Attorney Grievance Commission v. Hall

BELL, C.J. The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, the petitioner, by Bar Counsel, acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751, 1 filed a Petition For Disciplinary Or Remedial Action (“Petition”) against Ralph E. Hall, Jr., the respondent. The Petition charged that the respondent violated Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3, Diligence, 2 1.4, Communication, 3 1.6, Confidentiality of Information,' 4 1.7, Conflict of Interest, 5 ³¹¹ and 8.4, Misconduct, 6 as adopted by Maryland Rule 16-812. We referred the case, pursuant to Rule 16-752(a), 7 to the Honorable Michael D. Mason, of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, for hearing pursuant to Rule 16-757(c). 8 Following the hearing on the Petition, the matter was continued “to permit counsel for the parties to file Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.” After these pleadings were submitted and further arguments were heard, the hearing judge issued an opinion in which he made the following findings of fact. The respondent, Ralph E. Hall, Jr., graduated from law school in 1977 and is a member of the Maryland State Bar.

He has been a solo practitioner for most of his legal career. In ³¹² January of 2003, Carolyn Mudano met with the respondent to discuss her legal options after an initial complaint with the Human Rights Commission, filed by another attorney, failed to yield the results she desired. Ms. Mudano’s complaint to the Human Rights Commission alleged that her supervisors at the Montgomery County Department of Public Works engaged in employment discrimination after they discovered that Ms. Mudano was having a relationship with her married supervisor. The Department of Public Works immediately transferred Ms. Mudano to another office, but she wanted to regain her former position.

During mediation with the County, however, Ms. Mudano reluctantly agreed to allowing the County to find her a new position that would be mutually satisfactory. Eventually, Ms. Mudano became dissatisfied with the County’s efforts in finding her a new position. Ms. Mudano subsequently obtained the telephone number of an attorney named Jennifer Evans. Several years earlier, Ms. Evans shared office space with the respondent, but, unbeknownst to Ms. Mudano, Ms. Evans no longer maintained her office at the respondent’s location.

Ms. Mudano left a message at Ms. Evans’s former office, and the respondent returned Ms. Mudano’s call, resulting in their initial meeting. Ms. Mudano subsequently retained the respondent, and he filed suit against Montgomery County on her behalf. Shortly thereafter, a romantic relationship began to develop between the respondent and Ms. Mudano. “While [Ms. Mudano] had feelings for [Mr. Hall], she was concerned about beginning a personal relationship with him and the impact that might have on her case against the County. When she raised the concern with Mr. Hall, he simply smiled and told her that it was not a problem....

She was concerned not only about the impact that this relationship might have upon her case but also about the fact that Mr. Hall was married. Mr. Hall explained to her that his was a marriage of convenience.... She was also concerned about whether Mr. Hall was having a relationship with anyone else or whether he had had other relationships with clients in the past. Mr. Hall assured her that he had ³¹³ not done this in the past and he was not involved in any other relationship.... “While Mr. Hall denies having intercourse in the office, the Court finds Ms. Mudano’s testimony in this regard credible.

During the summer of 2003, Mr. Hall’s mother, who lived in Florida, passed away. As a result, he had to leave suddenly and travel to Florida. He asked Ms. Mudano to keep an eye on his office and gave her the key so that she could get the mail. When he returned from Florida, he told her to keep the key.” In January of 2004, Ms. Mudano’s suspicions about the respondent’s infidelity to her only heightened when she caught him shopping with a former client, Ms. D, when he was supposed to be conducting legal research at Catholic University.

Ms. Mudano did not tell the respondent that she saw him with another woman that evening, but she began repeatedly asking the respondent if he was seeing other people. The respondent vehemently denied that he was being unfaithful to her. “Eventually, he said that he was tired of her questioning him ... and that he was going to refer her to another attorney.... [Ms. Mudano] pleaded with him not to refer her out. He agreed to continue to represent her. “At about that same time, she attended an appointment with her therapist. In that visit, she disclosed that she was having an affair with her attorney.

The therapist explained to her that that relationship was not a good idea. After leaving the therapist, Ms. Mudano went to Mr. Hall and told him the therapist has said that the relationship was not a good idea. Mr. Hall responded by telling her she should get another attorney. He got a phone book to look for the number of an attorney he had in mind....

She begged him to continue representing her. Notwithstanding the therapist’s opinion, he agreed.” Their personal relationship also continued, so the hearing judge found: ³¹⁴ “On a number of occasions ..., [Ms. Mudano] used his office to conduct her personal business. He let her use his computers to check her. e-mails and to do job searches. During the fall of 2004, she used the computers in his office quite frequently [while attending classes at a community college].

