Attorney Grievance Commission v. Sheridan

HARRELL, Judge. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-709(a), 1 Bar Counsel, on behalf of the Attorney Grievance Commission (AGC), Petitioner, and at the direction of the Review Board, filed a petition with this Court for disciplinary action against Robert J. Sheridan, Esquire, Respondent. In the petition, Bar Counsel alleged violations of Rules 1.15(a), (b), and (c), and Rule 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) and Maryland Code (1992, 1998 Rep. Vol.), Business Occupations and Professions Article (BOP) § 10-306.

This Court referred the matter to ⁷ Judge Theresa A. Nolan of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Maryland Rules 16-709(b) and 16-711(a). 2 After an evidentia-ry hearing, Judge Nolan found by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated RPC Rules 1.15(a), (b), and (c), RPC Rule 8.4(c) and BOP § 10-306. Respondent filed with us extensive exceptions to the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by Judge Nolan. From the evidentiary record made below, Judge Nolan made the following findings of fact: 1. Robert J. Sheridan, (hereinafter “Respondent”) was admitted to practice law in the State of Maryland on November 16, 1978. 2.

In January 1991, Respondent entered into negotiations with I.H. Hershner Company, Inc. (hereinafter “Hershner”) a Pennsylvania corporation. Respondent was employed by Hershner to collect upon debts owed to Hershner. Hersh-ner assigned Respondent six debts, one of which was a debt owed to Hershner by RDP Enterprises (hereinafter “Perry”), a business whose offices were located in Maryland. 3. There is some disagreement between the Attorney Grievance Commission (hereinafter “Petitioner”) and Respondent over the fee arrangement between Hershner and Respondent.

Respondent claims that there was a retainer agreement which set out the fee arrangement. Such agreement provided that Respondent would be paid $150 an hour or on a percentage basis. The Court studied this agreement and noted that although it bore the signature of Barry V. Bishop, the president of Hershner, Respondent’s signature did not appear on the agreement. Further, there was ⁸ no date on the contract and numerous provisions were crossed out by Mr. Bishop.

Mr. Bishop has also initialed all of these provisions. 4. The Court also noted that the provisions were initialed by Respondent. However, his handwritten notes appeared next to the provisions. This suggests to the Court that Respondent did not agree to Mr. Bishop’s alterations to the provisions. 5.

On March 19, 1991, Hershner filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Despite this proceeding, Respondent continued to collect on Hershner’s accounts. 6. On June 12, 1991, Markian Slobodian, Hershner’s counsel for the bankruptcy proceeding, sent a letter to Respondent informing him of Hershner’s bankruptcy. Mr. Slobo-dian advised Respondent that he could become Special Counsel to Hershner in the bankruptcy proceeding if Respondent filled out the accompanying application.

Respondent failed to do so. 7. On January 31, 1992, an Order of Settlement was entered in Fairfax County, Virginia on behalf of the Hershner and Perry account. As part of the settlement, Hershner received $9,161.40, interest in the amount of $1,035.58, and attorney fees in the amount of $1,832.28. Perry was ordered to pay these amounts in twenty one installments of $450.00 each.

The checks were to be payable to “Robert J. Sheridan, Attorney for I.H. Hershner Co.” 8. Pursuant to the settlement and prior negotiations, Respondent received two checks for $450.00 and deposited them into his escrow account. He did not notify Hershner regarding the settlement or the receipt of the funds. It was disclosed that these funds were withdrawn from the escrow account on a later date and used for professional and personal services. 9.

Following the Perry settlement, Mr. Slobodian sent Respondent another letter concerning Hershner’s bankrupt ⁹ cy status. This letter informed Respondent that because he did not sign the application to be appointed as Special Counsel for Hershner, Respondent was no longer authorized to represent Hershner. Hershner then requested the return of all files and ordered Respondent to cease any further legal action on behalf of Hershner. Instead, Hersh-ner would seek to retain alternate counsel to proceed with any pending litigation.

