Barnes v. Barnes

HOLLANDER, J. This case arises from divorce proceedings between Le'Etta Johnson Barnes, appellant, and Patrick Ivan Barnes, appellee, litigated in the Circuit Court for Charles County. Appellant challenges an Order issued by the circuit court on February 15, 2007, which incorporated the terms of a settlement agreement that the parties entered on the record at a hearing on August 1, 2006. Thereafter, appellee’s counsel prepared the Order and submitted it to the court, without appellant’s signature, because appellant refused to sign it. Appellant presents three issues for our review, which we quote: ³⁹⁵ I. Whether the Circuit Court committed clear error by issuing a consent order to dispose of contested marital property issues without requiring the Appellee to file a financial statement and without considering evidence that the terms of the order did not designate the specific retirement benefits to be distributed.

II

Whether the Circuit Court abused its discretion by failing to consider evidence that the parties had not reached an agreement on terms of the proposed settlement agreement represented by the consent order during the settlement hearing, and evidence that the Appellant had not consented to the terms as intended by the Appellee.

III

Whether the Consent Order issued by the Circuit Court should be overturned as null and void because it is unenforceable as a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, the settlement hearing upon which it is based did not result in a meeting of the minds between the parties, and the settlement negotiations were not entered into in good faith by the Appellee. For the reasons that follow, we shall dismiss the appeal. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY The parties were married on August 15,1992, and separated in February of 2005. No children were born to their union.

According to the briefs, appellee is employed by Verizon and appellant is a “sole proprietor nail technician.” Appellee filed a Complaint for Absolute Divorce on April 17, 2006, based on a one-year separation. He alleged that the parties had resolved issues pertaining to the division of marital property and spousal support, and that no property or support issues remained for the court to resolve. In her Answer, appellant denied that the separation was intended to end the marriage. She also denied that the parties had resolved all issues pertaining to spousal support and the division of marital property.

Appellant subsequently ³⁹⁶ filed a Counterclaim for Absolute Divorce on grounds of adultery and constructive desertion, in which she detailed the property issues that she contended were unresolved. In her Counterclaim, which appellant personally signed in accordance with Maryland Rule 9-202(a), appellant averred: 16. During the course of their 13-year marriage, [appellant] has been self-employed and has relied on [appellee] for financial support and maintenance, including pension and health insurance. During their discussions of financial planning, [appellee] discouraged [appellant] from opening a retirement account or IRA stating continuously that the two would be able to live off his pension from Verizon. [Appellant] relied to her detriment on [appellee’s] representation that he would take care of her and did not open a retirement account. 17.

In March 2006, during a telephone conversation [appellee] informed [appellant] that they could stay married so she would be able to continue her medical insurance coverage. Accordingly, appellant requested a judgment of absolute divorce as well as other relief, including spousal support of $850 per month, an order that appellee continue appellant’s health insurance, and half of the funds from two real estate transactions involving the parties. Of import here, appellant also sought entitlement to “her share of [appellee’s] retirement account with Verizon and any and all other retirement accounts, IRA, 401-K, pension plans, stock or profit sharing plans held or obtained during the course of the marriage.... ” Along with her Counterclaim, appellant filed a long-form financial statement in the form prescribed by Md. Rule 9-203(a). Appellee filed an Answer to the Counterclaim on July 11, 2006, requesting its dismissal.

But, appellee did not file a financial statement. On the same date, appellant filed an Amended Complaint for Absolute Divorce, seeking a division of marital assets. In relevant part, the Amended Complaint requested: ³⁹⁷ C. That the Court order a division in kind or, if appropriate, a sale of all real and personal property jointly owned by the parties, including the Defendant’s business, Nails N Flight, and if sale be decreed, distribute the proceeds equitably. D. That the Court, pursuant to Md.Code, Family Law, Section 8-205(a) transfer to the Plaintiff his marital share of any and all of the assets from the Defendant’s business, Nails N Flight.

