Attorney Grievance Commission v. Mooney

CATHELL, Judge. Bar Counsel, on behalf of the Attorney Grievance Commission (AGC), petitioner, and at the direction of the Review Board, filed a petition with this Court for disciplinary action against Thomas J. Mooney, Esquire, respondent, 1 pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-709(a). 2 In the petition, Bar Counsel alleges violations of Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 5.1, 5.3, 7.1, 8.1, and 8.4 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) and Maryland Rule 16-812 based on four separate complaints filed against respondent. This Court referred the matter to the Honorable Michael D. Mason of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Maryland Rules 16-709(b) and 16—711(a). 3 After an evidentia- ⁶² ry hearing, Judge Mason found, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent violated MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 5.1, 5.3, 8.1, and 8.4. Respondent filed in this Court extensive exceptions to the findings of facts and conclusions of law made by Judge Mason.

As we shall indicate, we accept some of the court’s findings of facts and proposed conclusions of law, and do not accept certain of its findings and conclusions. We shall suspend respondent indefinitely, with permission to apply for readmission after ninety days. Termination of respondent’s suspension is subject to respondent engaging, at his expense, a monitor acceptable to Bar Counsel, who will oversee respondent’s practice of law and respondent’s accounting for funds entrusted to him for a period of two years, and who will provide Bar Counsel monthly reports for one year and quarterly reports thereafter. I. Facts This disciplinary action arose out of the complaints of four of Mr. Mooney’s clients: Ms. Francis L. Greenhill, Ms. Betty Johnson, Mr. Melvin Postell, and Ms. Dee Dee Cunningham.

The court heard testimony from Ms. Greenhill, Ms. Johnson, Ms. Cunningham, Mr. Mooney, Ms. Natalija Djurickovic, 4 and Mr. Dennis F. Biennas. 5 The petition came before the court on December 1, 1999. From the evidentiary record made below, Judge Mason made findings of fact with respect to each complaint. ⁶³ Complaint of Francis L. Greenhill In response to his letter of solicitation, 6 respondent was retained by Ms. Greenhill in the latter part of October 1997 to represent her in a criminal case set for January 22, 1998 in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Prince George’s County. She paid respondent a fee of approximately $325.00. Ms. Greenhill met with respondent in November to discuss the facts of her case.

Respondent entered his appearance in Ms. Greenhill’s case on November 7, 1997. Subsequently, Ms. Greenhill attempted to call respondent on the telephone on numerous occasions. The record reflects that respondent neither took nor returned any of her calls. Respondent failed to appear as counsel for Ms. Greenhill at the January 22, 1998 trial.

That day, at the direction of the court, Ms. Greenhill telephoned respondent’s office and was told that he was not there. When she returned to court, she decided to proceed pro se. The case was dismissed because no witnesses appeared to testify against her. Several weeks later, while Ms. Greenhill was in court on an unrelated matter, she saw respondent heading into court with another client.

She confronted him concerning his failure to appear at her trial and requested her money back. He offered her no explanation for his failure to appear, but told her to call his office to inquire about getting a refund. She thereafter called his office numerous times, but was never able to contact respondent. On one occasion, respondent’s receptionist told Ms. Greenhill that respondent no longer worked at that office.

Ms. Greenhill then filed a complaint with Bar Counsel. Approximately two months after Bar Counsel contacted respondent concerning Ms. Greenhill’s complaint, her $325.00 fee was refunded and she received a letter of apology from respondent. ⁶⁴ Ms. Djurickovic testified that she was hired by respondent in 1997 for the primary purpose of handling cases in Prince George’s County. Although the majority of her cases were in the District Court, she occasionally handled circuit court cases. She further testified that respondent had neither discussed the Greenhill case with her nor assigned it to her.

Both Ms. Djurickovic and respondent described their general process of “assigning” cases. Ms. Djurickovic was assigned a case when she was given the case file by respondent or the case file was otherwise left for her by respondent in the office. This usually occurred approximately a week in advance of trial. During the investigation of Ms. Greenhill’s complaint, respondent told an investigator for petitioner that because Ms. Djurickovic handled most of his firm’s cases in Prince George’s County, and that Ms. Greenhill’s case was in Prince George’s County, and he could not find Ms. Greenhill’s file, he assumed that he had assigned the case to her.

