Attorney Grievance Commission v. McLaughlin

Adkins, J. The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“AGC”), acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“Petition”) against Respondent Louisa Content McLaughlin. Bar Counsel charged McLaughlin with violating the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 1 during her representation of Doris Leedom. The AGC investigated after Paula McCabe, Ms. Leedom’s daughter and power of attorney, filed a complaint. Bar Counsel alleged that McLaughlin violated the following: (1) Rule 1.3 (Diligence); 2 (2) Rule 1.4(a) and (b) (Communication); 3 (3) Rule 1.5(a) (Fees); 4 (4) Rule 1.15(a) and (e) (Safekeeping Property); 5 (5) Rule 8.1(a) and (b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters); 6 (6) Rule 8.4 (a), (c) and (d) (Misconduct); 7 and Maryland Code (1957, 2010 Repl.

Vol.), § 10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article (“BP”) (Misuse of Trust Money). 8 We transmitted the matter to the Honorable Kevin J. Mahoney (“the hearing judge”) of the Circuit Court for Har-ford County to hear the case. After trying and failing to serve McLaughlin, Bar Counsel served the Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-723(b). The Fund mailed the Petition to McLaughlin at three different addresses. When McLaughlin did not answer the Petition, Bar Counsel moved for an Order of Default under Maryland Rule 2-613(b), which the Circuit Court granted.

McLaughlin was sent notice of the Default Order and served with Bar Counsel’s discovery requests. McLaughlin never responded to Bar Counsel, nor sought to overturn the default. McLaughlin did not appear at the Circuit Court hearing on March 20, 2017. The hearing judge concluded that because McLaughlin had defaulted, all requests for admissions in Bar Counsel’s discovery requests were deemed admitted pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-424(b).

The hearing judge issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, based on the admitted facts, in which he found by clear and convincing evidence that McLaughlin violated MLRPC 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(a), 1.15(a) and (e), 8.1(a) and (b), 8.4(a), (c), and (d), and BP § 10-306. He found multiple aggravating factors and no mitigating factors. THE HEARING JUDGE’S FINDINGS OF FACT The hearing judge made the following findings of fact. McLaughlin was admitted to the Maryland Bar on June 15, 2004 and has substantial experience in the practice of law.

In 2011, Ms. Leedom, then age 86, and a resident of New York, retained McLaughlin to prepare estate planning documents. Ms. Leedom gave her son George Leedom (“Mr. Leedom”) her power of attorney, and her daughter, Mrs. McCabe, was identified as his successor. When Ms. Leedom moved to Maryland in 2013, McLaughlin drafted a Maryland power of attorney for her, which named Mr. Leedom as her agent. In 2013, Ms. Leedom sold her New York home and gifted the proceeds, over $500,000, to Mr. Leedom.

McLaughlin provided some advice regarding this gift. The hearing judge found that Mr. Leedom managed his mother’s finances from 2011 to June 2014. At that time, Mr. Leedom entered a rehabilitation for substance abuse issues, and Mrs. McCabe notified [McLaughlin] .... However, [McLaughlin] did not advise Ms. Leedom of the risks of allowing Mr. Leedom to continue to serve as her power of attorney at any time after June 2014.

In fact, [McLaughlin] did not communicate with Ms. Leedom at all in June 2014, and never discussed Mr. Leedom’s substance abuse issues with Ms. Leedom. On August 12, 2014, Ms. Leedom, with [McLaughlin’s] assistance, sold two pieces of property located in Aberdeen, Maryland. The sale of the two properties resulted in net proceeds to Ms. Leedom of approximately $95,000.00. [McLaughlin] agreed to serve as an escrow agent, holding the proceeds of the sale in her Attorney Trust Account. Respondent was not to disburse the proceeds of the sale until [Mr.] Leedom and Mrs. McCabe agreed on the disposition of the funds.

