Attorney Grievance Commission v. Peters-Hamlin

Dissenting Opinion by McDONALD, J., which BARBERA, C.J., and ADKINS, J., join. The Respondent in this case has practiced law as a litigator for the federal government and in private practice for almost 30 years. She apparently has not been the subject of any other complaints of misconduct or sanctions except for the incident that resulted in this case. That incident occurred during a discovery dispute in a hotly contested commercial case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York nearly a decade ago.

According to the Respondent, that complaint was made by the judge assigned to that case after she complained, to the chief judge of the court, about derogatory remarks made to her by the assigned judge. Of course, this is a reciprocal disciplinary action and it is not our role to retry the case. And we would not want to. The evidentiary hearing in this case in the Southern District of New York took 11 days and resulted in a detailed 118-page report by the Magistrate Judge who presided at that hearing.

Ultimately, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York imposed a suspension, which triggered reciprocal disciplinary proceedings in numerous other jurisdictions. Not only does our Court reach a different result, but it is a result out of step with every other jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction in which the complaint was made and those in which hearings were conducted: • In January 2013, the Magistrate Judge who heard all of the evidence and issued the lengthy report recommended ⁵⁵⁴ a nunc pro tunc suspension of five years that would have concluded less than three months after she issued her report. • In April 2013, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, where the conduct occurred, imposed a nunc pro tunc suspension of seven years, which has since expired. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York later imposed a concurrent suspension which has also expired. In April 2015, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut imposed what was essentially a concurrent nunc pro tunc suspension that effectively suspended Respondent for a week. • The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia imposed a nunc pro tunc suspension that expired before it was imposed and conditioned reinstatement on a showing that Respondent had been reinstated in the Southern District of New York. • The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, although it declined to reverse the Southern District’s disciplinary action when Respondent appealed, took no disciplinary action of its own. • The State Bar of New York imposed reciprocal discipline in the form of a five-year nunc pro tunc suspension, which expired the month after it was imposed. • In Connecticut, where Respondent has her practice, the court declined to impose any discipline.

After conducting its own three-day hearing, the Connecticut court concluded that “even a retroactive suspension would serve no useful purpose.” The court did require Respondent to report any future allegations of misconduct. The Majority opinion is well written, but it necessarily only skims the surface of the detailed facts that make up this case. In my view, disbarment is not appropriate. I would impose discipline more in line with that recommended or imposed by the courts that received the complaint and that conducted hearings concerning the circumstances of the violations. ⁵⁵⁵ The discipline need not be the same, however.

There is a rationale for imposing some additional discipline unique to Maryland. Although Respondent has not been practicing in Maryland, she was delinquent in reporting to Maryland authorities the suspension imposed by the Southern District of New York. But that additional discipline should not be disbarment. Chief Judge BARBERA and Judge ADKINS have advised that they join this opinion.

HOTTEN, J. This reciprocal discipline action arises from a disciplinary proceeding initiated in the State of New York against Respondent, Kristan Peters-Hamlin, who while serving as lead counsel for a plaintiff in a trade secrets infringement suit, instructed a first-year associate to “mark-up” deposition transcripts and claim them as attorney work product; knowingly made false statements to the court to conceal same; and made copies and ordered additional copies of deposition transcripts for use in another matter, in contravention of court confidentiality orders. On August 5, 2015, Petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, acting through Bar Counsel, filed with this Court a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“Petition”) against Respondent based on her misconduct in New York. The Petition was bi’ought as a reciprocal discipline matter pursuant to Maryland Rules 16-751 (petition for disciplinary or remedial action) and 16-773 (reciprocal discipline or ⁵²⁵ inactive status). Attached to the Petition were certified copies of the Opinion and Order of the Committee on Grievances for the United States District Court, Southern District of New York (“Grievance Committee”) dated April 10, 2013 and the Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dated April 4, 2014.

By Order dated April 10, 2013, the Grievance Committee suspended Respondent from the practice of law in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York for seven years, nunc pro tunc 1 to April 10, 2008. Respondent appealed the Grievance Committee’s April 10, 2013 Order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. By Opinion and Order dated April 4, 2014, the Second Circuit affirmed the April 10 Order. In issuing its sanction, the Grievance Committee adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Honorable Lisa Margaret Smith, United States Magistrate Judge for the Southern District of New York (“magistrate judge”), who presided over Respondent’s evidentiary hearing.

