Attorney Grievance v. Jackson

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Dawn R. Jackson, Miscellaneous Docket AG No. 9, September Term, 2020, Opinion by Booth, J. ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – This attorney grievance matter involves an attorney who is licensed in the District of Columbia and not in Maryland. The attorney is a partner in a law firm that employs Maryland attorneys. In 2014, the attorney moved the law firm’s office from the District of Columbia to Maryland. In 2015, the Office of Bar Counsel met with the attorney in her office and made specific recommendations for maintaining an office in Maryland.

Three and one-half years later, after receiving an anonymous complaint, the Attorney Grievance Commission opened an investigation into the attorney’s alleged unauthorized practice of law. Although the Court of Appeals concluded that the attorney violated the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) 19-305.5, the Court determined that, given the significant and unusual mitigating factors that were present in this case, it would impose no sanction and that dismissal of the proceeding was appropriate. Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No.: CAE20-12284 Argued: September 13, 2021 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 9 September Term, 2020 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. DAWN R. JACKSON Getty, C.J. McDonald Watts Hotten Booth Biran Raker, Irma S.

(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. Opinion by Booth, J. Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. Filed: January 31, 2022 2022-01-31 10:33-05:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk In this attorney grievance proceeding, the Respondent, Dawn Jackson, is a lawyer admitted to the District of Columbia Bar who is not licensed in Maryland. She is a partner in a law firm, Jackson & Associates.

In addition to Ms. Jackson, the law firm also employs Maryland attorneys. In 2014, the law firm relocated from the District of Columbia to Maryland. In 2015, Senior Assistant Bar Counsel Dolores Ridgell met with Ms. Jackson in Ms. Jackson’s Maryland office. During that meeting, Ms. Ridgell made specific recommendations to Ms. Jackson concerning how to maintain her Maryland office in accordance with the Maryland rules of professional conduct.

Ms. Jackson incorporated Ms. Ridgell’s recommendations and continued to practice law from her Maryland office. She limited her own practice to matters arising under District of Columbia laws, where she was barred, while also performing administrative matters for the law firm. Three and one-half years after Ms. Ridgell’s visit to Ms. Jackson’s law office, Bar Counsel commenced this investigation on September 19, 2018, after receiving material from an anonymous source. On April 7, 2020, the Attorney Grievance Commission (“Commission”), through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-721, against Ms. Jackson, alleging that she violated numerous provisions of the rules of professional conduct.1 These included alleged 1 During much of the period relevant to this case, the ethical rules governing attorneys were entitled the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) and were codified in an appendix to Maryland Rule 16-812.

Effective July 1, 2016, the MLRPC were renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) and recodified in Title 19 of the Maryland Rules without substantive changes. See Maryland Rules 19-300.1 et seq. We shall use the current codification of those rules in this opinion. Additionally, for readability, we will use shortened references – i.e., Maryland Rule 19-301.1 will be referred to as Rule 1.1. violations of Rule 1.1 (competence); Rule 1.3 (diligence); Rule 1.4 (communication); Rule 1.16 (declining or terminating representation); Rule 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal); Rule 3.4 (fairness to opposing party and attorney); Rule 5.1 (responsibilities regarding non- attorney assistants); Rule 5.5 (unauthorized practice of law; multi-jurisdictional practice of law); Rule 8.1(a) (bar admission and disciplinary matters); and Rule 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d) (misconduct).

Bar Counsel also charged Ms. Jackson with violating sections 10-206 and 10-601 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article (“BOP”) of the Maryland Code. Bar Counsel later withdrew the charges related to competence and diligence. Pursuant to Rule 19-722(a), we designated Judge Lawrence V. Hill, Jr. of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (“the hearing judge”) to conduct a hearing concerning the alleged violations and to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law. Following a hearing in January 2021, the hearing judge concluded that Ms. Jackson violated Rule 5.5 by engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in Maryland.

The hearing judge further concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish violations of Rule 1.4, Rule 1.16, Rule 3.3, Rule 3.4, Rule 5.1, Rule 5.3, Rule 8.1(a), Rule 8.4(a)–(d), BOP § 10-206 and BOP § 10-601. This Court has original and complete jurisdiction in attorney discipline proceedings and conducts an independent review of the record. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ambe, 425 Md. 98, 123 (2012) (internal citations omitted). We review the hearing judge’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard.

Id. When no exceptions are filed to a hearing judge’s findings of fact, we accept them as established. Md. Rule 19- 740(b)(2)(A). Additionally, we “may confine [our] review to the findings of fact 2 challenged by the exceptions.” Md. Rule 19-740(b)(2)(B).

In this case, Bar Counsel did not file any exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact, and Ms. Jackson excepts to only one factual finding. We summarize below the hearing judge’s findings of fact and other undisputed matters in the record, as they relate to the alleged violations, and we address the one factual exception as part of our discussion. I Facts Ms. Jackson’s Bar Admissions Ms. Jackson was admitted to the New Jersey Bar in 2001 and the District of Columbia Bar in 2004. She is not, and never has been, licensed to practice law in Maryland.