On August 1, 2006, the parties and their lawyers attended a status conference before a domestic relations master. Prior to the conference, the parties and their attorneys engaged in settlement negotiations in the courthouse, which are not a part of the record. In their briefs, the parties present differing accounts of that meeting. 1 ³⁹⁸ In any event, it is undisputed that, after their negotiations, the parties and counsel came before the domestic relations master. The following colloquy is relevant: [THE MASTER]: Now, do I understand that the parties have an agreement that you want to put onto the record? [APPELLEE’S COUNSEL]: That’s correct, Your Honor. [THE MASTER]: Okay.

Which one of you wants to state it? [APPELLEE’S COUNSEL]: I’ll go forward. [THE MASTER]: Okay. [APPELLEE’S COUNSEL]: [I]t is my understanding that the parties have agreed that they have resolved all of their marital property issues as follows: That Mr. Barnes will give Mrs. Barnes three thousand dollars within thirty days of today. That Mrs. Barnes will receive the marital share of Mr. Barnes’s pension with Verizon if, as, and when he receives it pursuant to the Bangs Formula. And, Mr. Barnes will continue Mrs. Barnes on his health insurance through Verizon through the marriage. And ... will cooperate with Mrs. Barnes if Verizon is inclined to allow her to continue to stay on the health insurance ... with the understanding that Mrs. Barnes will be responsible for payment of the health insurance following divorce.

All other property has been divided to the marital [sic] satisfaction of the parties. And, each party will keep all other property which is in their possession with no right of claim to any property ... not otherwise mentioned. ³⁹⁹ It is also my understanding that Mr. Barnes will file what will be a Second Amended Complaint for Absolute Divorce based on a one year mutual and voluntary separation. And, we will then move forward filing ... once that it is answered [sic], filing a motion to refer the case to an examiner to take uncontested testimony. [THE MASTER]: Okay. [Counsel for appellant], did she leave anything out? [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: No. [THE MASTER]: Is that your understanding of the agreement? [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. That’s my understanding of the agreement.

(Emphasis added.) The domestic relations master then asked the attorneys to voir dire their clients. The following colloquy is pertinent: [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Would you state your name and address for the record, please? [APPELLANT]: Leetta [sic] Johnson Barnes. My address is 209 King James Road, Upper Marlboro, Maryland. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: And Ms. Barnes, how old are you? [APPELLANT]: Forty-three. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Ms. Barnes, are you able to read and write? [APPELLANT]: Yes. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Are you under the influence of drugs, alcohol or any other debilitating substances at this time? [APPELLANT]: No. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Ms. Barnes, you’ve heard the agreement that has been explained on the record today. Do you understand the agreement? [APPELLANT]: Yes. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Are you in agreement with it? ⁴⁰⁰ [APPELLANT]: Yes. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Have you been satisfied with my services? [APPELLANT]: Yes.

(Emphasis added.) The master made one observation concerning the agreement: [Y]ou may be well aware of this, but my understanding is that if there is an order for Mr. Barnes to keep insurance on Ms. Barnes after a divorce ... I guess what I’m saying is do you want to give effect to that provision? I think it does need to be part of the order. But, obviously it will be so, I just wanted to make sure of that.

There was no objection to the master’s suggestion. Appellant’s counsel then advised the master that “[t]here is one other matter.” She explained: “Mrs. Barnes would like to have stated in the order that she has the right to use her maiden name.” The master gave the parties until October 6, 2006, to prepare and sign a proposed order incorporating the terms of the agreement. Appellee’s attorney agreed to draft the proposed order. The master then concluded the hearing, stating: “Then I guess that’s it.

I think ... you have shown the ability to cooperate and you have saved yourself a lot of time and effort and not to mention money. So, I hope everything goes well according to plan.” The merits hearing of October 6, 2006, was rescheduled to November 17, 2006, as a result of a medical emergency on the part of appellee’s attorney. It was then rescheduled to January 5, 2007, due to maternity leave for appellant’s attorney, and was apparently postponed again because of a conflict on the part of appellee’s attorney. To our knowledge, it has not yet been held.

