Attorney Grievance Commission v. Gray
GREENE, J. Bar Counsel asks this Court to review the misconduct of an attorney with a rather lengthy history with the attorney disciplinary process. Indeed, this case represents the fourth opportunity for us to consider an appropriate sanction for Melissa D. Gray (“Respondent” or “Gray”), who is currently indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Gray, 421 Md. 92 , 25 A.3d 219 (2011) (“Gray I”) (entering reprimand by consent for violations of Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC” or “Rule”) 1.3, 1.4, and 8.1(b)); Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Gray, 433 Md. 516 , 72 A.3d 174 (2013) (“Gray II”) (ordering sixty day suspension for violations of MLRPC 1.3, 1.4, 1.15(e), and 8.1(b)); Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Gray, 436 Md. 513 , 83 A.3d 786 (2014) (“Gray III ”) (imposing sanction of indefinite suspension from the practice of law for violations of MLRPC 1.1,1.3, 3.2, and 8.1(b)). In the instant case, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Petitioner”), acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751(a), directed Bar Counsel to file three Petitions for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Gray on October 23, 2013, June 2, 2014, and July 10, 2014, respectively.
These petitions arise out of Respondent’s representation of four individuals in separate divorce matters: Pazura v. Pazura; Lafalaise v. Pierre; Garner v. Garner; and Antonelli v. Antonelli. On Petitioner’s motion, these complaints were consolidated by this Court on September 9, 2014. 235 Petitioner charged Respondent with numerous MLRPC violations, specifically Rules 1.1 (Competence), 1 1.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer), 2 1.3 (Diligence), 3 1.4 (Communication), 4 Rule 1.5 (Fees), 5 Rule 1.15 (Safekeeping Property), 6 1.16 (Declining or 236 Terminating Representation), 7 Rule 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 8 and Rule 8.4 (Misconduct). 9 Respondent was also charged with violations of Maryland Rules 16-604 (Trust account — Required deposits), 10 16-606.1 (Attorney 237 trust account record-keeping), 11 and 16-609 (Prohibited transactions). 12 Lastly, Petitioner charged Respondent with violating Section 10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article (“BOP”) of the Maryland Code (Misuse of trust money). 13 238 We referred the instant matters to Judge Susan Souder of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for an evidentiary hearing and to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Md. Rule 16-757. Respondent failed to respond to any of the above-mentioned petitions. Following Respondent’s failure to respond, an Order of Default was entered by the hearing judge on September 22, 2014.
After conducting a hearing, which Respondent failed to appear for, on November 3 and 5, 2015 Judge Souder issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in which she found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated, collectively, MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16, 8.1(b), and 8.4(a), Maryland Rules 16-604,16-606.1, and 16-609, and BOP § 10-306. I. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Concluding that Respondent had violated (1) MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(b), and 8.4(a) in the Pazura matter; (2) MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5,1.16, 8.1(b), and 8.4(a) in the Lafalaise matter; and (3) MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16, 8.1(b), and 8.4(a), Maryland Rules 16-604, 16-606.1, and 16-609, and BOP § 10-306 in both the Garner and Antonelli matters, Judge Souder issued the following: PAZURA V. PAZURA: FINDINGS OF FACT Respondent became a member of the Maryland Bar on June 14, 1988. On August 15, 2013, the Court of Appeals suspended Respondent from the practice of law in Maryland for a period of sixty days, effective September 15, 2013. On January 24, 2014, the Court of Appeals indefinitely suspended Respondent from the practice of law in Maryland, effective thirty days from the date of its opinion.
Respondent therefore remains indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Respondent represented Miranda Pazura in connection with her divorce case, Pazura v. Pazura in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. After Ms. Pazura retained 239 Respondent in October 2008, Respondent advised her to withdraw $83,700 from a home equity line of credit. Respondent did not explain to Ms. Pazura what the potential ramifications of this act could be.
After Ms. Pazura withdrew this money on Respondent’s advice, the Circuit Court entered a temporary restraining order, preventing Ms. Pazura from using the funds. Respondent consented to an order requiring the funds to be held in her escrow account. As a consequence of this order, the $83,700 was not available to Ms. Pazura to pay for her living expenses. Although Ms. Pazura promptly tendered a check for $83,700 to Respondent, Respondent did not deposit this check in her escrow account until several months later.