The magistrate judge found knowing and intentional misconduct in violation of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct (“NYRPC”), 3.3(a)(1); 2 3.4(c); 3 and 8.4(c) and (d). 4 ⁵²⁶ The filing of the Petition by Bar Counsel was precipitated by events occurring in the spring of 2007, in connection with Respondent’s representation as lead counsel of the plaintiff in Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs. Inc. v. Scivantage et al., Case No. 07 Civ. 2352 in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, while she was a partner at Dorsey & Whitney, LLP (“Dorsey & Whitney”). The Petition alleges that Respondent’s misconduct in New York constitutes violations of the following Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”): 3.3(a)(1) (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 3.4(c) (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct).

On August 6, 2015, we issued an order directing Bar Counsel and Respondent to show cause pursuant to the grounds outlined in Md. Rule 16-773(e), 5 why corresponding discipline should not be imposed by this Court. Following receipt of the parties’ responses, on August 20, 2015, this Court ordered Respondent indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in this State, pending further order of this Court, pursuant to Md. Rule 16-773(d). 6 This matter was not transmitted to a ⁵²⁷ hearing judge to hold an evidentiary hearing and render findings of fact and conclusions of law. 7 On January 12, 2016, we heard oral argument. On January 29, 2016, Respondent filed with this Court, a “MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE STATEMENT CORRECTING MATERIAL MISSTATEMENTS MADE BY DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL DURING ORAL ARGUMENT ON JANUARY 12, 2016” (“Motion for Leave”), alleging that Bar Counsel made a variety of misrepresentations regarding the reciprocal actions taken in other courts and bars, as well as the magistrate judge’s findings. Bar Counsel filed a response to Respondent’s motion on February 4, 2016, stating that the misstatements and misrepresentations alleged by Respondent were addressed, or could have been addressed, in her rebuttal.

Bar Counsel further maintained that the substance of Respondent’s motion was not a pleading attempting to correct the record, but rather, an attempt “to supplement her oral argument with additional facts and legal argument.” On February 12, 2016, Respondent filed a reply (“Reply”) in further support of her Motion for Leave, asserting that Bar Counsel’s response to her motion failed to correct the misstatements and misrepresentations proffered during oral argument. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Respondent violated MLRPC 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(c), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d), and the appropriate sanction for Respondent’s misconduct is disbarment. ⁵²⁸ BACKGROUND The magistrate judge made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, which we summarize: Respondent has been an attorney since 1988. She was admitted to the Bar of the District of Columbia in 1988, the Bar of Maryland in 1998, the Bar of New York in 2000, and the Bar of Connecticut in 2007. 8 She has been in inactive status in Maryland since July 2015. Respondent is also a former partner of the law firm Dorsey & Whitney and currently maintains a law office in Stamford, Connecticut.

In April 2007, Respondent was lead counsel for Dorsey & Whitney’s client, Wolters Kluwer Financial Services, Inc. (“Wolters Kluwer”), in its suit filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, against four of its former employees (“New York action”). The complaint alleged that former Wolters Kluwer employees had taken proprietary information and disclosed it to their new employer, the technology company Scivantage. At the close of extensive discovery conducted under orders of confidentiality, Dorsey & Whitney voluntarily dismissed the suit and refiled a substantially identical suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts (“Massachusetts action”) after Scivantage contested personal jurisdiction in the Southern District of New York. Dorsey & Whitney subsequently filed a motion in the Massachusetts action seeking injunctive relief and attached some of the discovery material produced by defendants in the New York action.

Following a hearing on the voluntary dismissal and the use of the discovery material, inter alia, the presiding ⁵²⁹ judge, the Honorable Harold Baer, Jr., (“Judge Baer”), issued an opinion imposing non-monetary sanctions on Dorsey & Whitney, Respondent, Marc Reiner (“Mr. Reiner”), a former partner at Dorsey & Whitney who worked on the matter, and Wolters Kluwer. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the imposition of non-monetary sanctions on Respondent as a result of her misconduct, but reversed the sanctions imposed on Dorsey & Whitney and Mr. Reiner. The New York disciplinary matter commenced when Judge Baer forwarded a copy of his decision to the Grievance Committee. Thereafter on January 30, 2008, the Grievance Committee issued an “Order to Show Cause” alleging that Respondent violated NYRPC 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(c), 8.4(c) and (d), 9 based upon the following three charges of misconduct: (1) [Respondent] ‘instructed an associate in her firm to alter or amend documents for the purpose of preventing their discoverability and attempted to mislead the [c]ourt as to these events;’ (2) [Respondent] ‘participated in a conference with the [c]ourt to adjourn a [Temporary Restraining Order] [ (“TRO”) ] hearing and discuss future depositions at a time when [she] knew that those depositions and the TRO hearing would not take place;’[ 10 ] and (3) [Respondent] ‘copied transcripts and ordered additional copies of transcripts in intentional disregard of court orders, and then ⁵³⁰ used the transcripts in an action in Massachusetts in violation of the [cjourt’s Confidentiality Order.’ On April 10, 2008, the Grievance Committee issued an interim suspension order. 11 Over a year later on June 5, 2009, the Grievance Committee determined that Respondent should be disbarred, but allowed her to submit mitigation evidence.