In the meantime, appellant’s attorney refused to sign the proposed order drafted by appellee’s attorney. Consequently, on January 19, 2007, appellee filed a “Motion to Enter,” in which he asked the court to issue the proposed order without ⁴⁰¹ appellant’s signature. The motion alleged that counsel for appellee had drafted a proposed order and sent it to counsel for appellant, but appellant’s counsel rejected it. Appellee further explained that, because appellant’s counsel refused to sign the proposed order, appellee obtained a transcript of the hearing held on August 1, 2006, and revised the proposed order to conform to the transcript, but counsel for appellant still refused to sign it.

According to appellee’s motion, appellant’s counsel contended that the proposed order contained provisions that were not agreed to at the hearing, and appellant did not have “ ‘full disclosure as to [appellee’s] retirement plans (emphasis added) prior to entering into full disclosure.’ ” Further, the motion stated: That [appellant’s] present position is no more than buyer’s remorse. That [appellee] and [appellant] entered into good faith negotiations and a good faith agreement. That the Order provided with this Motion accurately reflects the agreement placed on the record pursuant to the official transcript of proceedings of August 1st 2006. Indeed, the text of the proposed order submitted by appellee with the motion tracked almost verbatim the parties’ agreement at the hearing on August 1, 2006.

The proposed order provided: That by agreement of the parties, as stated on the record on Tuesday, August 1st 2006, and as acknowledged on the record on August 1 st 2006 that this Agreement resolves all marital property issues, it is thereupon this - day of -, 2007, by the Circuit Court for Charles County, Maryland, hereby, ORDERED, that the Plaintiff pay to the Defendant Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00) within thirty (30) days of August 1st 2006; and it is further, ORDERED, that the Defendant receive her marital share of the Plaintiffs pension with Verizon, if, as, and when received by the Plaintiff, pursuant to the BANGS formula; and it is further, ⁴⁰² ORDERED, that the Plaintiff continue the Defendant on his health insurance through Verizon until the date of absolute divorce and the Plaintiff shall cooperate with the Defendant if Verizon is inclined to allow the Defendant to continue to receive health insurance through Verizon. The Defendant shall be solely responsible for payment of her health insurance following the date of absolute divorce; and it is further, ORDERED, that all other property has been divided to the satisfaction of the parties and each shall keep all other property which is in their possession and which is not otherwise mentioned herein, with no right of claim by the other. The transcript of the hearing on August 1, 2006, and a letter dated July 20, 2006, from appellant’s counsel to appellee’s counsel, were attached as exhibits to the motion. In the letter, appellant’s attorney rejected a settlement offer apparently advanced by counsel for appellee in a prior letter, and proposed alternative terms.

In the course of the letter, appellant’s counsel stated: “We are aware that the court will likely order that Mrs. Barnes receive her marital share of Mr. Barnes [sic] pensions, including stock options and other annuities, from his employment at Verizon.” On January 28, 2007, appellant’s attorney filed a “Response to Motion to Enter and Motion Requesting Financial Information,” along with a sworn affidavit executed by appellant. Appellant averred: During the [August 1, 2006] hearing, the attorney for [appellee] read a statement into the record. It is my understanding that the statement was to express our intention to settle the property issues in the ... divorce proceeding. I did not understand or intend that statement to represent a final disposition of all issues.

I believed and understood that I would get an opportunity to review and sign a written settlement agreement between myself and [appellee] before the case concluded. ⁴⁰³ On or about August 13, 2006, my attorney informed me that [appellant’s] attorney, Phyllis Hotchkiss, had drafted a document to be signed by the court stating that I was to pay for my own health insurance and that I would not receive $3000.00 from the real estate in Baltimore until she signed the document. She also told me that the document stated that I would receive my marital name. I advised my attorney at this time that I did not understand at the hearing that I was to pay for my own health insurance because I thought the judge (master) said that [appellee] was to continue to pay for my health insurance. I also told my attorney that I did not know what I was receiving from [appellee’s] pension because we had not seen any paperwork showing [appellee’s] pension and 401K plans.

