Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Edwards

Barbera, C.J. Petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, acting through Bar Counsel, filed in this Court two Petitions for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Respondent, Christal Elizabeth Edwards, regarding six separate complaints filed against her by former clients and a stenographer formerly employed by Respondent. Bar Counsel moved to consolidate the two petitions and we granted that motion. The petitions allege violations of the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct 1 ("MLRPC") 1.1 (Competence), 1.2 (Scope of Representation), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4 (Communication), 1.5 (Fees), 1.15 (Safekeeping Property), 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation), 3.3(a) (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 3.4(c) (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel), 5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law), 7.1(a) (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct). 2 On June 29, 2016, this Court transmitted this matter to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County and designated the Honorable Nelson W. Rupp, Jr., ("the hearing judge") to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact and conclusions of law. The hearing took place on February 20-23, 2018, and April 16, 2018.

At the hearing, the judge heard testimony from Respondent and ten witnesses (seven for Petitioner and three for Respondent). The hearing judge precluded Respondent from introducing evidence regarding her record-keeping for two of her clients, as Respondent had failed to satisfy Bar Counsel's discovery request for those documents prior to the hearing. We adopt in large part the hearing judge's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Based on the rule violations that Respondent committed, as well as the aggravating and mitigating factors we have identified, we disbar Respondent.

I. The Hearing Judge's Findings of Fact We summarize here the hearing judge's findings of fact, which are supported by clear and convincing evidence. Background Respondent was admitted to the Maryland Bar in 2007 and the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in 2009. She was subsequently admitted to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in 2010 and the District of Columbia Bar in 2013. At all relevant times, Respondent maintained an office at 8403 Colesville Road, Suite 1100, Silver Spring, Maryland ("Colesville Road Office").

Respondent listed the Colesville Road Office with the Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland. Respondent also currently maintains an office at 9701 Apollo Drive, Suite 301, Largo, Maryland ("Apollo Drive Office"). Respondent suffers from ulcerative colitis, which is a "chronic ulceration in the large intestine, characterized by painful abdominal cramps and profuse diarrhea containing pus, blood, and mucus." Ulcerative Colitis , Dictionary.com [https://perma.cc/DB3A-NCUB]. Respondent was diagnosed in 1999 and testified that although the disease can be manageable, she occasionally experienced what she called "flare ups." These "flare ups" caused Respondent to be hospitalized six times between 2015-2016: (1) March 12-31, 2015; (2) August 27-30, 2015; (3) September 13-20, 2015; (4) October 11-16, 2015; (5) December 27-30, 2015; and (6) January 20-February 4, 2016.

The hearing judge credited Respondent's claim that she received care through doctor visits and "two to three-hour 'infusion appointments' from October 6, 2011 through May 19, 2016." 3 Representation of Rochell Richardson In late January 2010, Rochell Richardson entered into a contract with Capitol Improvement Contractors, Inc. ("Capitol") to rehabilitate her family home. The contract was financed through a City of Baltimore ("City") " '203k' home rehabilitation program" and required disputes under the contract to be resolved through arbitration "under the auspices of the Better Business Bureau, Inc." Seven months later, after demolishing "substantial portions of the home," and causing the water in Ms. Richardson's home to run continuously, Capitol stopped working due to, what it called, "unforeseen conditions." As a result, Ms. Richardson filed a pro se complaint against Capitol with the Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation ("DLLR"). The complaint alleged that Capitol had left Ms. Richardson's home unsafe and in a state of disrepair. Her complaint was sent to the Better Business Bureau per the arbitration clause of the contract.

On February 2, 2011, the Environmental Control Board of Baltimore City issued an Environmental Citation to Ms. Richardson due to the condition of her home. Later that same month, the City sent Ms. Richardson an invoice for a delinquent water bill totaling $ 2,106.59. Ms. Richardson's niece, Alisa Boddie, who acted as an intermediary throughout this matter, introduced Ms. Richardson to Respondent. In early October 2011, Ms. Richardson retained Respondent on a contingent fee basis to represent her in an "Arbitration and Civil Suit involving Capitol Improvement Contractors, LLC and Baltimore Housing Authority." In December 2011, the City declared Ms. Richardson's home uninhabitable.

Ms. Richardson was forced to move out later that month. On March 4, 2012, Respondent sent a "Demand Letter for Arbitration Hearing" to the Office of Rehabilitation. On March 23, 2012, Respondent sent a similar demand letter to the Better Business Bureau. No hearing was scheduled and nothing in the record suggests that Respondent followed up on either letter.

The following month, the Baltimore City Bureau of Revenue Collections sent a "Tax Sale Notice" to Ms. Richardson. At that point, Ms. Richardson learned that the City had placed a tax lien on her home because of the delinquent water bill. A tax sale was scheduled to occur on May 21, 2012. On the day of the tax sale, Respondent wrote to the Bureau of Revenue Collections stating that the water bill was part of a lawsuit. 4 Two days later, Capitol filed a breach of contract action against Ms. Richardson.

Respondent then assured Ms. Richardson that arbitration was unnecessary and that she would file a lawsuit against Capitol. Respondent, however, never sent a letter of representation or a demand letter to Capitol. Nor did Respondent file a lawsuit on Ms. Richardson's behalf, correspond with Capitol, or enter her appearance in Capitol's lawsuit against Ms. Richardson. In November 2014, Respondent advised Ms. Richardson that she was working on Ms. Richardson's case and that after the holidays, her case would be Respondent's "first priority." The hearing judge found that Respondent misled Ms. Richardson (and Ms. Boddie) by communicating that she would continue to work on Ms. Richardson's case.

On July 6, 2015, after receiving no communications from Respondent for over six months, Ms. Boddie requested, on Ms. Richardson's behalf, that Respondent call her to discuss the case. Respondent informed Ms. Boddie and Ms. Richardson, for the first time, that she had been in the hospital and "out sick right after the holidays and just returned to work full time about two weeks ago." The hearing judge found that between January and July 2015, Respondent took no action to protect the interests of Ms. Richardson. Respondent's medical records reflect a hospitalization from mid to late March, but nothing "right after the holidays" or "about two weeks" before July 6, 2015. By July 25, 2015, Respondent still had not taken any action in Ms. Richardson's case, prompting Ms. Richardson to file a complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission.