Ms. Jackson’s Law Practice with Brynee Baylor – Baylor & Jackson From 2001 through 2011, Ms. Jackson and Brynee Baylor were partners in the law firm of Baylor & Jackson, PLLC (“the Baylor & Jackson law firm”), which maintained an office for the practice of law in the District of Columbia. Ms. Baylor was licensed to practice in both Maryland and the District of Columbia. The law firm also employed associate- attorneys, Chervonti Jones and Tiffany Sims, both of whom were licensed to practice law in Maryland. Ms. Jackson’s practice focused on clients and legal matters arising in the District of Columbia, and Ms. Baylor handled cases in both jurisdictions where she was licensed, with the assistance of the associate-attorneys who were also licensed in Maryland.

Ms. Jackson and Ms. Baylor supervised the associate-attorneys. Ms. Jackson was also responsible for the firm’s administrative responsibilities, including maintaining the firm’s trust account, entering leases and other contracts on behalf of the law firm, hiring 3 staff, and other administrative functions. Ms. Jackson also served as a key resource for other members of the law firm. The attorneys in the firm would consult her on an as needed basis to calculate case expenses and the clients’ net recovery on contingency fee cases.

Ms. Jackson assisted with the preparation of settlement sheets, itemizing the deductions from the clients’ gross recovery. SEC Case Against Brynee Baylor At some point prior to November 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) commenced an investigation of Ms. Baylor for securities fraud. According to the SEC, Ms. Baylor helped perpetrate a securities fraud scheme in which Ms. Baylor posed as counsel to one of her co-defendants to lend an air of legitimacy to the scheme and masked some of her proceeds of the fraudulent funds as attorney’s fees, which she laundered through the Baylor & Jackson law firm. After unsealing a complaint against Ms. Baylor on November 30, 2011, the SEC contacted Ms. Jackson via telephone and advised her of the case that it had filed against her partner.

The SEC informed Ms. Jackson that it had seized the law firm’s operating account and her personal account, thus making it impossible for Ms. Jackson to pay staff or support her family. Ms. Jackson was named as a “relief defendant” in the SEC fraud litigation against Ms. Baylor, and spent the next few years helping the agency recover money for Ms. Baylor’s victims. The SEC case resulted in the entry of a judgment in 2013 against Ms. 4 Baylor, the Baylor & Jackson law firm, and other co-defendants for over $2.6 million, which was upheld on appeal that concluded in 2015.2 The hearing judge found that, in the aftermath of the SEC’s November 2011 telephone call, Ms. Jackson was overwhelmed with obligations to her family, her staff, the SEC, and attorney disciplinary authorities in Washington, D.C. and Maryland (who had opened disciplinary investigations into Ms. Baylor). After being told that federal officials had frozen her firm’s operating account, Ms. Jackson testified that she became “emotionally [] distraught,” describing herself as a “zombie trying to keep everything together.” Ms. Jackson testified about the physical and emotional toll that Ms. Baylor’s scandal had on her personal and professional life.

Portions of Ms. Jackson’s medical records were admitted into evidence. As part of our consideration of the mitigating factors found by the hearing judge in this case, we shall discuss in more detail the personal and 2 The SEC sued Ms. Baylor, the Baylor & Jackson law firm, the Milan Group, Inc., and other individuals as “Principal Defendants” for conducting an alleged securities fraud from which victims suffered losses amounting to millions of dollars. See S.E.C. v. Milan Group, 962 F. Supp. 2d 182 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 595 Fed. Appx. 2 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Ms. Jackson was named as a “Relief Defendant,” which the District Court described as a “person[] who allegedly received money resulting from the fraudulent activities but who [is] not charged with personally engaging in the fraud.” Milan Group, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 186 .

During the pendency of the case and trial, the SEC required that Ms. Jackson keep the Baylor & Jackson law firm intact as “a going concern” to preserve the law firm’s accounts and assets that would eventually contribute toward the monetary judgment to satisfy the victims’ monetary losses. The District Court entered summary judgment against Ms. Baylor, the Baylor & Jackson law firm, and other defendants jointly and severally liable for over $2.6 million in ill-gotten profits. Id. at 211 . The money judgment was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 2015.

Milan Group, 595 Fed. Appx. at 2 . 5 emotional problems that Ms. Jackson suffered as a result of Ms. Baylor’s fraudulent actions. Despite the SEC’s civil and criminal investigation into Ms. Baylor, she remained licensed in Maryland and in the District of Columbia for years after the complaints and indictment were unsealed. Ms. Jackson testified that, during the initial transition period in 2011 and 2012, she had no way to deny Ms. Baylor access to the office or to client files because Ms. Baylor was licensed to practice law, and Ms. Jackson was required by the SEC to maintain the Baylor & Jackson law firm as a going concern. Ms. Baylor continued to have keys to the office and could access her desktop computer by logging in remotely.