He had two computers. She was permitted to use both. She was uncertain if there was any client information on those computers, but in any event never saw any.... “After completing discovery, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in federal court.... On March 22, 2004, following oral argument, summary judgment was granted to the Defendants.

Final judgment in that case was entered on’ March 23, 2004. The final judgment as against [Ms. Mudano’s former supervisor] was without prejudice except as to the claim for unlawful employment practices. “After the original complaint was dismissed in federal court, Mr. Hall discussed with Ms. Mudano the advisability of filing a suit in state court against [her former supervisor/paramour] for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence and interference with economic relationship. With her consent, that suit was filed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland.... The case was specially assigned to the Honorable Joseph A. Dugan, Jr. * * * “On October 19, 2004, following a hearing on the motion to dismiss, Judge Dugan dismissed the complaint with prejudice. 1 - 9 - 1 ³¹⁵ “Mr. Hall thought that the dismissal was improperly granted and recommended Ms. Mudano appeal.

After some delay, she authorized the filing of the appeal. Mr. Hall noted the appeal on November 19, 2004, one day late. Mr. Hall had failed to count October 31st in the thirty days from the entry of judgment. On December 1, 2004, [the former supervisor’s] attorney filed a motion to strike the appeal____Mr.

Hall filed an opposition. Notwithstanding the opposition, the motion was granted and the appeal was dismissed. * * * “In December of 2004, [Ms. Mudano] discovered for certain he was seeing another woman. After reading [an anonymous] letter, she testified that she was able to figure out who the woman was, [Ms. D]. She contacted [Ms. D] who confirmed that she was involved in a relationship with Mr. Hall and had been for some years.” The two decided to confront the respondent at his office. “Upon entering the office, they discovered another client, [Ms. M], was present. [Ms. D] asked [Ms. M] if she also was having an affair with Mr. Hall. [Ms. M] denied that she was. [Ms. D] asked her to leave so they could talk to Ralph [the respondent].” Immediately after [Ms. M] left the respondent’s office, Ms. Mudano and [Ms. D] confronted the respondent about the lies that he had told them.

Both wanted to know why he insisted that he was being faithful to them when, in fact, he was seeing other women. After the confrontation, Ms. Mudano drove to the respondent’s home and told Mrs. Hall that her husband was having an affair with at least two other women. Ms. Mudano also told two other female clients of the respondent, suspecting that they also might be having a sexual relationship with the respondent. Despite exposing the respondent’s indiscretions, Ms. Mudano still believed that she could salvage her relationship with the respondent.

Ms. Mudano went to the respondent’s office and asked him to tell her the truth. She wanted the respon ³¹⁶ dent to be truthful about his indiscretions so, at least she hoped, their relationship could move forward. The respondent, however, told her to leave, and, according to Ms. Mudano, shoved her against the wall. The latter claim the hearing judge found not to be credible.

The relationship between the respondent and Ms. Mudano ended, and the respondent terminated his representation of her. Subsequently, Ms. Mudano filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission and instituted a malpractice suit 10 against the respondent. Ms. Mudano’s Attorney Grievance complaint alleged that the respondent improperly revealed confidential information to another client, [Ms. D]. At the hearing, the respondent testified that he talked with [Ms. D] about Ms. Mudano’s case because of [Ms. D’s] familiarity, obtained as a result of her career in human resources, with the Family Medical Leave Act. [Ms. D] testified that the respondent disclosed to her that Ms. Mudano was extremely fragile and possibly suicidal.

The respondent denied making such a disclosure to [Ms. D], but acknowledged that he might have told [Ms. D] that Ms. Mudano was a “nut.” The respondent maintains that the only clients he ever became sexually involved with were Ms. Mudano, beginning in August 2003, and [Ms. D], beginning in the spring of 1998. Although [Ms. M] sent him personal emails, the respondent denies ever having a sexual relationship with her. The respondent did not believe that his personal relationship with Ms. Mudano could, or did, negatively impact his ³¹⁷ ability to represent her or compromise her chances of succeeding on her employment discrimination claim. In fact, the respondent believed that his sexual relationship with Ms. Mudano was not discoverable by the defendants in the underlying suit.