In over three years, Respondent's representation of Ms. Richardson consisted of nothing more than the three letters sent to the Baltimore City Office of Rehabilitation, the Better Business Bureau, and the Baltimore City Bureau of Revenue Collections. Representation of Brenda Dyer In November 2012, Brenda Dyer was injured during a "Black Friday" event at a Walmart in Collierville, Tennessee. A group of customers, while rushing a display, knocked Ms. Dyer over and trampled her. Ms. Dyer suffered injuries to her leg and back.

Respondent's sister, who worked with Ms. Dyer, referred Ms. Dyer to Respondent. On December 12, 2012, Ms. Dyer hired Respondent on a contingent fee basis. Respondent told Ms. Dyer that they would wait to file a lawsuit until Ms. Dyer's medical treatment was complete and her doctors "cleared" her. On December 23, 2012, Ms. Dyer sent Respondent the following email: The [doctor] has set me up for [an] MRI on January 2nd for my back and knee.

My back ha[s] degenerative disc disease at L5 Sl. I thought you should know that info. Have you talked to Walmart at all [o]r are you waiting for me to get their determination [o]f fault letter? Respondent did not respond.

Three days later, Ms. Dyer again emailed Respondent, stating: Please call me when you are available so that we can meet up and discuss the case. I have not heard anything from them in reference to their decision about who was at fault yet. Respondent did not respond. A month later, Ms. Dyer emailed Respondent yet again, stating, in pertinent part: My parents suggested I send you an email because you are probably busy.

I had left you a message a couple weeks ago letting you know that the claims agent from Walmart had attempted to call me and I did not answer the call because you had stated you would do the talking with them instead of me. I was wondering if you were able to get ahold of them? I am just curious because the MRI bill will be coming in soon and I truthfully do not have the money to pay for it because it went towards my deductible. I already owe my doctor[']s office additional monies because they have charged additional for me when they had drained my knee and they were charging me incorrectly for the therapy sessions.

Please let me know what I should do or if Walmart has agreed that it was their fault. On the same day, Respondent replied: Yes, you are correct in not speaking with Walmart. I left a message and sent my letter of representation to them. I will give them a call on Monday and follow up with you then.

When Respondent sent this email, she in fact had not left a message, sent a letter of representation, or had any correspondence with Walmart whatsoever. The hearing judge found this to be a knowing and intentional misrepresentation. A week after Respondent's email, Ms. Dyer emailed Respondent, asking: "Did you already talk to the insurance guy?" Respondent did not respond. Eleven days later, Ms. Dyer emailed Respondent the following: I have to go in for surgery on Monday for my knee, there is a meniscus tear.

Have you heard anything from Walmart[?] You had stated previously you would be calling me back but I have not heard anything. I have given it a couple weeks and I have called and left you a message. Please let me know what is going on. Respondent did not respond.

Over a month later, Ms. Dyer emailed Respondent asking for an update on her case. Respondent did not respond. Eleven days later, Ms. Dyer emailed Respondent yet again, this time stating: I was just wondering if you had heard anything from Walmart yet. It has been over 4 months since it occurred so they have to have said something by now.

I am worried if we wait too long the tape will [disappear] from that night. On April 17, 2013, Respondent sent a letter to Walmart's representative, Claims Management, Inc., stating, in pertinent part: This letter is to advise that I am the legal representative for [Brenda Dyer] as the result of injuries sustained during an incident while shopping on "Black Friday" at a Wal-Mart store in Collierville, TN. It is my understanding that [Ms. Dyer] began working with your office over three months ago. Please feel free to contact me at the above address and telephone number for any further information.

Ms. Dyer never received a copy of that letter. Between September and October 2013, Ms. Dyer sent Respondent at least four text messages relating to her case. On October 4, 2013, having not received a response, Ms. Dyer emailed Respondent stating: I have sent you text messages on several different occasions. I have sent an email to the [firm's] general email address.

I just left a message at the office today. I am getting concerned that I have not heard back from you. My surgery is almost 2 weeks away. Have you heard anything?

I am concerned that I have not heard from you and wonder if everything is ok on your end or if I need to find another attorney. Please let me know so I will know how to proceed. On November 22, 2013, the statute of limitations for Ms. Dyer's claim in Tennessee expired with no suit having been filed. In April 2014, approximately five months after the statute of limitations had run, Respondent informed Ms. Dyer, for the first time, that Walmart denied liability for her injuries.

Respondent then told Ms. Dyer that she would pursue a lawsuit against Walmart in Arkansas. 5 On May 23, 2014, Ms. Dyer sent a text message to Respondent asking whether she had filed the complaint or retrieved the surveillance footage. Respondent did not respond. Nine days later, Ms. Dyer sent another text message to Respondent, asking, "Is the lawyer in Arkansas going to file?" Respondent replied, "Yes." The hearing judge found that this was a knowing and intentional misrepresentation because there was no evidence that Respondent had "made any arrangements to file a claim ... in either Tennessee or Arkansas." On June 5, 2014, Ms. Dyer again sent Respondent a text message following up on her questions from May 23, 2014. Respondent did not respond.

On June 11, 2014, Ms. Dyer sent a text message to Respondent terminating Respondent's representation. Respondent never filed a lawsuit or coordinated with local counsel to have a lawsuit filed in either Tennessee or Arkansas. On August 14, 2015, Ms. Dyer filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission. Outstanding Invoices-Marguerite D. Keller In July 2013, Respondent hired Marguerite Keller as a stenographer in connection with her representation of a client.

Respondent failed to pay three separate invoices totaling more than $ 1,400. On September 2, 2014, Ms. Keller filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission. Representation of LaTasha Houston Initial Work On March 30, 2014, LaTasha Houston, who sought to modify a child support order, executed a retainer agreement with Respondent. The agreement called for a $ 1,000 retainer and stated that work would be billed at an hourly rate of $ 275.00.

The following day, Respondent deposited Ms. Houston's $ 1,000 retainer into her attorney trust account. After the father of Ms. Houston's child, Mr. Wilson, moved to modify the child support order, a hearing was set for June 10, 2014. Respondent informed Ms. Houston that she would raise Ms. Houston's motion to modify the child support order at the hearing. On April 28, 2014, Respondent prepared a subpoena for Mr. Wilson's employer, the U.S. Marshals Service, to obtain information regarding his earnings and leave.

In preparing the subpoena, Respondent listed the return date as May 1, 2014, i.e., three days later. Twelve days after the subpoena's listed return date, Respondent served the subpoena on the Marshals Service via facsimile. The Marshals Service moved to quash the subpoena, arguing, among other things, that the subpoena was served after its return date. Respondent did not respond to the motion to quash, but instead, told Ms. Houston that they would find a different way of getting Mr. Wilson's financial information.

