Attorney Grievance Commission v. Joseph

⁶⁷⁴ GREENE, J. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751, 1 the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Petitioner”), acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Joel David Joseph (“Respondent”), charging him with professional misconduct arising out of representations made to the California Bar and third persons, regarding his residency in connection with applications for appearance pro hae vice in California’s state and federal courts. Petitioner charged Respondent with violating Rules 3.3(a)(1), 2 8.1(b), 3 and 8.4(c) and (d) 4 of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”). In accordance with Maryland Rule 16-752(a), 5 we ⁶⁷⁵ referred the matter to the Honorable Joseph A. Dugan, Jr. of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to render findings of fact and recommend conclusions of law. Judge Dugan held an evidentiary hearing on September 23, 2010, and in accordance with Maryland Rule 16-757(c) 6 rendered the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT Respondent, Joel David Joseph, was admitted to the Maryland Bar on April 1, 1981. He is self-employed as an attorney and also works for the Made in U.S.A. Foundation, which he founded. He has a part-time “national practice” and has been admitted pro hac vice in 25 different jurisdictions, mostly federal courts, across the United States. In March 2007, Respondent contacted the Law Offices of Robert M. Moss, the law firm of a solo practitioner, located in Santa Monica, California.

He spoke with Moss’s office administrator and paralegal assistant, Suzanne Brewer. As the hearing judge recounted, “Respondent told Brewer that he was a Maryland attorney looking for local counsel to sponsor his admission pro hac vice and act as co-counsel in cases to be filed in California courts. Respondent told Brewer that he lived in Maryland, ⁶⁷⁶ had an office in Maryland and had been practicing for years.” On March 23, 2007, Respondent and Moss entered into an Agreement to work together on two cases: Wartell v. United States and Pribyl v. K-2. Respondent already had retainer agreements with the plaintiffs in both cases.

The Wartell case was filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. A document entitled, “Application of Non-Resident Attorney to Appear in a Specific Case” was prepared and signed by Respondent, under the penalty of perjury, on or about May 10, 2007. The Application indicated that Respondent’s “out-of-state business information” was as follows: Law Offices of Joel D. Joseph, 7272 Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 300, Bethesda, Maryland 20814. It also contained the following statement: “I am not a resident of, nor am I regularly employed, engaged in business, professional or other activities in the State of California.

I am not currently suspended or disbarred in any court.” The Application indicated that Respondent was barred only in Maryland and that he was also admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the United States and the United States Courts of Appeal for the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th, and 10th Circuits. Respondent gave the application to Brewer; it was then signed by Moss and filed on June 28, 2007. The K-2 case was a class action suit filed in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles. Brewer prepared the Application of Joel D. Joseph Pro Hac Vice, using the information provided by Respondent in the Wartell application.

The application was dated June 15, 2007 and signed by both Respondent and Moss. The caption in the upper left hand corner of the Application indicated that the address for the Law Offices of Joel D. Joseph was 7272 Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 300, Bethesda, Maryland 20814. The application included the Declaration of Joel D. Joseph in Support of Pro Hac Vice Application, which was dated June 15, 2007 and signed under the penalty of perjury by Respondent. It represented, inter alia, that Respondent’s out-of-state address was also 7272 Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 300, Bethesda, Maryland 20814.

It also included the statement, “I am not a resident of, nor am ⁶⁷⁷ I regularly employed, engaged in substantial business, professional or other activity in the State of California.” Both the application and the declaration were filed on June 19, 2007. As the hearing judge stated: On or about June 18, 2007, Brewer received a phone call from Brandie Burroughs of the Office of Special Admissions & Specialization of the State Bar of California, concerning Respondent’s Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice in the K-2 case. Borroughs told Brewer that the California State Bar had the pro hac vice application ], but [it] provided a Maryland office address. [The Bar] wanted Respondent’s residence address and would not approve the application ] until [it] had the address where Respondent lived. Brewer agreed to provide this information.

