Attorney Grievance Commission v. Edib

HARRELL, J. The Attorney Grievance Commission (“Petitioner”), acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Timur Ziya Edib (“Respondent”), charging him with professional misconduct arising out of his representation of his client, Gokperi Kismir, principally with regard to the sale of certain real property in Virginia. Petitioner charged Respondent with violating Rule 1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), 1 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation), ⁶⁹⁹ 2 1.5(a) (Fees), 3 and 8.4(a) and (c) (Misconduct) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”). 4 The ⁷⁰⁰ Honorable Thomas L. Craven of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, acting as our hearing judge, made findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the matter. Judge Craven concluded, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, that Respondent did not violate MRPC 1.5(a) or MRPC 8.4(c), but that he violated MRPC 1.16(d) and 1.4, both of which established an MRPC 8.4(a) violation as well. I. Judge Craven’s Findings of Fact Edib was admitted to practice law in Maryland on 12 December 1998.

He maintains a law office in Maryland. The thrust of his practice is the representation of Turkish nationals immigrating to, or having business in, the United States. Respondent is fluent in Turkish and maintains dual U.S./Turkey citizenship. The Turkish Consulate in Washington, D.C., sometimes refers people to Respondent, as was the case with Ms. Kismir.

The complaint giving rise to these proceedings was lodged by Gokperi Kismir, Respondent’s former client. Ms. Kismir, a resident of Turkey, is the surviving sister of Mr. Gokperi Kismir (“Decedent”). Decedent resided in Alexandria, Virginia, dying there in May 2005. Ms. Kismir and Decedent apparently did not have a close relationship over the years and the miles.

Consequently, she was uncertain whether she was truly his sole heir. Ms. Kismir sought legal assistance in the United States by contacting the Turkish Consul, who referred her to Respondent. After some investigative work, Respondent determined that Ms. Kismir, indeed, was Decedent’s sole heir and that she held thereby marketable title to three pieces of real property in Northern Virginia as part of her inheritance. The circumstances surrounding the sale of one of these ⁷⁰¹ properties and the conduct of Respondent after he was terminated as her counsel forms the basis for the allegations against Respondent.

Respondent agreed to meet Ms. Kismir at the airport upon her arrival in the U.S. on 13 July 2006. Before the meeting occurred, however, the Turkish Consul put Respondent in contact with a Mr. Bekir Cakmak. Bekir Cakmak apparently knew Decedent to some extent during his life. He also advanced Decedent’s funeral expenses.

Bekir Cakmak gave Respondent several addresses of real property in Northern Virginia that Decedent may have owned, as well as names of several of Decedent’s other acquaintances. Respondent spoke with these acquaintances, learning that Decedent had been married (no children), but divorced. He had one or more ex-girlfriends, but no children by them. Ms. Kismir indeed was Decedent’s sole heir.

Respondent also learned, after consultation with a Virginia lawyer, that Virginia law provided that any real estate owned by Decedent at his death passed directly to Ms. Kismir outside of probate. 5 Respondent determined that the real estate consisted of two condominium apartments and one house, all in Northern Virginia. Upon Ms. Kismir’s arrival in the U.S., Respondent informed her of what he learned. He also told her he was not admitted to practice law in Virginia. Ms. Kismir, nonetheless, insisted that Respondent represent her in all matters regarding her brother’s death and estate.

Additionally, she told Respondent that she wanted his assistance with other matters, such as locating family rings that she believed belonged to her, but had been in Decedent’s possession, as well as with her recently deceased father’s estate. In short, Ms. Kismir presented Respondent with a wide range of issues—some involving the practice of law and others not implicating the need for legal training necessarily. The ⁷⁰² amount of time and effort that would be required to resolve the matters concerning Decedent’s assets (probate and non-probate), to advise and assist Ms. Kismir in managing and disposing of those assets, and in performing the other tasks she required, was entirely unknown at the inception of this relationship. Moreover, Ms. Kismir had very little money and was unable to afford a retainer fee for Respondent.

Notwithstanding the numerosity and range of the tasks before him, Respondent agreed to represent Ms. Kismir in all of the matters she requested. Respondent and Ms. Kismir signed two contracts on 15 July 2006. The first contract set Respondent’s fee for serving as administrator of the probate estate. 6 The second contract related to Respondent’s services in representing Ms. Kismir concerning the other matters. This contract had a provision that established Respondent’s compensation “based on the greater of either Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per hour for services rendered or a flat legal commission of fifteen percent (15%) of the gross value for all assets (personal or real property) received and handled through my office or escrow account for your benefit.” Although the contracts were written in English, the discussions between the two, both before contract execution and thereafter, primarily were in Turkish.