At this time, I authorized my attorney to request the pension and health insurance information from Verizon. I also asked her to have the order grant the name change and to have the specific terms of our agreement put into a separate document so I could have some privacy when I went to businesses to change my name. On or about September 10, 2006, my attorney showed me a document written by Ms. Hotchkiss ... that was supposed to represent the agreement between us regarding the property issues. The document contained waivers of all other pension, 401K, and retirement benefits that [appellee] had accumulated during the course of our marriage, except his pension from Verizon.

I did not agree to this waiver during the hearing with Master Woodside on August 1. The document I read on or about September 10 also stated that after the divorce, [appellee] would cooperate with me and Verizon so that I would continue receiving health insurance from Verizon, and that I would pay all costs for the health insurance. I did not agree to this during the hearing with Master Woodside on August 1 because I heard the statement during that hearing that he was to continue health insurance coverage for me after the divorce. ⁴⁰⁴ The September 10 document also stated that I was to receive $3,000.00 thirty days from August 1, but I had not received any money and my lawyer told me that Ms. Hotchkiss would not release the check until we signed the agreement. I informed my attorney that I could not sign the document and go forward because I did not agree to what the document stated, specifically that I was to pay for my own health insurance and that I waived my rights to [appellee’s] 401K and other portions of his retirement.

On or about September 28, 2006, my attorney called me to say that she could not get any information from Verizon about the health insurance and the pension benefits because she needed [appellee’s] permission to discuss his benefits. I reviewed a letter she had written to [appellee’s] lawyer asking for financial information and informing her that I objected to the way the draft agreement waived my rights and held me responsible for paying for my own health insurance. On or about December 5, 2006, my attorney told me that [appellee’s] attorney had not sent any financial information regarding [appellee’s] pension or health insurance and they were going to ask the court to proceed without our agreement. On or about December 18, 2006, [appellee] called me and asked why I was holding up the agreement.

I told him that my attorney could not get financial information regarding his pension plans and health insurance from Verizon or his attorney, and that I did not agree to pay for my own health insurance. He informed me that Verizon would not let me continue on the plan after the divorce anyway so that didn’t make any difference. During the hearing on August 1, I did not understand that [appellee’s] attorney said I was to pay for my own health insurance or that I would be waiving rights, since there was discussion that I would be returning to court with a witness to make a final decision about the divorce. I also believed that I would have something written to agree to ⁴⁰⁵ before the property issues were final and not that what I heard and what was said in court would count for a written agreement.

In her Response, appellant referred to the allegations of her affidavit, and argued that the settlement was discussed “for less than fifteen (15) minutes in the hallway of the ... courthouse prior to entering the hearing room. After entering the hearing room, [appellant] only heard [appellee’s] lawyer speak the terms of the proposed settlement into the record and did not get an opportunity to review any writing .... ” Moreover, she contended that she had never received “a financial or benefits statement revealing [appellee’s] assets, which is required in this case by Md. Rule 9-203(e) and has been requested on three separate occasions by [appellant’s] attorney....” Appellant insisted that “she entered into good faith negotiations but [appellee] has not acted in good faith by failing to honor the proposed agreement he seeks to enforce.” As evidence of appellee’s bad faith, appellant cited appellee’s failure to pay her the $3,000 until such time as appellant signed the proposed order; his failure to comply with court rules and her requests regarding financial information; and his knowledge that Verizon would not honor the settlement provision to maintain her health insurance. She also denied that appellee’s proposed order accurately reflected the agreement placed on the record, because it “omits [appellee’s] request for restoration of her maiden name.” 2 Further, appellant argued that, pursuant to Md. Rule 9-203(e), appellee should have filed a financial statement with his Answer to her Counterclaim or with his Amended Complaint. In addition, she complained that appellee had repeatedly refused, “during the course of settlement negotiations,” to ⁴⁰⁶ provide requested financial information.