The hearing judge found that despite this agreement, McLaughlin disbursed $10,000 to Mr. Leedom in October 2014. McLaughlin did not notify Mrs. McCabe or obtain her consent to the disbursement. In December 2014, Ms. Leedom executed a power of attorney, naming McLaughlin as her agent. The next month, McLaughlin “paid herself $5,175.00 from Ms. Leedom’s funds held in her trust account without Mrs. McCabe’s authorization or consent.” McLaughlin did not provide invoices or billing statements to Ms. Leedom, or to Mr. Leedom when he had his mother’s power of attorney.

Ms. Leedom executed another power of attorney in April 2015, naming Mrs. McCabe as her agent. Mrs, McCabe immediately sent McLaughlin a letter asking “for an accounting of and the return of her mother’s funds.” The hearing judge found that McLaughlin provided an accounting in May, “but refused to return the balance of Ms. Leedom’s funds unless and until Mrs. McCabe signed a waiver releasing [McLaughlin] from any and all liability.” He also found that Mrs. McCabe signed this release under duress. In July 2015, Mrs. McCabe filed a complaint with the AGC. Bar Counsel sent McLaughlin a copy of the complaint and requested a written response.

McLaughlin submitted a written response on September 18. The hearing judge found that McLaughlin made “knowing and intentional misrepresentations to Bar Counsel” in her response, specifically: [McLaughlin] stated that ‘Doris Leedom ... was adamant that she did not want her daughter [Paula McCabe] involved. I had been told by [Mr.] Leedom on several occasions that his mother became very agitated and combative when Paula wanted to take her to a hair appointment or when her name came up. I witnessed this on several occasions in meetings just between Doris Leedom and myself.’ [McLaughlin] also misrepresented to Bar Counsel that she was in frequent contact with [Mr.] Leedom, including in person meetings, in the fall of 2014.

Additionally, [McLaughlin] misrepresented that she wrote a letter to Mrs. McCabe on May 15, 2015, when in fact she had not. [McLaughlin] also misrepresented that Mike McCabe, Paula McCabe’s husband, ‘[o]n more than one occasion ... said he did not want to deal with Paula or have her get involved and finally on May 8, 2015 said he was not getting involved with this and that he had told Paula he wanted nothing to do with her actions.’ Finally, [McLaughlin] misrepresented that she ‘explained on several occasions to Mrs. McCabe [that] there was never an [escrow] account in Doris Leedom’s name.’ Bar Counsel sent a letter to McLaughlin dated November 13, 2015, which explained that the matter had been docketed for further investigation, enclosed additional correspondence from Mrs. McCabe, and requested a response. Bar Counsel sent a similar letter on January 11, 2016. McLaughlin received both of these letters, but never responded. An AGC investigator interviewed McLaughlin in February 2016.

McLaughlin told the investigator that she did not think she had to respond to Bar Counsel’s November 13 letter, and that she “did not recall” receiving the January 11 letter. Bar Counsel sent McLaughlin additional copies of the previous correspondence through U.S. mail and e-mail. McLaughlin received, but did not respond to these communications. THE HEARING JUDGE’S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The hearing judge found that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary because the Circuit Court had entered an Order of Default and McLaughlin had not moved to vacate the order.

He found that the admitted facts were “sufficient by a clear and convincing standard” to justify the court’s conclusions of law that McLaughlin violated MLRPC 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(a), 1.15(a) and (e), 8.1(a) and (b), 8.4(a), (c), and (d), and BP § 10-306. MLRPC 1.3: Diligence The hearing judge concluded that McLaughlin violated Rule 1.3 when she “fail[ed] to promptly advise her client, Doris Leedom, of the risks of continuing to have [Mr.] Leedom act as her power of attorney when [Mr.] Leedom was experiencing problems with substance abuse.” This “increased the likelihood that her client would suffer adverse financial consequences.” MLRPC 1.4: Communication The hearing judge found that McLaughlin violated 1.4(a) by failing “to provide information, advice and counsel to her client regarding the propriety of having [Mr.] Leedom, who had known substance abuse issues, continue as her power of attorney.” This omission left Ms. Leedom without “sufficient information to participate in making decisions regarding the representation.” The hearing judge found that McLaughlin’s failure “to explain to [Ms.] Leedom in any manner, the risks of having [Mr.] Leedom continue as her power of attorney” violated Rule 1.4(b) because she never explained the matter to permit her client to make an informed decision. MLRPC 1.5(a): Fees The hearing judge found that McLaughlin never provided an invoice or billing statement for the $5,175 fee to either her client or her power of attorney. She simply deducted the money from her IOLTA account, and the only justification for this fee was a notation: “through 08/2014.” The hearing judge found that “[wjithout any basis to substantiate her charges in this case, [McLaughlin’s] fee is unreasonable,” and violated Rule 1.5(a).

