Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kreamer

GREENE, J. The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, acting through Bar Counsel and pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751(a), ²⁸⁸ 1 filed a Petition For Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Respondent Barbara Osborn Kreamer on June 22, 2006. 2 The Petition alleged that Respondent violated multiple provisions of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct in her representation of six former clients: Patricia Goodwin, Courtney Anderson, David Ferrara, Gregory Dudok, Michael Boone, and Sarah Caldarelli. Bar Counsel alleged that Respondent violated most of the same rules in the six individual cases: Rule 1.1 (Competence), 3 Rule 1.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer), 4 Rule 1.3 (Diligence), 5 Rule 1.4 (Communication), 6 Rule 1.5 ²⁸⁹ (Fees), 7 Rule 1.15 (Declining or Terminating Representation), 8 ²⁹⁰ Rule 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 9 Rule 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 10 and Rule 8.4 (Misconduct) 11 . ²⁹¹ Pursuant to Maryland Rules 16-752(a) 12 and 16-757(c), 13 we referred the matter to the Honorable Emory A. Plitt, Jr., of the Circuit Court for Harford County to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to submit to this Court proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. After hearing evidence over a 6-day period, Judge Plitt filed a 31-page opinion in which he made detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, culminating in a determination that Respondent violated Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.16, 8.4(a), (c), and (d). Respondent filed written exceptions to several of the hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. 14 Bar Counsel filed no exceptions.

STANDARD OF REVIEW “In proceedings involving attorney discipline, this Court has original and complete jurisdiction and conducts an independent review of the record.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Cherry-Mahoi, 388 Md. 124, 152 , 879 A.2d 58 , 76 ²⁹² (2005). “In our review of the record, the hearing judge’s findings of fact generally will be accepted unless they are clearly erroneous.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 403 Md. 142, 155-56 , 939 A.2d 732, 740 (2008). See also Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(2). 15 As we noted in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mahone, 398 Md. 257, 266 , 920 A.2d 458, 463 (2007): As to the scope of our review, we take into consideration whether the findings of fact have been proven by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rule 16-757(b). This Rule provides that Bar Counsel has the burden of proving the averments of the petition by clear and convincing evidence, and the attorney who asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or extenuation has the burden of proving the defense or matter of mitigation or extenuation by a preponderance of the evidence. Weighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving any conflict in the evidence are tasks proper for the fact finder.

(Internal citations and quotations omitted.) “As to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, such as whether the provisions of the MRPC were violated, our consideration is essentially de novo.” Harris, 403 Md. at 156 , 939 A.2d at 740 . See also Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(l). ²⁹³ I. EXCEPTION TO THE BACKGROUND SECTION OF HEARING JUDGE’S OPINION Respondent first excepts to the Background section of the hearing judge’s written opinion. In this section, the hearing judge writes: This is the fourth “formal” disciplinary action brought against Respondent by the Attorney Grievance Commission. On February 2, 1999, she was indefinitely suspended.

See Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kreamer, 353 Md. 85 , 724 A.2d 666 (1999). She was reinstated by the Court of Appeals on June 10, 1999. On November 19, 2002, she was issued a public reprimand. By Opinion of June 21, 2005, she was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law with the right to apply for reinstatement within six months.

See Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kreamer, 387 Md. 503 , 876 A.2d 79 (2005). She has never been reinstated and has remained indefinitely suspended since the Petition in this case was filed on June 22, 2006. Respondent was admitted to practice before the Court of Appeals on December 18, 1991. Respondent resides in Harford County at 701 Beards Hill Road, Aberdeen, Maryland 21001, and conducted her practice of law from her home.

The Petition for Disciplinary Action, sub judice involves complaints made to the Attorney Grievance Commission by six former clients of Respondent: Patricia Goodwin; Courtney Anderson; David Ferrara; Gregory Dudok; Michael Boone; and Sarah Caldarelli. From the evidence presented during the course of trial, the events involved in these six complaints all occurred prior to Respondent’s indefinite suspension. Respondent is charged "with violating multiple provisions of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct in these six complaints from former clients. For the most part, she is charged with violating most of the same rules in the six individual cases.

For ease of reference, I first set out in full the rules which she is alleged to have violated in these ²⁹⁴ complaints. I thereafter treat each complaint individually and relate it back to the particular rules at issue. Respondent complains that this section “does not seem to be directed to any factual issues relevant to determining violations vel non by Respondent of any MRPC rules,” but rather focuses on her disciplinary history. Specifically, Respondent “suggests that the content of this section might well be taken by a disinterested reader as placing Respondent in a decidedly unfavorable light, particularly when asserted so early in the hearing judge’s submission and prior to any consideration therein of the merits of the respective positions of the parties.” Respondent asks this Court to not consider the Background section when it “determines whether or not any act or omission on Respondent’s part alleged in the [hearing judge’s opinion] violated any MRPC rule charged therein.” We overrule Respondent’s first exception.

It is clear from the entirety of the hearing judge’s opinion that the judge’s decision to include a preliminary section describing Respondent’s previous disciplinary encounters with this Court did not influence his findings of fact or conclusions of law with regard to the six complaints against Respondent. The analysis utilized by the hearing judge in finding that Respondent violated the MRPC does not include any mention of Respondent’s disciplinary history. Therefore, there is nothing in the opinion to suggest that the inclusion of a section describing Respondent’s disciplinary history in any way influenced the outcome of the circuit court proceeding. Moreover, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 403 Md. 142, 157 , 939 A.2d 732, 741 (2008), we previously overruled and addressed a similar exception.

In Harris , the attorney excepted to the hearing judge’s finding that the attorney had been suspended from the practice of law in 2002 and had not been reinstated as of the date of the hearing judge’s opinion. Id. The attorney argued that the finding was “immaterial and irrelevant to any alleged violation of the MRPC.” Id. We overruled the attorney’s exception, stating: ²⁹⁵ The issue of this finding’s relevancy is dictated by Rule 16-757(c), which states that the hearing judge “shall prepare and file or dictate into the record a statement of the judge’s findings of fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and conclusions of law.” It is clear that findings regarding Respondent’s status as an attorney are relevant and material to any “remedial action.” Respondent admitted, when he testified, that he has been suspended from the practice of law since 2002.

We, therefore, conclude that the hearing judge’s factual findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence and overrule this exception. Id. In the case sub judice, Respondent’s disciplinary history is a matter of public record, see Maryland Rule 16-723(e), and is relevant to any “remedial action” that might be undertaken by this Court. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kreamer, 387 Md. 503 , 876 A.2d 79 (2005).

Thus, Respondent’s exception is overruled.

II

THE COMPLAINT OF GREGORY M. DUDOK The hearing judge made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the complaint of Gregory M. Dudok: With regard to the complaint of Gregory Dudok, Ms. Kreamer is charged with violating Rules 1.1,1.2,1.3,1.4,1.16, 8.1, and 8.4. FINDINGS OF FACT Gregory Dudok was the Vice President of a corporation known as The Broken Spoke Family Association, Inc. On or about March 25, 2003, Mr. Dudok retained Ms. Kreamer to dissolve the corporation. He paid her a retainer fee of $ 300.00. Also on that date, Mr. Dudok signed a retainer/engagement agreement.