Subsequently, Brewer received a form via facsimile from Burroughs. The form indicated that a residential address is a requirement according to Rule 9.40, and that a residential address for the out-of-state applicant was not included in the application.[ 7 ] Brewer left the Respondent a telephone message informing him about the California State Bar’s request. Brewer recalled that she left the following message: “We have to have your residence address, the address where you live.” On or about June 21, 2007, Brewer received an email sent by Respondent to Moss. The email contained the following information: “My residence address in Maryland is 4938 Hampden Lane, Apt. 118, Bethesda, MD.” Brewer entered the information provided by Respondent on the form provided by the State Bar of California on the line indicating “Residential address f/Joel D. Joseph.” Although the email used the designation “Apt. 118,” Brewer wrote “# 118” on ⁶⁷⁸ the memo.

She testified that she did so because there was not a lot of room provided. Respondent then came into the office and signed the form. At that time, Brewer asked Respondent about the address and Respondent told her that it was an apartment where he lived with his girlfriend. Brewer then returned the form to the State Bar.

After the Wartell and K-2 filings, Moss and Respondent agreed to act as co-counsel in a class action in which Moss already represented a plaintiff, John Doe v. Panera LLC. This case was also filed in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles. On or about November 6, 2007, Brewer prepared an Application for Admission Pro Hoc Vice for Respondent’s admission in the Panera case. She again used the information previously provided by Respondent.

The caption in the upper left hand corner of this document provided that the Law Offices of Joel D. Joseph had an address of 4938 Hampden Lane, Suite 118, Bethesda, Maryland 20814. Brewer used this address because Respondent told her that he was not only living at that address with his girlfriend but was also working out of the apartment. A document titled Declaration of Joel D. Joseph in Support of Pro Hac Vice Application was also included with this Application. The Declaration was also signed by Respondent under the penalty of perjury.

The Declaration contained the representations that: “My out-of-state address is as follows: Law Offices of Joel D. Joseph, 4938 Hampden Lane, Suite 118, Bethesda, Maryland 20814” and that “I am not a resident of, nor am I regularly employed, engaged in substantial business, professional or other activity in the State of California....” The Application and Declaration were filed by Brewer on November 18, 2007, with the Superior Court. In early June, 2007, Brewer learned that Respondent maintained an apartment located on Ocean Avenue in Santa Monica, California. The apartment came to Brewer’s attention when she arranged for her husband to pick Respondent up and drive him to a mediation hearing in a case Moss was ⁶⁷⁹ handling for her husband. Brewer was familiar with the building and believed it had small units and catered to people that stayed there temporarily.

Respondent told Brewer that he rented the apartment because it was cheaper than staying in a hotel when he came to California several times a month. Moss moved his law practice to another office in December 2007. The testimony of Ms. Brewer clarifies that the new office was within a suite of offices that Mr. Moss owned in the same building. At that time, Respondent agreed to rent office space from Moss.

Respondent occupied that space from December 1, 2007 until mid-October 2008. Brewer’s testimony revealed that she was able to see Respondent come and go from the office from where she did her work for Mr. Moss. The hearing judge found that Respondent came into the office sporadically, sometimes he would be gone for a week or ten days and other weeks he would be in the office every day. In early May 2008, Brewer received a phone call from opposing counsel in the Panera case.

The caller told Brewer that Respondent’s name did not appear on the online list of members of the Maryland Bar. The hearing judge found that Brewer called Respondent and told him that he was not in good standing with the Maryland Bar, and Respondent told Brewer he did not pay his “bar dues” and would take care of it. Moss was distressed about Respondent’s failure to remain in good standing with the Maryland Bar because his admission in the California cases was conditioned on his good standing in Maryland. About a week later, Brewer contacted the Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland and confirmed that Respondent had been reinstated.

During her conversation with the Client Protection Fund, Brewer was asked to verify that the Ocean Avenue address was the correct address for Respondent. As the hearing judge stated: “This caused Brewer to question why Maryland would send dues notices to a California address if Respondent lived and practiced in Maryland.” The hearing judge also found that: ⁶⁸⁰ There came a time in 2008 when Moss asked Respondent to withdraw his appearance in the K-2 and Panera cases. At the time, Respondent was still occupying the office space he rented from Moss. Respondent told Moss that he had become engaged and was now living full time in California.