On August 6, 2009, the Grievance Committee reduced the sanction from disbarment to a seven-year suspension. Respondent appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On April 25, 2011, the Second Circuit vacated the Grievance Committee’s interim suspension order and remanded the matter for further proceedings, including an independent evidentiary hearing on the charges against Respondent. 12 A hearing was conducted before the magistrate judge in the Southern District of New York for eleven days during the months of June through August, 2012. The magistrate judge received hundreds of exhibits and heard testimony of several witnesses at Dorsey & Whitney, including Respondent.

On January 23, 2013, the magistrate judge submitted a 118-page Report and Recommendation, concluding that Respondent violated NYRPC 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(c), and 8.4(c) and (d), and recommended the imposition of a five-year suspension, nunc pro tunc to April 10, 2008. The Grievance Committee adopted the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, but ultimately imposed a seven-year suspension, nunc pro tunc. In support of its sanction, the Grievance Committee concluded that Respondent’s conduct was sui generis, 13 because her conduct involved “the corruption of a young and inexperienced lawyer, over whom she had power and authority,” she exhibited a lack of remorse for her inappropriate behavior, and she had a “habit of twisting the truth.” ⁵³¹ The magistrate judge made the following findings of fact relative to the charges, which we summarize in reverse order to remain consistent with the sequence of events: Charge Three 14 On April 12, 2007, Judge Baer entered a “Confidentiality Stipulation and Protective Order” (“the Confidentiality Order”), which was sent via fax and e-mail to counsel for both parties in the Wolters Kluwer litigation. Of relevance to the allegations in the instant disciplinary matter, the Confidentiality Order outlined the following stipulations: [information designated as ‘CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION’ or ‘ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY INFORMATION’ (“Protected Material”), could be ‘used solely for purposes of the prosecution and defense of the above-entitled litigation____’ Protected Material was not to be ‘used in any other litigation proceeding____’ ‘The obligations created by this Order shall survive the termination of this lawsuit unless otherwise modified’ by the [cjourt and that ‘[t]he [c]ourt,’ defined as ‘the United States District Court, Southern District of New York,’ ‘shall retain jurisdiction, even after termination of this lawsuit, to enforce this Order and to make such amendments and modifications to this Order as may be appropriate____’ The “ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY” designation meant that protected material could only be disclosed to attorneys at Dorsey & Whitney, defendants’ firms, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP and Sullivan & Worcester, LLP, the court reporters and videographers who covered the depositions, and independent experts retained by the parties.

In addition to prior document production, the defendants produced three CD-ROMs with electronic discovery to Dorsey & Whitney on the evening of April 13, 2007, which was the ⁵³² same day the firm filed a voluntary dismissal of the New York action. Subsequently on April 15, 2007, after counsel for the defendants became aware of Dorsey & Whitney’s transfer of the New York action and subsequent dismissal of same, they contacted Respondent and requested return of all their discovery documents and copies thereof. However, Respondent refused. On April 16, after Respondent was made aware by Mr. Reiner of a conference call with Judge Baer and defendants’ counsel to resolve the matter, Respondent replied, “I am going to want a copy made of the discs no matter what this judge says ...