Judge Craven found that Ms. Kismir understood the agreements and that the terms were fair and reasonable under the circumstances. Judge Craven also found that Respondent expended considerable time and effort fulfilling his duties as both the administrator of the probate estate and with regards to the disposition of the non-probate real property. Pursuant to his duties as the administrator, Respondent spent a day in New York and ⁷⁰³ another in Northern Virginia, inquiring of banks within walking distance of Decedent’s previous workplace and residence, respectively, regarding deposit boxes and accounts he may have maintained. Respondent also negotiated with tenants in the real properties and investigated Decedent’s brokerage accounts.

Finally, the hearing judge found that, at Ms. Kismir’s insistence, Respondent accompanied Ms. Kismir on various personal errands while she was in the U.S. At some point in mid-Summer of 2006, Ms. Kismir decided she wanted to liquidate promptly the real estate. Edib retained Turan Tumbal as the real estate broker (Bekir’s occupation) for these tasks. Respondent advised Ms. Kismir that she should sell the two apartments for just under $300,000, even though their fair market value was greater. This recommendation was intended to avoid a significant tax withholding that would have applied to a sale if the amount were greater than $300,000.

Specifically, the goal was avoidance of the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act (“FIRPTA”), 26 U.S.C. § 1445 (2006 & Supp. II 2008). This Act compels the withholding of 10% of the value of real property that is sold for greater than $300,000 if it is sold by a foreigner. See id. Ms. Kismir agreed to sell these properties for just under $300,000.

At a dinner meeting with Respondent and Cakmak, Ms. Kismir announced her intention to sell the house to Cakmak for below market value, but over $300,000. Ms. Kismir agreed to the below market sale in recognition of Cakmak’s assistance in burying Decedent and helping to sort out his affairs. Respondent protested her decision, to no avail. Two of Ms. Kismir’s later complaints to the Commission arose from this transaction.

First, she claims that Tumbal waived orally in her presence his 6% brokerage fee because it was a direct sale between Kismir and Cakmak. At settlement, however, without objection from Respondent, the title company paid Tumbal a 6% commission on the total sales price, ⁷⁰⁴ amounting to approximately $23,000. 7 Respondent’s failure to object, and failure later to recover the commission from Tumbal, is one source of Ms. Kismir’s dissatisfaction with Edib’s representation of her. The second source of dissatisfaction is that the FIRPTA tax that was avoided on the sale of the two apartments was not avoided on the sale of the house. Respondent alleges that the tax withheld is recoverable upon filing the appropriate tax return, but it appears that neither he nor Ms. Kismir took action to accomplish this (including Ms. Kismir’s new attorney engaged after Edib’s termination).

Respondent received a total of $143,970 in fees disbursed from the proceeds of the sales of the three Virginia properties. In each transaction, Respondent received 15% of the sales price, according to his contract with his client. In the Fall of 2006, after the settlement on the real estate, Decedent’s probate estate remained open, consisting primarily of $140,000 in cash. Respondent did not distribute the net estate to Ms. Kismir without first paying Decedent’s debts.

After the debts were paid, the probate estate contained approximately $93,000 and Respondent was in a position to close the estate and make a final distribution. Ms. Kismir inquired of Respondent on several occasions regarding the status of the probate estate and complained about the disputed real estate commission on the house sale. Respondent told Ms. Kismir that he was unable to make significant distributions from the estate at that time and also failed to further pursue recovery of the real estate commission. Frustrated with this, Ms. Kismir retained another attorney and, by letter of 22 June 2007, fired Respondent.

Throughout the summer of 2007, by correspondence, email, and telephone, her new attorney demanded that Respondent provide copies of documents relating to the estate and to Respondent’s representation of Ms. Kismir. Respondent was almost entirely unresponsive to and uncooperative with this ⁷⁰⁵ request, stating that Ms. Kismir had all of the documents to which she was entitled. 8 II. Conclusions of Law Judge Craven determined that Respondent violated MRPC 1.16(d) based on his failure to surrender papers to Ms. Kismir (or her new attorney) after she terminated his employment. 9 Judge Craven concluded that Ms. Kismir was entitled to the requested documents because she was a former client, as well as the sole heir to the Decedent’s Virginia estate, which Respondent continued to administer. Finally, the hearing judge stated that “based on the same facts, the court also finds that Respondent has failed to properly communicate with his client.” Therefore, the failure to surrender papers also amounted to a violation of MRPC 1.4(a) and (b).