Moss told Respondent that he could not be admitted pro hoc vice anymore and had to withdraw. Thereafter, Brewer prepared the necessary documents to withdraw Respondent’s appearances. In October 2008, after Respondent vacated the office space rented from Moss, Brewer came across a letter Respondent had written to the plaintiff in [the] Wartell [case] on or about April 3, 2007, which Brewer had not seen before. In this letter, Respondent informed Wartell that he had “moved to Santa Monica recently.” Brewer provided Petitioner with a copy of a complaint filed by Respondent, pro se, on or about June 5, 2007.

Whole Foods Market California was named as the defendant. In the complaint, filed in the Superior Court for the State of California County of Los Angeles, Respondent represented that: “Venue is proper in this County as the acts upon which this action is based occurred in part in this County. Plaintiff resides here----” In the Whole Foods complaint, Respondent represented that his address was 1223 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1413. This was the address of a UPS Store or other mailbox rental business.

There are no residences or other offices at that address. Brewer also determined that the Hampden Lane address that Respondent told her was an apartment [in Maryland] was actually a UPS store. The hearing judge also found that “Petitioner presented other documentary evidence that established the following: Respondent, on or about April 9, 2007, sent a check in the amount of $205.00 to the Client Protection Fund. The check was written on an account at U.S. Bank.

The address appearing on the check is 1431 Ocean Ave. Apt 620, Santa Monica, California. On April 27, 2007, the Client Protection ⁶⁸¹ Fund of the Bar of Maryland sent Respondent a letter concerning this check at the Ocean Avenue address. Business records provided by the UPS Store indicated that, on or about July 13, 2007, Respondent applied for his mail to be received by the UPS Store located at 4938 Hampden Lane.

The form signed by Respondent proved that the applicant’s ‘home address’ was 1223 Wilshire Blvd., # 1413, Santa Monica, CA, 90403. The UPS Store was authorized to receive mail for both Respondent and the Made in America Foundation, a non-profit business operated by Respondent.[ 8 ] The application does not mention the Law Offices of Joel D. Joseph. Respondent provided the UPS Store with his California Driver License with a date issued of May 14, 2007. The California Driver License displayed the 1223 Wilshire Blvd. address.

This address is neither a residence nor an office. It is a private mailbox business similar to the UPS Store. On March 14, 2008, Respondent sent Bar Counsel a letter in which he represented that he had “recently relocated to California.” The return address provided on the letter was Moss’[s] office: 1717 Fourth Street, Santa Monica. On October 29, 2008, in a matter before the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Respondent testified as follows: Q. Mr. Joseph, when did you move to Santa Monica, California?

A. I left Washington, D.C., I believe January 31, 2007. Q. All right, and at that point in time, you were— The Court: I’m sorry, say it again? You left D.C., January? Mr. Joseph: 31, 2007.

The Court: When you say, D.C., do you mean Bethesda? Mr. Joseph: Actually, I lived in Chevy Chase. So Chevy Chase, Maryland. I left Chevy Chase, Maryland— ⁶⁸² The Court: But that was your business address, was in Maryland, not in D.C.?

Mr. Joseph: My home and—my home was in Chevy Chase, Maryland and my office was in Bethesda, Maryland. By Ms. Ridgell: Q. And did you move directly from Maryland to the 1717 4th Street location in Santa Monica? A. No, that’s an office. My residence when I first moved there was 1431 Ocean Avenue.[ 9 ] During his deposition in these proceedings, Respondent testified that the 7272 Wisconsin Avenue address was office space he leased in a commercial building.

He vacated the office at the end of January 2007. Respondent acknowledged that the Hampden Lane address was a UPS Store and that he did not have an actual office or residence there. From 2006 to the end of January 2007, Respondent maintained a condominium on Wisconsin Avenue/Somerset Lane in Chevy Chase, Maryland. Respondent rented this property until the end of January 2007.

After that he rented no other apartments or condominiums in Maryland. He owned no real estate in Maryland in 2007. At one time he owned residential property at 8022 Cyprus Grove Lane, Cabin John, Maryland, however, as of 2004, he no longer owned this property. In 2007, Respondent owned one motor vehicle.

It was registered in Maryland as of January 31, 2007, however, Respondent registered the vehicle in California in mid-2007. In 2007, he also had a leased vehicle that was registered in Maryland. He stopped leasing this vehicle during 2007 and did not lease another.[ 10 ] ⁶⁸³ Respondent testified that he was registered to vote in Maryland during 2007. Respondent had not advised the election board of the address where he resided in 2006 through the end of 2007.