The agreement provided that Ms. Kreamer would perform all necessary legal services to dissolve the corporation. Ms. Kreamer also agreed to keep Mr. Dudok appraised of all developments in the case. The agreement provided that $100.00 of the $300.00 ²⁹⁶ retainer was to be considered as a non-refundable engagement fee. 16 The fee arrangement was on an hourly basis at the rate of $150.00 plus expenses. The agreement also provided that Ms. Kreamer would render bills on a monthly or quarterly basis “as applicable.” Ms. Kreamer also agreed that she would “make every effort to expedite client’s case promptly and efficiently according to the highest legal and ethical standards.” The $300.00 fee was deposited in her escrow account on March 25, 2003.

She withdrew the $100.00 “engagement fee” from her escrow account on March 25, 2003. On the same date that he engaged Ms. Kreamer to perform the dissolution, he turned over to her the corporate books and papers for her use. Simply stated, after March 25, 2003, Ms. Kreamer did absolutely nothing to perform the services requested by Mr. Dudok. After waiting over one year for Ms. Kreamer to follow through, Mr. Dudok attempted to contact her.

She received Mr. Dudok’s messages. Ms. Kreamer, however, never contacted Mr. Dudok in response to the messages that he had left until Saturday night, September 4, 2004 at approximately 9:00 p.m. Ultimately Mr. Dudok contacted the State Department of Assessment and Taxation about trying to dissolve the corporation. Some unidentified but practical employee of the department suggested to Mr. Dudok that he might just want to let the corporate charter lapse rather than go through the trouble of dissolving it which is exactly what Mr. Dudok did.

After receiving no response to his attempts to contact Ms. Kreamer, Mr. Dudok filed a complaint with the Attorney ²⁹⁷ Grievance Commission. It was only after the complaint was filed that Ms. Kreamer contacted Mr. Dudok by letter. She acknowledged in the letter that she had received the telephone messages in June. Ms. Kreamer also admitted that she did not respond to those inquires.

Ms. Kreamer attempted to defend her actions in this matter by claiming that she needed Articles or a Resolution of Dissolution showing that the Board of the Association had taken formal action approving a dissolution. However, she never told Mr. Dudok that she needed any such documentation. In fact, the first time she ever mentioned this to Mr. Dudok was in her letter of September 4, 2004. Despite not having done a single thing to perform the services requested, Ms. Kreamer offered to complete the work in her letter of September 4, 2004.

She enclosed with the letter of September 4, 2004, a refund of the $300.00 that Mr. Dudok had paid. When Mr. Dudok attempted to first track down Ms. Kreamer in June of 2004, he specifically left messages for her that he needed back all of the corporate documents which he had originally given her. She, however, did not respond to that request until September 12, 2004. Keeping in mind that Ms. Kreamer had all the corporate books and papers since March 25, 2003, in June of 2004, Mr. Dudok realized that he needed all of those documents back in order to file tax returns.

Up to that point, Mr. Dudok had assumed that Ms. Kreamer had followed through. He found that she had not followed through when he contacted the State Department of Assessments and Taxation. Ms. Kreamer could not offer any explanation as to why she never did anything to follow through and why she did not return Mr. Dudok’s telephone calls nor keep him advised of the status of the matter. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I find by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Kreamer violated the rules of professional conduct alleged by Petitioner in conjunction with her engagement by Mr. Dudok.

Ms. Kreamer incompetently represented Mr. Dudok in vio ²⁹⁸ lation of Rule 1.1 by not exhibiting the thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the engagement by her failure to prepare and file the necessary documents to dissolve the association. Further, Ms. Kreamer never orally or in writing told Mr. Dudok that she needed a Corporate Resolution or Minutes to reflect agreement on dissolving the corporation. Her failure to do anything on behalf of Mr. Dudok for over one year violated Rules 1.2 and 1.3 by her failure to abide by her client’s request that a dissolution be filed on behalf of the corporation and by failing to act in a reasonable time to conclude the representation. In point of fact, as noted in my Findings of Fact, she did absolutely nothing for over fifteen months.

She also violated Rule 1.4 by failing to communicate with Mr. Dudok, as noted, for over one year, and violated Rule 1.16(d) by failing to advise Mr. Dudok that she had done nothing and had in essence abandoned her representation. It should be obvious that if Mr. Dudok had not contacted her in June of 2004, she would have continued to do nothing to follow through on her client’s direction concerning the dissolution. She also violated Rule 8.4(c) by taking the $100.00 nonrefundable “engagement fee” upon representation and the $200.00 retainer and then never contacting Mr. Dudok at all or keeping him up to date on her progress. Perhaps most telling was her inability to answer the question posed to her at trial as to when, if ever, she was going to do anything to follow through.

She could not answer. She took the money with obviously no intent to pursue the matter. Ms. Kreamer’s total lack of any follow through for well over one year, her failure to respond to Mr. Dudok’s inquires, and her failure to return the corporate books until over three months after she was asked were certainly prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d). (Internal record citations.) Respondent submits four exceptions to the hearing judge’s factual findings regarding her representation of Mr. Dudock. ²⁹⁹ Respondent first complains that the hearing judge erred in finding that Mr. Dudock “turned over to [Respondent] the corporate books and papers” for her use.

Respondent contends that this finding “lacks the requisite evidentiary support” because “the record [ ] seems to indicate that Mr. Dudock gave Respondent a single ‘corporate’ book.” In addition, Respondent contends that Mr: Dudock did not actually turn over all necessary documents for the dissolution of the corporation; specifically, he did not turn over formalized minutes recording the approval of the dissolution of the corporation. We find this exception is without merit. While the hearing judge’s use of the phrase “corporate books and papers” may not be the most precise phraseology, it nonetheless is supported by the record. Mr. Dudock testified that on March 25, 2003, he turned over all documents of the corporation that were in existence at that time.

The omission of a formalized record of the vote of the corporation’s board of directors from the notebook does not render the hearing judge’s finding unsupported by the evidence. While these papers may not have been voluminous or numerous, the intent of the hearing judge’s statement is clear, Mr. Dudock relinquished to Respondent all corporate documents in his possession at the time he signed the retainer agreement. Second, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that “after March 25, 2003, [Respondent] did absolutely nothing to perform the services requested by Mr. Dudock.” 17 Respondent contends that this finding is in error because Respondent testified that after she met with Mr. Dudock on March 25, 2003, she, at a minimum, researched Maryland statutes regarding dissolution of corporations. Respondent’s exception misses the point.

The hearing judge found that Respondent did little to no work on the matter which Mr. Dudock hired Respondent to complete; that is, to bring about ³⁰⁰ the formal dissolution of The Broken Spoke Family Association, Inc. According to Mr. Dudock’s testimony, he turned over corporate documents to Respondent on March 25, 2003. Mr. Dudock then testified that at no time afterward did Respondent communicate to him her need for a formalized record of the vote of the Board of Directors approving the dissolution of the corporation. While Respondent may have researched Maryland statutory law on the dissolution of a corporation, it is clear from the record that Respondent, in the year that she had the corporate documents, did not undertake any other steps to effectuate the corporation’s dissolution, including the most basic step of requesting from Mr. Dudock a formalized record of the vote of the Board of Directors approving the dissolution of the corporation. The exception is overruled.