Respondent attended the June hearing without having filed an opposition to Mr. Wilson's motion to modify the child support order. At that time, Respondent told the court and Mr. Wilson that a motion to modify the child support was forthcoming. After the hearing and in response to Ms. Houston's trepidation about the case, Respondent reassured her that she would draft a motion to modify the child support order within a few days. Ms. Houston then asked if Respondent would file a motion to recuse the judge. 6 Respondent agreed to do so.

Throughout June and July 2014, Ms. Houston sent Respondent multiple emails requesting status updates on the two motions Ms. Houston had requested be filed by Respondent. When Respondent replied, she assured Ms. Houston that the motions were going to be served along with discovery requests. On June 14, 2014, Respondent propounded interrogatories on Mr. Wilson. When Mr. Wilson did not respond, Respondent failed to compel discovery or otherwise obtain the information sought.

Four days later, Ms. Houston requested to see a document relating to the motion to quash, which the U.S. Marshals Service had filed previously. Ms. Houston also reiterated her concern about the filing of the motion to modify child support and the motion to recuse, stating that Respondent was "three business days behind [the agreed upon] scheduled date." Respondent reassured Ms. Houston that she would finish the motions. Respondent did not mention the Marshals Service's motion to quash, nor did she provide a copy of the motion to Ms. Houston, as she had requested. Respondent continued to ignore Ms. Houston and her requests for documents and updates on her case.

Consequently, on July 14, 2014, Ms. Houston told Respondent that if the motions were not filed by July 18, 2014, Ms. Houston would be requesting a full refund. Respondent did not respond. On August 5, 2014, Ms. Houston wrote to Respondent to terminate her representation, request her client file, and demand a full refund of the retainer fee. Roughly two months later, Respondent sent a letter to Ms. Houston (and apparently all her clients), stating: I am writing this letter to inform you of my very unforeseen and unfortunate situation.

For the past six months I have been dealing with a chronic disease and it has caused me to be extremely ill for the past two months. As a result, I have been unable to fulfill my obligations to you, as my client and the matters of your case. I sincerely apologize. However, by the grace of God, I am currently doing well and back in the office fulltime.

It is my plan to personally contact you during this week, the week of September 29, 2014, to discuss your case and how you want me to proceed. Again, I sincerely apologize for any delay in your matter. The next day, Ms. Houston replied to Respondent's letter. In it, she again informed Respondent that she was discharging her and wanted her client file and a full refund.

Respondent agreed to send the requested refund and informed Ms. Houston that she had asked to be removed from the case. Ms. Houston wished Respondent well and asked when she could expect her file and refund. Respondent did not respond. The hearing judge found that Respondent also "never filed a motion or praecipe to withdraw her appearance from the matter." On October 8, 2014, Ms. Houston emailed Respondent, stating: [I]t has been 7 days since our last communication where you acknowledge[d] receipt of my letter and confirmed that you were sending my refund.

If it has not been done already, being that a week has pas[sed], please send my refund and a copy of my case by 10/15/2014. I pray all is well with your health. Respondent did not respond. The Lawsuit Near the end of October 2014, Ms. Houston filed a lawsuit against Respondent in the District Court of Maryland seeking $ 1,000 in damages.

On or about October 29, 2014, Respondent called Ms. Houston to inform her that Respondent would not be providing a refund. Ms. Houston once again asked for her refund and her client file. Ms. Houston served Respondent with the District Court complaint and a Writ of Summons on October 31, 2014. On January 23, 2015, Respondent filed a notice of intention to defend.

In the notice, Respondent argued that she did not owe Ms. Houston any money because the retainer fee was earned in full. Respondent then filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. The motion claimed, among other things, that Respondent was in "constant communication[ ] with [Ms. Houston]," that Respondent became "gravely ill for several months" after being "assigned" the case, that Ms. Houston was aware of Respondent's illness, and that the "modification hearing did not take place because [Ms.] Houston terminated the services of the Edwards Legal Group." The hearing judge found that Respondent "knowingly and intentionally misrepresented ... that she was 'in constant communication' with Ms. Houston." 7 Approximately six months after Ms. Houston's first request, Respondent provided Ms. Houston with her client file. The client file did not include either a motion for modification of the child support order or a motion to recuse the judge, both of which Ms. Houston had requested be done.

The District Court denied Respondent's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment and later ruled in Ms. Houston's favor awarding her $ 1,000 plus costs. Insofar as the record reflects, Respondent never returned the retainer fee to Ms. Houston. Respondent never provided an invoice to Ms. Houston during her representation. The Billing Records As part of Respondent's motion to dismiss Ms. Houston's complaint against her in the District Court, Respondent attached an invoice that she had generated.

In comparing the invoice with Respondent's bank records, the hearing judge found that Respondent's invoice was "false." Although Respondent's invoice demonstrated that Respondent withdrew Ms. Houston's $ 1,000 retainer fee on June 30, 2014, bank records reveal that Respondent had in fact disbursed all of Ms. Houston's $ 1,000 payment by April 14, 2014. Additionally, the hearing judge found that the invoice listed work Respondent had allegedly done on Ms. Houston's motion to modify the child support order and the motion for recusal, but that Ms. Houston's client file did not include either motion. The hearing judge then seemingly found that even if he were to credit the work Respondent listed in her invoice, Respondent disbursed the retainer fee before having earned it in full. Respondent billed at a rate of $ 275.00 per hour and claims to have performed 3.5 hours of work between March 30, 2014 and May 1, 2014.

Because Respondent was only entitled to $ 962.50 of the $ 1,000 retainer fee when she made her withdrawal on April 14, 2014, the hearing judge found that Respondent had disbursed the retainer fee before it was earned. 8 Respondent misled Ms. Houston to believe that she was working on Ms. Houston's behalf and, further, that Respondent sought removal from the case. Lastly, Respondent never explained to Ms. Houston that before she could file a motion for modification of child support, Respondent needed a subpoena of Mr. Wilson's financial information or answers to interrogatories. In short, Ms. Houston retained Respondent to file a motion for modification of child support and a motion for recusal. Respondent did neither.