He has not voted in Maryland since prior to 2007. On or about March 1, 2007, Respondent entered into a lease to rent an apartment at 1431 Ocean Avenue in Santa Monica. The lease was for a period of 12 months. The apartment had kitchen and bath facilities.

The Respondent kept his clothing and personal effects at this location. This was the only residential property Respondent rented in California during 2007. He stopped using the Ocean Avenue apartment in December 2007 because he got engaged. Although Respondent had a valid Maryland Driver’s license at the time, he obtained a California license on May 14, 2007.

He used the Wilshire Blvd. address for privacy reasons. Respondent testified that he got a California license because he was told by a California police officer that if he lived in California for 30 days or more he had to get a California driver’s license.[ 11 ] Respondent opened a bank account in California in 2007. As of June 2010, Respondent maintained an office at 9935 South Santa Monica Blvd. He rents this property.

He runs a nonprofit foundation, the Made in the USA Foundation, and practices law from this location.[ 12 ] ⁶⁸⁴ In 2007, Respondent began using the post office box service at 1223 Wilshire Boulevard. He stopped using the service at the end of 2007. Respondent filed tax returns with a California address and paid taxes in California in 2008 and 2009. He paid no income taxes in Maryland in 2008 or 2009.

In 2007, Respondent had no interest of any kind in rental property [in Maryland], other than the post office box. In 2007, 2008, and 2009, he owned no property in Maryland. [Respondent testified that] when he moved to California it was his intent to get the two cases filed and to monitor two other cases that he had in California. Those cases were filed in 2001 and 2002. He did not have the intent to move to California permanently.

Originally, Respondent had arranged with another firm in California to handle the Wartell case and planned to remain in Maryland. This firm backed out. Since the statute of limitations was approaching, Respondent wanted to make sure that the complaint was actually filed so he went to California and got local counsel. Respondent testified that the definition of the term “resident” is a moving target and that he did not intentionally lie to or mislead any court or to any person about his residential status.

Respondent testified that he and his wife are still not sure where they are going to reside permanently. He has not registered to vote in California and considered that he was “still up in the air about where [he] is a permanent resident. ...”[ 13 ] ⁶⁸⁵ With regard to the representations in the Whole Foods complaint filed by Respondent on June 5, 2007, Respondent testified that he just copied a form pleading that said he was a resident, that it was not necessary for venue in the case that he be a resident of California, and that the complaint was not signed under oath. Also, he considered himself to be a temporary resident of California when the complaint was filed. He asserted that the representation that he was a resident did not deceive any court or party.

On cross-examination, Respondent acknowledged that, although he considered himself a temporary resident of California when he filed the complaint, he did not indicate that information on the complaint. He testified that, in retrospect, he made a mistake with the court and should have said he was a temporary resident or not said resident at all. Respondent also testified, however, that he did not consider himself to be a temporary resident of California when he prepared and signed the Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice that was filed on June 28, 2007, in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.[ 14 ] ] Respondent stated that he did not consider the representations to be inconsistent. Although Respondent testified that he still considered himself a resident of Maryland, he filed income tax returns and paid income taxes in California for tax years 2008 and 2009.

He did not pay income taxes in Maryland in 2008 or 2009. After January 31, 2007, Respondent had no apartment, condominium, house or place to live other than the Ocean Avenue apartment. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Judge Dugan concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated MRPC 3.3(a)(1), as he was ⁶⁸⁶ not candid in his applications for admission pro hoc vice filed in California state and federal courts. The judge also found that Respondent engaged in dishonesty, deceit and misrepresentation in violation of MRPC 8.4(c), and that his dishonest and deceptive conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice because it was “likely to bring the legal profession into disrepute,” in violation of MRPC 8.4(d).