III

THE COMPLAINT OF COURTNEY ANDERSON The hearing judge made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the complaint of Courtney Anderson: With regard to the complaint of Courtney Anderson, Ms. Kreamer is charged with violating Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 8.4. FINDINGS OF FACT On April 24, 2003, Courtney Anderson hired Ms. Kreamer for representation in her divorce. Ms. Kreamer and Ms. Anderson signed a retainer/engagement agreement in which Ms. Anderson agreed to pay Ms. Kreamer a retainer of $1,200.00, $600.00 of which was considered to be a nonrefundable engagement fee. On that same date, Ms. Kreamer deposited the $1,200.00 into her escrow account.

The $1,200.00 was paid on Ms. Anderson’s behalf by her mother, Jackie Turner. Ms. Kreamer then removed the $600.00 of the $1,200.00 retainer from her escrow account as her “engagement fee”. Prior to retaining Ms. Kreamer, Ms. Anderson and her husband had already separated and ³⁰¹ divided marital assets. Ms. Anderson was already receiving child support and she told Ms. Kreamer at the outset of the engagement that there were no issues concerning alimony, retirement, marital property or child custody as those matters had previously been resolved between Ms. Anderson and her husband.

Ms. Anderson further told Ms. Kreamer that Mr. Anderson was agreeable to everything and requested that Ms. Kreamer prepare a Property/Separation Agreement to memorialize the agreement. During her first meeting with Ms. Kreamer, Ms. Anderson was told by Ms. Kreamer that she would “get right on it.” However, after hiring Ms. Kreamer in April, Ms. Anderson had no contact from Ms. Kreamer for five months thereafter. Ms. Anderson attempted to contact Ms. Kreamer at least once a month for those five months following her retention but never got any response. She became so concerned about the lack of a response that she increased her telephone calls to Ms. Kreamer’s office to weekly.

The first communication of any kind that Ms. Anderson received from Ms. Kreamer was a copy of a letter dated September 29, 2003 which Ms. Kreamer sent to Mr. Anderson advising him that she had been retained to represent Ms. Anderson. Despite having been retained in April, Ms. Kreamer did nothing more to move the matter along until September 29, 2003, when she filed a Complaint for a Limited Divorce. It is absolutely clear that Ms. Kreamer did nothing to work on the Property/Separation Agreement until April of 2004, over one year later. A Master’s hearing was scheduled in June of 2004.

Ms. Kreamer, however, did not inform Ms. Anderson about the Master’s hearing and the first that Ms. Anderson knew about it was when she received correspondence from Master Frederick Hatem. The only explanation Ms. Kreamer could offer was her claim that Ms. Anderson had changed addresses and it was hard to contact her. That explanation is unworthy of belief. At some point she paid Ms. Kreamer an additional $468.00 to cover what Ms. ³⁰² Kreamer claimed to be the cost of the Master’s Hearing.

Ultimately, Ms. Anderson did in fact receive her divorce. Ultimately when confronted by Ms. Anderson about the delay, Ms. Kreamer told her that she was “too busy.” Ms. Kreamer never explained to Ms. Anderson why she was so busy or that she would pick up the pace. Ms. Anderson never agreed to delaying the matter, and because she had already resolved things with her husband, she did not think that the matter would be too complicated. In point of fact, Ms. Anderson lived down the street from Ms. Kreamer and it would appear to me that there was no good reason why Ms. Kreamer did not keep her informed or advise her that she had not gotten to her case.

Despite Ms. Kreamer having agreed to periodically bill Ms. Anderson, Ms. Anderson did not receive any bill or accounting until January 8, 2004, some eight and a half months after the representation began. Between the time of her retaining Ms. Kreamer and the billing of January 8, 2004, Ms. Anderson had no idea as to how the money she had paid Ms. Kreamer was being used or what, if any, efforts Ms. Kreamer had made towards moving her matter along. Evidently uncertain of the accuracy of the January 8, 2004 bill, four days later on January 12, 2004, Ms. Kreamer sent Ms. Anderson another invoice in a different amount. During the course of its investigation, the AGO obtained certain records from Ms. Kreamer concerning her representation of Ms. Anderson.

The alleged contemporaneous billing records are virtually indecipherable. Ms. Kreamer also sent additional bills to Ms. Anderson on May 25, 2004 and July 19, 2004. Ms. Anderson did not realize that Ms. Kreamer was charging her for things which should properly be considered as office overhead such as setting up a file, revising accounting records, etc. For example, Ms. Kreamer improperly billed Ms. Anderson 15 minutes time on September 23, 2003 for what she described as “file organization and time sheet.” At the time that Ms. Kreamer billed Ms. Anderson for this, the only documents in her file were her initial notes and a ³⁰³ Financial Statement prepared on April 29, 2003. This task, according to Ms. Kreamer, involved merely putting Ms. Anderson’s name on a file and putting documents in a file.

She did nothing more than take a pre-printed form and place Ms. Anderson’s name on it. Ms. Kreamer also charged Ms. Anderson other billing statements for “reimbursement of fees and review and revise accounting.” This involved doing nothing other than filling out a deposit slip and updating her accounting records. CONCLUSION OF LAW I find by clear and convincing evidence that by her conduct, Ms. Kreamer violated the rules as alleged. Her failure to prepare the Separation Agreement on behalf of Ms. Anderson and as Ms. Anderson requested within a reasonable time after being retained demonstrates a lack of diligence in violation of Rule 1.3.

It must be kept in mind that at the time Ms. Kreamer was retained by Ms. Anderson, there were no outstanding issues concerning property, alimony, retirement or custody. Ms. Anderson was already receiving child support and Mr. Anderson was already agreeable to the terms they had worked out. Ms. Kreamer failed to take any action on Ms. Anderson’s behalf until the end of September, 2003, five months after being retained. Ms. Kreamer also violated Rule 1.4 by failing to maintain communications with Ms. Anderson and failing to return Ms. Anderson’s telephone calls during the five month lapse between the time she was retained by Ms. Anderson and the first letter she sent to Mr. Anderson.

Despite her obligation to do so, Ms. Kreamer failed to communicate with Ms. Anderson for eight and one-half months about how the money paid was being used and what Ms. Anderson owed. She did not send periodic billings to Ms. Anderson as was required by the retainer agreement. Ms. Kreamer violated Rule 1.5 by unreasonably charging Ms. Anderson for such things as file organization, time sheet maintenance, reimbursement of fees and review and ³⁰⁴ revise accounting. These are matters of overhead in any law office.

One is left to wonder what, if anything, she did to revise accounting because, as noted, her time sheets are totally unintelligible. Her failure to diligently pursue Ms. Anderson’s Separation Agreement and divorce, unreasonably charging her for administrative overhead as well as failing to maintain communications with Ms. Anderson, keeping her posted as to what was going on and not moving forward promptly is conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d). (Internal record citations.) Respondent excepts to the following statement made by the hearing judge: “Despite having been retained in April [of 2003], [Respondent] did nothing more to move the matter along until September 29, 2003. It is absolutely clear that [Respondent] did nothing to work on the Property/Settlement Agreement until April of 2004, over one year later.” Respondent contends this finding is clearly erroneous, arguing: The time interval referred to by the hearing judge in this finding was not inordinate, the complaint for divorce having been filed within four or five months of Respondent’s entry into this matter.