Representation of Angela Spencer In early 2012, Angela Spencer entered into a contract with Ardekani & Associates ("Ardekani") to renovate her kitchen. After the project was completed, Ms. Spencer withheld full payment because she was dissatisfied with Ardekani's workmanship. In September 2012, Ardekani filed a breach of contract action in the District Court of Maryland against Ms. Spencer. Ms. Spencer moved to dismiss that action.

In March 2013, the District Court dismissed the contractor's complaint and informed Ms. Spencer that she could proceed with a counterclaim against Ardekani. Following the disposition of Ardekani's subsequent appeal, the District Court set trial for November 21, 2014. On October 9, 2014, Ms. Spencer executed Respondent's retainer agreement and paid half of the $ 1,500 retainer. The agreement provided that Respondent would represent Ms. Spencer in her "Counterclaim for damages in civil case number 0502-0024756-2012 in Prince George's County, Maryland." The agreement also provided that Respondent would charge $ 325 per hour.

A week before the trial, Respondent entered her appearance and moved for a continuance. The court granted the motion and postponed the trial until January 27, 2015. Two months before trial, Ms. Spencer emailed Respondent to ask whether Respondent had contacted Mr. LaValle, Ms. Spencer's expert. Respondent did not respond.

A month later, on January 4, 2015, Ms. Spencer emailed Respondent to schedule a phone call. Respondent replied the following day, stating "I am just getting back in town from the holidays and want to review your case file at the courthouse again. Also, I am going to reach out to Ardekani this week as well. Let's touch base on Thursday [, January 8, 2015]." On January 13 and 16, 2015, Ms. Spencer asked again whether Respondent was in contact with Mr. LaValle.

Respondent did not respond. On January 26, 2015, the day before trial, Respondent filed an "Application to Inspect Public Records." The court subsequently postponed the matter until April 8, 2015. On February 16, 2015, Ms. Spencer emailed Respondent requesting an update on her case. Respondent did not respond.

On March 2, 2015, Ms. Spencer reiterated her request for an update. Respondent did not respond. On March 19, 2015, Ardekani, through its counsel, propounded interrogatories on Ms. Spencer. Ms. Spencer requested that Respondent send her the interrogatories and asked if everything was ready for trial.

Respondent did not respond. Respondent did not inform Ms. Spencer or Ardekani that she was hospitalized between March 12 and 31, 2015. On April 3, 2015, Respondent, without informing Ms. Spencer, filed another motion for a continuance because Respondent was "currently hospitalized." The court granted the motion and rescheduled trial for July 20, 2015. On April 23, 2015, Ms. Spencer emailed Respondent to ask if there was a new trial date and to request copies of all filings made by either Ardekani or Respondent.

Respondent did not respond. Two months later, Ardekani filed a "Consent Motion for Continuance" due to a scheduling conflict. As a result, the court rescheduled the trial for September 11, 2015. Ardekani also informed Respondent that it would be forced to move for sanctions based on Respondent's failure to provide discovery.

On June 30, 2015, Respondent emailed Ms. Spencer and told her that Ardekani had sent discovery requests while Respondent was in the hospital. Respondent also told Ms. Spencer to answer the interrogatories and that Respondent would review them. Respondent did not mention that Ardekani intended to file a motion for sanctions. Ms. Spencer sent the completed interrogatories to Respondent on July 8, 2015.

Ms. Spencer also provided suggestions to Respondent that Ms. Spencer felt would be appropriate for their interrogatories to Ardekani. It was at this time that Ms. Spencer expressed an interest in settling the case. Respondent, however, never engaged Ardekani in settlement negotiations or sent the interrogatories. On July 21, 2015, Ms. Spencer asked about the status of her case, whether the interrogatories had been sent to Ardekani, and if Respondent had drafted anything for Ms. Spencer to review.

Respondent did not respond. On August 8, 2015, Ms. Spencer emailed Respondent: "Next court date is about a month away. Are you okay? Would like to hear from you." Respondent replied that she was "back and doing well" and that she had been talking to Ardekani's attorney regarding discovery.

Respondent told Ms. Spencer that she would call her that night or the following morning. Respondent never called. Ardekani's attorney made additional attempts to obtain discovery from Respondent. None were successful.

On August 12, 2015, Ardekani moved for sanctions. The hearing judge found that Respondent "failed to inform Ms. Spencer of the Motion for Sanctions, failed to file a response, and failed to provide discovery responses to Ardekani." On August 19, 2015, Ms. Spencer sent Respondent a package consisting of all her original documents, including Ms. Spencer's answers to the interrogatories. The hearing judge found that although Respondent received the package, she failed to "ever open or review its contents." Throughout August, September, and October 2015, Respondent did not respond to several emails sent by Ms. Spencer. On September 3, 2015, Respondent filed another motion for continuance.

Respondent's motion stated that she was "extremely ill and recovering from a brief hospital stay from August 27 to August 30, 2015." The court obliged and set the hearing for October 14, 2015. On September 10, 2015, the court granted Ardekani's motion for sanctions and ordered Ms. Spencer to answer discovery by October 15, 2015. Respondent did not inform Ms. Spencer about the Order of Sanctions. On the date of the hearing, Respondent failed to appear.

Earlier that morning, Respondent notified counsel and the court that once again she was hospitalized. During the hearing, the court called Respondent to inform her that the rescheduled hearing would now take place on November 3, 2015. A few days before the hearing, Ms. Spencer emailed Respondent to ask if she should be available by phone for the pre-trial conference on November 3, 2015. Ms. Spencer again expressed her desire to settle the case.

Respondent, who had been out of the hospital for about two weeks, told Ms. Spencer that she did not need to attend the hearing. On November 3, 2015, neither Ms. Spencer nor Respondent appeared for the hearing. Ardekani's attorney argued the case should be dismissed because, among other reasons, Respondent had not responded after the request for sanctions. The court agreed and dismissed Ms. Spencer's counterclaim.

Respondent did not notify Ms. Spencer of the dismissal or Respondent's failure to appear. Two days after the hearing, Ms. Spencer emailed Respondent to ask for the outcome of the hearing. Respondent did not respond. Then, between November 23, 2015 and December 1, 2015, Respondent and Ms. Spencer exchanged the following emails: November 23, 2015 Ms. Spencer: Court records show dismissal.

Was there a settlement? ? Please advise. [Respondent]: I am back out sick but will follow up as soon as possible to let you know what's going on. Ms. Spencer: I hope "as soon as possible" means this week. I am reachable 24/7.

