Attorney Grievance Commission v. Ficker

WILNER, Judge. In two petitions, the Attorney Grievance Commission (AGC), through Bar Counsel, charged Robin K.A. Ficker (Ficker) with several violations of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (MLRPC). The charges emanated from eight complaints filed between 1988 and 1992. ¹⁷ Pursuant to former Maryland Rule BV 9 b (current Rule 16-709), we referred the two petitions to Judge Vincent E. Ferretti, Jr., of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, to conduct a hearing and make findings of fact and proposed conclusions of law. After hearing evidence over a period of 11 days, Judge Ferretti filed a 45-page opinion in which he made detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, culminating in a determination that Ficker had, in one manner or another, violated MLRPC Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 3.4, 5.1, and 8.4.

Exceptions were taken by either AGC, Ficker, or both in five of the eight cases. DISCUSSION The complaints against Ficker arise largely from alleged deficiencies in the way he ran his office—principally in the way he kept track of cases and assigned them to associates. In 1990, we reprimanded Ficker for a similar inattention to detail that, as in some of the instant cases, led to a failure to appear in court for two scheduled trials or hearings. Attorney Grier.

Comm’n v. Ficker, 319 Md. 305 , 572 A.2d 501 (1990) (Ficker I). Ficker was admitted to practice in 1973. In 1986, when his earlier troubles surfaced, he was a solo practitioner who operated out of an office in Bethesda and was assisted by a clerk with no legal training. As we pointed out in Ficker I, he maintained no diary or tickler system, and his only schedule of court dates was a large desk calendar.

Id. at 308 , 572 A.2d 501 . By 1988, when the current charges began to arise, he had three offices—one in Bethesda, one in College Park, and one in Frederick. His practice was a high-volume one that concentrated on serious traffic violations, often alcohol-related. He estimated that, in 1988-91, he handled between 750 and 850 cases a year.

He had cases throughout the State but practiced primarily in Montgomery, Prince George’s, and Frederick Counties. To assist him in maintaining that practice, Ficker hired various associates, none of whom, according to this record, remained in his employ very long or consistently. Stephen Allen was employed as Picker’s first associate in June, 1988. In August, 1989, Ficker hired a second associate, Denise Banjavic.

Banjavic quit five months later, in January, ¹⁸ 1990, and was replaced by B. Edward McClellan and Thomas Mooney. A month later, Allen left, after 19 months; he was replaced, in March, 1990, by David Saslaw and Noreen Nelligan. McClellan left in February, 1991 (13 months); Mooney left in March, 1992 (26 months). Saslaw and Nelligan left for a time but later returned.

Ficker apparently did not have a secretary but instead employed one non-lawyer assistant. His first assistant was Art Williams; after Mr. Williams, who was then in his seventies, suffered a stroke in 1989, Ficker employed Alex Burfield, a law student, to replace him. Both Allen and McClellan testified as to the way in which Ficker assigned cases and responsibility. Allen testified basically that Ficker would interview most of the clients and would assign cases to himself and the associates the day before trial.

The attorneys assigned the cases would often have never seen the file before and, in 99% of the cases, would never have met the client. Allen said that, sometimes when he got to court, he would have to call out the client’s name in order to make the introduction. Often, the file did not contain a police report, and it was not until he got to court that, through discussions with the prosecutor or police officer, he would learn the facts of the case. He said, in explaining why he ultimately left Ficker’s employ: “[W ]e had no control over where we were going to go I would say ninety percent of the time, whether it was going to be a trial the next day, how many different courts we had to be in.

It was pretty hectic---- I mean the pace was tremendous and you were running all over the state morning and afternoon. If you got stuck in a court in one county, you might have had two or three cases in another county in the afternoon that you wouldn’t know how to get there if you got stuck in a trial or something happened; so you know we were always continuing cases or asking for jury trials in cases to meet the deadline, to meet the other court dates.” Allen explained that cases set in for morning hearings were specifically assigned, but that afternoon cases would be handled by whomever was available: ¹⁹ “Everyone would handle cases in the morning, call in when they were done, and they would be advised because there wasn’t another attorney to go to that case. So whoever finished first would call in____ But whenever there were more cases than attorneys, all attorneys would be assigned one area to go to and everyone called in when they were done, and the first person who was done first or who was available would be sent off. I mean that happened continuously.” He added that his appearance and that of Ficker were often entered jointly, with neither one knowing who would end up actually representing the client.