MLRPC 1.15(a) and (e): Safekeeping Property The hearing judge found that McLaughlin “violated ... Rule [1.15(a) ] when she failed to keep her own property, i.e., the $5,175 in fees she earned in August 2014, separate from [Ms.] Leedom’s own property,” because “she failed to withdraw the funds from the IOLTA account until January 24, 2015.” The hearing judge found that McLaughlin violated Rule 1.15(e) “by disbursing $10,000 to George Leedom in October 2014 without Mrs. McCabe’s consent.... [and] when she disbursed $5,175.00 to herself for attorney’s fees without Mrs. McCabe’s consent.” MLRPC 8.1: Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters The hearing judge concluded that McLaughlin violated Rule 8.1(a) when she repeatedly made false statements to Bar Counsel in her September 18, 2015 letter. The hearing judge found that McLaughlin violated Rule 8.1(b) because she received three requests for information from Bar Counsel and never responded. MLRPC 8.4: Misconduct The hearing judge determined that McLaughlin violated Rule 8.4(a) because she violated other Rules of Professional Conduct.

The hearing judge concluded that McLaughlin’s five misrepresentations to Bar Counsel in the September 18 letter violated Rule 8.4(c), which prohibits conduct involving dishonesty or misrepresentation. The hearing judge found that McLaughlin’s “failures to communicate with her client, failures to safeguard her client’s funds, misrepresentations to [Bar Counsel], and failures to respond to [Bar Counsel’s] lawful requests for information” were “likely to impair public confidence in the profession and impact the image of lawyers in the public eye.” Such conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice, and violated 8.4(d). Business Occupations & Professions § 10-306: Misuse of Trust Money The hearing judge found that McLaughlin violated § 10-306 when she disbursed $10,000 to Mr. Leedom and $5,175 to herself contrary to the agreement that she would not disburse any proceeds from the sale of the Aberdeen properties until Mr. Leedom and Mrs. McCabe could agree on the disposition of the funds. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors Relying on Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shuler, 443 Md. 494, 506-07 , 117 A.3d 38 (2015), the hearing judge considered: (1) the rules McLaughlin violated; (2) her mental state; (3) the injury her misconduct caused, or could have caused; and (4) aggravating and mitigating factors.

He found that McLaughlin had violated numerous Rules of Conduct and BP § 10-306. The hearing judge concluded that McLaughlin’s mental state “seem[ed] to be intentional and deliberate” based on her September 18 letter. He found that Ms. Leedom lost $10,000 when McLaughlin released funds to Mr. Leedom without Mrs. McCabe’s consent, and $5,175 when McLaughlin transferred the fee to herself without “proper documentation that [she] had earned those fees.” Ms. Leedom may have lost additional funds when McLaughlin failed to advise her client of the dangers of retaining Mr. Leedom as her power of attorney. The hearing judge found multiple aggravating factors.

He found that McLaughlin had violated multiple rules and BP § 10-306. She engaged in “bad faith obstruction of the attorney discipline proceedings” because she “failed to respond to [Bar Counsel’s] last three letters.... failed to file an answer to the PDRA, which resulted in a default judgement being entered against her.... [and] she failed to respond to any of [Bar Counsel’s] discovery requests.” McLaughlin “submitted false statements, false evidence, and engaged in other deceptive practices” by making multiple misrepresentations in her response to Bar Counsel. McLaughlin did not acknowledge the wrongful nature of her misconduct because she “never admitted that she violated any Rules of Professional Conduct.,.. [and] never apologized for her misconduct.” The hearing judge found that Ms. Leedom was a vulnerable victim because she was 89 years of age at the time the misconduct occurred. McLaughlin had substantial experience in the practice of law.