As to the charge of violating MRPC 1.5(a), however, Judge Craven concluded that Petitioner had not met its burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent charged unreasonable fees. 10 He reasoned that: Ms. Kismir had presented Respondent with a complicated and difficult situation, the outcome of which was very uncertain. They negotiated a fee arrangement which she understood and which was reasonable under the circumstances. Respondent substantially complied with Ms. Kismir’s requests and obtained the results she desired and expected, ⁷⁰⁶ except that he failed to actively pursue a waiver or return of the real estate brokerage commission. Finally, the hearing judge resolved that Respondent did not violate MRPC 8.4(c) because his conduct did not involve dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, but that Respondent violated MRPC 8.4(a), predicated on the MRPC 1.4 and 1.16(d) violations.

III

Exceptions Both Petitioner and Respondent took written exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law. Petitioner tendered a single exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent did not violate MRPC 1.5(a). Respondent advanced exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions that Respondent violated MRPC 1.16(d) and 1.4(a) and (b). 11 No party took exceptions as to the findings of fact. Thus, we treat the facts as established conclusively.

See Md. Rule 16-759(b)(2)(A) (“If no exceptions are filed, the Court may treat the findings of fact as established for the purpose of determining appropriate sanctions, if any.”). A. Standards of Review This court has original and complete jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary proceedings. Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Thomas, 409 Md. 121, 147 , 973 A.2d 185, 200 (2009).

At the evidentiary hearing, Bar Counsel had the burden of proving his allegations in the disciplinary petition by clear and convincing evidence. See Md. Rule 16-757(b). “We accept a hearing judge’s findings of fact unless we determine that they are clearly erroneous.” Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. ⁷⁰⁷ Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50 , 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006). “This deference accorded to the hearing judge’s findings is appropriate, in part, because the fact finder is in the best position to assess the demeanor-based credibility of a witness.” Id. See also Md. Rule 16-759(b)(2)(B).

Findings of fact to which neither party takes exception may be treated by us as conclusively established. See Md. Rule 16-759(b)(2)(A) (“If no exceptions are filed, the Court may treat the findings of fact as established____”). “All proposed conclusions of law by the hearing judge, however, are subject to de novo review by this Court.” Thomas, 409 Md. at 147 , 973 A.2d at 201 (citing Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Ugwuonye, 405 Md. 351, 368 , 952 A.2d 226, 236 (2008)); Md. Rule 16-759(b)(l). B. Petitioner’s Exception Petitioner submits that Respondent charged an unreasonable fee and should be held accountable for a violation of MRPC 1.5(a). 12 Petitioner’s first and strongest argument is that Respondent’s fee was unreasonable because he collected the agreed upon 15% on the sale price of the house and allowed Tumbal to receive a 6% real estate commission on the sale.

Petitioner alleges that the fee is unreasonable because a services retainer agreement containing “contingent elements unknown” at the time the agreement is made “may become unreasonable in light of the changed facts and circumstances.” Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Pennington, 355 Md. 61, 74 , 733 A.2d 1029, 1036 (1999) (citing Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Korotki, 318 Md. 646, 664-65 , 569 A.2d 1224, 1233 (1990)). Petitioner argues essentially that a 15% charge may have been reasonable initially, but became unreasonable in light of the fact that it is in addition to, rather than in lieu of, the 6% real estate broker’s commission. ⁷⁰⁸ Petitioner’s reliance on Pennington is misplaced.

Concededly, the Pennington Court endorsed the proposition that a contingent fee should be re-evaluated after the fee is quantifiable, which paradigm does apply to the case at hand. Before the fee itself is analyzed, however, Petitioner’s paraphrasing and quotation from Pennington must be examined in context. Where the Pennington court made the statement that Petitioner relies on, it is important to note that the Court stated that “Korotki teaches, however, ... that an agreement ... may become unreasonable in light of the changed facts and circumstances____” Pennington, 355 Md. at 74 , 733 A.2d at 1036 (citing Korotki 318 Md. at 664-65 , 569 A.2d at 1233 ). In Korotki we held that the attorney violated MRPC 1.5(a) when he coerced clients into signing a new fee arrangement in anticipation of an appeal.