In addition, Respondent failed to file timely responses to discovery requests, resulting in the imposition of sanctions against Ms. Pazura. Respondent also failed to file discovery requests on behalf of Ms. Pazura until long after the discovery deadline in the case had elapsed. Respondent therefore failed to obtain information regarding Ms. Pazura’s husband’s financial status. Respondent also failed to return Ms. Pazura’s telephone calls seeking the status of her case.
Respondent did not keep Ms. Pazura informed of the status of the case and did not provide Ms. Pazura with copies of pleadings, correspondence, and court orders. Respondent also failed to prepare for trial. She did not obtain expert witnesses, including a vocational rehabilitation expert or a forensic accountant, to testify at trial. Finally, while Respondent received letters from the Office of Bar Counsel requesting that she respond to Ms. Pazura’s complaint, Respondent failed to submit a substantive written response to these inquiries of Bar Counsel.
PAZURA V. PAZURA: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Petitioner alleges that Respondent violated the following Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 240 (“MLRPC”): 1.1 (“Competence”), 1.3 (“Diligence”), 1.4 (“Communication”), 1.15 (“Safekeeping Property”), 8.1(b) (“Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters”), and 8.4 (“Misconduct”). The court finds that there is clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated each of these Rules except MLRPC 1.15. With respect to MLRPC 1.1 and 1.3, Respondent’s failure to pursue Ms. Pazura’s case demonstrated a lack of both competence and diligence. The same lack of thoroughness and preparedness that demonstrates Respondent’s violation of MLRPC 1.1 also demonstrates her lack of the diligence required of her by MLRPC 1.3.
Respondent failed to communicate adequately with Ms. Pazura as is required by MLRPC 1.4. Respondent failed to return Ms. Pazura’s telephone calls, did not keep Ms. Pazura informed of the status of her case, and did not provide Ms. Pazura with copies of pleadings, correspondence, or court orders. Accordingly, Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4(a) and 1.4(b). Furthermore, by failing to respond to inquiries from Bar Counsel, Respondent violated MLRPC 8.1(b).
Because Respondent violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, and 8.1(b), she also violated MLRPC 8.4(a). However, this court does not find that there is clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.15. While Respondent failed promptly to deposit the check she received from Ms. Pazura in her escrow account, this failure does not constitute a failure to keep client property separate from the lawyer’s property. Petitioner presented no evidence that Respondent ever commingled any funds from Ms. Pazura’s check with Respondent’s own funds.
Petitioner also presented no evidence that Respondent placed Ms. Pazura’s funds in an account other than an escrow account. Rather, Petitioner’s sole allegation with respect to a violation of this Rule is that Petitioner did not promptly deposit the check she received from Ms. Pazura. While promptly 241 depositing such a check in an escrow account certainly constitutes good practice, nothing in MLRPC 1.15 mandates the prompt deposit of such funds. Therefore, the Court does not find that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.15 in the matter of Pazura v. Pazura.
LAFALAISE V. PIERRE: FINDINGS OF FACT Respondent represented Pensione Lafalaise in a divorce case in which Mr. Lafalaise had previously been represented by other counsel. A judgment of divorce had already been entered in the case, but issues regarding marital property had not yet been resolved by the court. Respondent entered her appearance on behalf of Mr. Lafalaise on July 28, 2011. On April 25, 2012, the court listened — in open court — to the outlining of a consent agreement disposing of issues relating to marital property.
This agreement required the parties to prepare appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations Orders (“QDROs”) to effectuate the division of the parties’ retirement benefits. In addition, the agreement required Mr. Lafalaise’s ex-wife to convey certain real property to Mr. Lafalaise. On May 30, 2012, Respondent wrote to the court, requesting that a written order be entered to formalize the consent agreement placed on the record in the previous month. The court entered a written order on that same date.
Following this date, Respondent failed to take any additional steps towards obtaining the real property which was to be conveyed to Mr. Lafalaise or towards insuring the execution of the required QDROs. Furthermore, throughout the course of her representation of Mr. Lafalaise, Respondent failed adequately to communicate with her client. Respondent often failed to respond to Mr. Lafalaise’s telephone messages and to other communications from her client seeking information on the status of her case. Respondent also ignored Mr. Lafalaise’s 242 requests to make an appointment so that he could meet with Respondent personally.