Mr. McClellan said that he occasionally received files a week in advance but sometimes did not receive them until the day before trial. He confirmed that attorneys were assigned on a geographic basis and that whoever finished first would handle the “overflow.” It appears that Burfield (and before him Williams) in addition to his other duties, was essentially the dispatcher. As attorneys would call in, Burfield would inform them of where to go next, with or without a file. That situation apparently prevailed until March, 1990, when, as the result of Ficker being found in contempt of court for failing to appear in the Jordan case, described below, Ficker brought in another attorney, Thomas Heeney, as a mentor and made a number of changes in his office procedures.

Those changes included the hiring of an additional attorney, Ms. Nelligan, and a secretary, the purchase of a computer, the inauguration of weekly meetings between Ficker and his associates, and the development of two geographically-based calendars, one kept by Ficker and the other by Burfield. Saslaw agreed that things were “hectic” when he began employment in March, 1990 but said that they got better after the Jordan episode. He claimed that, in addition to a master calendar kept by Burfield, each of the lawyers had their own calendar of cases. The lawyers were assigned geographically and were able to get files earlier, and he had more time to review cases.

There was other evidence, however, that the ²⁰ system of dual calendars did not last longer than a few months. With this general background, we shall turn to the eight complaints made against Ficker. (1) Theo Dylewski In October, 1987, Ms. Dylewski met Ficker in the lobby of the Holiday Inn in Frederick 1 and retained him to represent her in connection with a charge of driving while intoxicated. She paid him $100 toward a $650 fee but received neither a receipt nor a written retainer agreement.

Trial was scheduled in the District Court in Frederick County for March 2, 1988; Ficker formally entered his appearance in November, 1987. Ms. Dylewski testified before the AGC Inquiry Panel that she called Ficker’s office in late January or early February to advise that she would be in Florida on March 2 and to request that the trial be postponed. She thought that she spoke to Ficker himself and that he told her a postponement would not be a problem, but that, if it were, he would let her know. Ficker said that he had no recollection of speaking with Ms. Dylewski about a postponement.

He testified that, a day or two before the trial date, his assistant Art Williams told him that Ms. Dylewski had called and said that she wanted to be in Florida on the day of trial. He had no recollection of speaking with Ms. Dylewski at that point but said that he “probably” tried to reach her. Mr. Williams, who was 81 when he testified in this matter in 1995, said that he had no recollection of Ms. Dylewski but asserted that he would never, on his own, advise a client of Ficker’s that a postponement would be granted or that it was all right not to show up for trial. He acknowledged that one of his duties was to answer the telephone and take messages, and that, if a client called and said that she needed a postponement, he would tell Ficker about it. ²¹ Ficker appeared in court on the trial date and orally requested a continuance, informing the court that his employee had Informed him that his client wanted to be in Florida.

He said that he did not file a motion in advance because (1) he had experienced difficulty in getting postponements in the District Court in Frederick, and (2) he had no idea of “why she wasn’t going to be in court or indeed if it was a sure thing that she wasn’t going to be in court.” When the prosecutor objected to a continuance, the court denied the request and issued a bench warrant for Ms. Dylewski. Ficker said that, upon returning to his office, he called the number he had for Ms. Dylewski and left a message with “someone” that a bench warrant had been issued. Ms. Dylewski testified that her first awareness of the warrant was on April 8, after she had returned from Florida, when her husband informed her that the State Police had been to her home to serve the warrant. She called Ficker, who advised her to surrender herself.

Upon the advice of a District Court clerk, she wrote a letter to the judge explaining the circumstances, and, eventually, the warrant was withdrawn. Ms. Dylewski later retained other counsel. Ficker never refunded the $100. AGC charged Ficker with violations of MLRPC Rules 1.1 (requiring the provision of competent representation), 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness), 1.4 (requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter), 5.3 (requiring a lawyer to provide proper supervision over non-lawyer assistants), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

On the evidence presented, Judge Ferretti said that he could not find by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Dylewski spoke personally with Ficker when she called his office in January or February. He did find, however, that Ficker was informed of her request for a continuance at least three or four days before the scheduled trial date. Judge Ferretti concluded that, as “a written request for a continu ²² anee might have been consented to by the State,” by failing to file a motion for continuance at that time, Ficker did not act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing Ms. Dylewski, in violation of MLRPC 1.3. He concluded further that, in failing to communicate with his client in a reasonably prompt manner, he also violated MLRPC 1.4(a) and 1.4(b).

