Baltimore Transit Co. v. Mezzanotti

Prescott, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The plaintiff-appellee instituted suit against the defendant-appellant for personal injuries, incurred as a result of allegedly negligent conduct on the part of defendant’s employee, when the plaintiff attempted to board one of its buses. After the defendant had filed a general issue plea, the plaintiff propounded certain interrogatories to the corporate defendant, which answered all of them except four, and, to these four, it flatly refused to reply. The plaintiff excepted to the sufficiency of the answers (in reality the failure to answer) pursuant to Maryland Rule 417 c 1, and the trial court sustained the exceptions, and ordered the defendant to answer.

Again the defendant refused to answer, and filed a notice to stay execution of the court’s order requiring it to answer the interrogatories, under the purported authority of Maryland Rule ¹¹ 819. The court refused to stay the operation of its order, and, instead of invoking the sanction of Maryland Rule 422 d (contempt), the court, upon motion of the plaintiff, entered a judgment by default against the defendant, pursuant to Maryland Rule 417 d. The appellant then moved to strike out the judgment by default. This motion was denied, as the defendant had not, and did not, answer the interrogatories.

The appellant then took the deposition of the plaintiff, who refused, upon advice of counsel, to answer questions concerning the happening of the accident, since the default judgment had already been entered. Again, at the extension of the judgment by default, the appellant attempted to cross-examine the plaintiff upon the issue of liability, which the court declined to permit. It, thereupon, made a proffer of a “factual and meritorious defense,” which was rejected by the court because of the default judgment. After considering the above litigious and somewhat protracted maneuvering, including, as it does, an assumption by the defendant of the calculated risk of a default judgment against it, the rather innocuous nature of the interrogatories, to which answers were refused, will, doubtless, cause surprise to many.

These interrogatories, which we designate as a, b, c and d, were: (a) State the names and addresses of all persons who investigated plaintiff’s injuries and damages for you. (b) Give a concise statement of the facts as to how you contend the occurrence took place. (c) If you contend that the plaintiff acted in such a manner as to cause or contribute to the occurrence, give a concise statement of the facts upon which you rely. (d) If you contend that a person not a party to this action acted in such a manner as to cause or contribute to the occurrence, give a concise statement of the facts upon which you rely.

They are, obviously, framed, in almost verbatim language, in accordance with suggested “Form of Interrogatories” 11, 17, ¹² 18 and 19 on page 40 of Niles, Discovery Digest for Maryland (see also Code (1960 Cum. Supp.), Vol. 9, p. 55). Interrogatories of the nature here involved are governed, largely, by Maryland Rule 417, (all future references to “Rules” will relate to Maryland Rules, unless otherwise stated) which, in turn, refers back to Rule 410 for the scope of the interrogatories' permitted, so we shall set forth these rules in part.* 1 ¹³ We do not deem it necessary nor desirable, at this time, to make an extended or elaborate statement concerning our discovery rules. It will suffice to say that it is clear they are broad and comprehensive in scope, and were deliberately designed so to be.

One of their fundamental and principal objectives is to require the disclosure of facts by a party litigant to all of his adversaries, and thereby to eliminate, as far as possible, the necessity of any party to litigation going to trial in a confused or muddled state of mind, concerning the facts that gave rise to the litigation. If all of the parties have knowledge of all of the relevant, pertinent and non-privileged facts, or the knowledge of the existence or whereabouts of such facts, the parties should be able properly to prepare their claims and defenses, thereby advancing the sound and expeditious administration of justice. In order to accomplish the above purposes, the discovery rules are to be liberally construed. And the trial judges, who are primarily called upon to administer said rules, are vested ¹⁴ with a reasonable, sound discretion in applying them, which discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of its abuse. 2 We turn now to a consideration of the specific interrogatories propounded.

(a).' It is difficult to sift out and state the essence or heart of the appellant’s argument under this heading (if there be either). The defendant deplores the dearth of appellate decisional law in the field of discovery; 3 and seems to pitch its claim that (a) is an improper interrogatory on the fact that Rule 410 c 2 only requires an opposing party to produce the reports, or names, of “experts” whom the opposing party “proposes to call” as witnesses. From this premise, appellant contends that it cannot be compelled to disclose the names of its investigators, because the plaintiff is not required to disclose to it the names of all of the experts who have examined the plaintiff, but only those whom she intends to call as witnesses, which permits the plaintiff “to shop around” for the right doctor with no fear of subsequent discovery. The argument is, patently, untenable.