I will take the heat for that decision, but I am going to want a copy made no matter what[.]” In efforts to address both the defendants’ concern regarding Respondent’s resistance to their demands and Respondent’s concern of spoliation issues if she returned same to the defendants, Judge Baer issued an oral order directing return of all documents in Dorsey & WTdtney’s possession to the court within twenty-four hours. After Mr. Reiner informed Respondent of Judge Baer’s order, Respondent stated, “[t]his is exactly what I thought would happen which is why I told you I want copies of the disc[s].” Shortly thereafter, Respondent contacted Eve Morris, head of the secretarial staff at Dorsey & AVhitney, to arrange to have copies made of all hard-copy documents and the CDROMs produced by the defendants. Respondent then used the copies in a motion for protective order submitted to Judge Baer seeking permission to send copies of the defendants’ document production to the judge in the Massachusetts action. On April 17, 2007, after Judge Baer became aware that Dorsey & Whitney made copies of the defendants’ document production, he sent an e-mail to the firm ordering that all discovery in plaintiffs possession be delivered to defendants by noon the following day.

Thereafter on April 19, 2007, Judge Baer issued an oral order to Zachary Carter (“Mr. Carter”), head of the New York Trial Group at Dorsey & Wfiiitney, directing the firm to return all deposition transcripts ⁵³³ taken during the course of the Wolters Kluwer litigation to the court. The following day, in response to an e-mail from Deidre Sheridan (“Ms. Sheridan”), an associate at Dorsey & Whitney, suggesting that the firm “consider a middle g[r]ound” that would allow Judge Baer to hold the transcripts, but release them for use in their motions with the court, Respondent declined. The deposition transcripts were eventually delivered to the court, beyond Judge Baer’s deadline. On April 21, 2007, after confirming delivery of the deposition transcripts to the court, Respondent e-mailed in-house counsel at Wolters Kluwer, stating, inter alia, that “the next step” was “sending the transcripts to the new judge.” (emphasis omitted).

Shortly thereafter, Respondent e-mailed the court reporter from Veritext who covered the depositions for the defendants, to request copies of the discs with the deposition transcripts, claiming that she “misplaced” the four discs containing the deposition transcripts. Respondent did not disclose this request to Judge Baer or anyone at Dorsey & Whitney. On or about April 23 or 24, 2007, Respondent was confronted by Jonathan Herman (“Mr. Herman”), a partner at Dorsey & Whitney assigned to oversee Respondent’s work, regarding Respondent’s knowledge that associates had not returned deposition transcripts to the court. A few days prior on April 20, associates Ms. Sheridan and Jordan Brackett (“Mr. Brackett”) informed Mr. Carter that they each still possessed folders containing working copies of the transcripts that have been marked up and tabbed.

Mr. Carter spoke to Respondent about the deposition transcripts on or about April 26 or 27, and Respondent spoke to Ms. Sheridan regarding Mr. Carter’s decision to not return them on April 26. After Respondent’s discussion with Mr. Herman, she refused to return the deposition transcripts, claiming work product privilege. Respondent subsequently sent Judge Baer’s law clerk an e-mail citing caselaw from associates in support of her use of the discovery from the New York action, ⁵³⁴ in the Massachusetts case, contending that the latter was a “continuing matter.” However, in correspondence to colleagues at Dorsey & Whitney, Respondent consistently referred to the Massachusetts action as a new case. On April 24, 2007, Respondent assisted with drafting a motion titled, “Motion for Order to Show Cause and for Expedited Discovery and Preservation of Documents and Information to be filed in the District of Massachusetts^” which included a supporting memorandum of law and a declaration by Respondent.

The motion was submitted to the judge in the Massachusetts action. Attached to the motion were over one-hundred pages of excerpts from the deposition transcripts in the New York action, which were designated “ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY.” Although the motion requested, inter alia, an order requiring Judge Baer to return the deposition transcripts in his custody to Wolters Kluwer, or to allow Wolters Kluwer “to request duplicate transcripts from the [ejourt reporter for use in the Massachusetts action[,]” the memorandum of law did not reflect that Respondent previously requested duplicate transcripts from the court reporter on April 21. Charge One (“The Brackett Charge”) Subsequently on April 24, 2007, Judge Baer’s law clerk sent an e-mail to Respondent, copying defendants’ counsel, and forwarded same to other members at Dorsey & Whitney involved in the Wolters Kluwer litigation. The law clerk requested a representation as to whether either firm was in current possession, or possession since April 20, any copies, in any format, of any deposition transcripts taken in the matter.

The parties were directed to return any remaining deposition transcripts to the court by April 25,11:00 a.m. Upon receipt of the e-mail, Mr. Brackett uncovered the folder in his office containing deposition transcripts with markings and flags, as well as several clean deposition transcripts, which should have been returned on April 20. Mr. Brackett apprised Respondent by phone immediately thereaf ⁵³⁵ ter, to which she replied that she was discussing the matter with another partner. Mr. Brackett left the folder containing the deposition transcripts in his office for Respondent to retrieve, but returned to his office the next day to discover that Respondent had not collected it.