At this time, Hershner was unaware that a settlement had been reached in the Perry case. 10. Despite this letter dated May 13, 1992, Respondent received another letter on June 10, 1992 advising Respondent that he could sign a stipulation of dismissal on behalf of Hershner in the case of Hershner v. Vitellaro, Case No. 91-CG-1779 937208. This letter however, did not advise Respondent to act on any of the other accounts for Hershner. 11. Some time later, Hershner learned about the Settlement Order in Fairfax County between Hershner and Perry.

Rodger Troupe, the administrative manager for Hershner, sent Respondent a letter confirming Hershner’s knowledge about the existence of a Settlement Order. Mr. Troupe informed Respondent that he also had knowledge Respondent had received money from Perry. Mr. Troupe requested this money to be forwarded to him at Hershner. Despite this request, Respondent failed to forward the funds. 12.

At the Court proceeding, Respondent testified that Mr. Troupe had not requested the funds. Instead, he asserted that Mr. Troupe instructed him to retain the money because Hershner owed Respondent outstanding legal fees. Following this correspondence, there was no action taken by either party. 13. Approximately two years later, on March 2, 1994, Allied Products, Inc. (hereinafter “Allied”) and Hershner entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement.

As part of the Agreement, Allied would buy substantially all of Hershner’s assets including any receivables that were written off and had no value. There was no mention of any security ¹⁰ interest held by Respondent. This agreement was approved by the Bankruptcy Court on March 14,1994. 14. On March 7, 1995, Respondent sent a letter to Perry inquiring about the payments still owed to Hershner as part of the January 1992 Order of Settlement.

Respondent ordered Perry to pay him $450.00 a month. Respondent further explained that he had put the Hershner file on hold when Hershner had filed for bankruptcy. Because the bankruptcy case was dismissed on November 4,1994, he felt he was free to pursue the case. Respondent then threatened to file a Request for Foreign Judgment in Charles County, Maryland if Perry did not comply with his demands. 15.

Following the March 7, 1995 letter, Perry received a subsequent letter from Respondent. This letter stated that Respondent wanted “in his hands” no later than October 25, 1995, $16,733.74 due to Hershner. Respondent ordered that this check be payable to “Robert J. Sheridan, Attorney for I.H. Hershner Co.” Checks were then issued to Respondent. A check was dated for March 20, 1995, May 11, 1995, and July 6, 1995; all in the amount of $450.00.

A subsequent check in the amount of $900 was received on August 9,1995. None of these checks were put in an escrow account for Hershner or a separate account for clients’ funds. Moreover, Respondent admitted that the funds were used on professional and personal expenditures. 16. Hershner or Allied was [sic] not notified about the funds.

Respondent testified that he did not inform Hersh-ner because he was unaware of Hershner’s existence and as a result, believed that there was no client to inform him [sic]. 17. On October 27, 1995, Perry faxed a copy of Respondent’s letter and attachments to Allied in order to inform Allied of Respondent’s conduct. Perry had become concerned that Allied was not receiving the funds. True to Perry’s belief, Allied had been unaware of any receipt of funds for the Perry receivable. ¹¹ 18.

Respondent’s conduct then intensified. On October 29, 1995, Respondent sent a final letter to Perry suggesting a modification of the original financial arrangement. Specifically, Respondent stated that Hershner and he would be willing to accept $12,000 payable in three equal installments “in [Respondent’s] hands.” 19. Interaction between Allied and Respondent occurred early November 1995, when Respondent sent a letter to Allied informing the company of how he felt he was treated unfairly by Hershner.

Respondent justified his retainer of the funds on the grounds that Hershner had abandoned all legal claims to the money. Because Hershner owed Respondent attorney’s fees and because Respondent had been awarded attorneys’ fees, Respondent had a lien on the proceeds. He did not inform Hershner of the money because he was unaware of their existence and because he felt that no [sic] money was owed to him. Moreover, he argued that the retainer agreement clarified his ownership interest in the money. 20.

Allied responded to Respondent’s letter and explained that Allied had purchased Hershner’s assets free and clear of all liens. As a result, the collections received by Respondent were Allied’s property. Respondent was ordered to give a full accounting of the collectibles since March 1994 and to cease making any further collections. Respondent failed to deliver a full accounting or return any of the collectibles. 21.