Ms. Jackson’s Formation of a New Firm – Jackson & Associates During this transition period—beginning in late 2011 or early 2012, as Ms. Jackson was cooperating with the SEC to preserve the Baylor & Jackson law firm as a going concern, and ultimately winding it down to satisfy the judgment—Ms. Jackson formed a new law firm, Jackson & Associates Law Firm, PLLC (“Jackson & Associates”). From 2011 until sometime in 2014, Ms. Jackson operated her new law firm from the same office space in the District of Columbia, where she continued to perform the same administrative responsibilities, with the same attorneys (except Ms. Baylor) and staff that had previously been employed at the Baylor & Jackson law firm. Jackson & Associates Moves Its Office from the District of Columbia to Maryland When their lease expired, in the spring of 2014, Jackson & Associates moved its office from its District of Columbia location to an office in Upper Marlboro, Maryland. Ms. Jackson continued to focus on cases arising in the District of Columbia, while the 6 Maryland lawyers who were employed by the firm, Tiffany Sims, Pamela Ashby, and Victoria Adegoke, handled Maryland cases.

After the office relocated from the District of Columbia to Maryland, Ms. Jackson continued to perform the same administrative responsibilities for the law firm that she always had—such as maintaining the trust account, entering contracts, overseeing the hiring of staff, and computing clients’ recoveries in contingency cases. Bar Counsel’s Investigation into Brynee Baylor and Site Visit to Ms. Jackson’s Maryland Office After a lengthy investigation, Bar Counsel filed disciplinary charges against Ms. Baylor on November 24, 2014.3 Ms. Baylor was ultimately disbarred by order of this Court pursuant to a joint petition for disbarment. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Baylor, 443 Md. 229 (2015). In preparation for the disciplinary case against Ms. Baylor, Senior Assistant Bar Counsel Dolores Ridgell (“Senior Assistant Bar Counsel” or “Ms. Ridgell”) met with Ms. Jackson on two occasions.

These meetings occurred on March 13, 2015 at Bar Counsel’s office in Crownsville, and on June 5, 2015 at Ms. Jackson’s office in Upper Marlboro, Maryland. Although the purpose of the second meeting was to prepare for the Commission’s disciplinary case against Ms. Baylor, in the context of that meeting, Senior Assistant Bar Counsel and Ms. Jackson discussed the fact that Ms. Jackson was operating her law practice from an office in Maryland. Ms. Jackson’s attorney, Stephan Brennan, was also present at the meeting, and corroborated Ms. Jackson’s recollection of the 3 Bar Counsel never charged Ms. Jackson with professional misconduct in connection with the facts and circumstances leading to Ms. Baylor’s disbarment. 7 substance of the discussion between Ms. Ridgell and Ms. Jackson concerning Ms. Jackson’s practice of law from the Maryland office. During this June 5, 2015 meeting, Ms. Jackson and Ms. Ridgell discussed the proper safeguards for Ms. Jackson to put into place in order to maintain an office in Maryland since she was not a Maryland attorney.

Ms. Jackson testified that she recalled Ms. Ridgell stating “[t]hat we always had to have a Maryland attorney on staff” and that her “business cards and letterhead needed to reflect that I was not licensed in Maryland . . . but licensed in D.C.” Ms. Jackson testified that she took Ms. Ridgell’s advice, and promptly placed this disclaimer on her firm’s letterhead, website profile, email signature, and her business card. The hearing judge determined that Ms. Jackson made these changes in response to her discussion with Bar Counsel. The signs in the lobby and outside the office door of the Maryland office, however, did not disclose that Ms. Jackson was not barred in Maryland. In 2020 (after Bar Counsel initiated this investigation), Ms. Jackson opened a second office for Jackson & Associates in the District of Columbia.

The hearing judge found that, after establishing this second office, Ms. Jackson continued to work in both the District of Columbia office and the Maryland office in Upper Marlboro. Bar Counsel’s Investigation and Disciplinary Charges Against Dawn Jackson In September 2018—over three and one-half years after Senior Assistant Bar Counsel Ridgell’s visit to Ms. Jackson’s Maryland law office—Bar Counsel opened an investigation into Ms. Jackson’s law practice after receiving an anonymous complaint. On October 17, 2018, Bar Counsel wrote to Ms. Jackson advising her that “[i]t has come to the attention of this office that you may be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.” 8 In the letter, Bar Counsel directed Ms. Jackson to “respond in writing indicating” why she believed that the establishment of Jackson & Associates’ Maryland office location complied with Rule 5.5(b)(1). In addition to Bar Counsel’s general concern related to the law firm’s office location, Bar Counsel asked Ms. Jackson to explain her alleged participation in two Maryland cases.

Bar Counsel’s letter advised Ms. Jackson that Bar Counsel, as well as the Maryland Attorney General, was authorized to investigate, and, if necessary, seek injunctive relief against “anyone engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.” Bar Counsel also pointed out that “there are criminal penalties for such conduct.” On December 3, 2018, Ms. Jackson, through her counsel, Mr. Brennan, submitted a detailed seven-page response to Bar Counsel, which attempted to address Bar Counsel’s general concerns related to Ms. Jackson’s Maryland office location, as well as Bar Counsel’s specific inquiries related to the two client matters. With respect to general concerns related to Jackson & Associates’ office location in Maryland, Mr. Brennan recounted the SEC investigation and disciplinary proceeding against Ms. Baylor, and Ms. Jackson’s full cooperation with Bar Counsel. Mr. Brennan reminded Bar Counsel’s office that he had represented Ms. Jackson throughout the proceedings involving Ms. Baylor, including his representation of Ms. Jackson as a witness in Bar Counsel’s case against Ms. Baylor, and pointed out that he had personal knowledge of much of the information contained in the letter. Mr. Brennan described the relocation of Jackson & Associates’ office from the District of Columbia to Maryland in 2014, pointing out that the firm employed three lawyers licensed to practice in Maryland.