If it be desirable to require parties to divulge the names of all experts consulted by them, and not merely those intended to be called as witnesses, this fact may be a legitimate argument to change the provisions of Rule 410 .c 2, but it constitutes no shield for the appellant to relieve it of its obligation to answer proper interrogatories. We note the appellant cites no authority, in point, to support its position. ¹⁵ The interrogatory was, we think, proper. It will be noticed that the question specifically limits its inquiry to “the names and addresses of all persons who investigated the plaintiff’s injuries and damages for you.” We stated above that it conforms to number 11 of the suggested “Forms for Interrogatories,” and the authority for its issuance is clearly encompassed within the terms of Rule 410 a (1) and a (3), supplemented by Rule 417. Courts, wherein the validity of this or similar questions have been contested, have sustained the same.

Buining v. The Transporter, 171 F. Supp. 127, 133 (except for “work product” of attorneys), (D. C. D. Md. Thomsen, J.); Brocata v. King, Daily Record, June 29, 1956 (Niles, C. J.). Cf. McCall v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 16 F. R. D. 467 (D. C. S. D. N. Y.); Greeff v. A. H. Bull Steamship Co., Daily Record March 1, 1956 (Niles, C. J.). We hold that the interrogatory was a proper one.

(b). The appellant argues that this interrogatory is probably objectionable if addressed to an individual defendant, but is clearly so, when propounded to a corporation. It claims that the contention by a corporate defendant as to how an accident occurred and the facts which form the basis for its' contention are gathered from many sources, arguing that such a contention results from the statement of facts supplied by the corporate agent who was in control of the instrumentality alleged to have caused plaintiff’s injury, the statements' of fact supplied by various witnesses, the statements of fact supplied by the corporation’s investigators, and, ultimately, the review by corporate counsel of all these factors' and a final determination, by him, as fi> how the accident occurred, based upon those facts which he accepts as true, thus, a forced disclosure of this contention would violate the rule relating to both “work-product and privilege.” With this argument, we are unable to agree. Rule 417 a provides that if interrogatories are served upon private corporations', the answers shall be made by an officer or agent of the corporation, “who shall furnish such information as is available to the party served.” The question, we think, neither ¹⁶ impinges upon the letter nor the spirit of Rule 417 or Rule 410 (a) (1) and a (3).

In 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure (Rules Ed.) p. 437, n. 88, the authors state: “One of the principal purposes of interrogatories is to ascertain the contentions of the adverse party.” It will be noted that the question does not ask for the statements of any witnesses, nor the production of any reports; it asks only for a concise statement of facts of the corporate version of how the accident did occur. A reading of the short, simple forms of answers to questions of this nature, 4 proposed by the same author who composed the suggested “Forms of Interrogatories,” should be convincing that the interrogatory is proper and an answer thereto is practical, without necessarily transgressing the rule relating to “work-product or privilege.” Rule 410 a specifically excludes privileged matter from the scope of discovery; and Rule 410 d relates to writings that are ordinarily not discoverable. Hence, if by any chance, an answer to this question would have required a violation of work-product or privilege, the appellant, by showing such violation to the trial court, when the exceptions to the answers were heard, could have been fully protected by a proper order of that court under the provisions of Rule 410 a, c and d, and Rule 406. Hazell v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 15 F. R. D. 282 (D. C. E. D. Pa.); McNeice v. Oil Carriers Joint Venture, 22 F. R. D. 14.

We shall say more concerning this when considering interrogatory d. Again, the appellant cites us no authority, in point, to support its position, and, again, courts, wherein this and similar questions, have been contested, have sustained their propriety. United States v. General Motors Corp., 2 F. R. D. ¹⁷ 528 (D. C. N. D. Ill.); Bell v. Novick Transfer Co., 17 F. R. D. 279 (D. C. D. Md.) ; Wilhelm v. Serio, et al., Daily-Record, December 28, 1956, (Niles, C. J.). We hold the interrogatory was a proper one.

(c). The appellant contends that an answer to this interrogatory, also, would necessarily invade privileged information and work-product matter; because the “contention of whether or not the plaintiff acted in such a manner as to cause or contribute to the occurrence is not one of fact but rather one of law and its determination lies in the office of counsel for the defendant.” The appellant cites us no authority, decisional or otherwise, and we have found none, which states that the interrogatory is an improper one. On the other hand, similar questions to the one being now considered, relating to contributory negligence or negligence, were held proper in Buining v. The Transporter, supra, (except for work-product of attorneys); Forsythe v. B. & O. R.R. Co., 15 F. R. D. 191 (W. D. Pa.); and McNeice v. Oil Carriers Joint Venture, supra. See also May v. B. & O. R.R. Co., 17 F. R. D. 288 (D. C., D. Md.), wherein Judge Thomsen aptly noted that; “ ‘* * * A defendant is entitled to be informed as to what he will have to meet [at the trial].’ So is a plaintiff.” Of course, as indicated above, the trial court is in a position to protect the parties against requiring the divulgence of privileged information or work-product matter.

The question was, we think, a proper one. (d). Appellant cites no authority in its argument objecting to this interrogatory. It claims the question is another attempt to “invade the privileged and work-product area,” urging that the determination “of the contributory negligence of a person not a party to the