Korotki initially entered into an agreement with his clients to receive one-third of any settlement reached before trial and 40% of any award achieved at trial, plus costs. When the trial court judgment was appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, Korotki had his clients sign an “Appellate Fee Agreement,” which authorized a 20% increase in his fees. Korotki told his clients that he would no longer represent them if they did not sign the new agreement. When the case reached this Court, Korotki again held a meeting at which he threatened to withdraw his representation unless the clients agreed to an additional 15% increase in his fees.

We found that “Korotki engaged in fee gouging, ‘which brings the legal profession into disrepute....’” Korotki 318 Md. at 671 , 569 A.2d at 1237 (quoting Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Kerpelman, 292 Md. 228, 244 , 438 A.2d 501, 510 (1981)). This conclusion was based on the hearing judge’s findings that Korotki coerced an increase in fees: (1) by threatening to terminate his representation, (2) by representing that, in that event, the clients would owe Korotki the full fee provided by the then current agreement (forty percent and later, sixty percent), and (3) by further representing that the clients, in order to obtain substitute counsel, would have to pay substitute counsel an additional ⁷⁰⁹ fee, ranging from thirty-three and one-third percent to forty percent. ⁷¹⁴ Mr. Penrose was employed as a lawyer ... but it is difficult to point out any services rendered by him which could not have been rendered in ordinary course by a capable and experienced bank executive.... ⁷⁰⁹ Korotki, 318 Md. at 669 , 569 A.2d at 1235 . We suspended Korotki from the practice of law for eighteen months, characterizing his misconduct as “a particularly aggravated case of greed overriding professionalism....” Id. at 649 , 569 A.2d at 1226 .

Thus, when the Pennington Court paraphrased Korotki , stating that an agreement “may become unreasonable in light of the changed facts and circumstances[,]” the “changed facts and circumstances” it alluded to were Korotki’s repeated coercive tactics that he employed to increase his fees. Pennington, 355 Md. at 74 , 733 A.2d at 1036 . In Edib’s case, the “changed facts and circumstances” occurring since the inception of the representation is represented by the 6% real estate broker’s commission, which Ms. Kismir alleged was unexpected. Respondent, unlike Korotki, never attempted to increase his fees beyond his 15% contingent fee.

The fact that Ms. Kismir did not receive a discount on the brokerage commission, which she claimed Tumbal promised her, stands in contrast to the calculated attorney misconduct in Korotki . Petitioner also argues that Respondent’s 15% contingent fee was excessive because the client paid it in addition to the 6% brokerage fee for selling the house. Pennington provides a legal proposition, however, that undermines this argument. The size of a contingent fee is not dispositive necessarily in determining whether there has been a violation of MRPC 1.5(a); rather, the Court should consider other factors, such as the purpose of the undertaking.

Id. at 75 , 733 A.2d at 1036 . In Pennington , the attorney represented her client in an employment discrimination action. Id. The client alleged that her employer discriminated against her by failing to promote her from a sales position to a management position.

Id. The client made it clear to Pennington that her principal objective was to acquire the management position, although she sought monetary compensation from the employer as well. Id. Pen ⁷¹⁰ nington’s retainer agreement established a contingent fee because the client had little money at the time.

See id. It provided that Pennington would receive 40% of all sums acquired after suit is filed, in addition to $5,000 if the client’s income becomes greater than $40,000 per year. Id. at 67 , 733 A.2d at 1032 . The client settled with the employer after suit was initiated, receiving $25,000 and a management position that paid in excess of $40,000 per year.

Id. Pennington took $15,000 as attorney’s fees. Id. The hearing judge found that Pennington violated MRPC 1.5(a).

In the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the hearing judge reasoned that the fee was reasonable when agreed upon because “both ... the result and the means to the result [were] unknown[.]” Pennington, 355 Md. at 68 , 733 A.2d at 1032 (second alteration in original). The hearing judge went on to state, however, that the actual fee taken was not reasonable because “ ‘it is generally a violation of the rule for the attorney’s stake in the result to exceed the client’s stake.’” Id. (quoting Korotki, 318 Md. at 665 , 569 A.2d at 1233 ). In finding a violation of MRPC 1.5(a), the hearing judge stated that “[n]othing has been presented to this court which would justify that line being crossed in this case.” Id. at 68, 733 A.2d at 1033 .