He conceded, however, that he may have neglected to assign the case. Additionally, he offered no explanation as to: (1) why he neither received nor returned Ms. Greenhill’s calls and (2) why his receptionist would have told Ms. Greenhill that he no longer worked at his office. Finally, he also told Mr. Biennas, the investigator, that when Ms. Djurickovic arrived in court, Ms. Greenhill’s case had already been “nolle prossed” when in fact the case actually had been dismissed. Based upon the aforementioned findings of fact, Judge Mason concluded that respondent violated the following rules in his representation of Ms. Greenhill: 1.

MRPC 1.1 (Competence) by failing to provide competent representation to Ms. Greenhill; 2. MRPC 1.3 (Diligence) by failing to act with reasonable diligence in representing Ms. Greenhill; 3. MRPC 1.4 (Communication) in failing to respond to the client’s inquiries after his failure to appear for a trial and by failing to appear at the trial itself; 4. MRPC 8.1 (Bar admission and disciplinary matters) by telling the bar investigator that the case had been assigned to an associate when the evidence indicated that no ⁶⁵ such assignment took place and respondent was aware of that fact when he made that statement; and 5.

MRPC 8.4 (Misconduct) by attempting to mislead the bar investigator by suggesting that the case had actually been assigned to an associate, by failing to appear for trial, and by falsely representing to the court at the disciplinary hearing that he could not remember what happened in this case because he did not have a file. 7 Complaint of Betty Johnson On or around September 1997, respondent was retained by Ms. Johnson to represent her minor son, Clifton Haggins, in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, in connection with the criminal charge of attempted murder. Ms. Johnson specifically asked respondent about filing a petition to waive the jurisdiction of the circuit court (a reverse waiver) and he agreed to do so as part of his representation. Such a petition was never filed by respondent. After retaining respondent, Ms. Johnson attempted to contact him by telephone on a number of occasions.

The record reflects that on at least one occasion, she was able to speak with him and during their conversation he assured Ms. Johnson that he would go to the jail to visit her son, who was incarcerated. Clifton Haggins informed his mother, Ms. Johnson, that respondent never came to visit. Ms. Djurickovic testified that respondent assigned Mr. Hag-gins’ case to her in January of 1998. 8 A line entering her appearance was filed in the case on October 21, 1997; howev ⁶⁶ er, she did not sign it and testified that she was unaware that it had been filed. She also testified that when she was assigned the case, there was no file. 9 As such, she had to go to court to get information concerning the case.

While conducting this research, she noticed that no motions had been filed on Mr. Haggins behalf. According to the docket entries, she filed standard motions to suppress on February 3, 1998. She also testified that at no time did respondent inform her that Mr. Haggins was a minor at the time of his alleged crime. 10 Ms. Djurickovic further testified that one of the first things she noticed when reviewing the case file was that a court date had been set on a day when she already had a trial scheduled in Frederick County. She told respondent that because of this prior commitment she would not be able to represent Mr. Haggins.

In response to this information, respondent said that he would take care of the matter and asked only that she have the motions continued to the trial date so he would only have to make one trip to court. The docket entry shows that, on March 6, 1998, the motions were continued to the trial date. Ms. Johnson testified that she contacted respondent approximately a week prior to her son’s trial date, and at that time he informed her that Ms. Djurickovic would be handling her son’s case. Ms. Johnson got Ms. Djurickovic’s phone number from respondent, called her, and left a message at her office. 11 Wfiien she did not hear from Ms. Djurickovic, Ms. Johnson made several calls to her pager number, which the office had ⁶⁷ given her.

After not getting a response, she called the pager one final time and put the numbers 911 along with the call back number. 12 During this time, Ms. Djurickovic was involved in taking depositions in an unrelated matter. During a recess from the depositions, she responded to Ms. Johnson’s last page. They briefly discussed Mr. Haggins’s case. It was the one and only conversation between the two women.