From these findings of fact, the hearing judge drew the following conclusions of law (citations to the record omitted): “1. Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(a)— * * * “There is evidence that Mr. Hall disclosed to [Ms. D] substantial personal information about Mudano. The Petitioner conceded that Mr. Hall was impliedly authorized to disclose to [Ms. D] information necessary to assist in representing Ms. Mudano with reference to her claims under the Family Medical Leave Act. However, Petitioner suggests that it was not necessary for the Respondent to discuss the personal details and/or identify the client by name.

The Court does not find by clear and convincing evidence that the Petitioner has established that Mr. Hall exceeded his authority in discussing Ms. Mudano’s case with [Ms. D], In order for him to obtain information and advice from [Ms. D] with respect to Ms. Mudano’s case, it was reasonably necessary for Mr. Hall to disclose to [Ms. D] the extent of Ms. Mudano’s problems, including her mental and/or emotional problems. “Separately, the Petitioner maintains that Mr. Hall violated this rule by discussing with Ms. Mudano [Ms. M’s] family problems and her treatment by her ex-spouse or soon to be ex-spouse. However, it appears from the evidence that the information disclosed involved matters of public record that had previously been disclosed in court. The Court does not find by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Hall violated Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(a) in discussing his representation of [Ms. M] with Ms. Mudano. “Further, the Petitioner argues that Mr. Hall’s cavalier attitude toward safeguarding confidential information was ³¹⁸ demonstrated by the access he gave Ms. Mudano and [Ms. D] to his office. The Court disagrees.

While both were given access, ... the client information was for the most part maintained on Mr. Hall’s computers and protected by a password. While Ms. Mudano was given access to the computer, there is no evidence that she was given access to any client records. While Ms. Mudano was given access to the office at times when Mr. Hall was not present and assuming there were hard copies of client files available in the office, there is no evidence that Ms. Mudano searched through any of those files and thereby gained any confidential information. Further, Mr. Hall was not reasonably required to assume that she might search his client files and take precautions to guard against such an unauthorized search. “2.

Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(b)— * * * “The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Hall violated Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(b) by engaging in a sexual relationship with Ms. Mudano at a time he was representing her in an employment discrimination suit arising out of a sexual relationship that she maintained with her former supervisor. Notwithstanding the fact that the former relationship with her supervisor may have been consensual, in the fact that during the pendency of the litigation, she was carrying on an affair with her attorney could reasonably have prejudiced her case. * * * “Contrary to what Petitioner suggests, the Court does not find that the Respondent fully appreciated the danger to Ms. Mudano and placed his sexual desires over the best interest of his client.[ 11 ] Instead, because he failed to ade ³¹⁹ quately investigate her condition, he was unaware of the severity of her problem, and thereby exposed her to unreasonably and unnecessary danger by engaging in a sexual relationship with her under the circumstances. More troubling, is the fact that Respondent continued his relationship with her even after learning that her therapist had advised her that she should not be engaged in an affair with her lawyer.... “Mr. Hall’s conduct is further exacerbated by the fact that at the time that he was engaged in a romantic relationship with this emotionally fragile client, he was lying to her about the existence of any other relationship. He continually represented to her that he was not involved in a relationship with any other woman at a time he was involved in a relationship with [Ms. D].

In repeatedly lying to Ms. Mudano about a fact that was of extreme importance to her, Mr. Hall could not have helped but recognize these lies had the very real potential to undermine the trust and confidence which she had reposed in him and thereby severely undermine the attorney/client relationship. Once established, he was obliged to honor that relationship. “3. Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c) * * 4= “The Respondent acknowledges that he lied to Ms. Mudano when he told her that he was not involved in any other relationships. Under the facts of this case, as discussed by the Court in its consideration of whether the Respondent violated Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(b), the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the dis ³²⁰ honesty and deceit in this instance rise to the íevel of constituting a violation of Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c). “4.

Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d) * * * “The Court recognizes that not every instance of sexual conduct involving a client by an attorney is necessarily prejudicial to the administration of justice. However, the Court finds that in this instance, the relationship arose at least in part out of the Respondent’s failure to recognize the severity of the client’s emotional distress and the position of influence that he exercised over the client. The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the relationship in this case resulted from an exploitation, albeit unwitting, of that relationship, given the client’s fragile condition. Accordingly, the relationship in this instance is one that is likely to engender disrespect for the legal profession, and is accordingly prejudicial to the administration of justice. “5.

Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3 4: * :|: “The Respondent acknowledges that he miscounted the days and thereby missed the deadline for noting an appeal by one day. However, by way of mitigation, it is unlikely Ms. Mudano suffered any damage as a result thereof, particularly in light of Judge Thompson’s finding that the appeal would not have been successful.[ 12 ] “6. Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4(a) ³²¹ * * * “The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent failed to appreciate the fact that by engaging in a sexual relationship with Ms. Mudano, he would potentially impair his ability to represent her for the reasons discussed earlier herein. Further, on one or more occasions, Ms. Mudano questioned Mr. Hall as to whether or not a personal relationship could adversely impact upon his representation of her.

Mr. Hall wrongly assured her that it would not. Accordingly, the Respondent violated Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4(b) by failing to provide her with information reasonably necessary to permit her to make an informed decision regarding the representation.” The petitioner took no exceptions to the, hearing judge’s findings of fact or conclusions of law and recommends that the respondent be disbarred. Highlighting that the respondent was found to have had a conflict of interest and engaged in conduct involving dishonesty and deceit, all of which were prejudicial to the administration of justice, the petitioner relies on Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Culver to justify its recommendation. 381 Md. 241, 286-87 , 849 A.2d 423, 450 (2004). The petitioner also insists that the Court should consider the respondent’s previous sanction in 1992 as an aggravating factor.

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hall, Misc. Docket (Subtitle BV) No. 25, September Term, 1990, Slip Op. filed February 25, 1992. That sanction, an indefinite suspension with the right to apply for readmission within 18 months, was imposed for the respondent’s violation of several Rules of Professional Conduct in his representation of several clients. In particular, it was determined that the respondent violated Rules 1.1, Competence, 1.3, Diligence, 1.4, Communication, all of which were found to have been prejudicial to the administration of justice under Rule 8.4.

Moreover, the respondent also was found to have mishandled client funds in violation of Maryland Code (1989, 1992 Supp.) § 10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article and charged an unreasonable fee in violation of Rule 1.5, Fees. Notwithstanding the ³²² fact that none of the respondent’s previous disciplinary complaints involved having sexual relations with clients, the petitioner points out, he obviously is no stranger to disciplinary proceedings before the Attorney Grievance Commission. The respondent takes exception to the factual determination made by the hearing judge that he was “currently awaiting the grant of a final divorce” at the time of the hearing. The respondent points out that neither he nor his wife had filed a divorce action at the time the hearing judge rendered his opinion.

Thus, while acknowledging that this is a minor factual point for our purposes, the respondent nevertheless does take exception to this erroneous factual finding by the hearing judge. Furthermore, the respondent takes exception' to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law that he violated Rules 1.7(b), 8.4(c), 8.4(d) and 1.4(b). This Court has original jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary proceedings. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 371 Md. 510, 539 , 810 A.2d 457, 474 (2002).

We review de novo the hearing judge’s conclusions of law. Rule 16-759(b)(l); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goff, 399 Md. 1, 27 , 922 A.2d 554, 569 (2007); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mahone, 398 Md. 257, 265-66 , 920 A.2d 458, 463 (2007); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. 690, 700 , 919 A.2d 669, 675 (2007); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 493 , 813 A.2d 1145, 1160 (2002). If the hearing judge’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the conclusions drawn from them are supported by the facts found, a party’s exceptions to conclusions of law will be overruled. Goff, 399 Md. at 28 , 922 A.2d at 570 ; Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. at 700 , 919 A.2d at 675 ; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Manger, 396 Md. 134, 146-47 , 913 A.2d 1, 8 (2006).

Moreover, a hearing judge’s findings of fact will not be overruled unless we determine that those findings are clearly erroneous. Goff, 399 Md. at 28 , 922 A.2d at 570 ; Mahone, 398 Md. at 265 , 920 A.2d at 463 ; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50 , 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006). The hearing judge is properly responsible for “[wjeighing the credibility of wit ³²³ nesses and resolving any conflict in the evidence!).]” Goff, 399 Md. at 28 , 922 A.2d at 570 (2007) (quoting State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733, 750 , 720 A.2d 323, 331 (1998)). The respondent filed six exceptions to the healing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 16-758. 13 The first exception, as indicated, is to the hearing judge’s factual finding that “a divorce is pending” and that the respondent was “currently awaiting the grant of a final divorce.” The respondent contends that, in actuality, he and his wife were separated, but neither had filed for divorce.

This exception concerns a trivial finding of fact, one that hinges on a semantic argument. The hearing judge’s statements are not clearly erroneous in light of the respondent’s testimony that he was separated from his wife and expected to become divorced. That a complaint for divorce had not, at that point in time, been filed does not render the judge’s findings in this regard clearly erroneous. Exception one is, therefore, overruled.