November 24, 2015 [Respondent]: As I said, I am out sick and will follow up with you as soon as possible. December 1, 2015 Ms. Spencer: Need to know when we can talk. The hearing was 11/3. If you can't talk, please send whatever documents were issued by the court.

Following Ms. Spencer's December 1, 2015 email, Respondent did not respond or send any documents to Ms. Spencer. On December 4, 2015, Ms. Spencer and Respondent engaged in the following email exchange: Ms. Spencer: I hope to hear from you this weekend. If not, I will be contacting an attorney to review this situation early next week. Please also return to me immediately all the materials I sent to you in preparation for trial and provide me with copies of any pleadings you received or initiated on my behalf, including from the District Court.

I believe I had a right to know if your health situation was so dire as to prevent you from properly representing me. [Respondent]: Ms. Spencer, I am still out sick and slow to return. If you want another attorney, please feel free. As I told you, I have everything under control. Ms. Spencer: I need to know what that means ("I have everything under control").

Surely you can explain. I can't imagine that you cannot talk or type to your client advising the status of the matter. [Respondent]: I AM GETTING READY TO START MY TREATMENT FOR TODAY AND I WILL NOT BE ABLE TO TALK OR TYPE. IF YOU CANNOT WAIT OR IMAG[IN]E THAT[,] THEN LET ME KNOW AND I WILL SEND YOUR FILE TO YOU. I PRAY YOU NEVER GET SICK.

Ms. Spencer: Has the case been dismissed yes or no? What do you have "covered?" How difficult is that to say? I will be praying for you. Respondent did not reply to Ms. Spencer's last email, nor did she send Ms. Spencer any documents from her client file.

Additionally, Respondent's medical records do not support her assertions that she was in the hospital or had appointments on December 4, 2015, or at any time the month prior. Sometime in early December 2015, Respondent and Ms. Spencer spoke on the phone. Respondent told Ms. Spencer that the "matter would not be dismissed" because "she was in the hospital." Respondent's medical records do not corroborate her claim that she was in the hospital at the time she spoke with Ms. Spencer or when the court dismissed Ms. Spencer's case. Respondent assured Ms. Spencer that she would file a motion to inform the court that she was "unavailable or ill." From December 27, 2015 to December 30, 2015, Respondent was hospitalized with a flare up.

By January 4, 2016, Respondent still had not communicated with Ms. Spencer. As a result, Ms. Spencer sent the following email: I have not heard from you since our conversation in early December during which you advised that you would be in touch with me by mail before the end of the month and that you planned to file additional documents with the court. Please advise on the status of my case. I do not want to report this matter to the AGC and/or institute legal action but I cannot imagine why I have not heard from you.

If you are ill, please advise what procedure(s) you have put in place to protect your clients' interest. If you feel there is something that you can do to mitigate the current situation, please advise promptly. The next day, Respondent emailed her reply: I am ill and just go[t] out of the hospital last week. However, because of my continued illness, I am suspending my practice and terminating my service with you.

At this time I am in the process of preparing your file to be returned to you. The hearing judge found Respondent's email to be a knowing and intentional misrepresentation because, as discussed later in this opinion, Respondent was not in fact suspending her law practice. Respondent failed to return Ms. Spencer's client file. 9 The hearing judge also found that Respondent "never advised Ms. Spencer that she was incapacitated or otherwise unable to represent her due to health limitations." On October 9, 2014, the same day that Ms. Spencer executed the retainer agreement with Respondent, Respondent deposited the $ 750.00 initial fee into her attorney trust account, and then immediately made a cash withdrawal of $ 125.00 from the same account. By October 20, 2014, less than two weeks later, Respondent had withdrawn the remaining $ 625.00.

On November 10, 2014, Ms. Spencer wrote a check to Respondent for the remaining $ 750.00 owed under the retainer agreement. That same day, Respondent deposited Ms. Spencer's check into her attorney trust account, and then immediately made a cash withdrawal in the amount of $ 100.00. By November 25, 2014, Respondent had withdrawn all of Ms. Spencer's remaining funds. 10 Respondent never provided Ms. Spencer with any billing statements during her representation, nor did she refund any portion of Ms. Spencer's retainer fee. Although Respondent testified that these funds were earned, the hearing judge found the testimony "lack[ed] any credibility." Additionally, due to Respondent's failure to provide documents to Bar Counsel during discovery, the hearing judge precluded Respondent from introducing evidence of her record keeping.

Representation of Gloria Marigny In September 2012, Gloria Marigny, believing she had been discriminated against, resigned from her position as a Licensed Practical Nurse with the Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center ("VA") in Memphis, Tennessee. The VA's agency decision denied Ms. Marigny's claims on September 14, 2014. Ms. Marigny filed two pro se discrimination actions against the VA. One action was in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee (the "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission action" or "EEOC action"), the other was with the United States Merit Systems Protections Board (the "MSPB action") in Atlanta.

In early December 2015, Ms. Marigny's sister referred Ms. Marigny to Respondent. On December 20, 2015, Ms. Marigny executed Respondent's retainer agreement, which provided that Respondent would represent Ms. Marigny in both actions. The agreement required Ms. Marigny to pay a retainer fee of $ 3,500.00 and an hourly rate of $ 325.00. Ms. Marigny paid half of the retainer fee when she executed the contract.

Respondent was present for two telephonic conferences (one for the MSPB action and one for the EEOC action). During the EEOC conference, Respondent agreed to enter her appearance within the week and to make her Initial Disclosures by January 6, 2016. During the MSPB conference, Respondent stated that she would streamline a list of witnesses that Ms. Marigny had previously prepared and designate herself as Ms. Marigny's representative. From December 27 through December 30, 2015, Respondent was hospitalized due to a flare up of her ulcerative colitis.

On December 29, 2015, however, Respondent wrote a $ 2,150 check from her attorney trust account payable to herself. The memo line of the check listed "Atty fees - G. Marigny/A. Fowler." 11 Then, on January 4, 2016, Respondent wrote another check from her attorney trust account payable to herself, this time for $ 600. The memo line listed "Atty fees - A. Fowler, Marigny." The invoices that Respondent provided to Bar Counsel show that Respondent had performed 2.6 hours of work as of January 4, 2016. Thus, Respondent had earned only $ 845 of the $ 2,750 she disbursed to herself.