On March 17, 1998, in response to the facts outlined, supra, Ms. Johnson notified the court that she was dismissing respondent and seeking other counsel. On March 20, 1998, just three days before trial, new counsel entered their appearance in the case. Based upon the aforementioned findings of fact, Judge Mason concluded that respondent violated the following in his representation of Ms. Johnson: 1. MRPC 1.1 in failing to represent Mr. Haggins in a competent manner; 2.

MRPC 1.3 in failing to act either diligently or promptly in representing his client; 3. MRPC 1.4 in failing to meet with his client, or otherwise discuss the case with Mr. Haggins or Ms. Johnson for a period of over four months; and 4. MRPC 8.4 in accepting Mr. Haggins’ case for representation and thereafter taking no action to provide representation and further misrepresenting to his client’s mother that he was taking such efforts. Judge Mason further found that respondent attempted to mislead the court by testifying in the court hearing that he believed he had given the case to Ms. Djurickovic in a timely fashion and reasonably believed that she was taking necessary action. 13 ⁶⁸ Complaint of Melvin Postell In response to his letter of solicitation, respondent was retained by Mr. Postell, on or about March 26, 1998, to represent him at a trial scheduled for March 30, 1998 before the District Court, in Prince George’s County.

Mr. Postell paid a fee of $600.00 for the representation. On the day of the trial, an unknown member of respondent’s staff told Mr. Postell over the telephone that he did not have to appear at the trial. 14 In reliance on this information, Mr. Postell did not appear. Neither respondent nor any representative from his office appeared for Mr. Postell’s trial. Shortly after March 30, 1998, Mr. Postell learned that a bench warrant had been issued for his arrest.

He called respondent and was put through to Ms. Djurickovic. She told Mr. Postell to turn himself in to the police, to which Mr. Postell replied that their office should post any necessary bond. Ms. Djurickovic explained to Mr. Postell that she would have to discuss that matter with respondent. When she later discussed the issue with respondent, he said he would take care of the matter.

Subsequently, Mr. Postell turned himself in to the authorities. Respondent filed a motion to rescind the bench warrant. Concerning his failure to appear, respondent indicated to the investigator for Bar Counsel, Mr. Biennas, that he had assigned the case to Ms. Djurickovic. Ms. Djurickovic testified that she had never been assigned Mr. Postell’s case and only became aware of it after the failure to appear, when Mr. Postell’s call was forwarded to her.

Because of this testimony, and because (1) the trial was set for March 30, 1998 and, according to the exhibits, respondent did not enter his appearance in the case until March 26, 1998; and (2) respondent, not Ms. Djurickovic, drafted the motion to rescind the bench ⁶⁹ warrant, Judge Mason found that respondent gave Mr. Bien-nas false information. Based upon the aforementioned findings of fact, Judge Mason concluded that respondent violated several of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct in his representation of Mr. Postell. 1. The court found that respondent violated MRPC 1.1 and 1.3 by failing to provide competent and diligent representation to Mr. Postell. He found that respondent not only failed to appear for trial, he failed to do anything except make a halfhearted effort to have the bench warrant rescinded.

He did not include the most important piece of information—that his client was told by someone in respondent’s office that he did not have to be in court that day¿ 2. It found that he violated MRPC 1.4 by failing to keep Mr. Postell informed about the status of his case. 3. It found that he violated MRPC 5.3 (Responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assistants). The court found that respondent failed to make any reasonable efforts to ensure that his administrative staff would accurately inform the clients of the status of their cases.

Only in the absence of any such reasonable efforts could a situation arise where a member of his staff would tell a client that he did not have to appear for trial. 15 4. It also found that he violated MRPC 8.1 because respondent falsely informed the bar investigator that he had assigned the case to his associate. The court found that, at best, respondent intended to assign the case, but knew by the time he spoke to the bar investigator that Ms. Djurickovic had never gotten the case. 5. Finally, Judge Mason found that respondent, by reason of his actions described above, violated MRPC 8.4.

Additionally, as has been noted, according to the court, respondent attempted to deceive the bar investigator regarding his han ⁷⁰ dling of the case. Further, the judge found that while it may-have been technically correct in the motion to rescind the bench warrant to assert that the defendant did not know that he had to appear in court, the statement was misleading. Judge Mason reasoned that if counsel had been candid with the hearing court and informed the court that the client had been erroneously informed not to appear, the chances of having the bench warrant recalled may have been substantially higher. Instead, counsel simply stated that the client did not know he had to be in court without explanation.