The respondent’s second exception takes issue with the hearing judge’s finding regarding his personal relationship with Ms. Mudano and its conclusion that he violated Rule 1.7(b) as a result of that relationship. Rule 1.7(b), as relevant here, prohibits an attorney from representing a client if the attorney’s personal interests have the potential to limit materially his or her representation of the client, unless the attorney reasonably believes that his ability to represent the client will not be adversely impacted. The respondent argues that the hearing judge’s finding that he violated Rule 1.7 by “engaging in a sexual relationship with Ms. Mudano at a time he was representing her in an employment discrimination suit” is inconsistent with the court’s finding that he did not place “his ³²⁴ sexual desires over the best interest of his client.” The sentence that the respondent refers to as being inconsistent with the hearing judge’s finding of a Rule 1.7(b) violation must be viewed in the context in which the hearing judge made that statement: “Contrary to what Petitioner suggests, the Court does not find that the Respondent fully appreciated the danger to Ms. Mudano and placed his sexual desires over the best interest of his client. Instead, because he failed to adequately investigate her condition, he was unaware of the severity of her problem, and thereby exposed her to unreasonable and unnecessary danger by engaging in a sexual relationship with her under the circumstances.

More troubling, is the fact that Respondent continued his relationship with her even after learning that her therapist had advised her that she should not be engaged in an affair with her lawyer. While Mr. Hall offered to refer her to another lawyer, when Ms. Mudano rejected that suggestion, he continued the relationship with her.” The respondent attempts to raise questions about the basis for the hearing judge’s conclusion of a Rule 1.7(b) violation by focusing on one ambiguous sentence included in that portion of the hearing judge’s findings and conclusions. We believe, however, that when the allegedly inconsistent sentence is viewed in context, the sentence that the respondent focuses on is not at all conflicting with the hearing judge’s conclusion that the respondent violated Rule 1.7(b). Instead, the hearing judge’s arguably ambiguous statement is merely an acknowledgment that, although Ms. Mudano’s emotional fragility might not have been crystal clear to the respondent, he surely had some knowledge that his client was not a pillar of emotional stability at the time he was having a sexual relationship with her.

The respondent maintains that his sexual relationship with Ms. Mudano, while representing her in her employment discrimination action, did not create the inherent conflict that arises when an attorney has a sexual relationship with a client that he is representing in a domestic relations matter. Attor ³²⁵ ney Grievance Comm’n v. Culver, 381 Md. 241, 274 , 849 A.2d 423, 443 (2004) (holding that an attorney who engages in a sexual relationship with a client, whether consensual or not, while representing a client in a matrimonial matter has committed a violation per se of Rule 1.7(b)). Therefore, the respondent maintains that the hearing judge erred when he concluded that his sexual relationship with Ms. Mudano created a conflict and resulted in his violation of Rule 1.7(b). The respondent correctly asserts that, while an attorney’s mere engagement in sexual relations with a client in a domestic relations matter is a per se violation of Rule 1.7(b), Culver, 381 Md. at 275 , 849 A.2d at 443 , in non-domestic actions, Maryland has no general rule prohibiting sexual relationships between attorneys and their clients.

The fact that no general rule exists, however, does not mean that such relationships should be pursued or are immune to sanctions. To the contrary: “In 2002, the American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Ethics 2000 Commission) added new paragraph (j) to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8, a bright-line rule which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in “sexual relations with a client unless a consensual sexual relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer relationship commenced.” Before this revision to the Rule, the Model Rules did not contain an explicit ban on lawyer-client sexual relationships. The comment to the Rule notes that because the relationship between the attorney and client is almost always unequal, a sexual relationship between the attorney and client can involve exploitation of the lawyer’s fiduciary role, thereby violating the attorney’s ethical duty not to use the trust of the client to the client’s disadvantage. See Center for Professional Responsibility, American Bar Association, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct R. 1.8(j) cmt. 17, at 145 (2003). “The American Bar Association, in Formal Ethics Opinion No. 92-364 (1992) disapproved of sexual relationships between attorneys and clients, concluding as follows: ³²⁶ ‘“A sexual relationship between lawyer and client may involve unfair exploitation of the lawyer’s fiduciary position, and/or significantly impair a lawyer’s ability to represent the client competently, and therefore may violate both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility....

First, because of the dependence that so often characterizes the attorney-client relationship, there is a significant possibility that the sexual relationship will have resulted from exploitation of the lawyer’s dominant position and influence and, thus, breached the lawyer’s fiduciary obligations to the client. Second, a sexual relationship with a client may affect the independence of the lawyer’s