We did not adopt the hearing judge’s conclusions in this regard. We rejected the idea that any fee greater than the client’s award was unreasonable per se. Id. at 75 , 733 A.2d at 1036 . We pointed out also that MRPC 1.5(a)(4) recognizes that both the amount at issue and the result achieved should be considered when determining whether a fee is unreasonable. 13 See MRPC 1.5(a)(4).

Thus, the fact that Pennington received 60% of the monetary settlement did not amount to a MRPC 1.5(a) violation because the purpose of the litigation ⁷¹¹ was achieved when Pennington’s client was offered a management position. 14 Applying that rationale to Edib’s case, the fact that he charged and received from Ms. Kismir his full 15% fee, in addition to her having to pay Bekir the 6% brokerage fee, does not amount to a MRPC 1.5(a) violation for several reasons. First, the 6% paid to Tumbal is not part of an analysis of whether Respondent had a larger stake in the outcome of the undertaken services than Ms. Kismir. Second, Ms. Kismir obtained substantially the result that she desired. Respondent liquidated her real estate in a timely manner.

The fact that Ms. Kismir was charged both a 6% broker’s fee, as well as a 15% fee based on Respondent’s contingent fee agreement, did not persuade Judge Craven, and does not persuade this Court, by clear and convincing evidence, that a violation of MRPC 1.5(a) occurred. Petitioner’s second argument in support of its exception is that Respondent violated MRPC 1.5(a) because his 15% fee was in excess of the Virginia “Fee Schedule for Executors and Administrators.” Virginia Code § 26-80 states that an executor or administrator may receive “reasonable compensation,” but does not define what “reasonable compensation” is or how it may be determined. See Va.Code. Ann. § 26-30 (2010).

Petitioner relies on the “Fee Schedule for Executors and Administrators,” promulgated by the Virginia Office of Commissioner Accounts. This states that, “in the absence of unusual circumstances,” it ordinarily allows 5% on the first $500,000, and 4% on the next $500,000 to be charged to any client by an attorney rendering services as an executor or administrator in Virginia. John H. Rust, Jr., Commonwealth of Va., Fiduciary Compensation Schedule for Executors and Administrators 1 (2007). Petitioner argues that, even though Ms. Kismir’s property passed to her outside of probate, this fee schedule is a relevant consideration in assessing the reasonableness of Respondent’s fees in light of both MRPC ⁷¹² 1.5(a)(3) and Attorney Griev.

Comm’n v. Kendrick, 403 Md. 489, 507 , 943 A.2d 1173, 1183 (2008) (stating that Md.Code (1974, 2001 Repl.Vol.) Est. & Trusts, §§ 7-601, 7-602, 7-603, and 7-604 “set forth a framework for the reasonable allowance of compensation for the personal representatives(s) and/or the attorney(s) of an estate.”). We shall consider each authority in turn. Petitioner misapprehends the application of Kendrick to the present case. In Kendrick , this Court concluded that the attorney violated MRPC 1.5 because he charged his client more than the permissible amount under § 7-601 of the Estates and Trusts Article.

An attorney is only allowed to charge in excess of this section if he obtained prior court approval or notified the creditors of the estate that he proposed to do so. See § 7-604(a) (allowing an attorney to take a reasonable fee from the estate if all creditors consent in writing); § 7-602(b) (requiring the attorney to seek leave of the court when billing attorney’s fees). Kendrick established that a Maryland attorney working on a Maryland estate violated Maryland testamentary law, which was the basis for finding that the attorney violated MRPC 1.5(a). See Kendrick, 403 Md. at 508 , 943 A.2d at 1184 (“We hold that the acceptance of these payments by Respondent without court approval and without compliance with the requirements set forth in § 7-604, violated Rule 1.5.”).

Respondent here was not administering an estate when he sold the real property for Ms. Kismir because the properties passed directly to her upon her brother’s death, outside of probate. Accordingly, there was no violation of the Virginia authorities in this case. Kendrick does not persuade us that Respondent’s fee was unreasonable. Although Kendrick referred to the Maryland fee schedule as a “framework for the reasonable allowance of compensation,” the Maryland fee schedule in Kendrick served only as applicable and authoritative Maryland law.