We excerpt portions of his ruling below: There is clear and convincing evidence that Respondent left Maryland on January 31, 2007, and traveled to California with the intent to reside and/or live there. Respondent’s intent may be inferred from his actions and their natural consequences beginning in January 2007. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Smith, 405 Md. 107, 121 , 950 A.2d 101, 108 (2008) (a person’s intent must be judged in light of the circumstances attending his actions, including their natural and inevitable consequences), citing, Lee v. State, 65 Md.App. 587, 592-94 , 501 A.2d 495, 498 (1985), Blount v. Boston, 351 Md. 360, 368 , 718 A. 2 [d] 1111, 1115 (1998) (Intent may be more satisfactorily shown by the acts of the individual, rather than by his words and is best shown by objective factors.)[.] Respondent’s conduct and contemporaneous statements provided clear and convincing evidence that he intended to live and/or reside in California after January 31, 2007. Within a few weeks of his arrival he entered into a lease for an apartment residence on Ocean Avenue in Santa Monica for a period of 12 months.

Respondent admitted that, at the time he rented the apartment, he intended to stay in the apartment for at least 12 months. Prior to April 9, 2007, he opened a bank account in a California bank using the address of the apartment he leased. Respondent received mail at the Ocean Avenue address. On April 27, 2007, correspondence from the Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland was sent to Respondent at the Ocean Avenue, Santa Monica, California address. ⁶⁸⁷ On May 14, 2007, even though he had a valid Maryland Driver’s License at the time, he obtained a California Driver’s License because he was told by a California police officer that if he lived in California for 30 days or more he had to get a driver’s license.

On or about June 5, 2007, Respondent represented in a civil complaint he filed as a plaintiff in the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles that he resided in Los Angeles County, California, and that he was a ‘California resident and citizens [sic] who purchased ... coffee in the State of California during the past three years----’ Respondent’s choice of words in other statements made in 2007 and 2008 provide further evidence that Respondent was not merely visiting or temporarily staying in California but intended to live there for the foreseeable future. Respondent wrote to his client Arthur Wartell on or about April 3, 2007, and informed him that he had moved to Santa Monica recently. On March 14, 2008, Respondent wrote to Bar Counsel that he had recently relocated to California and was applying for membership in the California Bar. In his letter to Bar Counsel, Respondent used a California return address.

On October 29, 2008, Respondent testified in another matter before the Circuit Court for Montgomery County that he moved to California on January 31, 2007 and that his residence when he first moved was located at 1431 Ocean Avenue in Santa Monica. In addition, Respondent maintained no real connection with Maryland. He had neither a residence nor a business office in Maryland after January 31, 2007. At that time, he no longer rented either living or office space.

The only evidence Respondent can point to to show that he was a resident of Maryland after January 31, 2007, are the facts that he authorized the UPS Store to receive mail on his behalf and on behalf of the Made in America Foundation[ 15 ] and did not cancel his voter registration. In Maryland, ⁶⁸⁸ evidence that a person is registered to vote is ordinarily persuasive and should be given considerable weight when the question of domicile is a[n] issue. While evidence of the exercise of suffrage in a certain place is not conclusive and may be overbalanced by other circumstances. Comptroller v. Lenderking, 268 Md. 613, 619 , 303 A.2d 402, 405 (1973).

In this case, Respondent did not vote in Maryland after January 31, 2007. Since the Application for Delivery of Mail Through Agent signed by Respondent is dated July 13, 2007, from January 31, 2007 until that date, Respondent had no connection to Maryland other than the voter registration. Furthermore, the UPS Store records indicated that mailbox number 118 was closed on May 31, 2008, and another box was not opened by Respondent until December 5, 2008. Between those two dates, Respondent was again without even a rented mailbox on which to base his claim that he was a resident of Maryland.

Respondent had a duty to be candid with the Court. This duty required not only that he refrain from misrepresentations but that he correct any false information previously provided. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147, 176 , 994 A.2d 928, 945 (2010) (A lawyer’s failure to correct an earlier misrepresentation to the Court violated MRPC 3.3(a).)[.] Respondent failed to honor that obligation when he falsely represented that he was not a resident of California in the applications for admission pro hoc vice on June 19, June 28, and November 16, 2007. He, therefore, violated MRPC 3.3(a) and 8.4(c).

In addition, the Respondent ] represented that he maintained a law office at 7272 Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 300, Bethesda, Maryland, in the applications filed in June 2007 in the Wartell and K-2 cases. These representations were false and misleading, in that, at the time, he no longer had such an office. On the Panera application, which was filed in November 2007, after the State Bar of California inquiries, Respondent represented that he had a law office at 4938 Hampden Lane, Suite 118, Bethesda, Maryland, when ⁶⁸⁹ in fact he had no such office. These misrepresentations concerning the location of his law office also violated MRPC 3.3(a) and 8.4(c).