In response to Respondent’s lien theory, Allied attacked Respondent’s arguments. First, Allied argued that there is no evidence the retainer agreement was ever entered into. Further, if there was a retainer agreement, it would not confer rights onto Respondent to retain any payments by Perry, absent a judicial determination. 22. Second, Allied asserts that the Bankruptcy Court’s approval of the sale of assets by Allied freed Allied of any liens, security interests, and encumbrances on Hershner’s assets.

Thus, the Bankruptcy Court would have discharged any lien Respondent had. ¹² 23. Despite the arguments advanced by Allied, Respondent refused to return the money to Allied. Such inaction prompted Allied to make an offer of settlement. Allied would be willing to accept an immediate cash payment of two thirds the amount of the Perry account balance.

Because the account was for $9,687.43, the net would be $6,458.29. In addition, Respondent would retain the $3,600.00 already collected and Allied would assign Respondent the receivable including the judgment Hershner obtained. Respondent did not accept this offer, nor did Respondent return any of the money. Further, Respondent did not seek judicial assistance or advice from the Maryland Bar Association.

As a result, the Court believes that attorney misconduct occurred. 24. The Court observed that Respondent truly believed that the money was legally his. Further, the Court believes that Respondent’s actions were not motivated by any decision to intentionally defraud Allied or Hershner. Respondent’s decision to retain the funds however, defrauded Allied and/ or Hershner of its legal claim to the settlement money.

Based upon the aforementioned findings of fact, Judge Nolan concluded that the Respondent violated the following: 1. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.15 — Safekeeping Property. (a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules.

Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the representation. (b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this ¹³ Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.

(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property in which both the lawyer and another person claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. 2. Business Occupations and Professions Article § 10-306 of the Annotated Maryland Code Misuse of Trust Money: A lawyer may not use trust money for any purpose other than the purpose for which the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer. 3. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 8.4(c) — Misconduct It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (d) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

Respondent’s exceptions launch ad hominem assaults on Judge Nolan, her conduct during the hearing, and the authorship of her written findings and conclusions, as well as asserting a lack of clear and convincing evidence in the record to support Judge Nolan’s conclusion that Respondent acted unethically. We address Respondent’s exceptions below. I. Throughout his exceptions, Respondent describes a virtual witch hunt against him aided and abetted by Judge Nolan. He essentially alleges that the conduct of the hearing and Judge Nolan’s findings were tainted by her pre-determined conclusion that Respondent violated his ethical duties and “general” prejudice against him.

As a result of such prejudice, Respondent also believes that Judge Nolan denied him ¹⁴ his due process rights. For example, in paragraph 2 of Respondent’s Exceptions, he states: Ordinarily the defects at the [Inquiry] Panel and [Review] Board levels are rectified by a full and fair trial before an impartial Circuit Court judge, but such was not the case in these proceedings. The trial court’s pre-disposition or predetermination of Respondent’s guilt was presumably caused in substantial part by the AGC’s unlawfully including in the Petition charges of criminal violations that had been filed with the Inquiry Panel, that were found by the Inquiry Panel (despite the members being hand-picked Allied cronies or puppets) to be groundless, that were specifically dismissed by the Panel, and which were not part of the charges the Review Board authorized the AGC to file. It is one thing for the AGC to include charges not previously before the Panel or Board, but possibly related to the factual allegations.