Although the complaint sought only limited divorce, so that it could have been filed earlier, in the interim, Ms. Anderson appeared to be comfortable with her situation in that she had been and still was talking with her husband about their martial situation and was receiving support money from him, including child support in an amount in excess of what she likely would have been awarded under the guidelines. She was unwilling to bring an action based upon her husband’s adultery (he was then already involved with another woman, who was pregnant by him and awaiting the birth of the child ...) which would have provided a ground for a much more immediate absolute divorce. She was also apparently herself involved with another man, although in her testimony she denied intimacy. ³⁰⁵ We overrule Respondent’s exception as it does not address the underlying facts of the hearing judge’s findings. Respondent’s exception merely attempts to shift the responsibility for Respondent’s failure to undertake steps to effectuate the divorce onto Ms. Anderson.

The social construction of Ms. Anderson’s and Mr. Anderson’s relationship and their personal lives outside their marriage does not address or explain Respondent’s failure to complete the task for which she was hired.

IV

THE COMPLAINT OF DAVID A. FERRARA As to the complaint of David A. Ferrara, the hearing judge made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: In this matter, Ms. Kreamer is charged with violating Rules 1.1, 1.2,1.4, 1.5, and 8.4. FINDINGS OF FACT On November 12, 2003, Mr. Ferrara retained Ms. Kreamer to represent him in a divorce and custody matter and paid a $1,500.00 retainer. $500.00 of the $1,500.00 retainer was considered to be a non-refundable engagement fee. The agreement between Mr. Ferrara and Ms. Kreamer provided that Ms. Kreamer would render bills on a periodic basis either monthly or quarterly, recapping the services rendered and itemizing any expenses. The agreement provided that Ms. Kreamer would represent Mr. Ferrara on an hourly basis at a rate of $160.00 per hour and further that she would “make every effort to expedite client’s case promptly and efficiently according to the highest legal and ethical standards.” The calculation of child support is governed by 12-201-12-204, Family Law Article, Maryland Code and Maryland Rule 9-206.

In particular, Rule 9-206 sets forth the worksheets that are to be used in making child support calculations under two circumstances, primary physical custody and shared physical custody. The worksheets set forth ³⁰⁶ the exact manner in which child support is to be calculated. The statute requires the use of the guidelines. Section 12-203, Family Law Article, provides that the Court of Appeals mandates standardized worksheet forms to be used which, of course, is the purpose of Rule 9-206.

On five different occasions during her representation of Mr. Ferrara, Ms. Kreamer calculated what she believed to be Mr. Ferrara’s child support obligation. Each time, despite the information being the same, Ms. Kreamer told Mr. Ferrara that his child support obligation was a different figure. In contacts that Mr. Ferrara had with his wife, he learned that his wife’s attorney had calculated the child support guidelines differently from the many attempts by Ms. Kreamer. Mr. Ferrara’s wife was represented by H. Edward Andrews, Esquire.

Concerned about the different figures he was being given, Mr. Ferrara went to the judiciary’s website and accessed the required worksheet forms. Because of the improper calculation of the child support guidelines by Ms. Kreamer, Mr. Ferrara, after completing the forms, realized that there was at least a $200.00 discrepancy between Ms. Kreamer’s calculations and those of his wife’s attorney. Ms. Kreamer admitted at trial that she improperly calculated Mr. Ferrara’s child support obligations and further admitted that she used a form that she had created instead of the child support guidelines worksheet. It is important to note that although in her testimony she claimed to understand what the term “adjusted actual income” meant, she could not explain it.

Despite instructions from me, not to look in her client file, she did so and tried to use Mr. Ferrara’s wife’s attorney’s guidelines worksheet to explain the correct method of calculation. Ms. Kreamer ultimately admitted that she had made mistakes in the calculations. After discovering these errors, Mr. Ferrara became very insecure about Ms. Kreamer’s method of calculation which was, of course, critical from his perspective. Mr. Ferrara told Ms. Kreamer that because of his work and personal situation, it would be impossible for him to have his children with him every weekend and that he ³⁰⁷ agreed to his wife having primary physical custody of their children.

Nevertheless, despite Mr. Ferrara’s explicit instructions to Ms. Kreamer to the contrary, she insisted on calculating child support guidelines on a shared custody basis and pursued that with opposing counsel. Mr. Ferrara was very straightforward with Ms. Kreamer concerning custody and visitation, yet she did exactly the opposite of what Mr. Ferrara told her. Despite being aware of and having had brought to her attention the errors in the calculation of child support, Ms. Kreamer nevertheless charged Mr. Ferrara for the continuing erroneous calculations twice on November 25, 2003, once on December 1, 2003, once on December 3, 2003, once on December 24, 2003, and once on January 3, 2004. A Pre-Trial Conference with the court was set for February 13, 2004.

In discussions with Ms. Kreamer, Mr. Ferrara told her that he would be available on that date. However, Ms. Kreamer was not available. Ms. Kreamer then asked the court to reset the conference for February 20, 2004 but that was on a date that Mr. Ferrara was not available. He had told Ms. Kreamer prior thereto that he would not be available on February 20, 2004.

Ms. Kreamer offered this Court no explanation as to why she rescheduled the Pre-Trial Conference on a date when her client was unavailable, despite knowing of his conflict in advance. Evidently, that Pre-Trial Conference did not take place. Throughout her representation of Mr. Ferrara, he continually requested periodic invoices from Ms. Kreamer. That was in fact one of the conditions of the retainer agreement that she had with Mr. Ferrara.

Even though the retainer agreement provided for billings to be done monthly or quarterly “as appropriate,” he did not receive an invoice until February 11, 2004. With regard to the issue of the scheduling of the Pre-Trial Conference, Ms. Kreamer billed Mr. Ferrara for rescheduling this. Beginning on February 11, 2004, Mr. Ferrara received a number of invoices from Ms. Kreamer respectively dated March 3, 2004, June 30, 2004, and July 30, 2004. None of them agree.

Mr. Ferrara ³⁰⁸ asked to see Ms. Kreamer’s detailed billing records which are totally incomprehensible. One thing is clear from the detailed time records and the billing statements and that is, like the other complaints, Ms. Kreamer charged Mr. Ferrara for such administrative tasks as updating and revising her time sheets, file preparation, etc. Despite Mr. Ferrara’s requests, Ms. Kreamer did not provide the requested detailed time sheet information until after Mr. Ferrara terminated her. During her representation of Mr. Ferrara, Ms. Kreamer unreasonably continued to charge Mr. Ferrara for doing her own accounting. Ms. Kreamer in fact testified that she billed Mr. Ferrara for the time it took to document money she had received from him and to write a deposit slip.

She charged Mr. Ferrara 1 hour and 30 minutes on March 3, 2004, for what she described as “accounting and file organization;” fifteen minutes on November 26, 2003 for “updating time sheet;” seven minutes on December 8, 2003 for “update time sheet;” five minutes on December 16, 2003 for “update time sheet;” and five minutes on January 5, 2004 for “time sheet update.” In fact, it is questionable whether or not Ms. Kreamer had any idea at all about how much time she spent. Instead of keeping contemporaneous separate time sheets, she calculated the time spent on the matter by going to her “calendar books” and client files to figure out what she had done. It became apparent that some of the charges that she made for these administrative tasks were for her to figure out how much time she had spent. By letter of March 3, 2004 Mr. Ferrara terminated Ms. Kreamer.