In addition to finding that respondent misled the court in the way he phrased the motion to rescind the bench warrant in thé Postell case, Judge Mason found that respondent was not candid when he testified in the disciplinary court hearing itself, that he could not recall what his investigation had revealed in respect to this case. He had to have found out why the client failed to appear before he could file the motion in the Postell case to rescind the bench warrant. Judge Mason reasoned that, because respondent was already being investigated by Bar Counsel at that time in the Greenhill matter, it was inconceivable that respondent would have discovered and then forgotten what he had learned regarding Mr. Postell’s case. 16 Complaint of Dee Dee Cunningham Respondent was retained by Ms. Cunningham to represent her in connection with an assault trial scheduled for May 28, 1998. Ms. Cunningham insisted that she was innocent and presented respondent with a list of witnesses who had observed the fight from which the charges arose, who she asserted would testify on her behalf.

Additionally, she told respondent of the existence of certain medical records that would corroborate her version of what had occurred. After ⁷¹ the initial meeting, but before the trial, Ms. Cunningham sent a fax to respondent reminding him of the witnesses and medical records. Moreover, before the trial, she made repeated unsuccessful efforts to reach respondent. On the day of the trial, respondent did not appear.

Instead, Ms. Djurickovie arrived late. Ms. Cunningham had no prior contact with Ms. Djurickovie. Although Ms. Djurickovie had a file, she had received no information about the witnesses or the medical records from respondent. Ms. Djurickovie testified that respondent had given this case to her on the afternoon of the day before trial.

It was not until her initial discussion with Ms. Cunningham that Ms. Djurickovie learned that Ms. Cunningham had requested that respondent obtain medical records and subpoena witnesses. Realizing that neither task had been performed, Ms. Djurickovie recommended that the case be continued in order to secure the witnesses and obtain the medical records. However, Ms. Cunningham elected to go forward with the trial. 17 Ms. Cunningham was convicted, but offered a probation before judgment. She refused the probation before judgment in order to preserve her appeal rights.

Accordingly, a guilty verdict apparently was entered against her. After an appeal was noted, Ms. Cunningham promptly fired respondent and his firm. Respondent testified on December 1, 1999 that he could not locate his file and was therefore unsure as to how the case was handled; however, in a letter to Bar Counsel dated September 15, 1998, 18 concerning Ms. Cunningham’s complaint, he wrote: “I reviewed the file and spoke to my associate Ms. Djurickovie ⁷² concerning this matter.” Judge Mason found it difficult to believe that respondent had simply forgotten what he learned when he spoke to his associate about a case that Bar Counsel was investigating. Additionally, respondent testified that he could not dispute that he had been given the names of witnesses and that he had failed to subpoena them.

He also conceded that it was possible that he gave Ms. Djurickovic the file the night before the trial. Based upon the aforementioned findings of fact, Judge Mason concluded that respondent violated the following in his representation of Ms. Cunningham: 1. MRPC 1.1 by failing to provide competent representation due Ms. Cunningham; 2. MRPC 1.3 by failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing Ms. Cunningham; 3.

MRPC 1.4 in failing to respond to any of Ms. Cunningham’s phone calls or correspondence prior to the trial and in failing to respond to her letter of June 12, 1998, 19 following the trial; 4. MRPC 5.1 because the system set up by respondent to provide files to Ms. Djurickovic for the Prince George’s County cases was woefully inadequate, it was not reasonably designed to make sure that Ms. Djurickovic received the files in a timely fashion and to ensure that she received notice that she had been assigned to a given case; and 5. MRPC 8.4 by virtue of the violations of the MRPC as set out, swpra; by failing to respond to Bar Counsel’s request for information regarding Ms. Cunningham’s complaint; and by attempting to mislead the court by testifying that he could not recall what had occurred in this case. 20 ⁷³ II. Discussion As we stated in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Gavin, 350 Md. 176,189 , 711 A.2d 193, 200 (1998): This Court has original and complete jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary proceedings.