Mr. Lafalaise paid Respondent approximately $15,000.00 for this representation, but Respondent failed to return any unearned portion of that fee. Respondent admitted that she did not provide Mr. Lafalaise with any legal services of value in exchange for the fee she received. Following termination of the representation and in spite of numerous requests from Mr. Lafalaise, Respondent failed to return original documents to her client Finally, Respondent failed to respond to numerous inquiries and lawful requests for information made by the Office of Bar Counsel concerning Mr. Lafalaise’s complaint. LAFALAISE V. PIERRE: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Petitioner alleges that Respondent violated the following Rules: 1.1 (“Competence”), 1.3 (“Diligence”), 1.4 (“Communication”), 1.5 (“Fees”), 1.16 (“Declining or Terminating Representation”), 8.1(b) (“Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters”), and 8.4 (“Misconduct”).
The court finds that there is clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated each of these Rules. With respect to MLRPC 1.1 and 1.3, Respondent’s failure to pursue Mr. Lafalaise’s case demonstrated a lack of both competence and diligence. Respondent failed to prepare QDROs in Mr. Lafalaise’s case, failed to assist her client in obtaining the real property due to him under the consent agreement, and generally provided no legal services of value. This demonstrates a lack of competence which violates MLRPC 1.1.
The same lack of thoroughness and preparedness that demonstrates Respondent’s violation of MLRPC 1.1 also demonstrates her lack of the diligence required of her by MLRPC 1.3. Respondent failed to communicate adequately with Mr. Lafalaise as is required by MLRPC 1.4. Respondent often failed to respond to Mr. Lafalaise’s telephone messages and to 243 other communications from her client seeking information of the status of h[is] case. Respondent also ignored Mr. Lafalaise’s requests to make an appointment so that he could meet with Respondent personally.
Accordingly, Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4(a). The fee paid to Respondent by Mr. Lafalaise, while not unreasonable on its face, was unreasonable in fact, as Respondent failed to provide Mr. Lafalaise with any legal services of value. The charging of an unreasonable fee violates MLRPC 1.5(a). In addition, Respondent’s failure to return the unearned portion of the fee she received and failure to return to Mr. Lafalaise the original documents — “papers and property to which the client is entitled” — which he requested constitutes violations of MLRPC 1.16(d).
Furthermore, by failing to respond to inquiries from Bar Counsel, Respondent violated MLRPC 8.1(b). Finally, because Respondent violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5,1.16, and 8.1(b), she also violated MLRPC 8.4(a). GARNER V. GARNER: FINDINGS OF FACT Zachariah Garner retained Respondent on March 1, 2013 for assistance in a divorce case pending in Howard County. Mr. Garner paid Respondent $6,000.00 for this representation.
Respondent failed to submit to the Court an updated Financial Statement that Mr. Garner had completed in Respondent’s presence. Respondent was also unprepared for a pendente lite hearing held June 4, 2013, despite the fact that Mr. Garner had already provided Respondent with his bills and other financial information. Because Respondent was unprepared for the hearing, the result of that hearing was unfavorable for Mr. Garner. 244 In addition, Respondent failed to send discovery responses to opposing counsel and failed to file any response to related discovery motions filed by opposing counsel. Respondent also failed to keep Mr. Garner informed about his case and failed to respond to request for information made by her client.
Following the pendente lite hearing, Mr. Garner asked Respondent several questions about Respondent’s failure to submit to the court the updated Financial Statement that he had completed, about the nature of the results of the hearing, and about a potential appeal of the result. Respondent failed to provide a response to any of these questions. Respondent’s only response to Mr. Garner’s inquiries was to advise him to file for bankruptcy in order to resolve the financial concerns which the result of the hearing caused for him. Respondent also failed to respond to emails which Mr. Garner sent her, in spite of the fact that many of these emails were sent in response to emails sent by Respondent.
Further, Respondent failed to return Mr. Garner’s phone calls and voicemail messages (including when the phone calls were in response to phone calls from Respondent) and failed to inform Mr. Garner about the discovery motions that had been filed by opposing counsel. Ultimately, Respondent abandoned the representation. As a result, Mr. Garner was forced to retain a new attorney. In spite of the limited services which she had performed for Mr. Garner and in spite of her eventual abandonment of her client, Respondent failed to return any of the $6000.00 fee which Mr. Garner had paid to her.