His letter to Ms. Kreamer terminating her services is important in that it sets out in detail the events concerning the calculation of the child support guidelines and the issues concerning the scheduling of the Pre-Trial Conference and the bills. Of particular interest is the fact that (as verified by the bills) that on March 2, 2004, Mr. Ferrara paid Ms. Kreamer $500.00, and then the very next day she told him that he owed her an additional $810.00. She then changed that to say that he owed her an additional ³⁰⁹ $1,300.00. Mr. Ferrara continued to receive bills after he terminated Ms. Kreamer again none of which agreed.

On June 30, 2004, Ms. Kreamer advised Mr. Ferrara that she had made some errors in her billing statements and deducted $570.00 from the balance he owed but then told him he still owed her $1,541.00. Ultimately, the fee dispute between Mr. Ferrara and Ms. Kreamer was resolved by arbitration and Mr. Ferrara paid an additional $72.00 over and above what he had previously paid. One of the most troubling aspects of the Ferrara complaint is the fact that Mr. Ferrara, at the outset of the representation, asked Ms. Kreamer if she had ever had any prior disciplinary issues. It is absolutely clear to me that Ms. Kreamer misrepresented to Mr. Ferrara that she had never been in trouble with the bar.

She absolutely knew when she was asked that question by Mr. Ferrara that she had been suspended on February 2, 1999 and issued a reprimand on November 19, 2002. Mr. Ferrara later found out the truth by consulting the Court of Appeals publicly available records through the internet. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW There is no doubt by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Kreamer has violated the rules of professional conduct as alleged by AGC. She incompetently represented Mr. Ferrara in violation of Rule 1.1 by not exhibiting the thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation by her abject failure to understand and comprehend how to calculate child support.

Although she claims that the majority of her practice was family law, she had no idea how or when to deduct child health care insurance costs when calculating child support. Furthermore, she did not understand the meaning of “adjusted actual income” in the calculation of child support. Had she understood what that term means and had she consulted the Family Law Article and the rules, it would not have been necessary to calculate the child support guidelines on five different occasions knowing that there was no dispute as to the figures to be “plugged in.” Further, she did not com ³¹⁰ prehend the use of the required worksheets. Rather, she used some form that she had created which, as one can see, is at variance with the required worksheet.

Mr. Ferrara made it clear to Ms. Kreamer that because of his personal situation, he could not have the children every weekend yet, despite those instructions, she continued to propose that and charge Mr. Ferrara for proceeding in that fashion. She violated Rule 1.4 by failing to communicate with Mr. Ferrara throughout the representation as to how she was billing him, the accuracy of her billings, and how retainer funds were being used. She unreasonably charged Mr. Ferrara for miscalculating the child support guidelines; for rescheduling the Pre-Trial Conference for which she knew he was not available; and for “updating time sheet” and for updating accounting and reimbursement all in violation of Rule 1.5. She unreasonably charged Mr. Ferrara for her mistakes as well as the cost for running her law office by updating her time sheets which was really trying to figure out how much time she had spent on his case, reviewing her accounting, and filling out deposit slips so that she could reimburse herself the cost of various court fees.

Lastly, Ms. Kreamer clearly violated Rule 8.4(c) by misrepresenting to Mr. Ferrara that she had never been in trouble with the bar. When asked that question by Mr. Ferrara she clearly replied no, knowing full well that there were at least two prior formal disciplinary actions by the Court of Appeals against her. It is also clear beyond any doubt that her conduct throughout the representation of Mr. Ferrara was conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d). (Internal record citations omitted.) Respondent first excepts to two of the hearing judge’s findings: (1) “Ms. Kreamer ultimately admitted that she had made mistakes in the calculations.

After discovering these errors, Mr. Ferrara became very insecure about Ms. Kreamer’s method of calculation which was, of course, critical from his perspective.”; and, (2) ³¹¹ Nevertheless, despite Mr. Ferrara’s explicit instructions to Ms. Kreamer to the contrary, she insisted on calculating child support guidelines on a shared custody basis and pursued that with opposing counsel. Mr. Ferrara was very straightforward with Ms. Kreamer concerning custody and visitation, yet she did exactly the opposite of what Mr. Ferrara told her. Despite being aware of and having had brought to her attention the errors in the calculation of child support, Ms. Kreamer nevertheless charged Mr. Ferrara for the continuing erroneous calculations twice on November 25, 2003, once on December 1, 2003, once on December 3, 2003, once on December 24, 2003, and once on January 3, 2004. (Internal record citation omitted.) Respondent argues these findings are in error because “the record demonstrates[ ] that Mr. Ferrara continually gave [Respondent] changing information pertinent to child support guidelines calculations, which [thereafter] required or substantially contributed to requiring recalculations of child support, with concomitant expense.” We overrule Respondent’s exceptions. “Consistent with the standard of review for factual findings in attorney discipline cases, we have iterated that the judge ‘may elect to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon.’ ” Harris, 403 Md. at 158 , 939 A.2d at 742 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm. v. Harris, 371 Md. 510, 543 , 810 A.2d 457, 477 (2002)).

With respect to these exceptions, the hearing judge did just that. Although Respondent testified that Mr. Ferrara called or stopped by Respondent’s office several times to have his child support obligation recalculated by Respondent, Mr. Ferrara testified that he had Respondent recalculate his child support obligation on “five different occasions over a period of a month . .. and a half” because, “with exception of the last [calculation,] they were done incorrectly.” Mr. Ferrara testified that through his own research and from conversations with his ex-wife, he learned that Respondent’s calculations had been incorrectly performed, to Mr. Ferrara’s detriment. Therefore, the hearing judge chose to believe the testimony of Mr. Ferrara concerning Respondent’s represen ³¹² tation of Mr. Ferrara in his divorce. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the hearing judge’s factual findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent “had asked the court to reset the [pre-trial] conference on a date that Mr. Ferrara was not available.... [Respondent] offered [the hearing judge] no explanation as to why she rescheduled the Pre-Trial Conference on a date when her client was unavailable, despite knowing of his conflict in advance.” Respondent complains that “the record discloses [that Respondent] promptly made reasonable efforts to resolve the scheduling problem that arose, including communicating with the chambers of Judge Carr to reschedule the conference involved, but unknown to her at the time [as] opposing counsel had gone directly to the Assignment Office and obtained the February 20, 2004 date.” Respondent’s exception does not refute the factual findings in question. Indeed, the hearing judge’s factual findings are supported by the evidence. The testimony of Mr. Ferrara indicates that he informed Respondent of his unavailability to attend any conferences from February 20 through February 27, 2004. Respondent, however, failed to confirm with the Assignment Office that the rescheduled pre-trial conference (from February 13, 2004) was not rescheduled on a day which Mr. Ferrara could not attend.

Respondent contends that opposing counsel contacted the Assignment Office without her knowledge; however, Respondent should have taken a more proactive response to the rescheduling of the pre-trial conference. Respondent should have not just contacted the judge’s chambers to reschedule the originally-scheduled February 13, 2004, conference, but should have also contacted the Assignment Office. The exception is overruled. V. THE COMPLAINT OF SARA LOUISE CALDARELLI As to the complaint of Sara Louise Caldarelli, the hearing judge made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: ³¹³ In the matter of the complaint of Mrs. Caldarelli, Ms. Kreamer is charged with violating Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 8.1, and 8.4.

