Attorney Grievance Commission v. Trilling

PER CURIAM. The Attorney Grievance Commission filed in this Court a petition for disciplinary action against Michael P. Trilling. Mr. Trilling has been a member of the Maryland Bar since December 1973. Pursuant to Maryland Rule BV9, this Court transmitted the charges to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for a hearing, and we designated Circuit Judge Richard B. Latham to hear the charges.

Judge Latham’s findings of fact are as follows: “The Respondent, Michael P. Trilling, was served with a copy of the Petition for Disciplinary Action together with a copy of the Request for Admissions of Facts and Genuineness of Documents on July 27, 1987. Respondent did not answer the Petition for Disciplinary Action and on September 17, 1987, an Order of Default was entered against Respondent, and a notice of such default was sent to the Respondent by the Clerk of this Court on September 25, 1987, advising the Respondent that he might move to vacate the Order of Default within thirty (30) days of the date of the entry of the default. “At the hearing of this matter Petitioner moved into evidence its Petition for Disciplinary Action, Request for Admission of Facts and Exhibits attached thereto which are ⁷¹³ now deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 4-424(b) of the Maryland Rules of Procedure. “The Court therefore finds, by clear and convincing evidence, and further based on the transcript of testimony at the Inquiry Panel which was also introduced by the Petitioner at this hearing, that Respondent, Michael P. Trilling, represented Jack Harris, Incorporated, a collection agency located in Lanham, Maryland. He was retained to pursue collection matters from debtors for amounts due creditor-clients of Jack Harris, Incorporated. “Respondent would forward to Virginia counsel claims which were required to be pursued in the State of Virginia. “Dale E. Sanders, Esquire, was a member of the Virginia Bar to whom Mr. Trilling would forward claims in that State. He pursued two matters, one on behalf of United National Bank and one on behalf of the Giant Food Federal Credit Union in which sums collected were forwarded to Mr. Trilling.

Mr. Sanders forwarded the sum of $3,204.73 in a matter involving United National Bank vs. Rodriguez and the sum of $717.66 to Mr. Trilling in the matter of Giant Food Federal Credit Union v. Clarence Brooks. The Respondent, Trilling, placed those sums in his escrow account. “In the early part of 1985 the creditors sought an accounting of funds which had been collected since they had been notified by the debtors that payment in full had been made. Dale Sanders, Esquire, Virginia counsel, filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission on July 30, 1985, in which he provided copies of cancelled checks as evidence that money which he had collected had in fact been forwarded by him to Respondent and that Respondent had deposited those sums in his escrow account. Evidence of receipt by Respondent of these sums and the account in which they were deposited are attached to the Request for Admissions filed by Petitioner constituting Exhibit 4 and its various sub-parts. “Admission 8b, unanswered by Respondent, indicates that between the period June 20, 1982, and February 15, 1985, ⁷¹⁴ the funds collected by Virginia counsel were received by Respondent Trilling and deposited in his escrow account and aggregated the total of $3,204.73 (Admission 8cc) being sums collected in the case of United National Bank v. Rodriguez and the sum of $717.66 (Admission 8qq) being sums collected in the Giant Food Federal Credit Union v. Brooks. “The Court finds that the aggregated sum payable to Respondent’s client, Jack Harris, Inc., was the sum of $3,824.33 as of May 31, 1985, and was not transmitted by Respondent to Jack Harris, Inc. or any creditor-client.

Exhibit 7, attached to the Request for Admissions, analyzes Respondent’s escrow account, that being done by Colonel' K.W. Watkins, an Investigator with Petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Commission. That analysis shows that at no time between May 21, 1984, and May 31, 1985, did Respondent maintain a sufficient balance in his escrow account to pay the sums held on behalf of his client. Indeed, as indicated by Exhibit 6, eighty-two checks drawn on the escrow account between May 1984 and May 1985 show that 62 of those checks were payable