The court found no violation of MLRPC Rule 1.1 and no violations of MLRPC Rules 5.3 or 8.4(c), by not having a bettér management system in place or by not properly supervising Mr. Williams. Ficker filed exceptions to the court’s findings and conclusions with respect to Rules 1.3 and 1.4. AGC excepted to the court’s failure to find a violation of Rule 5.3. Ficker’s exceptions hinge, essentially, on the assertion that there was no clear and convincing evidence that he was aware of Ms. Dylewski’s plans or request until a day or two before trial and that, in light of that circumstance, it was reasonable for him to appear in court and move orally for a continuance rather than attempt to file a written motion.

Judge Ferretti’s finding that Ficker was aware of Ms. Dylewski’s situation three or four days before trial is not supported by substantial evidence, he claims, and is therefore clearly erroneous. AGC, on the other hand, urges that, if Ficker did not know of his client’s situation until three or four days before trial, that was because he did not have in place proper measures to assure that Mr. Williams would do his job properly, and that that failure constitutes a violation of Rule 5.3. Ficker’s exceptions have merit and will therefore be sustained. With respect to Ficker’s knowledge, the evidence before Judge Ferretti would have allowed either of two findings: (1) that Ms. Dylewski in fact spoke with Ficker in late January or early February and that he therefore knew at that point that she needed a postponement, or (2) that he did not learn of her situation until a day or two before trial.

The one finding that is not allowed by the evidence is the one that Judge Ferretti made—that Ficker learned of the situation three or four days before trial. There was no evidence to ²³ support that finding. Judge Ferretti found insufficient evidence to conclude that Ms. Dylewski spoke personally with Ficker, thus leaving as the only viable alternative a conclusion that he did not become aware of her situation until the very eve of trial. On that premise, we do not believe (1) that, given his prior experiences in seeking postponements, it was unreasonable for Ficker to choose to appear in court and explain the situation personally to the judge, rather than filing a written motion, or (2) that, as a practical matter, Ficker would have been able to contact his client and assure her appearance in court.

With respect to the postponement, it is not at all clear that a written motion filed a day or two before trial would have been successful or that the prosecutor would have consented to it. Simple courtesy and a decent respect for a fellow lawyer would, of course, have dictated that Ficker, even at that late date, call the State’s Attorney’s Office to alert them to the situation and to his intent to seek a postponement, but he has not been charged with being discourteous. As to communicating with his client, she was in Florida; he did not know where to reach her; and, when he called the one Maryland number he had upon his return from court, he had to leave a message with someone else. We find no merit in AGC’s exception with respect to MLRPC Rule 5.3 in this matter.

That rule provides, in relevant part, that a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over a non-lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the non-lawyer’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer. AGC notes that, if Ms. Dylewski did not talk to Ficker, she spoke with Mr. Williams, among whose duties were answering the telephone and taking messages. Its position is that Ficker should have had in place some procedure to assure that Williams would, in a timely manner, relay any message he received from Ms. Dylewski. Judge Ferretti found that no tickler or calendaring system would have prevented the lapse in question.

It was simply a matter of Mr. Williams apparently not timely relaying a call, ²⁴ which he acknowledged was his duty to do. There is no evidence in this record that that was a persistent problem with respect to Mr. Williams, and we are not prepared to conclude, on this record, that one missed communication, even though significant, constitutes a violation of MLRPC Rule 5.3. (2) Dave R. Miller—Burñeld Mr. Miller was charged with an alcohol-related offense in the spring of 1989. In response to a written solicitation from Ficker, he contacted Ficker’s office on.

June 17, 1989. Mr. Burfield, who had replaced Mr. Williams as Ficker’s assistant, met Miller on the parking lot of the Holiday Inn in Frederick. Ficker was in the vicinity earlier but apparently did not remain to meet with Mr. Miller. AGC’s complaint arose from the fact that Burfield, on his own, charged Miller $60 for the initial interview and took a check for $60 from Miller, payable to Burfield.