FINDINGS OF FACT On March 21, 2003, Mrs. Caldarelli retained Ms. Kreamer for representation in a divorce case. It should be noted that prior to retaining Ms. Kreamer, Mrs. Caldarelli had been represented by another lawyer, Zoe Lambros, Esquire, who ceased practicing law and moved out of state. At the time Mrs. Caldarelli retained Ms. Kreamer, Mrs. Caldarelli and her husband had already executed a Separation and Property Settlement Agreement. Ms. Kreamer used basically the same retainer/engagement agreement that she used with her other clients, again in which Ms. Kreamer agreed to “make every effort to expedite client’s case promptly and efficiently according to the highest legal and ethical standards.” Ms. Caldarelli gave Ms. Kreamer a $1,300.00 retainer fee.

The Retainer Agreement has a date of July 3, 2003 for Mrs. Caldarelli’s signature and a date of March 25, 2003 for Ms. Kreamer’s signature. Ms. Kreamer made the astounding statement at trial that she did not consider herself as representing Mrs. Caldarelli until after July 3, 2003. She accepted the money and cashed the check. On April 14, 2003, Ms. Kreamer withdrew the $600.00 engagement fee from her escrow account.

It defies belief for Ms. Kreamer to allege that she didn’t consider herself as representing Mrs. Caldarelli until after July of 2003. Long before she retained Ms. Kreamer to represent her, Mrs. Caldarelli had filed pro se, on August 12, 2002, a Complaint for Absolute Divorce in this court in Civil No. 12-C-02-2314. Mr. Caldarelli filed an Answer to Mrs. Caldarelli’s pro se Complaint on September 9, 2002, admitting that the parties had been separated for more than two years and requesting that the court grant the divorce and that the Separation and Property Settlement Agreement be incorporated therein but not merged. Subsequent to that pro se ³¹⁴ Answer, another Answer was filed by Mr. Caldarelli through a lawyer in the State of Georgia identified as T. Jeff Moore.

It was undisputed that Mr. Moore was not a member of the Maryland Bar and did not request admission for the purpose of representing Mr. Caldarelli. Keep in mind that the subsequent Answer by the Georgia lawyer was filed five months before Mrs. Caldarelli retained Ms. Kreamer and was sitting in the court file. In that subsequent Answer, the Georgia lawyer on behalf of Mr. Caldarelli challenged service of process, jurisdiction and the execution of the Separation and Property Settlement Agreement. Additionally, the Answer by the Georgia attorney questioned the bona fides of the pro se Answer Mr. Caldarelli had filed some two months before on September 9th.

There was also in the court file an Affidavit of Service attesting to service on Mr. Caldarelli of the Complaint at his address in Georgia. Also, the Answer filed by the Georgia lawyer was not signed by Mr. Caldarelli as required by Maryland Rule 9-202(a). There was urgency to the matter at the time that Mrs. Caldarelli first met with Ms. Kreamer. Mrs. Caldarelli had received correspondence from the Georgia lawyer, Mr. Moore, basically stating that if she didn’t move forward with the divorce in Maryland, Mr. Caldarelli would file in Georgia.

Mrs. Caldarelli retrieved all of the papers and documents from her prior attorney and gave them to Ms. Kreamer within a week. The Georgia lawyer made it clear that unless the matter was pursued in Maryland he would file in Georgia. Despite the urgency of the matter as related to Ms. Kreamer by Mrs. Caldarelli, from March 20, 2003 until July 22, 2003, Ms. Kreamer did nothing to advance obtaining a divorce for Mrs. Caldarelli in the already pending case in this court. On July 22, 2003, Ms. Kreamer entered her appearance in the pending case in this court and she says, reviewed the Maryland court file.

She, however, did nothing further until at least September 2, 2003. She never filed a Motion to Strike the Answer filed by the Georgia lawyer despite the fact that it was easy to ³¹⁵ find out that he was not a member of the Maryland bar and that the Answer was not in proper form. When confronted with this, Ms. Kreamer’s response was that she “intended” to argue later that the Answer should be stricken but never filed a Motion making that request. Mr. Caldarelli down in Georgia stopped waiting.

On June 27, 2003, Mrs. Caldarelli was served with a Complaint for a divorce and Summons filed in a Georgia court. Mrs. Caldarelli immediately gave the documents to Ms. Kreamer. There is no doubt that Ms. Kreamer had them. Thereafter, for reasons which were never explained, Ms. Kreamer prepared a pro se Answer for Mrs. Caldarelli to file in the Georgia divorce case.

Ms. Kreamer does not deny preparing the pro se Answer and giving it to Mrs. Caldarelli. Ms. Kreamer testified that she had no idea what Mrs. Caldarelli would do with the pro se Answer. That is simply unworthy of belief. Ms. Kreamer prepared that pro se Answer knowing full well that Mrs. Caldarelli was going to send it to the Georgia court.

Ms. Kreamer did no research on Georgia law and did not even consider any effect the filing of a pro se Answer in Georgia might have on the issue of whether or not Mrs. Caldarelli may have been consenting to the jurisdiction of the Georgia court. Ms. Kreamer continued to do absolutely nothing. After the pro se Answer was filed in the Georgia case, on August 23, 2003, the Georgia court granted Mr. Caldarelli a divorce. At no time did Ms. Kreamer attempt to look into obtaining a Georgia lawyer to represent Mrs. Caldarelli or at least for Mrs. Caldarelli to consult.

The judgment of the Georgia court did not incorporate the Property Settlement Agreement and in fact provided that both parties waived any right to any present or future right of action against the other with regard to property or debts. After being confronted with this fait accom,pli in Georgia, Ms. Kreamer compounded the problem by preparing and giving to Mrs. Caldarelli a pro se “Motion to Vacate the Judgment of Divorce” which Mrs. Caldarelli filed in the Georgia case. ³¹⁶ The Separation and Property Settlement Agreement that Mrs. Caldarelli and Mr. Caldarelli had entered into and which clearly had been filed in the Harford County case and would have been, without objection, incorporated but not merged in a Maryland judgment, gave Mrs. Caldarelli certain benefits including alimony, the value of some life insurance policies, her marital portion of Mr. Caldarelli’s pension and the marital home. Ms. Kreamer did nothing else on Mrs. Caldarelli’s behalf other than to withdraw her appearance in the Harford County case on September 3, 2004. The Separation and Property Settlement Agreement was already in the Harford County file.

It is inexplicable, knowing that a Georgia divorce had already been granted, for Ms. Kreamer to request a hearing in the Harford County case on September 2, 2003 to take divorce testimony. When she filed that, the clerk’s office recognized that the matter was contested and so advised her. The notation by the clerk’s office was that she was to submit a new request which she did on September 8, 2003, again simply asking for a hearing without disclosing the existence of the Georgia decree. Throughout her representing of Mrs. Caldarelli, Ms. Kreamer, despite agreeing to and being required to, did not submit billing statements to Mrs. Caldarelli.

The first statement that Mrs. Caldarelli received was in September of 2004. Again, as in other cases, Ms. Kreamer unreasonably charged Mrs. Caldarelli for such tasks as “file organization” and “accounting” which was nothing more than Ms. Kreamer trying to figure out how much to charge. It is obvious that Mr. Caldarelli was waiting for Mrs. Caldarelli to finalize the Maryland case and that he only filed in Georgia when that did not happen. Ultimately, Mrs. Caldarelli discharged Ms. Kreamer with good reason.