McLaughlin was indifferent to making restitution or correcting her misconduct because she never refunded her fees, nor apologized. He also found that McLaughlin was likely to repeat her misconduct, because “absent recognition of and remorse for her wrongdoing, there is a substantial likelihood that she will repeat it.” The hearing judge found that McLaughlin had no available mitigating factors because she had not provided any evidence, nor had she “participated in any way during these proceedings .... ” DISCUSSION In proceedings before this Court, McLaughlin was limited to addressing sanctions because of the default entered against her. We issued a per curiam order disbarring McLaughlin on September 11, 2017. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McLaughlin, 456 Md. 45 , 169 A.3d 952 , 2017 WL 3976468 (2017).

We now explain the basis for that order. Standard of Review “In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court has original and complete jurisdiction and conducts an independent review of the record.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McClain, 406 Md. 1, 17 , 956 A.2d 135 (2008). The Court will accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Page, 430 Md. 602, 626 , 62 A.3d 163 (2013).

Both parties may file “exceptions to the findings and conclusions of the hearing judge[.]” Maryland Rule 19-728(b)(1). Because neither party filed an exception in this case, we choose to “treat the findings of fact as established.” Md. Rule 19-741(b)(2)(A); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. De La Paz, 418 Md. 534, 552 , 16 A.3d 181 (2011). We review the hearing judge’s conclusions of law without deference, “even where default orders and judgments have been entered at the hearing level.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harrington, 367 Md. 36, 49 , 785 A.2d 1260 (2001). The Order of Default The hearing judge entered an Order of Default under Md. Rules 2-613(b) and 19-724(c) because McLaughlin never filed a response to the Petition.

He relied on Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thomas, 440 Md. 523, 550-51 , 103 A.3d 629 (2014), to conclude that “a full-blown evidentiary hearing [wa]s not necessary.” In Thomas, we explained: In the context of a default attorney grievance proceeding, ... after an order of default has been entered, the taking of additional evidence may be warranted only when, as noted above, new and material evidence has come to light since the filing of the PDRA, or perhaps when the hearing judge expresses doubt as to certain averments (or absence thereof) and invites live testimony or additional demonstrative evidence. Id. at 547 n.26, 103 A.3d 629 . Absent those circumstances, in the event of a default, the hearing judge is not required to hold a full evidentiary hearing. Id. at 550 , 103 A.3d 629 .

The hearing judge properly entered an Order of Default when McLaughlin failed to answer the Petition, see Md. Rules 2-613(b), 19-724(c), and never sought to vacate the default under Md. Rule 2-613(d). 9 We turn our attention to whether the admitted facts were sufficient by a clear and convincing standard to warrant the hearing judge’s conclusions of law. MLRPC 1.3: Diligence Rule 1.3 requires an attorney to “act with reasonable promptness and diligence in representing a client.” Our review of the record reveals that McLaughlin was aware that Mr. Leedom had a history of substance abuse before she began representing Ms. Leedom. McLaughlin was aware that Mr. Leedom entered a facility to treat his substance abuse in June of 2014, and interacted with him while he was intoxicated after he had been released from treatment. Mrs. McCabe had contacted McLaughlin in July 2014 regarding her brother’s past and current substance abuse problems, and alleged that he had poor financial management skills.

McLaughlin’s September 18 letter lists a series of events between June and December 2014 that should have raised concerns for any reasonable attorney regarding Mr. Leedom’s fitness to serve as his mother’s power of attorney. 10 These events undoubtedly impacted Ms. Leedom’s interests. See MLRPC 1.3, cmt. [8] (“A client’s interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change of conditions .... ”). Despite learning new information and observing changes in Mr. Leedom’s behavior, McLaughlin did not promptly discuss these issues with her client, or act to protect her client’s financial interests. We have “consistently regarded neglect and inattentiveness to a client’s interests to be a violation of the Canon of Ethics warranting the imposition of some disciplinary sanction.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Montgomery, 296 Md. 113, 120 , 460 A.2d 597 (1983).