There was evidence that Burfield had done that with respect to other clients as well. In its petition, AGC alleged that Burfield “regularly and repeatedly interviewed and advised [Ficker’s] clients, took money from new clients on his own behalf and misled and or allowed [Ficker’s] clients to believe he was an attorney.” AGC further claimed that “[d]espite [Ficker’s] knowledge of Mr. Burfield’s activities, he took no remedial action and otherwise failed to supervise him.” That lapse, it alleged, constituted a violation of MLRPC Rules 5.3 (failure to supervise a non-lawyer employee) and 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). Judge Ferretti found no violation of either rule. He concluded that (1) at the time of the Miller matter, Ficker was unaware of what Burfield was doing, and (2) when, in July, 1989, Ficker discovered that conduct, he reprimanded Bur-field, put an immediate stop to the practice, refunded the money Burfield had charged the various clients, and docked Burfield’s pay for the cost of the refund.

Because Miller had stopped payment on his check, there was no need for Ficker to reimburse him. Judge Ferretti found that, although Burfield did regularly interview Ficker’s clients, there was no ethical bar to a non-lawyer interviewing clients. Judge Ferretti ²⁵ further found that Burfield did not render any legal advice. Neither party has excepted to the findings or conclusions in this matter.

(3) Timothy Jordan The Jordan case arose from a failure to appear at trial, but it implicated as well failures in delegation and assignment. In May, 1989, following a one-car accident in which he lost control of his car and hit a tree, Jordan was charged, in Washington County, with driving while intoxicated, driving under the influence, failing to wear a seat belt, and speeding. In response to a mailed solicitation from Ficker, Jordan met with Burfield on the parking lot of a Holiday Inn in Frederick on June 17,1989, retained Ficker to represent him for a fee of $999, and gave Burfield $100 toward the fee. Shortly thereafter, Ficker entered his appearance on behalf of Jordan and prayed a jury trial.

That, of course, caused the case to be transferred to the Circuit Court for Washington County. Ficker was made aware that Jordan had previously been convicted of driving while intoxicated, in 1982, resulting in a suspended sentence in favor of probation, and that he was then facing a separate driving while intoxicated charge in Frederick County. In his testimony, Ficker acknowledged that because Jordan had a second and third offense, he was “looking at lots of jail time, unless we knocked out one of the cases” and that it was important “to know what the facts were to assess which of the cases, if not both of them, were winnable in a trial because it is the third offense where they really hammer you.” The record before us does not reveal when the Frederick County case was tried. Ficker represented Jordan in that case and was pleased that his client escaped incarceration.

Trial in the Washington County case was scheduled for March 6, 1990. On March 5, a court clerk called Ficker’s office twice to confirm the date and to inquire whether Ficker intended to insist on a jury. Someone from Ficker’s office called back and informed the clerk that a jury would be required. Despite the notice and the fact that Jordan himself ²⁶ was in court, no one appeared from Ficker’s office when the case was called at about 9:45 a.m.

As a result, after a later hearing, Ficker was held in contempt of court and fined $1,000. 2 The Jordan case was' assigned to Mr. Saslaw, who had begun employment that week and had never tried a jury case, although Ficker said that he was unaware of that lack of jury experience and believed that Saslaw was competent to try the case. Saslaw was not given the file until March 5, the day before trial. In addition to the Jordan case, Saslaw had two cases to try in the District Court in Frederick. Ficker said that he called Saslaw that evening and discussed the case with him, although their recollections differed as to the extent of the conversation.

Saslaw said that it consumed only three to five minutes; Ficker said that he discussed the facts and assumed that Saslaw would be able to handle the matter. Ficker regarded it as a “simple case.” There would be just the police officer and Jordan and the only question was “could they prove the guy was driving.” That defense, presumably, was based on the fact that, after Jordan had driven his car off the road and into a tree, he left the scene and went to a nearby hospital for treatment, and that the police did not catch up with him until he was at the hospital. The police report, however, indicated a strong odor of alcohol in the car and emanating from Jordan. Jordan refused to take the breathalyzer test.