She then retained J. Richard Moore, Esquire to represent her and to try to salvage something out of the mess in Georgia. Through Mr. Moore’s efforts, Mrs. Caldarelli was able tó get the house and some value from the life insurance policies. She, however, lost the alimony that was payable to ³¹⁷ her under the agreement and a marital portion of Mr. Caldarelli’s pension. Her loss of these things was a direct result of Ms. Kreamer’s abominable handling of her case.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW By clear and convincing evidence, Ms. Kreamer violated the rules of professional conduct as charged by Petitioner. She incompetently represented Mrs. Caldarelli in violation of Rule 1.1 by not exhibiting the thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation, by her failure to move to strike the Answer prepared by the Georgia lawyer in the Maryland case; by not moving forward with the Maryland case; by preparing a pro se Answer for Mrs. Caldarelli to file in the Georgia proceedings without any consideration or research as to the effect of such a filing and by failing to do anything on Mrs. Caldarelli’s behalf after she found out that the Georgia divorce had been granted. Ms. Kreamer violated Rule 1.2 by failing to abide by Mrs. Caldarelli’s objectives in the representation which was to move the Maryland case forward. Recall that the case had already been filed pro se in Maryland months before her retention of Ms. Kreamer.

There was a Property and Separation Agreement in place and everything had been worked out. Ms. Kreamer’s failure to purse the Maryland matter on Mrs. Caldarelli’s behalf upon being retained in March of 2003, demonstrates a clear lack of diligence on her part in violation of Rule 1.3. Ms. Kreamer violated Rule 1.4 by failing to provide Mrs. Caldarelli with accurate billing statements during the representation. Ms. Kreamer violated Rule 1.5 by unreasonably charging Mrs. Caldarelli for things which are part of normal overhead such as file organization and accounting. 1 additionally find by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Kreamer violated Rule 8.4(c) when she misrepresented ³¹⁸ that her representation of Mrs. Caldarelli did not begin until July 3, 2003 when she had previously accepted the retainer fee, withdrawn a portion of it as a non-refundable engagement fee and had received all of the documents that Mrs. Caldarelli had.

Her neglect of Mrs. Caldarelli’s case and lack of competence as well as her misrepresentations is also conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d). (Internal record citations and footnote omitted.) Respondent raises two exceptions to the hearing judge’s factual findings. First, Respondent excepts to the judge’s finding that “[i]t defies belief for [Respondent] to allege that she did not consider herself representing Mrs. Caldarelli until after July of 2003.” Respondent contends that while “it may well have been -wiser for Respondent to have refrained until after receipt of a copy of the contract signed by Mrs. Caldarelli before withdrawing the ‘engagement fee’ portion of the retainer ..., the withdrawal does not do away with the need for Mrs. Caldarelli’s signature to create a viable contract in this instance.” In other words, Respondent claims that her attorney-client relationship with Mrs. Caldarelli did not begin until Mrs. Caldarelli signed the retainer agreement on July 3, 2003. We overrule this exception.

An attorney-client relationship is formed when: 1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person’s intent that the lawyer provide legal services for the person; and ... (b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, and the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the services. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brooke, 374 Md. 155, 174 , 821 A.2d 414, 425 (2003) (quoting Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 14 (2000)); accord Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 72 , 930 A.2d 328, 346 (2007). “An attorney-client relationship [ ] does not require an explicit agreement.” Brooke, 374 Md. at 175 , 821 A.2d at 425 . Rather, “[t]he relationship may arise by implication from a client’s ³¹⁹ reasonable expectation of legal representation and the attorney’s failure to dispel those expectations.” Id.

In the case sub judice, Mrs. Caldarelli manifested her intent that Respondent provide legal services in Mrs. Caldarelli’s divorce, on or about March 25, 2004, by (1) handing over to Respondent the documents and papers necessary to the representation, and (2) remitting the $1,300.00 retainer fee. While the written retainer agreement was not signed by Mrs. Caldarelli until July 3, 2003, Mrs. Caldarelli clearly expressed her desire to have Respondent provide her legal representation in March 2003. Respondent’s actions in the acceptance of the papers and fees manifest Respondent’s intent to provide legal representation to Mrs. Caldarelli. In addition, Respondent’s withdrawal of the $600 non-refundable engagement fee on April 14, 2003, further evidences Respondent’s intent to provide Mrs. Caldarelli legal representation.

Therefore, we hold that the hearing judge was correct in finding that Respondent had established an attorney-client relationship prior to July 3, 2003. Respondent next excepts to what the Respondent perceives as “attribution to her of responsibility for activities and events which were initiated and/or occurred long before her relationship with Mrs. Caldarelli.” Respondent complains that “[i]t was not [Respondent who created all the problems that Mrs. Caldarelli had when she first approached Respondent.” Respondent states that she was not the one “who permitted Mrs. Caldarelli’s deteriorated martial situation to languish, literally for years, without any effective measures being undertaken;” who “lost or misplaced a Separation and Property Settlement Agreement that had been reached between Mrs. Caldarelli an d her husband;” or, “who failed to record a deed for the former Caldarelli marital residence conveying Mr. Caldarelli’s interest therein to [Mrs. Caldarelli].” Respondent’s exception misses the point of the hearing judge’s findings and instead attempts to place the responsibility on Mrs. Caldarelli for Respondent’s failure to act appropriately on Mrs. Caldarelli’s case. The record shows that, despite accepting Mrs. Caldarelli’s documents and retainer fee on or about March 25, 2003, and then withdrawing the $600 ³²⁰ non-refundable legal engagement fee on April 14, 2003, Respondent did little to advance Mrs. Caldarelli’s divorce through the court system. It was not until July 22, 2003, that Respondent entered her appearance in the pending divorce case, despite Mrs. Caldarelli having expressed urgency in resolving the case.

At their initial meeting in March, Mrs. Caldarelli had informed Respondent that she had recently received correspondence from Mr. Caldarelli’s lawyer in Georgia stating that if she did not move the divorce in Maryland forward, Mr. Caldarelli would seek a divorce in Georgia. Nevertheless, Respondent did not act upon Mrs. Caldarelli’s case. Accordingly, the exception is overruled. Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s findings that: Thereafter, for reasons which were never explained, Ms. Kreamer prepared a pro se Answer for Mrs. Caldarelli to file in the Georgia divorce case.

Ms. Kreamer does not deny preparing the pro se Answer and giving it to Mrs. Caldarelli. Ms. Kreamer testified that she had no idea what Mrs. Caldarelli would do with the pro se Answer. That is simply unworthy of belief. Ms. Kreamer prepared that pro se Answer knowing full well that Mrs. Caldarelli was going to send it to the Georgia court.

Ms. Kreamer did no research on Georgia law and did not even consider any effect the filing of a pro se Answer in Georgia might have on the issue of whether or not Mrs. Caldarelli may have been consenting to the jurisdiction of the Georgia court. Ms. Kreamer continued to do absolutely nothing. After the pro se Answer was filed in the Georgia case, on August 23, 2003, the Georgia court granted Mr. Caldarelli a divorce. At no time did Ms. Kreamer attempt to look into obtaining a Georgia lawyer to represent Mrs. Caldarelli or at least for Mrs. Caldarelli to consult.