Mr. Brennan enclosed documentation confirming that the 9 Jackson & Associates website, Ms. Jackson’s letterhead, business cards, and email contact information reflected that Ms. Jackson was not admitted to practice law in Maryland, but that she is admitted in the District of Columbia and New Jersey. As for the two client matters raised by Bar Counsel in its letter, Mr. Brennan explained that the clients represented in those cases were not represented by Ms. Jackson but were instead represented by other members of the law firm who were licensed in Maryland. Mr. Brennan enclosed copies of the pleadings that had been filed in each case, which confirmed that Ms. Jackson was not counsel in either case. In one case that we will discuss below—the “Yenchochic case”—Mr. Brennan acknowledged that two lines had been filed in that case seeking the reissuance of a summons, which appeared to bear Ms. Jackson’s signature.

However, Mr. Brennan stated that Ms. Jackson had no recollection of signing them. Mr. Brennan pointed out that the lines were filed in 2012 after the SEC investigation into Ms. Baylor came to light, which was a “very disruptive, stressful and tumultuous time” for Ms. Jackson. Despite the absence of any memory of signing these lines, Ms. Jackson acknowledged that it was “possible” that the lines were signed by her, during this tumultuous period when she was “moving too fast and not paying enough attention at a time when she was asked to sign a large number of papers in a large number of cases.”4 4 In his letter to Bar Counsel, Mr. Brennan also addressed Bar Counsel’s inquiry concerning another client-related matter involving Michelle Lyons. Although Bar Counsel’s charges included this second client matter, the hearing judge determined that Bar Counsel failed to prove that Ms. Jackson “took any action” in connection with the Lyons matter.

Bar Counsel did not file exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact pertaining to these 10 Mr. Brennan concluded by stating that, other than Ms. Jackson’s “possible mistake” in signing two lines requesting that a summons be reissued in one of Ms. Baylor’s cases in the aftermath of the SEC investigation, he was “confident that it was an isolated occurrence that ha[d] not reoccurred in the past six years.” On behalf of his client, Mr. Brennan concluded by stating that he had “attempted to provide a thorough response to Bar Counsel’s concerns, and that he and Ms. Jackson remained willing to cooperate in Bar Counsel’s investigation.” Despite Ms. Jackson’s response to Bar Counsel’s letter and willingness to cooperate, Bar Counsel initiated formal charges,5 which resulted in the evidentiary hearing before charges. Accordingly, we shall not discuss them further. See Md. Rule 19-740(b)(2)(B) (we “may confine [our] review to the findings of fact challenged by the exceptions[]”). 5 The record before the hearing judge in this matter included portions of Bar Counsel’s responses to Ms. Jackson’s request for admissions (“admissions”). In the admissions, Bar Counsel admits that on February 11, 2020, Ms. Jackson requested additional information from the Office of Bar Counsel concerning what additional steps, if any, she could undertake to ensure compliance with her ethical obligations.

According to Bar Counsel’s admissions, Bar Counsel did not respond to Ms. Jackson’s letter because its office “does not provide legal advice.” Instead, the Commission proceeded to file this Petition in April 2020. Although Bar Counsel’s current policy is not to offer what it considers to be “legal advice” on compliance related matters, it has not always been that office’s policy. At the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Jackson attempted to introduce the deposition transcript of Glenn M. Grossman, who was Bar Counsel from July 2010 – July 2017, to demonstrate what Bar Counsel’s policy had been during the time period covering some of the charges. Counsel for Ms. Jackson deposed Mr. Grossman on November 12, 2020, which Bar Counsel’s office attended.

Because Mr. Grossman resided in Florida at the time of the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Jackson’s counsel offered portions of his deposition transcript into evidence pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-419(a)(3)(B). This rule permits the deposition of a witness to “be used by any party for any purpose against any other party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, if the court finds: . . . that the witness is out of the State, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition.” The hearing judge sustained Bar 11 Judge Hill. As previously noted, the hearing judge found only one violation of Rule 5.5(a)—related to two lines filed in the Yenchochic case discussed below. Representation of Michelle Yenchochic Michelle Yenchochic retained the Baylor & Jackson law firm for her representation in an uncontested divorce with her then-husband Roger Diaz.

In May 2011, Ms. Baylor filed the complaint on Ms. Yenchochic’s behalf in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The hearing judge found that Ms. Baylor was Ms. Yenchochic’s counsel of record for the duration of her case. Ms. Baylor’s assistant served as the liaison with the client. To Ms. Yenchochic’s recollection, she only worked with two attorneys—Ms. Baylor and later, Tiffany Sims—both of whom were licensed to practice in Maryland.