Overlooked by Ficker—probably because, according to Jordan, the matter was never discussed between them—was the fact that Jordan’s face “was imprinted” in the windshield of the car. His hair was stuck to the windshield, and he had glass fragments on him when he met the officer at the hospital. It appears that Saslaw misunderstood what he was expected to do. He admitted that Ficker had told him that it was a jury trial case, and, indeed, the file reflected that to be so, yet ²⁷ Saslaw somehow was under the impression that the case was still in the District Court and that his mission was simply to request a jury trial.

When he arrived at the District Court, he attempted to locate the Jordan case on the District Court docket, and, finding no record of the case in that court, he proceeded to try his two District Court cases and then returned to the office. It was not until after 4:30 p.m. that he learned that the case was in circuit court and that no one had appeared. In “testimony” given at Ficker’s contempt hearing, Saslaw took full responsibility for the error, attributing it to a “rookie mistake.” Jordan was eventually tried, convicted, and given a sentence of one year, suspended in favor of three years probation, and a fine. On these facts, Ficker was charged with violating MLRPC Rules 1.1, 1.3, 3.4, 5.1, and 8.4(d).

Judge Ferretti found no violation of Rules 1.3, 3.4, or 8.4. He did, however, find a violation of Rules 1.1 and 5.1. Given the nature of Ficker’s practice, Judge Ferretti held that Ficker had an obligation to determine the extent of Saslaw’s prior experience in handling DWI jury trials before assigning him such a case. He declared “that Mr. Ficker did not inquire into or ascertain Mr. Saslaw’s experience in jury trials; that Mr. Saslaw did not expect to try a jury trial; that Mr. Ficker did not discuss a jury trial in depth in the Jordan case with Mr. Saslaw; that Mr. Ficker did not prepare Mr. Saslaw nor require Mr. Saslaw to prepare for a jury trial.” He found that “there was no procedure in place for checking on the Jordan case in the Hagerstown Circuit Court.” From this, Judge Ferretti concluded that Ficker had violated MLRPC Rule 5.1 “by not making reasonable efforts to insure that a subordinate lawyer could provide competent representation to the client based upon adequate legal knowledge, skill and preparation reasonably necessary for the proposed representation.... ” That failure, the judge concluded, also constituted a violation of Rule 1.1.

Ficker filed no exceptions to Judge Ferretti’s findings and conclusions in Jordan. AGC excepted to his failure to find a violation of Rules 3.4(c) and 8.4(d). Liability under Rule ²⁸ 3.4(c), it urges, stems from Ficker’s failure to have in place a system or procedure “to check on a particular matter,” and that, as a result, Ficker is as responsible as Saslaw for Saslaw’s failure to appear. It seeks to fit under Rule 3.4(c) as well the fact that Saslaw was, in fact, unprepared to try the Jordan case in any event, due to Ficker’s practice of assigning cases the day before trial.

Ficker’s responsibility for Saslaw’s failings suffices to constitute a violation of Rule 8.4(d) as well, in its view. We shall overrale AGC’s exceptions. Although we do not absolutely reject the notion that a supervising lawyer may be responsible under Rule 3.4 or 8.4 when a subordinate fails to appear in court for a scheduled hearing or appears with insufficient knowledge to provide adequate representation, we believe that, on this record, Judge Ferretti’s analysis of the problem was essentially correct—responsibility is more appropriately placed under Rule 5.1. Saslaw was an admitted novice in this area of law, which, according to Ficker, constituted 98% of his practice.

If he intended to have Saslaw jump immediately into trying jury cases involving charges of driving while intoxicated, he had an obligation to determine whether Saslaw was, in fact, sufficiently trained or experienced to provide competent representation in that area. He had no right merely to assume such competence, as he admittedly did. Moreover, and, indeed, more important, especially when dealing with a novice, it was wholly and inexcusably inappropriate for him to assign such cases the day before trial, with a minimum of instruction. Saslaw had never met the client, had never talked to the officer, knew nothing about the case, and obviously was unaware even that the case was to be tried.

Moreover, this was not, as Ficker so cavalierly assumed, a simple case. According to his own client, there was ample evidence that Jordan had been driving the car, and this was his second or third offense, for which a jail sentence was a distinct possibility. Saslaw’s appearance had not been entered in the case, and the client was fully expecting Ficker to appear on his behalf. The deficiency here was in failing to supervise ²⁹ the associates, such as Saslaw, exacerbated by the manner in which cases were assigned to them.