Respondent failed to deposit any portion of the $6000.00 fee into an Attorney Trust Account (“ATA”). Respondent did not have Mr. Garner’s informed consent, obtained in writing, to an arrangement which would have allowed her to proceed in a fashion other than by depositing the sum in an ATA. Respondent failed to maintain appropriate trust account records as required by Md. Rule 16-606.1. Respondent 245 failed to create and maintain records concerning disbursements made from her trust account and did not properly identify the payee of any disbursements, the person for whom any disbursements were made, or the purpose of any disbursements.
Finally, Respondent failed to respond to lawful requests for information made by the Office of Bar Counsel. On October 3, 2013, Assistant Bar Counsel James Botluk sent a letter to Respondent requesting a response to the complaint filed by Mr. Garner. Respondent failed to respond to this letter. Assistant Bar Counsel Botluk thereafter sent a second letter, dated October 30, 2013, via certified mail, with return receipt requested.
Respondent also failed to respond to this second letter. Therefore, a third letter was sent on December 16, 2013. Respondent did not respond to this letter either. A fourth letter was then mailed, again via certified mail, return receipt requested on December 30, 2013.
Respondent did not respond to this fourth letter. Eventually, on January 15, 2014, Assistant Bar Counsel James Gaither sent William M. Ramsey, an investigator with Petitioner, to hand-deliver a new letter to Respondent. Mr. Ramsey attempted several times to deliver this letter to Respondent at her office, but met with no success until February 20, 2014. On that date, Respondent informed Mr. Ramsey that she would be in contact with Assistant Bar Counsel Gaither, but Respondent has not yet made any contact with the Office of Bar Counsel.
GARNER V. GARNER: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Petitioner alleges that Respondent violated the following Rules: 1.1 (“Competence”), 1.2 (“Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Lawyer and Client”), 1.3 (“Diligence”), 1.4 (“Communication”), 1.5 (“Fees”), 1.15 (“Safekeeping Property”), 1.16 (“Declining or Terminating Representation”), 8.1(b) (“Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters”), and 8.4 (“Misconduct”). In addition, Petitioner alleges that Respondent violated Md. Rules 16-604 (“Trust Account — Required deposits”), 16-606.1 (“Attorney trust ae 246 count record-keeping”), and 16-609 (“Prohibited transactions”). Finally, Petitioner alleges that Respondent violated Md.Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-306 (“Misuse of trust money”).
With respect to MLRPC 1.1 and 1.3, Respondent’s failure to pursue Mr. Garner’s case demonstrated a lack of both competence and diligence. Respondent failed to submit an updated Financial Statement to the court, was unprepared for a pendente lite hearing, failed to provide discovery to opposing counsel, and failed to respond to discovery motions filed by opposing counsel. In addition, Respondent eventually abandoned her representation of Mr. Garner entirely. These actions demonstrate a lack of competence in violation of MLRPC 1.1.
The same lack of thoroughness and preparedness that demonstrates Respondent’s violation of MLRPC 1.1 also demonstrates her lack of the diligence required by MLRPC 1.3. With Respect to MLRPC 1.2, Respondent’s total failure to pursue Mr. Garner’s case competently and diligently worked a frustration of Mr. Garner’s intentions concerning the objective of the representation. This failure to pursue Mr. Garner’s objectives violates MLRPC 1.2. Respondent also failed to communicate adequately with Mr. Garner as is required by MLRPC 1.4.
Respondent failed to respond to Mr. Garner’s inquiries following the pendente lite hearing, failed to reply to emails sent by Mr. Garner, and failed to return Mr. Garner’s phone calls. Accordingly, Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4(a). The fee paid to Respondent by Mr. Garner, while not unreasonable on its face, was unreasonable in fact, as Respondent failed to provide Mr. Garner with adequate representation. The charging of an unreasonable fee violates MLRPC 1.5(a).
Respondent’s failure to deposit the $6000.00 fee she received from Mr. Garner in an ATA violates multiple provisions of the law. As Respondent did not have her client’s informed consent, confirmed in writing, to an arrangement other than one which would require her to deposit unearned 247 fees in an ATA, and as Respondent did not perform sufficient services to warrant the $6000.00 she had received, Respondent violated MLRPC 1.15(c). This conduct also violates Md. Rule 16-604 and 16-609(a) and is in violation of the prohibition contained in Md.Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-306 against a lawyer using “trust money for any purpose other than the purpose for which the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer.” Furthermore, because, as detailed above, Respondent failed to maintain proper account records, her conduct violated Md. Rule 16-606.1.