Ms. Sims appeared on behalf of Ms. Yenchochic at her divorce proceedings in December 2012 and January Counsel’s objection to the introduction of Mr. Grossman’s deposition transcript, reasoning that the witness could have “Zoomed in from Naples.” Ms. Jackson excepts to the hearing judge’s failure to admit the deposition testimony into evidence. We sustain this exception. Ms. Jackson was entitled to admit Mr. Grossman’s deposition transcript pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-419(a)(3)(B) because the deposition was properly noted, Bar Counsel attended the deposition, Mr. Grossman was out of the State, and Ms. Jackson did not procure his absence. There is no “Zoom exception” to the witness unavailability rules, and Ms. Jackson was entitled to rely upon the Maryland Rules as written.

Mr. Grossman’s deposition testimony highlights the policy changes in the Office of Bar Counsel during the period between Ms. Ridgell’s 2015 visit to Ms. Jackson’s office and the filing of charges in this matter in 2020. Mr. Grossman acknowledged that “there were a number of ways that I pursued [the job of protecting the public.]” Although “one way was to prosecute those who violated the Rules of Professional Conduct[,] . . . another way was to educate lawyers on their ethical obligations so that they wouldn’t have to get into trouble and the public would be protected in that way.” When asked whether staff counsel such as Ms. Ridgell would “have occasion to engage in a dialogue with attorneys to help them meet their ethical obligations,” Mr. Grossman confirmed that such a practice “would happen” during his tenure as Bar Counsel. 12 2013. The hearing judge found that Ms. Sims properly appeared in Ms. Yenchochic’s divorce proceeding, obtained a judgment of absolute divorce on her client’s behalf, and closed the case. The hearing judge found that Ms. Jackson had no contact with Ms. Yenchochic regarding her divorce case.

Ms. Yenchochic testified that she “never dealt with Dawn Jackson,” “never met her,” “never spoke to her,” never exchanged emails with her, and had no knowledge of her participation in any aspect of the divorce proceedings. The only involvement that Ms. Jackson had with Ms. Yenchochic’s case involved the filing of two lines bearing Ms. Jackson’s signature—one in March 2012 and a second in September 2012—requesting the reissuance of summons, after Ms. Baylor encountered difficulty serving Mr. Diaz. The hearing judge found that Ms. Jackson had no recollection of the Yenchochic case “at all[,]” nor did she recall signing the forms “close to a decade ago.” The hearing judge credited Ms. Jackson’s testimony that, amid the SEC scandal, her life in 2012 “was a blur. I was literally a zombie trying to keep everything together.” The hearing judge found that Ms. Jackson had no idea as to how her signature was included on the two lines that were filed “close to a decade ago” and that her lack of memory was “very reasonable.” Despite her lack of recollection, the hearing judge determined that Ms. Jackson “admitted to the authenticity of her signature.” Ms. Jackson’s sole exception to the hearing judge’s factual findings in this matter relates to his finding that Ms. Jackson signed the lines requesting the reissuance of a summons in the Yenchochic case.

She argues that Bar Counsel failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that she, in fact, signed the forms. She 13 contends that the hearing judge’s findings on this point are somewhat inconsistent, noting that the hearing judge found that, given the passage of time, it places Ms. Jackson in “the awkward position of trying to defend her actions when, in fact, she cannot recall them either.” She points out that the hearing judge found her “recollection or lack thereof to be very reasonable” and recognized the difficulty that this posed in his fact finding. Although this is a close case given Bar Counsel’s burden, we overrule Ms. Jackson’s exception. We cannot say, on this record, that the hearing judge’s factual finding was clearly erroneous.

Based upon our review of the record, the hearing judge found Ms. Jackson’s testimony to be very reasonable and credible on every point, including her admission that the signature on these forms that were executed eight years prior to the hearing appeared to be hers, which were signed at a chaotic period in her life, the circumstances of which were not of her own making.6 6 Ms. Jackson urges us to exercise our discretion to dismiss these charges based upon the equitable doctrine of laches. Although we have never applied laches in the context of an attorney grievance proceeding, we have recognized that the defense may apply where prejudice to the attorney or other circumstances make it “inequitable to grant the relief sought.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Penn, 431 Md. 320, 335 (2013) (citations omitted). Although this is a closer case than those in which we have previously considered the equitable defense, see e.g., id.; Attorney Grievance Commission v. Cassilly, 476 Md. 309 (2021); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kahn, 290 Md. 654 (1981); Anne Arundel Bar Association v. Collins, 272 Md. 578 (1974), we decline to apply the doctrine here, given that we have considered Bar Counsel’s extraordinary delay in pursuing charges against Ms. Jackson as part of the mitigating factors in this case, and are exercising our discretion to impose no sanction in this case. 14 II Hearing Judge’s Conclusions of Law At the start of the evidentiary hearing, Bar Counsel voluntarily dismissed charges against Ms. Jackson for violations of Rules 1.1 and 1.3. As previously noted, the hearing judge determined that Bar Counsel failed to meet its burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Jackson violated Rules 1.4, 1.16, 3.3, 3.4, 5.1, 5.3, 8.1(a), 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d), and BOP § 10-206 and BOP § 10-601 pertaining to the unauthorized practice of law.