In the MSPB matter, around January 4, 2016, Respondent told Ms. Marigny that she did not need to attend the hearing before the administrative judge. 12 The next day, neither Respondent nor Ms. Marigny appeared for the hearing. Consequently, the administrative judge issued an Order to Show Cause that stated in relevant part: On January 5, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. EST, the agency called in for the prehearing conference, but neither the appellant nor [Respondent] did. To date, I have received no written confirmation from the appellant or [Respondent] that [Respondent] is representing the appellant in these proceedings; therefore, unless I am informed otherwise, I will assume that [Respondent] is not representing the appellant.

The appellant is hereby given an opportunity to show cause why she did not participate in the previously schedule[d] January 5, 2015 prehearing conference. If the appellant shows good cause, I will reschedule the prehearing conference. The appellant['s] response to the order must be received no later than January 12, 2016 . Any response to the appellant's submission by the agency must be received no later than January 19, 2016 .

On January 5, 2016, Respondent called the VA representative to discuss the MSPB matter and explained that she did not appear at the hearing because she had mistakenly thought it was set for a different day. The VA representative emailed Respondent to provide her with a copy of the "Prehearing Submission," which was filed by Ms. Marigny's previous counsel, and to inform Respondent that the administrative judge had just issued an "Order to Show Cause." The VA representative later emailed Respondent a copy of the order. Respondent did not file a response by the January 12, 2016 deadline. Respondent also did not inform Ms. Marigny of her failure to appear at the January 5, 2016 hearing.

On January 12, 2016, Respondent traveled to Memphis to meet with Ms. Marigny. They discussed Ms. Marigny's cases 13 for approximately two hours. Respondent assured Ms. Marigny that Respondent would continue to work on her cases. At the meeting, Ms. Marigny paid Respondent an additional $ 400 and gave her several compact discs relating to her case.

Respondent once again did not inform Ms. Marigny about the Order to Show Cause, nor did she inform Ms. Marigny that she had not entered her appearance in the EEOC matter or that she had not filed the Initial Disclosures by the court's deadline. Ms. Marigny's $ 400 check was returned for insufficient funds. Nevertheless, Respondent disbursed $ 400 from her attorney trust account to herself. At that point, Respondent had exhausted Ms. Marigny's advance fee of $ 1,750.

Respondent never re-deposited the $ 400 into the attorney trust account. On January 19, 2016, the VA filed a motion to dismiss the MSPB matter based on Respondent's failure to respond to the Order to Show Cause. The VA representative emailed Respondent and attached the motion to dismiss. The email stated: I filed the attached.

Somehow, the system has your name as [the] one who is to be notified by U.S. Mail of pleadings, but it doesn't list your U.S. Mail address, and I don't have it. Maybe the judge added you after your voicemail to her a few weeks ago? I don't know. Respondent did not respond.

Respondent also did not file a response to the motion to dismiss. Also on January 19, 2016, Respondent told Ms. Marigny that she had been sick, but was now out of the hospital and wanted to "catch up" about the two cases. Respondent was then hospitalized from January 20, 2016 until February 4, 2016. On January 21, 2016, Ms. Marigny emailed Respondent to ask about the status of her MSPB case.

Ms. Marigny explained that she was unable to retrieve information through the MSPB e-file system. Ms. Marigny offered to help Respondent "remedy the situation," if needed. On January 27, 2016, Respondent, while in the hospital, spoke briefly with Ms. Marigny and stated that she would call her later. Respondent never called.

On February 3, 2016, counsel for the VA wrote to Ms. Marigny regarding her EEOC matter, stating: A scheduling conference was held in your case on December 22, 2015. At that time, [Respondent] appeared by telephone and indicated she would be representing you. The Court directed [Respondent] to file a notice of appearance by the close of business the following day. To date, [Respondent] has not filed a notice of appearance, provided any contact information, contacted my office, or taken any other steps to indicate her continued involvement in this case.

As a result, I am forced to assume that you are proceeding in this matter without representation. If this assumption is incorrect, please have [Respondent] (or other counsel of your choosing) file a notice of appearance as soon as possible. * * * Please provide me a copy of your Initial Disclosure on or before February 12, 2016. If I have not received your disclosures by that time, I will have to request assistance from the Court in resolving this matter. In mid-February 2016, Ms. Marigny filed a pro se motion for a continuance in the EEOC matter because she had not heard from Respondent.

The motion explained that Respondent was recently hospitalized and incommunicado. The Court granted Ms. Marigny's motion and extended the time to file the Initial Disclosure until February 26, 2016. Two days later, Ms. Marigny wrote to Respondent, whom she had not heard from since January 27, 2016, stating: Please contact me soon regarding MSPB case and [t]he Federal case. [The VA attorney in the EEOC case] has contact[ed] me also regarding my Federal [case], I have Initial Disclosure due soon. I hope that you were able to listen to the copies of the CD[s] that were given to you as some of my exhibits for my case with MSPB and Federal. * * * No one from your office has contacted me regarding your status.

As my representative it is improper. I have not received court permission to withdraw from representation. I'm requesting you to surrender papers and files given to you. Please[ ] refund my advance payment of fee that has not been earned or incurred, and [the] 5 CD's given to you on 1/12/2016 during our face to face meeting/discussion of your conversation regarding interaction with Ms. Keta Barnes (Dept. of Veterans Affair Attorney).

Ms. Marigny then wrote a letter to the administrative judge in the MSPB matter to explain why her claim should not be dismissed. On February 18, 2016, Respondent called Ms. Marigny. Respondent told Ms. Marigny that she was out of the hospital and would resume working on Ms. Marigny's case no later than February 25, 2016. In response, Ms. Marigny wrote to Respondent: Please be advised this is the second letter requesting you to surrender papers and files given to you.

Please refund my advance payment of fee $ 1,750.00 that has not been earned or incurred and 5 Cd's given to you on 1/12/2016 during our face to face meeting[.] Respondent did not respond. On March 2, 2016, the Board issued an order that rescheduled the MSPB matter for April 28, 2016, and set a prehearing conference for April 13, 2016. Respondent was given notice of the order. Two weeks later, the VA's representative emailed Respondent to ask if she was still representing Ms. Marigny.

The VA's representative also offered to help streamline the witness list because the deadline was approaching. The following day, the VA's representative, having not heard from Respondent, sent Ms. Marigny a similar email and copied Respondent. Later that same day, Respondent emailed the administrative judge a motion to withdraw from her representation of Ms. Marigny due to an inability to maintain an appropriate working relationship. Respondent sent Ms. Marigny the motion eleven days later.