Kendrick, 403 Md. at 507 , 943 A.2d at 1183 . The Court referred to the code as a “framework” because it provided strict rules regarding how much an attorney could charge related to the value of a decedent’s estate. ⁷¹³ The Court was not suggesting that this was a “framework” insofar as it should be used to indicate what reasonable compensation is in any instance regarding the disposition of real estate. The Court observed simply that these statutes specifically define what reasonable compensation is in Maryland for an estate administrator. 15 Once the Court determined in Kendrick that the attorney violated the statute, it was clear that the fee was unreasonable. Because the circumstances in Kendrick are distinguishable from those in Edib’s case, we do not find the Commission’s argument persuasive.

Petitioner cites MRPC 1.5(a)(3) as authority in support of its argument that if Respondent charged in excess of the Maryland fee schedule for the compensation due to an estate administrator, Respondent’s fee was unreasonable. MRPC 1.5(a)(3) states that a consideration whether a fee is unreasonable is “the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services____” MRPC 1.5(a). As noted previously, however, Respondent was not acting as an estate administrator when he sold the properties. Therefore, the Maryland fee schedule for an estate administrator does not bear heavily on our analysis under MRPC 1.5(a)(3) because the sale of property and the administration of an estate, where conducted separately, are not sufficiently analogous legal services.

Petitioner’s third and final argument is that any fees charged by Respondent for the liquidation of the real estate are unreasonable, alleging that Respondent performed no actual “legal services” in doing so. This argument is unpersuasive as well. MRPC 1.5 makes no mention of “legal services.” MRPC 1.5 only implicates attorneys who “make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee[.]” An attorney is entitled to a reasonable fee whether he or she is performing “legal services” per se. As we stated in Page v. Penrose: ⁷¹⁴ [W]hile his services may not, and so far as we can see were not, of a strictly legal character, nevertheless, it is just that he should have been compensated for the services he gave at the same rate as he would have been had they been strictly legal in character. 147 Md. 225, 225 , 127 A. 748, 749 (1925).

We hold alternatively that Respondent did not violate MRPC 1.5(a) based on a weighing of its applicable factors. The fact that the time and labor involved in dealing with Ms. Kismir’s various requests, ranging from asset liquidation to finding lost property, was unknown at the inception; that Respondent achieved his client’s desired result (the liquidation of real property); and, that Respondent was particularly capable of performing the services required by Ms. Kismir, 16 all bear on MRPC 1.5(a)(1), (4), and (7), respectively, and suggest that Respondent’s fee was reasonable. There is no evidence bearing on the other factors. MRPC 1.5(a)(1) provides that the first factor to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee is “the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly[.]” In the findings of fact, Judge Craven found that the amount of time and labor were unknown to Respondent at the inception, yet he agreed nonetheless to represent Ms. Kismir.

Although the novelty of the questions and tasks involved may not have been significant, the difficulty in detecting what property Decedent owned proved to be challenging, requiring Respondent to walk door-to-door to banks in locations in at least two states in search of assets, and on more ⁷¹⁵ than one occasion. This factor augurs in favor of concluding that Respondent’s fee was reasonable. MRPC 1.5(a)(4) provides another factor to be considered, “the amount involved and the results obtained[.]” Judge Craven found that “Respondent ... accomplished most of what [Ms. Kismir] had expected of him, much of which he was uniquely equipped to perform.” Therefore, it is clear that the “results obtained” were largely what Ms. Kismir desired. This finding also bears on MRPC 1.5(a)(7), which provides as a relevant factor “the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the serviees[.]” The hearing judge found that Respondent was “uniquely equipped” to handle Ms. Kismir’s needs.

Respondent’s ability to communicate in Turkish and English in pursuing Ms. Kismir’s multitudinous requests also supports the conclusion that Respondent’s fee was reasonable. 17 We overrule Petitioner’s exception. C. Respondent’s Exceptions Respondent takes exception to the conclusion that he violated MRPC 1.16(d). 18 Respondent states that although he “may have violated ... Rule 1.16(d) when he failed to turn over his former client’s file to [Ms. Kismir’s new attorney],” he did not fail actually to give his client any documents that she ⁷¹⁶ needed to protect properly her interests. Respondent alleges that MRPC 1.16(d) does not require a lawyer to give a copy of every relevant document, only documents that the client could show were needed to protect the client’s rights or that would prejudice the client otherwise if the client was without them.

In