The hearing judge concluded that the only violation that Bar Counsel established was a violation of Rule 5.5(a)—arising from Ms. Jackson filing two lines in the Yenchochic case requesting the reissuance of a summons. Based upon this act, the hearing judge determined that Ms. Jackson “did to the lowest degree engage in the unauthorized practice of law by signing a [l]ine.” Reiterating that the act of filing of a “[l]ine is a highly technical act,” the hearing judge concluded that it was nonetheless a violation of Rule 5.5(a). We conduct a de novo review of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law. Md. Rule 19-740(b)(1).

Neither party filed exceptions to the majority of the hearing judge’s conclusions that there was insufficient evidence to find a violation of the professional rules as charged. With respect to the legal conclusions for which no exceptions were filed by either party, based upon our independent review of the record, we agree with the hearing judge’s conclusions that Bar Counsel failed to establish a violation of these rules by clear and convincing evidence, and we see no reason to elaborate further. We shall focus on the conclusion of law for which exceptions have been lodged. 15 Both parties have filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions concerning Rule 5.5. Notwithstanding the hearing judge’s characterization of the violation as being a “highly technical” one, Ms. Jackson excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated the rule at all.

Bar Counsel excepts to the hearing judge’s failure to find more violations of Rule 5.5 based upon the undisputed facts. Bar Counsel also excepts to the hearing judge’s failure to find a violation of Rule 8.4(a), (b), and (d), as well as BOP §§ 10- 601 and 10-206. We start our discussion with Rule 5.5—the flagship violation from which all other charges and exceptions flow. Rule 5.5 – The Unauthorized Practice of Law The crux of this attorney grievance case involves Rule 5.5 and the applicable provisions of the Business Occupations and Professions Article of the Maryland Code,7 which prohibit attorneys who are not licensed in this State from engaging in the practice of law unless permitted by an exception set forth in the rule or statute.

Rule 5.5 provides in pertinent part: (a) An attorney shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so. (b) An attorney who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction shall not: 7 BOP § 10-206(a) states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, before an individual may practice law in the State, the individual shall: (1) be admitted to the Bar; and (2) meet any requirements that the Court of Appeals may set by rule.” BOP § 10- 601(a) states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a person may not practice, attempt to practice, or offer to practice law in the State unless admitted to the Bar.” 16 (1) except as authorized by these Rules or other law, establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law; or (2) hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the attorney is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction. Rule 5.5 has four basic components.8 First, paragraphs (a) and (b) set out the general prohibitions against non-Maryland barred attorneys engaging in or assisting in the 8 As noted, Rule 5.5(c), (d), and (e) permits an attorney who is not admitted in Maryland to provide legal services in the State only under the following circumstances: (c) An attorney admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that: (1) are undertaken in association with an attorney who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter; (2) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the attorney, or a person the attorney is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized; (3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the attorney’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the attorney is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or (4) are not within subsections (c)(2) or (c)(3) of this Rule and arise out of or are reasonably related to the attorney’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the attorney is admitted to practice. 17 (d) An attorney admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this jurisdiction that: (1) are provided to the attorney’s employer or its organizational affiliates and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or (2) are services that the attorney is authorized to provide by federal law or other law of this jurisdiction. (e)(1) In this section, “foreign attorney” means an attorney who (A) is not admitted to practice law in any United States jurisdiction, (B) is a member in good standing or a recognized legal profession in a country other than the United States and, as such, is authorized to practice law in that country, (C) is subject to effective regulation and discipline by a duly constituted professional body or a public authority of that country, and (D) has not been disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in any jurisdiction of the United States.

(2) A foreign attorney may not establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this State for the practice of law, or hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the attorney is admitted to practice law in this State. Any violation of this provision or any material misrepresentation regarding the requirements in subsection (e)(1) of this Rule by the foreign attorney will subject the foreign attorney to liability for the unauthorized practice of law. (3) A foreign attorney, with respect to any matter, may (A) act as a consultant to a Maryland attorney on the law and practice in a country in which the foreign attorney is admitted to practice, including principles of international law recognized and enforced in that country and (B) in association with a Maryland attorney who actively participates in the matter, participate in discussions with a client of the Maryland attorney or with other persons involved with the matter, provided that the Maryland attorney shall remain fully responsible to the client for all advice and other conduct by the foreign attorney with respect to the matter. 18 unauthorized practice of law, representing to the public that they are licensed in the jurisdiction, or establishing an office in the State. Second, paragraph (c) relaxes these prohibitions somewhat by allowing attorneys admitted in any United States jurisdiction (and not disbarred or suspended in any jurisdiction) to provide legal services on a temporary basis under certain enumerated conditions (“temporary services exception”).