Mr. Brackett had the deposition transcripts sent to Respondent by messenger that same day. Although Respondent received clarification from Judge Baer’s law clerk that the parties were not required “to go through its pleadings files and remove all exhibits from its pleadings[,]” in response to the law clerk’s request, she did not inform the law clerk that Dorsey & Whitney had already used the deposition transcripts in its filings in Massachusetts. Ultimately, none of the deposition transcripts in the firm’s possession were returned to the court by the 11:00 a.m. deadline. On April 26, following a discussion between Mr. Herman and Mr. Brackett regarding his deposition transcripts, Respondent asked Mr. Brackett to accompany her to the office, where the deposition transcripts remained.

As they proceeded to review the deposition transcripts, Respondent stated to Mr. Brackett, “I’ll leave the office for a few minutes, you should scribble all over them so that they’ll be deemed work product and we won’t have to return them.” Respondent then left her office for approximately two to three minutes and Mr. Brackett proceeded to make small markings on the first page of each of the remaining clean deposition transcripts. Later that day, Mr. Brackett informed Mr. Herman of what transpired in Respondent’s office. When confronted by partners at Dorsey & Whitney of the Brackett allegation, she did not deny her statement, but stated that she was “joking” and made the statement in a mocking and sarcastic fashion. Both Respondent and her former secretary, Eileen Brennan, provided conflicting versions of the events.

Apart from Respondent’s directive to Mr. Brackett, both versions exculpated Respondent of any wrongdoing. The magistrate judge rejected both versions and credited Mr. Brackett’s testimony. ⁵³⁶ On April 26, 2007, after becoming aware of the Brackett allegation, Judge Baer issued a subsequent order by e-mail to Respondent, directing the return of any copies of deposition transcripts to the court that evening. However, the deposition transcripts were not delivered to the court until April 27. Respondent attached a cover letter to the deposition transcripts mischaracterizing her knowledge of the matter, stating “[s]ome of the attached [deposition] transcripts that were brought to my attention yesterday for the first time do not appear to be work product privileged.” Although Respondent ultimately facilitated Dorsey & Whitney’s compliance with Judge Baer’s oral orders, several times throughout that period, she maintained that his orders were “not valid.” Respondent has also maintained that she was not obliged to comply with Judge Baer’s orders.

However, in other instances she reiterated that she was lead counsel and that all matters pertaining to the Wolters Kluwer litigation must “go through” her. In rendering her conclusions, the magistrate judge relied upon her extensive record-based findings, which were largely based upon the credibility of the witnesses, including Respondent, who testified during the eleven-day hearing. In sum, the magistrate found overwhelming evidence to support her conclusion that (1) in connection with Charge One, Respondent did, in fact, instruct Mr. Brackett, a first-year associate at Dorsey & Whitney, to place handwritten “marks” on deposition transcripts to claim attorney work-product privilege against court orders, and then attempted to mislead the court as to these events; (2) in connection with Charge Three, Respondent copied deposition transcripts and ordered additional copies of same, and then used them in the Massachusetts action, in defiance of court orders; and (3) Respondent’s “repeated attempts to circumvent the proper legal process established] that she acted with a culpable state of mind” while engaging in the misconduct for which she has been charged. ⁵³⁷ STANDARD OF REVIEW The manner in which this Court handles reciprocal disciplinary cases is well established. Pursuant to Md. Rule 16 — 773(g), “the factual findings and conclusions of law of the sister jurisdiction(s) are treated generally as conclusive evidence of an attorney’s misconduct.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Adams, 441 Md. 590, 605 , 109 A.3d 114, 123 (2015) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Katz, 429 Md. 308, 315 , 55 A.3d 909, 913 (2012)). “The introduction of such evidence does not preclude, however, the introduction of additional evidence that shows ‘cause why no discipline or lesser discipline should be imposed.’ ” Id.