It is quite another to file with the Court charges that were specifically dismissed by the Panel as groundless, leave those charges pending throughout the trial, and then, during final argument, admit the lack of evidence and voluntarily dismiss, and pretend that the charges did not seriously affect the conduct of the trial and the outcome. The trial court’s predisposition and predetermination of guilt and general prejudice against the [Respondent] was further demonstrated by, among other things, a) some questionable limitations on Respondent’s cross-examination of Petitioner’s witnesses, b) repeated interruptions of Respondent’s direct testimony, even while Respondent was in mid-sentence, to adver-sarially argue her version of the facts (as if she were present during 1991-92 events or the 1995 events) from nothing more than pure speculation, c) repeated interruptions of Respondent’s direct testimony, even while Respondent was in mid-sentence, to argue her incredibly erroneous positions on the law[.] Moreover, Respondent bootstraps his claim of judicial prejudice, in part, upon his unsubstantiated theory that, after the hearing, the judge simply handed the matter to her law clerk ¹⁵ to draft findings and conclusions that Respondent committed ethical violations. He asserts that: Judge Nolan completely ignored the clear and undisputed facts, admitted to knowing nothing about bankruptcy law or the applicable lien laws or the attorney ownership of fee assessment laws, and simply handed the matter to her law clerk to find Respondent guilty and write up some miscel-lan[e]ous dates and “facts” to make Respondent look guilty. His exceptions are replete with similar accusations.

For example, in excepting to paragraph 7 of the trial court’s findings of fact, Respondent writes: Paragraph 7 further demonstrates the trial judge’s (or her clerk’s) complete lack of any grasp of the applicable legal terms and concepts in this case. The Order was not entered “on behalf of the Hershner and Perry account”, and it is woefully inaccurate and legally illiterate to use the term “received”, followed by dollar amounts, to describe any settlement or judgment. If, for example, in a court case such amounts are paid in a lump sum with a contemporaneous dismissal, then perhaps it can be said that the plaintiff “received” specified dollar amounts. Similarly, the trial judge (or her clerk) apparently cannot grasp the concept of a consent judgment, which is an agreement of the parties as to what is owed, and a court approval of that amount (law judgments of any kind being nothing more than judicial declarations of what is owed, with the judgment collection (voluntarily or by execution) to be left to future events and determination).

Again, Paragraph 7 is a clear demonstration of the complete lack of due process, which presumably requires a knowledgeable and attentive fact-finder with complete impartiality and grasp of applicable law, terms and legal concepts, not a pre-decided “fact”-finder instructing a totally unknowledgeable law clerk to whip up something that makes the Respondent look guilty. Respondent’s allegations ring hollow. We have reviewed the record before us and find Respondent’s allegations regarding Judge Nolan to be baseless. The transcript belies Respondent’s allegations of judicial prej ¹⁶ udice and clearly shows that Judge Nolan afforded Respondent ample opportunity to present his case.

She did not demonstrate, as Respondent alleges, her prejudice against Respondent by imposing “some questionable limitations on Respondent’s cross-examination of Petitioner’s witnesses,” nor did she unjustifiably interrupt Respondent’s direct testimony. To the contrary, her active participation during the hearing served only to sharpen the issues and efficiently confine the proceedings to relevant matters. During cross-examination, Respondent resisted answering questions. When Respondent had the opportunity to cross-examine Petitioner’s witnesses, he often made argumentative statements rather than asking proper questions.

The judge’s restrictions on Respondent’s comments throughout the hearing lay well within her discretion and the spirit of the Maryland Rules of Judicial Conduct. If Respondent felt restricted in the presentation of his case, the blame lies squarely on him for failing to respond to questions when asked or for failing to take advantage properly of the opportunities afforded him by Judge Nolan. The judge’s conduct in this case did not deprive Respondent of a fair hearing. We overrule any exceptions pertaining to accusations of judicial prejudice.

Respondent has pointed to not one shred of credible evidence to support his claim that Judge Nolan referred this case to her law clerk to “paper” a pre-ordained decision to hold him accountable in this matter. Furthermore, Respondent’s focus on whether Judge Nolan’s law clerk drafted the findings of fact and conclusions of law, even if true, is of no moment in these disciplinary proceedings. We reject any notion that the delegation of drafting findings of fact and conclusions of law to a judge’s clerk, for the judge’s review and adoption, lies outside the realm of a judicial clerk’s duties or the proper administration of the judicial process. Judicial clerks are integral to the judicial process.