The hearing judge found that Respondent "abandoned Ms. Marigny in the MSPB matter." As for the EEOC matter, on March 11, 2016, the court granted a motion to compel based on Ms. Marigny's (and Respondent's) failure to file the Initial Disclosures. The court then set March 21, 2016, as the new deadline for Ms. Marigny to comply. On April 1, 2016, the VA's counsel moved for sanctions against Ms. Marigny. The motion claimed that Ms. Marigny had misrepresented that she obtained counsel to represent her in this case.

The court denied the motion, however, and set May 20, 2016, 14 as the new deadline for Ms. Marigny to submit the Initial Disclosures. When the Initial Disclosures were not sent by the new deadline, the VA's counsel again moved for sanctions. Ms. Marigny wrote to the court and explained that Respondent had failed to return her "paper and property," which made it difficult for her to obtain new counsel. The hearing judge found that Respondent "failed to take any other action in the EEOC and MSPB matters," which resulted in Ms. Marigny proceeding pro se .

The hearing judge also found that Respondent "failed to explain the 'pros and cons' of Ms. Marigny's case at any stage of the representation prior to abandoning it." On July 13, 2016, the court dismissed Ms. Marigny's EEOC action. The MSPB matter was pending when the hearing judge issued his findings. Respondent did not return Ms. Marigny's client file in a timely manner, nor did she return Ms. Marigny's retainer fee. In fact, throughout her representation of Ms. Marigny, Respondent failed to maintain a proper accounting of Ms. Marigny's funds and never sent her an invoice.

The invoice Respondent ultimately provided to Bar Counsel did not include: (1) "any information relating to the dates on which the Respondent deposited and disbursed Ms. Marigny's funds"; (2) "the amount of each transaction"; and (3) "the payee and [the] check number associated with each transaction." The hearing judge therefore rejected Respondent's testimony that she performed additional work not listed on her invoice for Ms. Marigny. Bar Counsel's Investigation During Bar Counsel's initial investigation of Respondent, Respondent continued her representation of Ms. Spencer and Ms. Marigny. Her misconduct during those representations generated additional complaints and required additional investigations. As a result of this overlap between misconduct and investigations, our summary of the investigation is somewhat tangled.

On September 11, 2014, in response to Ms. Keller's complaint, Bar Counsel wrote to Respondent and provided her a copy of the complaint and requested a written response within fifteen days. Respondent did not respond. On October 6, 2014, Bar Counsel wrote to Respondent again, but this time requested a response within ten days. Two days later, Respondent replied by stating that she had "every intent[ion] to pay for [Ms. Keller's] services" and that she had "spoken with Ms. Keller or someone from her office and informed them that [she] was out of the office sick." Respondent also stated that she was "back in the office fulltime" and "back in a position to work with Ms. Keller to get the invoices paid." On November 18, 2014, Respondent informed Bar Counsel that she would "pay Ms. Keller in full by December 15, 2014." Respondent did not pay Ms. Keller by that date.

On December 12, 2014, Ms. Houston filed her complaint with Bar Counsel. On January 13, 2015, Bar Counsel provided Respondent with a copy of the complaint and requested a response with fifteen days. That same day, Bar Counsel wrote a separate letter to Respondent requesting confirmation by January 28, 2015, that she had paid Ms. Keller. Respondent did not respond.

On February 13, 2015, Bar Counsel repeated her requests from January 13, 2015, regarding Ms. Keller's complaint and Ms. Houston's complaint. Respondent did not respond. From March 18 to March 31, 2015, Bar Counsel's investigator, Michael Peregoy, made several attempts to contact Respondent. On March 31, 2015, Respondent left a voicemail for Mr. Peregoy stating that she was in the hospital and would contact him once she was discharged.

Respondent's medical records reveal that she was discharged from the hospital that same day. Over a week later, Respondent called Mr. Peregoy and asked for copies of the outstanding requests relating to the Keller and Houston matters. Respondent assured Mr. Peregoy that she would respond within two weeks of receiving the materials. On April 9, 2015, Bar Counsel sent copies of all prior correspondence to Respondent's home address.

On April 14, 2015, Respondent called Mr. Peregoy to confirm receipt of the materials and to verify her Colesville Road Office address. Respondent also told Mr. Peregoy that she would provide her written responses by April 20, 2015. On May 12, 2015, Respondent submitted her responses for the Houston matter (but not the Keller matter) and explained that the responses were late because she had been in the hospital. There was no finding that Respondent had been recently hospitalized.

On June 22, 2015, Bar Counsel again requested Respondent's response to Ms. Keller's complaint. Bar Counsel also sought documentation associated with Respondent's medical issues and hospitalizations that, according to Respondent, occurred during her representation of Ms. Houston. Bar Counsel gave Respondent seven days to respond. On June 29, 2015, Respondent wrote to Bar Counsel.

In the letter, Respondent expressed that she had spoken with Ms. Keller, "made payment arrangements to immediately pay one of the three invoices," would "pay the second invoice in two weeks[,] and pay the final invoice two weeks after that date." Respondent enclosed a "copy of a postal money order in the amount of $ 340.25 and a hospital discharge notice dated March 31, 2015." Respondent did not provide any documentation regarding her medical issues that allegedly took place during the Houston matter. On July 2, 2015, Bar Counsel once again requested an explanation for Respondent's failure to refund Ms. Houston's funds given her email stating that a refund was forthcoming. Respondent did not respond. On July 27, 2015, Ms. Richardson filed a complaint with Bar Counsel.

On August 5, 2015, Bar Counsel mailed Respondent a copy of the complaint and requested a written response within fifteen days. Respondent did not respond. On August 27, 2015, Bar Counsel wrote Respondent again, sending a copy of the August 5, 2015 letter and requesting a response within ten days. Respondent responded belatedly and partially on September 13, 2015.

Respondent's response asked for additional time based on her hospitalization from August 27 to August 30, 2015. Bar Counsel granted Respondent's extension and set the deadline for September 30, 2015. Respondent did not respond by September 30, 2015, nor does the record reflect that Respondent ever responded to Bar Counsel's request. Meanwhile, on August 14, 2015, Ms. Dyer filed her complaint with Bar Counsel.

On September 18, 2015, Bar Counsel sent Ms. Dyer's complaint to Respondent and requested a response within fifteen days. Respondent did not respond. Given Respondent had not provided responses to the Richardson or Dyer matters, Bar Counsel, on October 7, 2015, again wrote to Respondent asking for her responses no later than October 17, 2015. Respondent did not respond.