There is no evidence that McLaughlin investigated the situation, or verified that Mr. Leedom was complying with his obligations as his behavior deteriorated. 11 An attorney who fails to investigate a client’s matter violates Rule 1.3. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. London, 427 Md. 328, 347 , 47 A.3d 986 (2012) (“The failure to consistently monitor and manage a client’s business is a classic example of a Rule 1.3 violation.”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 385, 394 , 794 A.2d 92 (2002) (attorney violated Rule 1.3 when he failed to investigate a client’s matter). McLaughlin violated Rule 1.3 when she did not act to protect her client against Mr. Leedom’s behavior, including advising her client about the risk of keeping Mr. Leedom as her power of attorney when he was experiencing substance abuse problems or investigating whether he was complying with his duties as her power of attorney. MLRPC 1.4; Communication “Attorneys violate Rule 1.4 when they fail to communicate with clients and keep them informed of the status of their legal matters.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Powers, 454 Md. 79, 93 , 164 A.3d 138 (2017).

The duty to communicate includes providing information about “significant developments affecting ... the substance of the representation.” MLRPC 1.4, cmt. [3]; see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Narasimhan, 438 Md. 638, 656-57 , 92 A.3d 512 (2014) (failing to inform a client about the status of a matter or update the client after significant case developments violates Rule 1.4(a)). The record shows that Ms. Leedom engaged McLaughlin for estate planning, including establishing a power of attorney to manage her financial affairs. McLaughlin was required “when appropriate, to consult with the client about the means to be used to accomplish the client’s objectives.” MLRPC 1.4, cmt. [3]. McLaughlin knew that her 89-year-old client suffered from the early stages of dementia and did not wish to manage her own affairs. 12 Moreover, she learned from a third party—after the instrument was signed—that Mr. Leedom entered a rehabilitation facility for his alcoholism.

McLaughlin did not know whether her vulnerable client was aware of this change in circumstances. When the representation began, both McLaughlin and Ms. Leedom knew of Mr. Leedom’s history of substance abuse problems. Surely, the reoccurrence of Mr. Leedom’s substance abuse problems could affect his ability to manage his mother’s financial affairs under the power of attorney, and could well increase the risk of mismanagement and loss. Under these circumstances, McLaughlin had a duty to communicate with Ms. Leedom about this information. 13 Her failure to discuss this information with Ms. Leedom violated Rule 1.4(a) because she did not keep her client reasonably informed about the matter.

Rule 1.4(b) requires an attorney to “explain ongoing matters to the extent reasonably necessary to allow a client to make informed decisions .... ” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Steinberg, 395 Md. 337, 363 , 910 A.2d 429 (2006). Whether a lawyer has fulfilled this duty “depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved.” MLRPC 1.4, cmt. [5]. In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rand, 429 Md. 674, 717 , 57 A.3d 976 (2012), we explained that the analysis of whether an attorney has violated Rule 1.4(b) requires considering “the entire interaction between [the attorney] and [the client] and the information that was communicated.” McLaughlin violated Rule 1.4(b) when she did not explain to Ms. Leedom the risks of having Mr. Leedom continue as her power of attorney. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shuler, 454 Md. 200, 214 , 164 A.3d 209 (2017) (failure to explain important aspects of the matter to a client violates Rule 1.4(b) when the client is denied the opportunity to make an informed decision).

McLaughlin should have consulted with her client to permit Ms. Leedom to make an informed decision about her financial management because the circumstances of the ongoing representation had changed. See Steinberg, 395 Md. at 363 , 910 A.2d 429 . MLRPC 1.5: Fees Rule 1.5(a) prohibits attorneys from agreeing to, charging, or collecting “unreasonable fee[s],” and sets out a list of non-exclusive factors to determine whether a fee is reasonable. It is unclear how McLaughlin earned the $5,175 she deducted from the escrow account, other than for work “through 08/2014.” McLaughlin’s letter stated that this fee related to the sale of Ms. Leedom’s Aberdeen properties.