See Gill v. Ripley, 352 Md. 754, 773 , 724 A.2d 88, 98 (1999). Their work is “entirely judicial in nature and is ‘supervised, approved, and adopted by the judges who initially authorized it.’ ” Gill, 352 Md. at 772 , 724 A.2d at 97 (citations omitted). Judge Nolan’s ¹⁷ adoption of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, evidenced by her signature, cast them as her product, as if (and for all we know it was) penned originally by her hand from their inception. Whether her judicial clerk drafted the findings of facts and conclusions of law, or whether the judge herself drafted them, has no bearing on Respondent’s case.

II

We now turn our review to the content and sufficiency of the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the trial court. In doing so, we note that this Court has original jurisdiction over all attorney disciplinary proceedings. See Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 470 , 671 A.2d 463, 473 (1996).

The responsibility to make final determinations of an attorney’s alleged misconduct is reserved to us. See Md. Rule 16-709; Glenn, 341 Md. at 470 , 671 A.2d at 473 . As to disputed findings of fact made by Judge Nolan, “ Ve [make] an independent, detailed review of the complete record with particular reference to the evidence relat[ed] to the disputed factual finding.’ ” Glenn, 341 Md. at 470 , 671 A.2d at 473 (citing Bar Ass’n v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 516 , 307 A.2d 677, 680-81 (1973)). In reviewing the record, however, this Court adheres to the fundamental principle that the factual findings of the assigned judge in an attorney disciplinary proceeding “are prima facie correct and will not be disturbed on review unless clearly erroneous.” Id.

See also Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Kemp, 303 Md. 664, 674 , 496 A.2d 672, 677 (1985); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Kahn, 290 Md. 654, 679 , 431 A.2d 1336, 1350 (1981). This means that we will not tamper with the factual findings if they are grounded on clear and convincing evidence.

See Kahn, 290 Md. at 654 , 431 A.2d at 1350 . We also keep in mind that it is elementary that the judge “may elect to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon.” Kemp, 303 Md. at 675 , 496 A.2d at 677 . Such deference is paid, in part, because she is in the best position to assess first hand a witness’s credibility. See Glenn, 341 Md. at 470 , 671 A.2d at 474 .

We add, however, that “an attorney in a disciplinary proceeding need only establish factual matters in defense of an attorney’s position by the preponderance ¹⁸ of evidence, including whether mitigating circumstances existed at the time of the alleged misconduct.” Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Powell, 328 Md. 276, 288 , 614 A.2d 102, 108 (1992). Violation of RPC Rule 1.15 We have reviewed extensively the record and conclude that Judge Nolan’s findings of fact as they pertain to Rules 1.15(a), (b), and (c) are supported by clear and convincing evidence. To the extent that Respondent disputes her findings of fact, we overrule those exceptions on the grounds they are either irrelevant, argumentative, or unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence.

It is undisputed that Respondent and Hershner formed an attorney-client relationship in early 1991. Hershner employed Respondent’s legal services for collection efforts against various debtors owing monies to Hershner. From the inception of this relationship, Respondent owed an ethical duty to his client under Rule 1.15. Rule 1.15(a) requires that: A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own property.

Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules. Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the representation. Respondent failed to keep separate the collected funds.

In 1991 and 1992, Respondent received two settlement checks of $450 each from Perry. Respondent deposited the checks in his escrow account, but later withdrew them and applied the money for his own professional or personal use. In 1995, without directions from or the knowledge of his client, Respondent demanded payments in arrears from Perry as evinced by his dunning letter dated 7 March 1995. 3 Respon ¹⁹ dent received payments from Perry, but did not deposit the funds in escrow and instead used them for business and professional purposes. These examples provide clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Rule 1.15(a).

Rule 1.15(b) states that: Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property. Respondent did not notify Hershner of funds received from Perry in 1991 or 1992; in fact, he did not notify his client about the settlement he reached with Perry. In 1995, Respondent received a series of payments from Perry and, again, he failed to notify Hershner or its successor, Allied, of the payments received.