On December 14, 2015, Bar Counsel wrote to Respondent once more regarding the Richardson and Dyer matters. Bar Counsel included copies of the previous correspondence, advised Respondent that the Dyer complaint was now docketed for further investigation, requested a detailed explanation of Respondent's failures to respond, and sought a copy of Ms. Richardson's client file. Respondent did not respond. On February 29, 2016, Ms. Marigny filed a complaint with Bar Counsel.

On March 16, 2016, Bar Counsel mailed the complaint to Respondent and requested a response within fifteen days. Respondent did not respond. On April 29, 2016, Bar Counsel sent a second letter and a second request regarding the Marigny matter. Respondent did not respond.

On May 23, 2016, Ms. Spencer filed her complaint with Bar Counsel. On June 7, 2016, Bar Counsel sent Respondent copies of the prior correspondence in the Spencer and the Marigny matters, advised Respondent that the matters were docketed for further investigation, and requested a response within ten days. Respondent did not respond. On June 23, 2016, Bar Counsel made another request for a response in the Spencer and Marigny matters.

Respondent did not respond. On August 3, 2016, Bar Counsel sent letters to Respondent's home and offices. Bar Counsel included copies of the previous correspondence regarding the Spencer and Marigny matters and requested a response within seven days. Twenty-two days later Respondent faxed and emailed Bar Counsel to request an extension of time to respond to those matters.

Bar Counsel granted the extension through September 9, 2016. On September 8, 2016, Respondent sent a response to Bar Counsel regarding the Spencer and Marigny complaints. In her response, Respondent stated that she had "located all of Ms. Spencer's records" and returned them to Ms. Spencer. Respondent did not return Ms. Spencer's client file, nor did she provide a copy of the file to Bar Counsel until February 8, 2018.

II

The Hearing Judge's Conclusions of Law The hearing judge determined that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(a), 1.15(a) and (c), 1.16(a) and (d), 3.4(c) and (d), 8.1(b), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d). Respondent excepts to each of the hearing judge's conclusions of law; Bar Counsel excepts to none. We shall address each conclusion and, in the course of doing so, address the pertinent exceptions.

III

Standard of Review This Court has "original and complete jurisdiction" in attorney disciplinary proceedings and "conducts an independent review of the record." Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. McLaughlin , 456 Md. 172 , 190, 171 A.3d 1205 (2017) (citation omitted). The hearing judge's findings of fact are left undisturbed unless those findings are clearly erroneous or either party excepts to them. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kremer , 432 Md. 325 , 334, 68 A.3d 862 (2013). The hearing judge's factual findings are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by "any competent material evidence[.]" Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. McDonald , 437 Md. 1 , 16, 85 A.3d 117 (2014) (citation omitted).

We review the hearing judge's conclusions of law without deference. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Hamilton , 444 Md. 163 , 178, 118 A.3d 958 (2015).

IV

Discussion Respondent's Factual Exceptions Exceptions Regarding the Factual Background Many of Respondent's exceptions are flawed for two reasons: (1) they lack any evidentiary support in the record or (2) the only support Respondent has for her exception is her own testimony, which the hearing judge determined-and we accept-was not credible save for that which was corroborated by medical records. Because Respondent fails to present (or cannot present) any other evidence that would warrant overturning the hearing judge's findings of fact or conclusions of law, we overrule these exceptions. See, e.g. , Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Thompson , 462 Md. 112 , 134, 198 A.3d 234 (2018) ("Given that Respondent did not present further evidence in the record to reveal that the hearing judge's findings were clearly erroneous, we reject Respondent's factual exceptions."). To illustrate our point, we present the following examples.

Respondent excepts to the hearing judge's absence of findings that her Colesville Road Office and Apollo Drive Office were "virtual office spaces" and that Respondent participated in a medical research study in 2014. The record is devoid of any documentation apart from Respondent's testimony that would corroborate Respondent's argument that her offices were "virtual." As to the research study, the record reflects that Respondent "was seen in [Capital Digestive Care's] office" approximately once a month from July 2013 until November 2014, but it does not reflect the nature of those visits other than that they were "Follow Up[s]." We therefore overrule both exceptions as both are grounded solely in Respondent's testimony, which as noted, the hearing judge found to lack any credibility. For the same reasons, we overrule Respondent's overarching exception, which is that her illness serves as an "explanation" for her misconduct. Respondent has maintained that her illness, along with other factors, should serve as a basis to dismiss both petitions for disciplinary or remedial action.

The hearing judge rejected this assertion and found that Respondent's reliance on her illness as a defense was "insincere," "deceitful," and "deceptive." Thus, although the hearing judge recognized that Respondent's illness was a burden, he rejected her argument that her illness excused her years of misconduct. We accept the finding that Respondent was insincere about her illness. The hearing judge also made a number of findings that Respondent made misrepresentations regarding her repeated assurances to all but one of her clients that she would work on their cases. Respondent excepts to those findings, arguing that she had every intention of working, but that her illness prevented her from doing so.

The hearing judge found, and we accept as not clearly erroneous, that Respondent's use of her illness as a defense was "deceptive." The record is riddled with instances in which Respondent told clients, opposing attorneys, Bar Counsel, and the courts that she was hospitalized or sick at times that Respondent is unable to corroborate with medical records. The most egregious example, perhaps, occurred on Friday, April 3, 2015, when Respondent moved for a continuance without authorization from her client and represented to the court that she was "currently hospitalized." In fact, Respondent was discharged from the hospital three days earlier on Tuesday, March 31, 2015. Respondent also, after failing to reply to Bar Counsel's earlier requests for responses, told Bar Counsel's investigator that she would call him once she was discharged from the hospital. In reality, she was discharged from the hospital the same day she spoke with him and did not call him back until over a week later.

Respondent misrepresented the severity of her illness when she told Bar Counsel in mid-May that her responses (which had been requested multiple times) were delayed because she was in the hospital. Between April 9, 2015 and May 12, 2015, Respondent was not in the hospital. 15 Respondent argues, by way of "explanation," that she had every intention to continue working, and thus made no misrepresentations to her clients when she assured them that she would do so. This argument is without merit. Respondent provided no evidentiary support, other than her own testimony, which the hearing judge discredited.

We therefore treat Respondent's "explanation" as an exception to the hearing judge's finding and overrule the exception. Exceptions Regarding the Representation of Rochell Richardson Respondent excepts to the hearing judge's finding that "[o]n or about May 29, 2012, Ms. Richardson