The rules governing admissions in both Federal and California State Courts used the term “resident.” 16 While ⁶⁹⁰ the rules do not expressly define the term “resident,” it is apparent that the purpose of the rules is to keep lawyers who are admitted in jurisdictions other than California from moving to California, establishing a residence, being regularly employed or regularly engaging in substantial business, professional or other activities in California, from using the pro hac vice admission rules to engage in the practice of law in California without going through California’s admissions process. That issue was addressed in Paciulan v. George, et. al, 38 F.Supp.2d 1128 (N.D.Ca.1999), aff'd, 229 F.3d 1226 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1077 , 121 S.Ct. 775 , 148 L.Ed.2d 673 (2001), a case in which the plaintiffs, California residents who were admitted to practice law in jurisdictions other than California, challenged the constitutionality of a California rule of Court, which prohibited California residents from appearing pro hac vice in state court____The United States District Court dismissed the complaint and found that there was a rational basis for California to limit pro hac vice admissions to non-residents in order to prevent California residents from using the rule to circumvent the State’s stringent Bar membership requirements. Furthermore, there is clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit and/or misrepresentation, in violation of MRPC 8.4(c), in his communications with the State Bar of California, Brewer and Moss. It is clear from Respondent’s communications with Brewer that he understood that the State Bar of California was trying to obtain the address of his residence in the usual sense of the word.

Brewer testified that, after she spoke with the representative of the California Bar, she made it clear to Respondent that they were looking for the address of the place where he lived. Respondent obviously understood that the Bar Association was requiring that he ⁶⁹¹ provide a residential address because he referred to the mailbox number as “Apt. 118.” Respondent also told Brewer that he lived with his girlfriend at an apartment located at the Hampden Lane address and conducted his law practice there. Respondent clearly knew that both of these representations were false. These misrepresentations also constituted violations of MRPC 8.4(c).

Respondent testified at trial that he presently believed that he is a domiciliary of the State of Maryland and was, at all relevant times, a domiciliary of the State of Maryland. He indicated that his arrangement with the UPS Store to receive his mail and the fact that he was still registered to vote in Maryland was evidence of the fact that he is a domiciliary of Maryland. In light of the conduct and representations in 2007 and 2008, Respondent’s testimony is not credible. Furthermore, if Respondent actually believed that renting a mailbox and being on the voter roles in Maryland made him a resident of Maryland for purposes of the applications for admission pro hoc vice, it would not have been necessary for Respondent to mislead Brewer and Moss by using the designation “Apt.” on the email and by telling Brewer that the Hampden Lane address was an apartment where he lived with his girlfriend and from which he conducted his practice of law in Maryland.

The issue here, however, does not rest on the technical definition of resident/domiciliary for voting or other purposes. Rather, the issue at the heart of this matter is whether Respondent was candid and/or truthful when he represented to the California Courts that he was not a resident of California for purposes of the rules governing admission to the Courts in which he sought to practice. Was Respondent truthful when, knowing that 4938 Hampden Lane was the address of a mailbox rental business, he represented to Moss, Brewer and the State Bar of California that his “residence address in Maryland [was] 4938 Hampden Lane, Apt. 118, Bethesda, MD?” Was he truthful when he signed the form that he knew would be returned to the State Bar of California that indicated that his “residen ⁶⁹² tial address” was 4938 Hampden Lane, # 118, Bethesda, MD? The answer to these questions is no.

Respondent’s testimony concerning the Whole Foods complaint, assuming arguendo that it was truthful, contradicted Respondent’s contention that he believed he was not a resident of California for purposes of the pro hac vice applications. In an attempt to explain his representations that he was a California resident in the Whole Foods complaint, Respondent testified that he believed he was a “temporary resident” of California when he filed the complaint on June 7, 2007. It follows, therefore, that Respondent made intentionally false and/or misleading representations that he was not a resident, temporary or otherwise, of California in his subsequent applications filed in the Wartell, K-2 and Panera cases. Respondent’s interpretation of the terms “residence” and “domicile” leads to the absurd conclusion that renting a mailbox in Maryland would establish residence and/or domicile in Maryland.