(quoting Katz, 429 Md. at 316 , 55 A.3d at [913]); Md. Rule 16-773(g). 15 This Court has discretion, under Md. Rule 16-773(e), “to impose a discipline consistent with the sister jurisdiction’s factual findings and conclusions, or to order a different or more serious alternative based on the existence of ‘exceptional circumstances[.]’ ” Adams, 441 Md. at 605-06 , 109 A.3d at 123 (quoting Katz, 429 Md. at 316 , 55 A.3d at 913 ). “Exceptional circumstances” precluding an order of reciprocal discipline include, inter alia, that the attorney’s misconduct “does not constitute misconduct in this State or it warrants substantially different discipline in this State[.]” Md. Rule 16-773(e)(4). 16 This rule ensures that all attorneys ⁵³⁸ barred in this State are subject to similar sanctions for comparable misconduct, regardless of whether the misconduct occurred in this State or another jurisdiction. See generally Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zodrow, 419 Md. 286, 302 , 19 A.3d 381, 390-91 (2011). However, pursuant to Md. Rule 16-773(f), 17 this Court is “inclined, but not required, to impose the same sanction as that imposed by the state in which the misconduct occurred.” Id. at 302 , 19 A.3d at 390-91 . “We are required to assess for ourselves the propriety of the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction and that recommended by [Bar Counsel].” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Whitehead, 390 Md. 663, 672 , 890 A.2d 751, 756 (2006). See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gordon, 413 Md. 46, 55 , 991 A.2d 51, 56 (2010) (“our rules state that we may impose ‘corresponding discipline,’ not that we shall impose ‘identical discipline.’ ”); Katz, 429 Md. at 317 , 55 A.3d at 914 (noting that this Court has “the long-established duty to impose discipline that is consistent with our attorney disciplinary jurisprudence by assessing, independently, the propriety of the sanction imposed by a sister jurisdiction, as well as the sanction recommended by Bar Counsel.”).

Accordingly, “the sanction imposed will depend not only on the decision of the sister jurisdiction, but also on the specific facts of each case, balanced against Maryland precedent.” Katz, 429 Md. at 317 , 55 A.3d at 914 . See also Gordon, 413 Md. at 56 , 991 A.2d at 56-57 (“We are required to analyze each case individually and decide whether to deviate from the original jurisdiction’s sanction.”). We impose corresponding discipline only if the purpose of the originating ⁵³⁹ jurisdiction’s sanction is congruent with ours, while remaining cognizant that “[o]ur purpose in attorney discipline cases is the protection of the public, rather than the punishment of the erring attorney.” See id. DISCUSSION For the reasons that follow, we shall uphold the conclusions of law of the magistrate judge.

MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) (False Statements of Fact or Law) and 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation) MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) provides, “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly ... make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer[.]” MLRPC 3.3 as a whole, is based upon the idea that “[e]very court ... has the right to rely upon an attorney to assist it in ascertaining the truth of the case before it[,]” which imposes upon an attorney the obligation to be fully honest and forthright throughout litigation. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dore, 433 Md. 685, 703 , 73 A.3d 161, 171 (2013). Conduct that violates MLRPC 3.3 often violates MLRPC 8.4(c) as well, given that both rules concern dishonest conduct. Id. at 707 , 73 A.3d at 174 .

Under MLRPC 8.4(c), “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Barnett, 440 Md. 254, 266 , 102 A.3d 310, 318 (2014). “Dishonest acts, in and of themselves are violative of [MLRPC] 8.4(c).” Id. (citation omitted). Clear and convincing evidence supports the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Respondent violated MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c) when she instructed Mr. Brackett to “mark-up” the deposition transcripts, in an intentional effort to render them attorney work product, and then knowingly made a false statement of fact to the court, claiming that the ⁵⁴⁰ remaining deposition transcripts in the firm’s possession constituted work-produet. Respondent also violated MLRPC 8.4(c) when she e-mailed the court reporter service requesting additional copies and untruthfully claiming that she had “misplaced” the discs of the deposition transcripts.

Her conduct in both instances was calculated to mislead the court about her actions. MLRPC 3.4(c) (Duty to Obey Obligations under the Rules of a Tribunal) MLRPC 3.4(c) provides, “[a] lawyer shall not ... knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists[.]” Clear and convincing evidence supports the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Respondent violated MLRPC 3.4(c) when she knowingly copied deposition transcripts and ordered additional copies of same for use in the Massachusetts action, in contravention of Judge Baer’s Confidentiality Order. The evidence demonstrates that Respondent executed this process of duplication without permission, in order to circumvent Judge Baer’s Confidentiality Order in the New York action, all the while cognizant that such conduct was prohibited under the terms