But her letter does not contain sufficient information to conclude that the fee was reasonable under Rule 1.5(a). “[A]n otherwise-reasonable fee can become unreasonable if the lawyer fails to earn it.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garrett, 427 Md. 209, 224 , 46 A.3d 1169 (2012). In her initial engagement letter to Ms. Leedom, McLaughlin explained that she sent statements for fees and disbursements on a monthly basis, but she never provided an invoice or billing statement for this fee to anyone. Failure to send invoices when an attorney is required to do so is unreasonable. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Green, 441 Md. 80, 99 , 105 A.3d 500 (2014); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rand, 445 Md. 581, 608 , 128 A.3d 107 (2015).

The hearing judge’s findings of fact, and our own review of the record establish that McLaughlin never submitted an invoice for this charge, nor supplied a basis for her fee. Therefore, she violated Rule 1.5(a). MLRPC 1.15: Safekeeping Property Rule 1.15(a) requires a lawyer “to keep the property of clients separate from the lawyer’s own property.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hamilton, 444 Md. 163, 188 , 118 A.3d 958 (2015). This Court has consistently held that “an attorney’s failure to withdraw earned fees from his or her trust account in a timely manner results in an impermissible commingling of funds violative of MLRPC 1.15(a) ....” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Weiers, 440 Md. 292, 305 , 102 A.3d 332 (2014).

The hearing judge found that McLaughlin violated Rule 1.15(a) when she failed to remove her earned fees from trust monies. Because we do not know what legal services she provided, or when, it is impossible to know whether or when she should have removed these funds. Therefore, we decline to reach this issue, which did not, in any event, affect our decision to disbar McLaughlin. Rule 1.15(e) applies to property that comes into an attorney’s possession “in the course of representing a client.” If two or more persons claim an interest in the property, the lawyer is required to keep that property separate pending the resolution of the dispute.

Id. The hearing judge found that all of Bar Counsel’s averments were admitted because McLaughlin never answered the Petition, nor appeared at the hearing. For that reason, he concluded that McLaughlin had violated 1.15(e). It is not clear to us whether 1.15(e) would apply to the dispute between Mrs. McCabe and Mr. Leedom.

McLaughlin received the property in the course of the representation. But our review of the record does not show that anyone disputed that Ms. Leedom owned the funds, or that Mrs. McCabe or Mr. Leedom claimed an interest in the funds. Our cases applying 1.15(e) typically address a lawyer’s failure to pay bills out of settlement funds on a client’s behalf, or turn settlement funds over to a client. 14 This rule also applies to attorney fee disputes. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gracey, 448 Md. 1, 23 , 136 A.3d 798 (2016).

There is no evidence in the record that anyone disputed McLaughlin’s fee because she never notified anyone that she was taking the fee. We similarly decline to reach this issue because it does not affect our decision to disbar McLaughlin. MLRPC 8.1: Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters Rule 8.1(a) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly making false statements of material fact in connection with disciplinary matters. An attorney violates this rule “whenever an attorney makes intentional misrepresentations to Bar Counsel.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mitchell, 445 Md. 241, 259 , 126 A.3d 72 (2015).

Bar Counsel identified five “knowing and intentional” misrepresentations McLaughlin made in her September 18 letter to Bar Counsel. The hearing judge found, apparently by allegation and default, that McLaughlin made five “knowing and intentional” misrepresentations to Bar Counsel, and that this conduct violated Rule 8.1(a). We review these misrepresentations in greater detail. 1. Misrepresentation regarding Ms. Leedom’s preference that Mrs. McCabe should not be involved in her finances or her day-to-day care.

McLaughlin misrepresented that Ms. Leedom did not want Mrs. McCabe involved in managing her finances or her day-to-day care, and became “agitated and combative” when Mrs. McCabe took her to appointments, or when her name came up. Mrs. McCabe provided letters to Bar Counsel from Ms. Leedom’s physician and daily caregivers. All of these letters refuted McLaughlin’s assertion and stated that Mrs. McCabe was involved in her mother’s day-to-day care and that they had a loving and positive relationship. McLaughlin did not provide any information supporting her claim, and we find that the record sufficiently demonstrates the falsity of her statement. 2.