The judgment of the Georgia court did not incorporate the Property Settlement Agreement and in fact provided that both parties waived any right to any present or future right of action against the other with regard to property or debts. After being confronted with this fait accompli in Georgia, Ms. Kreamer ³²¹ compounded the problem by preparing and giving to Mrs. Caldarelli a pro se “Motion to Vacate the Judgment of Divorce” which Mrs. Caldarelli filed in the Georgia case. (Internal record citations omitted.) Respondent claims these findings are in error because “it is undisputed that [Respondent] promptly told Mrs. Caldarelli that she needed a lawyer in Georgia.” Respondent contends that she should not be held responsible for Mrs. Caldarelli’s failure to obtain legal representation in Georgia. Respondent’s exception again misses the point of the hearing judge’s factual findings.

The hearing judge simply stated that he did not believe Respondent’s testimony that she did not know that Mrs. Caldarelli would file the pro se Answer in Georgia when she prepared and gave the document to Mrs. Caldarelli. As we have previously stated, the hearing judge “may elect to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon.” Harris, 403 Md. at 158 , 939 A.2d at 742 . In this case, the hearing judge did not believe Respondent’s version of events. The exception, therefore, is overruled.

Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent sought a hearing in the Circuit Court for Harford County in order to take testimony with regard to the divorce complaint filed in that court without disclosing to the Court the existence of the Georgia divorce decree. Respondent contends that her “action in requesting a hearing in the Maryland divorce case is hardly inexplicable” as “she was trying to challenge the Georgia divorce in Maryland.” She argues that while such action “may not have been the most appropriate way to accomplish what she sought to do, ... and maybe a tactical error, [ ] it should not be held to constitute unethical behavior.” Respondent’s exception does not address the underlying factual finding; rather, it attempts to justify her decision to request a circuit court hearing after a Georgia court had issued a divorce decree, terminating the Caldarelli’s marriage. Thus, the exception is overruled. Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that “[t]he Separation and Property Settlement Agreement that Mrs. Caldarelli and Mr. Caldarelli had entered into ³²² and which clearly had been filed in the Harford County case and would have been, without objection, incorporated but not merged in a Maryland judgment, gave Mrs. Caldarelli certain benefits including alimony, the value of some life insurance policies, her marital portion of Mr. Caldarelli’s pension and the marital home.” Specifically, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s use of the phrase “gave Caldarelli certain benefits,” claiming that “it appears to be an expression of the hearing judge’s opinion or prediction as to what the lower court would have done with respect to certain provisions of the Caldarelli settlement agreement, rather than a factual finding.” The duty of the hearing judge in attorney grievance cases is to consider the evidence placed before him or her and render an opinion regarding the factual findings and conclusions of law in that case.

The hearing judge did just that in this case. We overrule this exception. Last, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s use of the adjective “abominable” when referring to Respondent’s handling of the case. Respondent complains that the disparaging adjective would tend to put Respondent in an unfavorable light.

In the instant case, we do not find the hearing judge’s use of “abominable” to be inappropriate or unreasonable. In the instant case, Mrs. Caldarelli lost alimony and the martial portion of her husband’s pension as a result of Respondent’s failure to represent Mrs. Caldarelli in a competent fashion. Under the circumstances, the hearing judge’s characterization of Respondent’s handling of Mrs. Caldarelli’s affairs is both reasonable and consistent with the facts. We overrule this exception.

VI

THE COMPLAINT OF MICHAEL D. BOONE As to the complaint of Michael D. Boone, the hearing judge made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: In the Boone matter, Respondent is charged with violating Rules 1.1,1.3,1.4, 1.16 and 8.4. ³²³ FINDINGS OF FACT On May 12,2003, Mr. Boone retained Ms. Kreamer to represent him in a separation and divorce matter. He paid Ms. Kreamer a $2,000.00 retainer of which $600.00 was considered to be a non-refundable engagement fee. Thereafter he was to be charged at the rate of $150.00 per hour plus expenses. Mr. Boone was to be billed on a “monthly or quarterly basis as applicable” recapping the services rendered and expenses advanced.

Ms. Kreamer agreed that she would make every effort to expedite Mr. Boone’s case promptly and efficiently “according to the highest legal and ethical standards.” Despite his inquiries, during Ms. Kreamer’s representation of Mr. Boone between May 12, 2003 and March of 2004, he never received a billing statement. A Master’s Hearing was scheduled for January 22, 2004 at 9:00 a.m. Mr. Boone was present. Ms. Kreamer, however, failed to appear in a timely fashion for the Master’s Hearing.

She later appeared 30 minutes late. Her explanation for not appearing timely was that she was involved in another domestic matter which had been scheduled for that same morning but which Ms. Kreamer thought was scheduled for the afternoon. On June 12, 2004, Judge Carr issued an Order fixing child support and a wage lien against Mr. Boone in the amount of $3,000.00 per month. Mr. Boone had no prior knowledge of that Order and in fact learned of it from his estranged wife.

Ms. Kreamer did not provide a copy of the Order to Mr. Boone until September 9, 2004. He had no idea that the matter was before Judge Carr and was not told by Ms. Kreamer. In the interim, between Judge Carr’s Order of June 12, 2004 and Mr. Boone’s receipt of a copy of the Order on September 9, 2004, he left several messages for Ms. Kreamer asking her to contact him but none were returned. There was some exchange between Mr. Boone and Ms. Kreamer and Mrs. Boone and her attorney concerning a possible settlement.

For reasons which Ms. Kreamer could ³²⁴ not explain, without consulting or reviewing the matter with Mr. Boone, Ms. Kreamer submitted a proposed Property and Separation Agreement to opposing counsel. There was a conference scheduled before Judge Whitfill on August 11, 2004. Even though she was still counsel of record, Ms. Kreamer failed to appear. Mr. Boone appeared pro se.

In point of fact, Mr. Boone was so disgusted with Ms. Kreamer’s actions that he decided to go to the August 11th conference on his own. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW By clear and convincing evidence, I find that Ms. Kreamer violated the rules of professional conduct as charged. She incompetently represented Mr. Boone in violation of Rule 1.1 by not exhibiting thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for representation of Mr. Boone by her failure to timely appear for the Master’s hearing; by failing to advise Mr. Boone of Judge Carr’s Order of June 12, 2004; and by failing to appear at the conference before Judge Whitfill on August 11, 2004 even though she was still counsel of record. In addition, Ms. Kreamer’s failure to advise Mr. Boone of Judge Carr’s Order of June 12, 2004, for over three months demonstrates an appalling lack of diligence in violation of Rule 1.3.

She violated Rule 1.4 by her failure to communicate with Mr. Boone and keep him informed of the status of the matter, despite Mr. Boone’s efforts to find out and discuss with Ms. Kreamer the Order of June 12, 2004, which he learned from his wife. Further, throughout the representation, Ms. Kreamer did not provide Mr. Boone with billing statements on how his retainer was being used. She violated Rule 1.16(d) by failing to appear at the August 11, 2004 hearing. She was still counsel of record at that time and had a duty to appear in court, having been given appropriate notification. ³²⁵ Additionally, her failure to appear in court; her failure to communicate with Mr. Boone concerning the Order for three months; and her failure to consult and discuss with Mr. Boone any settlement proposal before submitting it to opposing counsel was clearly conduct prejudicial to the