(4) Elmer Klein This charge also emanated from a failure to appear. Klein was charged with an alcohol-related offense. As this was a second offense, Klein prayed a jury trial, which was scheduled to take place in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, before Judge Robert Heller, at 9:30 a.m. on February 21, 1990. Three lawyers from Ficker’s office—Ficker and associates Stephen Allen and Denise Banjavic—entered their appearances.

By the time of trial, Banjavic had left Ficker’s employ. When the case was called, no one from Ficker’s office was present. Someone on Judge Heller’s staff called Ficker’s office and spoke to Burfield, who advised that Ficker was in District Court in Frederick and that he (Burfield) had informed the circuit court that Ficker would be late and should arrive around 11:00. When Ficker did not arrive by 11:00, another call was made.

Burfield reported that Ficker was still in Frederick, but that another lawyer would be dispatched. Around noon, Mr. McClellan, appeared. McClellan said that he had been in court in Prince George’s County, that he had never met Mr. Klein, did not have a file, and knew nothing about the case. After a break for lunch, Klein told Judge Heller that he wanted to proceed with Mr. McClellan.

As part of an apparent plea bargain, Klein pled guilty to driving under the influence, in return for which the prosecutor nol prossed the more serious charge of driving while intoxicated. Klein was sentenced to 60 days in jail, which was suspended in favor of probation and a fine. Later in the afternoon, Judge Heller spoke with Ficker, who said that he had three cases in Frederick County and, according to Judge Heller, “seemed cavalier about the entire matter.” Ficker testified that he apologized to Judge Heller. As a result of Judge Heller’s complaint, Ficker was charged with violating MLRPC Rules 1.3 (reasonable diligence), 3.4(c) (knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a ³⁰ tribunal), 5.1 (supervising lawyers in the firm), and 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

There was a great deal of evidence taken with respect to the Klein case. Ficker had no recollection of assigning the case. He stated that on the schedule for February 21, 1990 were three cases in Frederick, several people to be met in Frederick (including two prospective clients), three clients to be met in Rockville, a proceeding identified only as an “NBA” in Rockville, 3 a case in Rockville, three matters in Prince George’s County, and the Klein case in Annapolis. It is evident that Ficker handled the matters in Frederick.

McClellan was assigned to the cases in Upper Marlboro. Allen was sent to District Court in Hyattsville to obtain a continuance in a case. He claimed that he was not assigned the Klein case—that no one was—although he said that he may have driven to Annapolis on February 20 to file a request for postponement in that case. This was one of those cases, he said, that the first lawyer who finished his morning docket would handle.

He called the office after completing his assignment in Hyattsville and Burfield told him that McClellan had been sent to Annapolis. There was other evidence that Allen was, in fact, assigned the case but thought it had been postponed. There was no evidence that he had the file with him on February 21. From all of the evidence presented, Judge Ferretti found that Allen was, in fact, assigned the Klein case and that, as á result, AGC’s charges were unfounded.

Because the case was assigned to Allen, and because Ficker did nothing to ratify Allen’s failure to appear, the judge found no violation of MLRPC Rule 5.1. Nor, he continued, did Allen’s failure to appear constitute a violation by Ficker of Rule 1.3 (acting with reasonable diligence), Rule 3.4 (knowingly disobeying an obligation owed to a tribunal), or Rule 8.4 (conduct prejudicial to ³¹ the administration of justice). The underlying basis of his conclusions was that Allen’s failure to appear was not the product of any conduct by Ficker personally or the result of procedures that he put in place. AGC has excepted to those findings and conclusions.

As to Rule 5.1, it argues that the court reached inconsistent conclusions. In the Jordan case, discussed above, which involved a failure to appear in the Circuit Court for Frederick County on March 6, 1990, Judge Ferretti found that the failure arose from the lack of any procedure designed to avoid such lapses, and AGC maintains that the same finding should be made with respect to the Klein case. Such a finding, it continues, would establish a violation of Rules 3.4 and 8.4 as well. More specifically, it contends that the evidence showed that Ficker did not assign the case to Allen in a timely and proper manner.

Klein