If so, Respondent established his residence and/or domicile in California when he entered the agreement to receive his mail with the California UPS Store located at 1223 Wilshire Boulevard in Santa Monica, California. In support of his position that he was and remains a resident of Maryland, Respondent submitted a memorandum from an Assistant Attorney General to all Clerks of Circuit Courts dated September 20, 2004. Respondent did not testify or offer other evidence that he relied on the representations contained in the memorandum at the time he was engaging in the conduct in question. The memorandum pertains to Tax-General § 10-912(d)(l) and attempts to answer the question: Who is a “Resident?” The opinion in this memorandum is, of course, not binding on this Court and, in any case, only applies for purposes of the Tax-General Article.

Furthermore, the information contained in the memorandum does not support Respondent’s contention that a rented mailbox and voter registration made him a resident of Maryland. ⁶⁹³ According to the memorandum, the term “resident” means: an individual, other than a fiduciary, who is domiciled in Maryland on the last day of the taxable year or for more than 6 months of the taxable year, maintained a place of abode in this State, whether domiciled in the State or not.[ 17 ] According to the memorandum the term “domicile” has been defined as the place where a natural person has his or her trae, fixed, permanent home, without any present intention of removing therefrom, and to which he or she has, whenever away, the intention to return. A natural person can have only one domicile at a time. Respondent did not have a fixed, permanent home in Maryland as of the last day of 2007 and did not maintain a place of abode in Maryland for 6 months of the tax year. After January 31, 2007, his only residence and/or place of abode was in California.

Respondent suggested that, if he had the financial resources to maintain an apartment in Maryland, the present disciplinary action would not have been brought. Had Respondent actually maintained a residence in Maryland ⁶⁹⁴ after January 31, 2007, his argument that he was a resident would certainly be stronger, however, that factor alone would not establish that he was a resident of Maryland. Although actual residence and voting in a jurisdiction have been considered the most important objective circumstances indicating domicile, numerous other factors are also pertinent to show a person’s intent. These include such things as: paying taxes, statements on tax returns, ownership of property, where the person’s children attend school, the address at which one receives mail, statements as to residency contained in contracts or other documents, statements on licenses or governmental documents, where furniture and other personal belongings are kept, which jurisdictions’ banks are utilized, membership in professional, fraternal, religious or social organizations, where one’s regular physicians and dentists are located and where one maintains charge accounts.

Blount v. Boston, 351 Md. 360, 369-370 , 718 A.2d 1111, 1116 (1998). In an effort to justify his misrepresentations in the applications filed with the Courts, Respondent pointed out that he did not have to obtain admission pro kac vice and could have just been out-of-state counsel and that it was Moss who wanted him to proceed in that manner and Respondent agreed to do so. The Rules of Professional Conduct require that a lawyer’s representations to a Court must be truthful and candid, whether the representation was required or voluntary. A lawyer is intimately associated with the administration of the law and should rightfully be expected to set an example in observing the law.

Public confidence in the legal profession is a critical facet of the proper administration of justice. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Clark, 363 Md. 169, 183 , 767 A.2d 865, 872 (2001). An attorney engages in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of MRPC 8.4(d), when his or her conduct negatively impacts on [sic] the efficacy of the courts or legal profession. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rand, 411 Md. 83, 96 , 981 A.2d 1234, 1242 (2009). ⁶⁹⁵ Respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of MRPC 8.4(d), when he filed applications for admission pro hac vice that contained misrepresentations and when he provided false and misleading information to Moss, Brewer and the State Bar of California....

STANDARD OF REVIEW We explained in Attorney Grievance v. Sapero, 400 Md. 461, 478 , 929 A.2d 483, 493 (2007): This Court has original and complete jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary proceedings. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Cherry-Mahoi, 388 Md. 124, 152 , 879 A.2d 58, 76 (2005) (citations omitted). As noted in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mahone, 398 Md. 257, 265-66 , 920 A.2d 458, 463 (2007): “We accept a hearing judge’s findings of fact unless we determine that they are clearly erroneous. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50 , 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006).

As to the scope of our review, we take into consideration whether the findings of fact have been proven by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rule 16-757(b). This Rule provides that Bar counsel has the burden of proving the averments of the