Third, paragraph (d) provides that an attorney admitted in another United States jurisdiction may provide legal services in Maryland that are provided to the attorney’s employer or affiliate organization (“in-house counsel exception”) or services that the attorney is authorized to provide under federal law (“federal practice exception”) or law of this State (“state law exception”).9 Finally, paragraph (e) provides certain exceptions for “foreign attorneys” who are not admitted to practice law in any United States jurisdiction but who are members in good standing of a recognized legal profession in a country other than the United States. In this case, Ms. Jackson argues that her office does not run afoul of Rule 5.5(a) and (b) because as a member of the Bar of the District of Columbia, her practice falls within the federal practice exception set forth in Rule 5.5(d). We will consider the application of the federal practice exception as part of our discussion of the Rule. But first, we start with the hearing judge’s conclusions pertaining to Rule 5.5, starting with his conclusions related to the client-specific matter, followed by his conclusions related to Ms. Jackson’s conduct generally by maintaining a practice in Maryland. 9 BOP § 10-206(b) provides some state law exceptions to the unauthorized practice of law that are not pertinent here. 19 A. Rule 5.5(a) – Charges Arising from the Reissuance of a Summons The only violation of Rule 5.5 that the hearing judge found related to Ms. Jackson’s conduct in filing the two lines requesting the reissuance of a summons in the uncontested Yenchochic divorce case in 2012 after Ms. Baylor’s departure from the firm.

The hearing judge determined that Bar Counsel met its burden of proving that Ms. Jackson signed the summons reissuance lines, concluding that Ms. Jackson sufficiently authenticated her signature by acknowledging that, although she did not recall signing them, the signatures “appeared” to be hers. Based upon this authentication, the hearing judge concluded that Ms. Jackson, “by her own admission did compose a ‘form that was filed in a court.’” The hearing judge concluded that such an act fell within the statutory definition of the “practice of law.” However, in reaching his conclusion, the hearing judge noted that “pro se parties file these same types of forms daily” and pointed out that “no degree of legal experience or knowledge is required to file a [l]ine to reissue [a summons].” Ms. Jackson excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that signing a line requesting that a summons be reissued constitutes the practice of law. Ms. Jackson points out that the hearing judge found the violation to be a technical one and observed that “no degree of legal experience or knowledge is required to file a line to reissue” a summons. Ms. Jackson also notes that the hearing judge found no evidence showing that she fundamentally participated in material elements” of this or any other case.

We agree with the hearing judge’s characterization of the act of filing a pro forma line requesting the issuance of a summons as being a violation of Rule 5.5(a) in the most technical sense. The preparation of such a document does not require any degree of legal 20 experience, knowledge, or training. Nor is such a document considered to be a “pleading” as defined by the Maryland Rules. See Md. Rule 1-202(v).

However, a line is a paper filed with the court. See Md. Rule 1-202(t). The Maryland Rules require that “[e]very pleading and paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney who has been admitted to practice law in this State . . . .” Md. Rule 1-311(a). Ms. Jackson caused a line to be filed bearing her signature.

We determine that this act of signing and filing the line constituted a violation of the Maryland Rules in violation of Rule 5.5(a) and overrule her exception. B. Rule 5.5(a) and (b) – Charges Related to Ms. Jackson’s Practice Generally Turning to Bar Counsel’s charges that relate to Ms. Jackson’s practice generally, the hearing judge concluded that Bar Counsel had not proven that Ms. Jackson violated Rule 5.5 by generally engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. Concerning testimony from Ms. Jackson and the Maryland attorneys in the law firm that they would engage in general interoffice discussions, the hearing judge concluded as follows: Regarding [Ms. Jackson’s] advice or discussing matters with a Maryland attorney, the [c]ourt finds no violation. There is nothing in the Rules that prohibit[s] a Maryland attorney from seeking the opinion of a non-Maryland barred attorney.

Therefore, the [c]ourt finds there is no violation to providing advice to a barred Maryland attorney. As for Bar Counsel’s Rule 5.5 charges related to Ms. Jackson’s physical presence in Maryland, the hearing judge concluded that Bar Counsel had not met its burden in proving that Ms. Jackson “maintained a systematic and continuous presence in Maryland for the practice of law[.]” The hearing judge noted that, although Ms. Jackson “maintained an office for the practice of law” in Maryland, which was also the firm’s address, “there 21 was no evidence that [Ms. Jackson] held herself out as a Maryland attorney.” The hearing judge also pointed out that “[a]t all times, she had a Maryland attorney on staff” and observed that “[a]nyone in the public who saw the firm listed in the lobby of the building, website, advertising, and/or business cards could meet and consult with a Maryland attorney.” (Cleaned up). The hearing judge commented on the fact that, “although going back years, [Bar Counsel] did not produce one witness who testified they were told [that Ms. Jackson] was a Maryland attorney or sat and consulted with [Ms. Jackson] in the Maryland office.” In reaching his conclusion, the hearing judge also found it noteworthy that Ms. Ridgell met with Ms. Jackson in 2015 and that the Office of Bar Counsel was aware that Ms. Jackson had established her office in Maryland by that time. The hearing judge pointed out that Bar Counsel had not called their former colleague to testify in this matter.