Md. Rule 16-709b; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Adams, 349 Md. 86, 93 , 706 A.2d 1080, 1083 (1998); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 470 , 671 A.2d 463, 473 (1996); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kent, 337 Md. 361, 371 , 653 A.2d 909, 914 (1995); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 328 Md. 276, 287 , 614 A.2d 102, 108 (1992). Under our independent review of the record, we must determine whether the findings of the hearing judge are based on clear and convincing evidence. The “hearing court’s findings of fact are prima facie correct and will not be disturbed unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 392 , 692 A.2d 465, 469 (1997) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 347 , 624 A.2d 503, 505 (1993)). Accordingly, the ultimate decision as to whether a lawyer has violated professional rules rests with this Court.

Garland, 345 Md. at 392 , 692 A.2d at 469 ; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Breschi 340 Md. 590, 599 , 667 A.2d 659, 663 (1995). Respondent’s Exceptions 21 Complaint of Francis L. Greenhill Judge Mason found that respondent was in violation of MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 8.1, and 8.4 for his actions conducted in the representation of Ms. Greenhill. Respondent excepts to the findings that he violated MRPC 1.1, 1.4, 8.1, and 8.4. ⁷⁴ a. MRPC 1.1 (Competence), MRPC 1.3 (Diligence), & MRPC 1.4 (Communication) While respondent concedes that no lawyer from his office appeared at Ms. Greenhill’s trial and admits that such practice may be a violation of MRPC 1.3, he argues that it does not make out a clear violation of MRPC 1.1.

We disagree. MRPC 1.1 states: A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. Respondent failed to provide Ms. Greenhill with any representation, much less competent representation.

Instead, he left Ms. Greenhill to fend for herself when her day in court arrived. When the court directed that she call her attorney, she called his office and was told that he was not there. As to a specific case, such a complete failure of representation is the ultimate incompetency. We have held that it is unacceptable for an attorney to appear in court for a trial or other proceeding unprepared, and that such practice may constitute a violation of MRPC 1.1.

See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ficker, 349 Md. 13, 39-40 , 706 A.2d 1045, 1057-58 (1998) (Ficker II). An attorney who does not even show up for the court appearance violates the same rule, absent sufficient explanation. As we said in Ficker II, 349 Md. at 39-40, 706 A.2d at 1057-58: The Comment to Rule 1.1 explains, in that regard: “Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation.

The required attention and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake____” The requirement of adequate preparation has long been recognized as part of a lawyer’s responsibility to provide ⁷⁵ competent representation, and it is not without significance that, in the current Code of Professional Responsibility embodied in the MLRPC, the duty to provide competent representation is given “the place of honor as the first ingredient in the lawyer-client relationship.” 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering, 2d ed. § 1.1:101 (1997). Former DR 6-101(A)(2) precluded a lawyer from handling a matter “without preparation adequate in the circumstances,” and the failure to make a proper investigation of the facts of a case prior to trial has led to discipline. See In Re Conduct of Chambers, 292 Or. 670 , 642 P.2d 286, 291 (1982); People v. Felker, 770 P.2d 402 (Colo.1989). See also Lamar v. American Finance System of Fulton Cty., Inc., 577 F.2d 953 , 955 (5th Cir.1978), noting the duty in a non-disciplinary context.

Respondent did not adequately represent Ms. Greenhill because he failed to appear for her trial. When Ms. Greenhill retained respondent in October of 1997 for her criminal trial set for January 22, 1998, clearly it was her intention to have him represent her in trial that day. His failure to appear in court for his client’s trial is incompetent representation. Respondent acknowledges that his failure to appear at Ms. Greenhill’s trial may be a violation of MRPC 1.3.

MRPC 1.3 states in relevant part that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” He excepts, however, to the court’s finding that he violated MRPC 1.4 in “failing to respond to the client’s inquiries after his failure to appear for a trial” and “by failing to appear at the trial itself.” MRPC 1.4 states: (a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. We overrule his exception and hold that respondent’s actions violated both MRPC 1.3 and 1.4. As we stated in Attorney ⁷⁶ Grievance Commission v. Montgomery, 296 Md. 113, 120 , 460 A.2d 597, 600 (1983) (Montgomery I), the “lack of communication with one’s client, for whatever reason, is a matter of continuing concern to the public.