In addition, Respondent’s failure to return the unearned portion of the fee she received in Mr. Garner’s matter and her abandonment of Mr. Garner’s case without notice to him constitute violations of MLRPC 1.16(d). As this court has previously held, above, so it is in Mr. Garner’s case: by failing to respond to repeated inquiries from Bar Counsel, Respondent violated MLRPC 8.1(b). Finally, because Respondent violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16, and 8.1, she also violated MLRPC 8.4(a). ANTONELLI V. ANTONELLI: FINDINGS OF FACT Pamela Antonelli retained Respondent in March 2011 for representation in a divorce ease.
Ms. Antonelli paid Respondent $6980.00 in furtherance of this representation. Respondent failed adequately to communicate with Ms. Antonelli throughout the representation and eventually abandoned the representation altogether. In spite of this, Respondent has not returned any portion of the fee paid to her by Ms. Antonelli. Respondent failed to deposit any portion of the $6980.00 into an ATA.
Respondent did not perform any legal services of value for her client and therefore did not earn any portion of this fee which was not deposited in an ATA. Respondent did not have Ms. Antonelli’s informed consent, 248 obtained in writing, to an arrangement other than one which would have required Respondent to deposit her unearned fees in an ATA. Respondent failed to maintain appropriate records for her ATA, as required by Md. Rule 16-606.1. Respondent failed to create and maintain records concerning disbursements made from her trust account and did not properly identify the payee of any disbursements, the person on whose behalf any disbursements were made, or the purpose of any disbursements made.
Finally, Respondent failed to respond to lawful request for information made by the Office of Bar Counsel. On February 12, 2014, Assistant Bar Counsel James Gaither sent a letter to Respondent requesting her response to the complaint filed by Ms. Antonelli. Respondent failed to respond to this letter. Therefore, on March 4, 2014, Mr. Gaither sent another letter to Respondent via certified mail, return receipt requested.
Respondent did not respond to this letter either. In fact, to date, Respondent has yet to provide any response at all to the Office of Bar Counsel concerning Ms. Antonellfs complaint. ANTONELLI V. ANTONELLI: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Petitioner alleges that Respondent violated the following Rules: 1.1 (“Competence”), 1.2 (“Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Lawyer and Client”), 1.3 (“Diligence”), 1.4 (“Communication”), 1.5 (“Fees”), 1.15 (“Safekeeping Property”), 1.16 (“Declining or Terminating Representation”), 8.1(b) (“Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters”), and 8.4 (“Misconduct”). In addition, Petitioner alleges that Respondent violated Md. Rules 16-604 (“Trust Account — Required deposits”), 16-606.1 (“Attorney trust account record-keeping”), and 16-609 (“Prohibited transactions”).
Finally, Petitioner alleges that Respondent violated Md.Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-306 (“Misuse of trust money”). With respect to MLRPC 1.1 and 1.3, Respondent’s failure to pursue Ms. Antonelli’s case demonstrated a lack of both 249 competence and diligence. Respondent abandoned her representation of Ms. Antonelli and provided her with no services of legal value.
These actions demonstrate a lack of competence in violation of MLRPC 1.1. The same lack of thoroughness and preparedness that demonstrates Respondent’s violation of MLRPC 1.1 also demonstrates her lack of the diligence required by MLRPC 1.3. With Respect to MLRPC 1.2, Respondent’s failure to pursue Ms. Antonelli’s case competently and diligently worked a frustration of Ms. Antonelli’s intentions concerning the objective of the representation. This failure to pursue Ms. Antonelli’s objectives violates MLRPC 1.2.
Respondent also failed to communicate adequately with Ms. Antonelli as is required by MLRPC 1.4. Respondent failed to communicate with Ms. Antonelli regarding the status of her case, as the Rule requires. Accordingly, Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4(a). The fee paid to Respondent by Ms. Antonelli, while not unreasonable on its face, was unreasonable in fact, as Respondent failed to provide Ms. Antonelli with adequate representation.