The hearing judge commented that, despite Ms. Ridgell’s knowledge of Ms. Jackson’s office and physical presence in the State, she did not take any action to stop it or to follow up to ensure that “no systematic presence occurred.” Bar Counsel excepts to the hearing judge’s failure to find additional Rule 5.5 violations over and above the technical violation involving the lines for reissuance of the summons. For ease of discussion, we categorize Bar Counsel’s exceptions into three buckets of alleged misconduct based upon undisputed facts. In the first exceptions bucket, Bar Counsel contends that the hearing judge erred by failing to conclude that Ms. Jackson actually engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. In the second bucket, Bar Counsel asserts that the hearing judge erred in failing to conclude that Ms. Jackson held herself out to the public as being admitted to practice law in Maryland.

In the third and final bucket, 22 Bar Counsel asserts that the hearing judge erred in failing to conclude that Ms. Jackson violated Rule 5.5(b)(1) by maintaining an office in Maryland.10 1. Bar Counsel’s Exceptions Related to Rule 5.5(a) Charges that Ms. Jackson Engaged in the “Unauthorized Practice of Law” Bar Counsel contends that Ms. Jackson engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Rule 5.5(a) by: (1) determining fees to be charged by the Maryland attorneys in the law firm for Maryland cases; (2) preparing settlement sheets in Maryland cases that itemized expenses and documented the clients’ recovery; and (3) attending settlement conferences or mediations in Maryland cases. Bar Counsel contends that these “undisputed facts provide additional grounds for violations of Rule 5.5(a).” For these undisputed facts to form the basis of a Rule 5.5 violation, we must first determine whether such acts constitute the “practice of law.” Although Rule 5.5 prohibits the unauthorized practice of law, it doesn’t define it, and with good reason. We have “found it difficult to craft an all-encompassing definition.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hallmon, 343 Md. 390, 397 (1986) (cleaned up).

This Court determines what constitutes the “practice of law.”11 To determine what is the 10 We determine that it is particularly appropriate to compartmentalize Bar Counsel’s exceptions in this manner given the unique and significant mitigating factors in this case (including the fact that, for years, the Office of Bar Counsel was not only aware of Ms. Jackson’s Maryland office, but had made specific recommendations for how to maintain it), as well as the fact that under our current rules and case law, there are exceptions where an attorney who is not admitted in Maryland, may nonetheless maintain an office for the practice of law and not run afoul of the prohibition in Rule 5.5(b)(2) against holding oneself out as a Maryland lawyer. 11 BOP § 10-101(h)(1) also identifies certain conduct as constituting the “practice [of] law.” Specifically, the statute defines the phrase “Practice law” as “engag[ing] in any of the following activities: (i) giving legal advice; (ii) representing another person before a 23 practice of law, we look at the facts of each case and determine whether they “fall within the fair intendment of the term.” Id. (cleaned up). As we recently stated in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Maldonado, [t]o determine whether an individual has engaged in the practice of law, the focus of the inquiry should be on whether the activity in question required legal knowledge and skill in order to apply legal principles and precedent. The unauthorized practice of law includes utilizing legal education, training, and experience to apply the special analysis of the profession to a client’s problem.

Where trial work is not involved but the preparation of legal documents, their interpretation, the giving of legal advice, or the application of legal principles to problems of any complexity, is involved, these activities are still the practice of law. 463 Md. 11 , 43 (2019) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Based upon our review of this record, we determine that Bar Counsel has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Jackson engaged in the unauthorized unit of the State government or of a political subdivision; or (iii) performing any other service that the Court of Appeals defines as practicing law.” (Emphasis added). In other words, although the statute provides some basic definitions as far as what constitutes the practice of law, it recognizes that for any other conduct, it is this Court’s role to define it. We have described the role of the Legislature and the Court of Appeals in connection with defining the practice of law as follows: Under our constitutional system of separation of powers, the determination of what constitutes the practice of law and the regulation of the practice and of its practitioners is, and essentially and appropriately should be a function of the judicial branch of the government.

In many States it has been held that the legislative branch cannot constitutionally exercise that judicial function although it may make implementing regulations. In Maryland there has always been a comfortable accommodation in this area . . . . The legislature has forbidden the practice of law by one not a lawyer . . . but it consistently has recognized that the courts can and should decide in any instance presented what does and does not constitute the practice of law. Public Service Comm’n v. Hahn Transp., Inc., 253 Md. 571, 583 (1969) (internal citations omitted). 24 practice of law through her performance of administrative functions related to the operation of the law firm.

Ms. Jackson was in charge of hiring attorneys, determining their salary, and approving leave. As part of her administrative functions, she established the hourly rates for associate-attorneys employed by the firm. She tracked expenses incurred by the firm and provided the information to the Maryland attorneys so that they could assist their clients in understanding their potential recovery. Ms. Jackson testified that she “did not have any involvement in handling Maryland cases,” but that through the performance of the firm’s administrative duties, she managed the disbursement process and assisted her colleagues with calculating the clients’ net recovery after deducting contingency fees, liens, and case expenses.

Bar Counsel argues that Ms. Jackson’s preparation of settlement sheets for clients of the firm constituted the practice of law. Stripped of its label, a “settlement sheet” typically consists of a document prepared using basic bookkeeping functions—deducting expenses and fees from a gross recovery number.12 None of these administrative or 12 In support of its argument that Ms. Jackson’s preparation of settlement sheets constitutes the practice of