate decision as to whether a lawyer has violated the [MRPC] rests with this Court.”) (internal citations omitted).

Based on our independent review of the record and findings of fact, we conclude that Judge Johnson was correct in concluding that Respondent Andrew M. Steinberg committed the following violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, in addition to MRPC 8.1 addressed earlier. A. Complaints of Christine Serabian and George E. Meng, Esquire. MRPC 1.1 requires a lawyer to provide competent representation to a client, and to exercise “the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” Respondent violated MRPC 1.1 when he failed to appear at at least one client meeting, arrived an hour late each to two of the mediation sessions, and participated unprepared in the second mediation session. As this Court has stated, such actions do not reflect the thoroughness or preparation that the legal profession demands, and constitute a violation of MRPC 1.1.

See generally Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ficker, 319 Md. 305, 315 , 572 A.2d 501, 509 (1990) (holding that it is a violation of Rule 1.1 when the attorney appears in court unprepared or fails to appear completely). Furthermore, such neglect is a clear violation of MRPC 8.4(d), which prohibits conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 83 , 753 A.2d 17, 31 (2000) (“We have held that failure to be punctual in a scheduled court appearance is ‘not only detrimental to the administration of justice but also constitute^] discourteous conduct degrading to the tribu ³⁶³ nal.’ ”) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Howard, 282 Md. 515, 523 , 385 A.2d 1191, 1196 (1978)). Steinberg likewise violated MRPC 1.3, which requires that a lawyer act with “reasonable diligence and promptness” in his representation of Ms. Serabian.

In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Awuah, 374 Md. 505, 522 , 823 A.2d 651, 661 (2003), we held that failure to deliver a client’s file after termination of the representation, despite repeated requests from the client, is a violation of Rule 1.3. Steinberg’s representation was terminated in February 2004 and, despite numerous requests from Ms. Serabian for the file, Respondent did not return her papers until much later. During that time, Ms. Serabian needed the file to represent herself in the ongoing litigation. She suffered significant set-backs in her efforts to overturn the sanctions imposed upon her due to the omissions of Respondent.

Additionally, Steinberg’s inexcusable six-month delay in withdrawing formally from the court case, after his representation was terminated, demonstrates a lack of requisite diligence and promptness. MRPC 1.4 requires a lawyer to comply promptly with reasonable requests from the client for information, to explain on-going matters to the extent reasonably necessary to allow a client to make informed decisions, and to keep the client informed about the status of pending matters. Respondent here failed to explain adequately the outcome of the mediation sessions. Most significantly, the record shows that Respondent presented the contents of an offer made by opposing counsel to Ms. Serabian’s brother, 31 but failed to communicate the contents of the offer to Ms. Serabian.

In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Harris, 366 Md. 376 , 784 A.2d 516 (2001), we held that the attorney violated Rule 1.4(a) and (b) by explaining the status of the case and the ³⁶⁴ consequences of dismissal to one of his clients, but not to the others in the group he was representing. 32 In other words, we held that keeping one client reasonably apprised of the status of the case, to the exclusion of another affected client, is a violation of MRPC 1.4. Harris, 366 Md. at 396-97 , 784 A.2d at 527-28 . Additionally, we held that the attorney violated Rule 1.4(a) by not keeping the client reasonably informed as to the status of the client’s pending case, which included the failure to relay a settlement offer made by the client’s insurance company. Harris, 366 Md. at 399 , 784 A.2d at 529 .

Respondent likewise violated Rule 1.2 by his actions. This Rule requires that a lawyer abide by a client’s decision concerning the objectives of the representation and whether to settle matter, and also requires the lawyer to consult with the client as to the means by which the objectives may be achieved. Respondent further violated Rule 1.4 by failing to communicate on at least two occasions the status of depositions. Steinberg, on the eve of the 13 November 2003 deposition, cancelled the scheduled deposition, falsely citing as a justification Ms. Serabian’s refusal to appear.

Notwithstanding this direct misrepresentation, Steinberg did not communicate the cancellation to Ms. Serabian, evidenced by her showing up, unaccompanied by her counsel, at opposing counsel’s office to be deposed on 13 November. The record shows that Stein-berg and Mr. Meng rescheduled the deposition for 22 January 2004. While Ms. Serabian knew she would be deposed sometime in January, Respondent did not communicate the final date to his client, also a violation of Rule 1.4. Respondent violated MRPC 1.5(c), regarding contingency fees, when