Also in November 1995, after discovering that Respondent had collected monies from Perry without notifying it, Allied demanded a full accounting of the amounts collected by Respondent since March 1994. Respondent did not provide an accounting. His failure to notify Hershner in 1991 or 1992 and Allied in 1995, and to provide an accounting as demanded by Allied, provides clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Rule 1.15(b). Rule 1.15(c) provides that: When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property in which both the lawyer and another person claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their interests.

If a dispute arises concerning their respec ²⁰ tive interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. Disputes over the ownership of funds collected by Respondent in the Perry case arose in 1992 and 1995. In a letter dated 23 June 1992, after discovering Perry made payments to Respondent, Hershner demanded the payments be forward. Respondent failed to forward the funds or keep the funds separate until the dispute was resolved.

In 1995, another dispute arose, this time between Respondent and Hershner’s successor, Allied. Respondent failed to keep the funds separate until the dispute was resolved. These facts provide clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Rule 1.15(c). Respondent conceded during oral argument before us that his 1992 conduct was problematic.

Based on such a concession, he indicated that, by his standards, an appropriate sanction for that conduct alone would be a reprimand or up to a 60-to-90 day suspension. As to his conduct in 1995, Respondent argues that he is blameless. He claims that he did not know of the bankruptcy status of Hershner or of Allied’s existence as Hershner’s assignee of its assets and claims until Allied contacted him later in November 1995 and cannot be culpable for any of his 1995 actions until that point. We cannot accept any of Respondent’s suggestions that he is somehow immunized from his ethical duties under Rule 1.15 because he lacked knowledge of the existence of Allied.

This Court has explained that with regard to Rule 1.15 “an unintentional violation of this rule ... is still a violation of the attorney’s affirmative duties imposed by the rule.” Glenn, 341 Md. at 472 , 671 A.2d at 475 . See also Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Adams, 349 Md. 86, 96 , 706 A.2d 1080, 1085 (1998). Respondent also argues that no attorney-client relationship existed between himself and Allied and, therefore, he owed no duty to it under Rule 1.15 for his 1995 conduct.

In paragraph 86 of his exceptions Respondent states: It is inconceivable that Allied could claim third'party protected status vis-a-vis Respondent (when there was no client ²¹ instruction with regard to Allied, when there was no knowledge of Allied’s existence, let alone its identity, and where the very transaction on which its status would be based is null and void with regard to this Respondent, due to the total lack of proper bankruptcy notice), or claim potential harm by Respondent, when it made no effect to contact Respondent or Mr. Perry, no effort to collect anything from Mr. Perry, and would clearly never have contacted Mr. Perry or the Respondent. Clearly Allied had no real interest in the Perry receivable, and clearly Allied is not the type of third person contemplated in the rules and statutes as being the subject of the protections the rules and statutes afford. Similarly, the rules and statutes presuppose the attorney’s knowledge the attorney’s knowledge of the existence of a client and the existence of a third person, neither element being present in this case, at least as to the 1995 events. And, again, had Respondent been even slightly aware of Allied’s existence, he obviously would have contacted Allied, attempted arrangements to continue pursuing the Perry judgment or turned the file over to Allied, rather than waste thousands more in overhead to more than likely receive less monies, and have to put an entire legal career at risk to be able to keep even a penny of it (if one believes that Hershner never instructed [Respondent] to keep proceeds, and if one disregards [Respondent’s] exclusive ownership).

(underlining by Respondent) (emphasis added by this Court). We disagree. At the outset, we note that this argument ignores the fact that Respondent had a duty to provide an accounting upon request, 4 and that disputed funds must be kept separate. ²² Furthermore, Allied is a third party protected by Rule 1.15. This Court recognizes the “principle of law that attorneys, with notice of an assignment of settlement proceeds by their client to a third party, are obligated to protect the interests of that third party and may be held liable for failure to do so.” Roberts v. Total Health Care, Inc., 349 Md. 499, 519 , 709 A.2d 142, 151-52 (1998).

While this case does not involve issues of civil liability as were considered in Roberts , the principle also applies in attorney disciplinary actions. See id. Respondent claims he had no notice of Allied’s existence. We are unconvinced that Respondent did not know, or could not have known, of