Moreover, this Court has consistently regarded neglect and inattentiveness to a client’s interests to be [an ethical violation] warranting the imposition of some disciplinary sanction.” Montgomery I involved five different cases in which the attorney repeatedly failed to return communications from clients and neglected to file timely claims on their behalf. The sixty-day suspension in Montgomery I apparently did not deter the attorney; he later was found to have neglected three more cases in which he also failed to communicate with his clients. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Montgomery, 318 Md. 154 , 567 A.2d 112 (1989) (Montgomery II). This second set of violations led to his disbarment.

In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ficker, 319 Md. 305 , 572 A.2d 501 (1990) (Ficker I), we disciplined an attorney who in two separate cases neglected to file his appearance pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-214(a) or to appear in court on behalf of his clients. Mr. Ficker argued before this Court that under former Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) Disciplinary Rule (DR) 6-101(A)(3), 22 a single failure to appear did not amount to “neglect” of a legal matter. He based his argument on the comment to DR 6-101. We noted, however, that we interpreted DR 6-101 more broadly than the comment.

In addition, we had already held in Montgomery I that a single failure to appear could constitute a violation of DR 6-101(A)(3). Thus, Mr. Ficker’s failure to appear in each case constituted “neglect.” Id. at 311-12 , 572 A.2d at 504 . ⁷⁷ In the present case, Judge Mason found that respondent had violated MRPC 1.3 for his failure to appear, and MRPC 1.4 for failing to appear as well as his subsequent failure to respond to the attempted communications by Ms. Greenhill. The comment to MRPC 1.3 states in relevant part, “[u]nless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 1.16, a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client.” The comment to MRPC 1.4 provides that “[e]ven when a client delegates authority to the lawyer, the client should be kept advised of the status of the matter.” The record reflects that after their initial meeting and his filing of appearance, respondent had no contact with Ms. Greenhill until she happened to see him heading into court with another client several weeks after her trial. Thus, as of November 1997, respondent effectively ceased all communications with Ms. Greenhill regarding the status of her case or what actions he might take on her behalf.

Not only did he not answer or return her telephone calls, but he failed to appear at her scheduled trial. It was only by a chance later meeting that Ms. Greenhill was able to confront respondent and request that he refund her money. During their exchange, respondent continued to evade Ms. Greenhill by offering no explanation for his actions and telling her to call his office to inquire about getting a refund. When she thereafter called his office numerous times, she was never able to contact respondent.

On one occasion, respondent’s receptionist even told Ms. Greenhill that respondent no longer worked there. Only after Ms. Greenhill filed a complaint and Bar Counsel contacted respondent concerning that complaint, was her $325.00 fee refunded and a letter of apology received. Respondent clearly did not cany through all matters undertaken for Ms. Greenhill; he did not even appear at her trial. Additionally, when she attempted to collect the refund, to which she was clearly entitled, respondent not only failed to communicate with Ms. Greenhill, but an inference can be drawn from the evidence that he avoided her.

Respondent was forthcoming with said refund and apology only after Ms. ⁷⁸ Greenhill’s complaint to the Bar Counsel. Respondent clearly violated MRPC 1.3 and 1.4. b. MRPC 8.1 (Bar admission and disciplinary matters) Respondent excepts to the finding by Judge Mason that he lied to or deceived the bar investigator, Mr. Biennas, when he indicated that the Greenhill case had been assigned to an associate, Ms. Djurickovic. We agree with respondent and shall grant this exception.

Although Judge Mason ultimately concluded that respondent’s statements to the investigator were not accurate, the evidence does not support by clear and convincing evidence a finding that respondent knew at the relevant time that the files had not been physically given to Ms. Djurickovic or that he intended to mislead the investigator. MRPC 8.1 states in relevant part: [A] lawyer ... in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or (b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. In Maryland, a finding of deceit and misrepresentation in a disciplinary action must be found to be intentional. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Clements, 319 Md. 289, 298 , 572 A.2d 174, 179 (1990) (holding that it is necessary “to establish that the dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation is intentional”).