The charging of an unreasonable fee violates MLRPC 1.5(a). Respondent’s failure to deposit the $6980.00 fee she received from Ms. Antonelli in an ATA violates multiple provisions of the law. As Respondent did not have her client’s informed consent, confirmed in writing, to an arrangement other than one which would require her to deposit unearned fees in an ATA, and as Respondent did not perform sufficient services to warrant the $6980.00 she had received, Respondent violated MLRPC 1.15(c). This conduct also violates Ms. Rule 16-604 and 16-609(a) and is in violation of the prohibition contained in Md.Code Ann., Bus.
Occ. & Prof. § 10-306 against a lawyer using “trust money for any purpose other than the purpose for which the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer.” Furthermore, because, as detailed above, Respondent failed to maintain proper account records, her conduct violated Md. Rule 16-606.1. 250 In addition, Respondent’s failure to return the unearned portion of the fee she received in Ms. Antonelli’s matter and her abandonment of Ms. Antonelli’s case without notice to her constitute violations of MLRPC 1.16(d). Furthermore, by failing to respond to repeated inquiries from Bar Counsel, Respondent violated MLRPC 8.1(b). Finally, because Respondent violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16, and 8.1, she also violated MLRPC 8.4(a). (Citations omitted).
II
DISCUSSION In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court has original and complete jurisdiction and conducts an independent review of the record. Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Jarosinski 411 Md. 432, 448 , 983 A.2d 477, 487 (2009). Where no exceptions are filed to the hearing judge’s findings of fact, we “may treat the findings of fact as established for the purpose of determining appropriate sanctions[.]” Md. Rule 16-759(b)(2)(A). “In other words, we deem the hearing judge’s findings of fact ‘correct if (1) they are not clearly erroneous, or (2), at the Court’s option, if neither party filed exceptions to them.’ ” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Bell, 432 Md. 542, 558 , 69 A.3d 1040, 1049 (2013) (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Kremer, 432 Md. 325, 334 , 68 A.3d 862, 868 (2013)). We review the hearing judge’s conclusions of law for legal correctness.
Md. Rule 16-759(b)(1). Neither party has taken exception to the hearing judge’s findings of fact, therefore we deem Judge Souder’s findings as established. Bell, 432 Md. at 558 , 69 A.3d at 1049 . Petitioner excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law in three respects.
Petitioner first excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence of a violation of Rule 1.15(a) in the Pazura matter. Second, Petitioner excepts to the hearing judge’s omission of any specific finding of a Rule 8.4(d) violation in all four matters. Lastly, Petitioner excepts to the hearing judge’s 251 omission of any specific finding of a Rule 8.4(b) and (c) violation in the Garner and Antonelli matters. Petitioner recommends that Respondent be disbarred, irrespective of our consideration of these exceptions.
Respondent, in addition to failing to appear before this Court, has filed no exceptions or a sanction recommendation in these matters. Based on our de novo review of the record, we sustain Petitioner’s exceptions as to Rules 8.4(b)-(d). We overrule Petitioner’s exception as to Rule 1.15(a) in the Pazura matter. A. Pazura Complaint MLRPC 1.1 requires a lawyer to provide competent representation to his or her clients.
As defined in the Rule, “[e]ompetent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” MLRPC 1.1. We agree with the hearing judge that, on the facts of this case, “Respondent’s failure to pursue Ms. Pazura’s case demonstrated a lack of both competence and diligence” in violation of Rule 1.1. See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 54 , 891 A.2d 1085, 1097 (2006) (“Evidence of a failure to apply the requisite thoroughness and/or preparation in representing a client is sufficient alone to support a violation of Rule 1.1.”). Respondent, to the detriment of her client, failed to timely respond to opposing counsel’s discovery requests, timely submit discovery requests on the behalf of Pazura, advise Pazura as to the consequences of withdrawing $83,700 from a home equity line of credit, and prepare for Pazura’s trial by failing to obtain expert witnesses to testify.
MLRPC 1.3 requires a lawyer to “act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” We agree with the hearing judge that Respondent’s lack of preparedness for trial and lack of thoroughness during the course of the representation as described above violates Rule 1.3. MLRPC 1.4 requires an attorney to “(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent ... is required ...; (2) 252 keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; [and] (3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information” as well as “explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions.” We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusions that Respondent violated Rule 1.4(a) and (b) by failing to return Pazura’s telephone calls, failing to keep Pazura informed on the
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