Thus, in order to establish its case against respondent, Bar Counsel is required to prove with clear and convincing evidence that respondent’s supposed false statements were made with the knowledge that such statements were false when he made them. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 470 , 671 A.2d 463, 474 (1996) (“The burden is on Bar Counsel to establish the allega ⁷⁹ tions by clear and convincing evidence.”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kemp, 335 Md. 1, 9 , 641 A.2d 510, 514 (1994) (“To be sustained, the findings of fact of a hearing court must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.”). We have defined the clear and convincing evidence standard as “more than a preponderance of the evidence and less than evidence beyond a reasonable doubt....” Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 320 , 413 A.2d 170, 178 (1980) (quoting Whittington v. State, 8 Md.App. 676 , 679 n. 3, 262 A.2d 75 , 77 n. 3 (1970)). We expounded further: The requirement of “clear and convincing” or “satisfactory” evidence does not call for “unanswerable” or “conclusive” evidence.

The quality of proof, to be clear and convincing, has also been said to be somewhere between the rule in ordinary civil cases and the requirement of criminal procedure—that is, it must be more than a mere preponderance but not beyond a reasonable doubt. It has also been said that the term “clear and convincing” evidence means that the witnesses to a fact must be found to be credible, and that the facts to which they have testified are distinctly remembered and the details thereof narrated exactly and in due order, so as to enable the trier of the facts to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. Whether evidence is clear and convincing requires weighing, comparing, testing, and judging its worth when considered in connection with all the facts and circumstances in evidence. Berkey, 287 Md. at 320 , 413 A.2d at 178 (quoting 30 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 1167).

In the Greenhill case, the evidence does not support a finding that respondent violated MRPC 8.1 by telling the bar investigator that he believed the case had been assigned to the associate. It is respondent’s contention that he told the bar investigator that he believed that the Greenhill case had been assigned to Ms. Djurickovie based on his knowledge that ninety to ninety-five percent of the cases in his office, which were pending in Prince George’s County, were handled by Ms. Djurickovie, that Ms. Greenhill’s case was in Prince George’s ⁸⁰ County, and he could not find Ms. Greenhill’s file. In other words, he assumed that he had assigned the case to her and gave an answer that reflected that assumption. Judge Mason said that: it [is] inconceivable that [respondent] could have investigated this failure to appear, as a result of the investigation hired an office manager (and fired his secretary according to his letter to bar counsel), and now can’t recall what his investigation revealed!

Instead, the [c]ourt concludes that [respondent] has taken this position because his investigation revealed that Ms. Djurickovic had never received this file as she testified. This means he made a false representation to the investigator for bar counsel when he told him that he believed the case had been assigned to the associate, which he does not want to admit. Although [respondent] denies making such a statement to bar counsel, the [c]ourt finds that he did. This conclusion based on the evidence presented to the trial court does not meet the standard of clear and convincing evidence.

Judge Mason bases his conclusion, in large part, on Mr. Biennas’s testimony that “[h]e did tell me that that case was assigned to somebody else, an associate in his office.” This testimony was based on a conversation Mr. Biennas had with respondent one year and six months earlier. Respondent explained that he told Mr. Biennas in general terms that the case had been assigned to Ms. Djurickovic. In dealing with cases set in Prince George’s County, respondent acted under the assumption that, absent unusual circumstances or any recollection to the contrary, such cases were handled by Ms. Djurickovic. This is further evidenced by respondent’s testimony relative to the Greenhill case that “since it was a Prince George’s County case, Ms. Djurickovic would probably have handled it” and his subsequent testimony acknowledging that he had no specific knowledge that she did, in fact, handle it.

The evidence presented by Bar Counsel is not so clear and convincing to lead one to conclude that respondent intended to mislead the bar investigator. We hold that Judge Mason erred in finding that respondent made intentional false repre ⁸¹ sentations to the bar investigator. We therefore grant respondent’s exception to the finding that he violated MRPC 8.1. c. MRPC 8.4 Respondent excepts to the finding of the trial court that he lied to or deceived the bar investigator, Mr. Biennas, when he indicated that the Greenhill case had been assigned to an associate, Ms. Djurickovic, and that he falsely represented to the court at the hearing that he could not remember what happened in the case because he did not have a file.

We agree with respondent, overrule the finding of the trial court, and grant this exception. However, respondent does not except to the finding that he violated MRPC 8.4(d) by failing to appear for trial. We hold that respondent did violate MRPC 8.4(d) when considering that portion of the finding. MRPC 8.4 states in relevant part: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice....

We first address the trial court’s finding that respondent violated MRPC 8.4(c) by lying to or deceiving the bar investigator, Mr. Biennas, when he indicated that the Greenhill case had been assigned to an associate, Ms. Djurickovic. As we stated, supra, Bar Counsel has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that respondent intended to mislead the bar investigator as to this allegation. Accordingly, we grant respondent’s exception concerning his conversation with the bar investigator and overrule the hearing court’s finding on that issue. We next address Judge Mason’s finding that respondent violated MRPC 8.4(c) by falsely representing to the court at the hearing that he could not remember what happened in this case because he did not have a file.

We have held that conduct before the hearing court at an attorney ⁸² disciplinary hearing cannot be the basis for a separate finding of a violation of MRPC 8.4 in the same proceeding on the charges already filed. We addressed this exact issue in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 361-62 , 624 A.2d 503, 512 (1993): Bar Counsel also contends that Judge Simpson’s finding that Goldsborough was “deliberately untruthful” in his testimony before the circuit court necessitated a finding that he violated Rule 8.4(c). While Goldsborough’s conduct before the circuit court might be relevant in determining an appropriate sanction, it does not permit a separate finding of a Rule 8.4(c) violation. The charges brought against Golds-borough were based on his pattern'of conduct occurring before the petition for disciplinary action was filed in this Court.

Due process considerations dictate that attorneys are entitled to notice of the charges against them when disciplinary proceedings begin. [In re ] Ruffalo, 390 U.S. [544,] 550-51, 88 S.Ct. [1222,] 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d [117,] 122 [ (1968) ]. While the charges are not necessarily fixed until a petition is docketed in this Court, once the petition is docketed, the charges become fixed. The existing charges cannot be expanded to include an attorney’s post-charge conduct during the circuit court hearing itself Judge Simpson’s findings regarding Goldsborough’s untruthfulness before the circuit court might serve as the basis for subsequent formal charges, but only after Goldsborough is provided adequate notice. Judge Simpson was correct in not finding a violation of Rule 8.4(c) based on Goldsborough’s post-charge deliberate untruthfulness at the circuit court hearing.

We therefore overrule Bar Counsel’s exception. [Footnote omitted.] [Second emphasis added.] Clearly, in respect to charges and allegations filed in a specific proceeding, the Disciplinary Rules are designed to address only possible violations, which arise out of an attorney’s conduct prior to the disciplinary hearing in that proceeding in the circuit court. Accordingly, we grant respondent’s exception concerning his hearing testimony and overrule the court’s finding on this point. ⁸³ Third, we address the court’s finding that respondent violated MRPC 8.4 by failing to appear at Ms. Greenhill’s trial. Failure to represent a client in an adequate manner violates MRPC 8.4(d). We held in Ficker I, 319 Md. at 315, 572 A.2d at 506, that tardiness or absence from a trial may violate former Code DR 1-102(A)(5), which contained virtually the same text as current MRPC 8.4(d).

As we explained: Ficker knew precisely when Daley’s trial was to be held and had agreed to be there. His negligent failure to be present at that trial interfered with the orderly disposition of the court’s docket; a trial set for 9:00 a.m. had to be postponed until afternoon. We have held that failure to be punctual in a scheduled court appearance is “not only detrimental to the administration of justice but also constitute^] discourteous conduct degrading to the tribunal.” Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Howard, 282 Md. 515, 523 , 385 A.2d 1191, 1196 (1978).

We have held that an attorney who fails to appear punctually at a trial is guilty of a contempt of court. Kandel v. State, 252 Md. 668 , 250 A.2d 853 (1969). Misconduct of that sort is a contempt of court because it interferes with the conduct of court business. [A]n attorney plays such an integral role in the judicial process that without his presence the wheels of justice must, necessarily, grind to a halt. The attorney’s absence from the courtroom is immediately cognizable by the judge and intrudes upon the