Further, she contended that she “has not been able to and cannot make an informed decision regarding the proposed settlement in this case without full disclosure of [appellee’s] financial information.” Appellant added that, in the event the case proceeded to trial or a disposition of marital property by the court, “the Court will not be able to make a determination of the property amount of a grant [sic] to either party without a financial statement from [appellee].” Accordingly, appellant asked the court to dismiss appellee’s Motion to Enter; order appellee to file a financial statement pursuant to Md. Rule 9-203(e), or, in the alternative, to dismiss appellee’s pleadings for failure to comply with the Rule; and schedule a “settlement conference for parties to present and review the written terms of proposed settlements. ...” Neither appellant nor appellee requested a hearing on the Motion to Enter, however. On February 16, 2007, without a hearing on the competing motions, the court issued an Order consisting of the terms of the proposed order submitted by appellee.

II

DISCUSSION As noted, appellant filed this appeal before the case was concluded; the merits hearing had not yet been held when the appeal was noted. Neither party has raised the issue of appealability, however. Nevertheless, as Maryland appellate courts have often observed, “[w]hether a matter is appealable is a jurisdictional matter and may be raised by an appellate court even if not noted by the parties.” Gruber v. Gruber, 369 Md. 540, 546 , 801 A.2d 1013 (2002). See also, e.g., In re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306, 326 , 783 A.2d 673 (2001); Office of State Prosecutor v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 356 Md. 118, 125 , 737 A.2d 592 (1999); Tharp v. Disabled Veterans Dept., 121 Md.App. 548, 557 , 710 A.2d 378 (1998).

We perceive two potential impediments to appealability; one is easily surmounted, but the other significantly constrains our review. ⁴⁰⁷ We shall first address the issue of finality. Ordinarily, an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment. Md.Code (2006, 2007 Supp.), § 12-301 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“C.J.”). In our view, the lack of finality of the court’s Order of February 16, 2007, is not a bar to appealability.

The Order qualifies as an appealable interlocutory order under C.J. § 12-303(1), because the Order was “entered with regard to the possession of property with which the action is concerned,” and/or it qualifies under C.J. § 12-303(3)(v), because the Order concerned “the sale, conveyance, or delivery of real or personal property or the payment of money....” See Cannon v. Cannon, 156 Md.App. 387 , 393 n. 1, 846 A.2d 1127 (2004), aff'd, 384 Md. 537 , 865 A.2d 563 (2005); McCormick Const. Co. v. 9690 Deerco Rd. Ltd. Partnership, 79 Md.App. 177, 180-81 , 556 A.2d 292 (1989). The second issue of appealability concerns the question of whether the Order is a consent order, despite the fact that it is not labeled as such, and notwithstanding that appellant refused to sign it.

Preliminarily, we observe that both parties refer to the Order as a “consent order.” For example, appellant argues that “[t]he decision of the Circuit Court to issue the Consent Order constitutes clear error.” Appellee maintains that “[t]he Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion when it entered the Consent Order without a hearing over Wife’s objections, as the written Consent Order in all respects comports with the terms recited into the record.... ” Moreover, it is clear that the court below believed that the Order reflected the consent or agreement of the parties. In this regard, we note that the Order does not address the judicial findings and analysis that are mandated by Title 8 of the Family Law Article of the Maryland Code when the court resolves “a dispute between [divorcing] parties with respect to the ownership of personal [or] real property.” Md.Code (2006 Repl.Vol., 2007 Supp.), § 8-202(a)(1) & (2) of the Family Law Article (“F.L.”). In Hearn v. Hearn, 177 Md.App. 525 , 936 A.2d 400 (2007), we observed: “ ‘Consent judgments are agreements entered into by the parties which must be endorsed by the court.’ ⁴⁰⁸ They reflect the agreement of the parties ‘pursuant to which they have relinquished the right to litigate the controversy.’ ” Id. at 534 , 936 A.2d 400 (citations omitted). A consent order has also been defined as “an agreement of the parties with respect to the resolution of the issues in the case or in settlement of the case, that has been embodied in a court order and entered by the court, thus evidencing its acceptance by the court.” Long v. State, 371 Md. 72, 82 , 807 A.2d 1 (2002).

Accord Smith v. Luber, 165 Md.App. 458, 468 , 885 A.2d 894 (2005). In distinguishing between a consent order and a settlement agreement, this Court said in Dorsey v. Wroten, 35 Md.App. 359, 361 , 370 A.2d 577 (1977): While a settlement agreement is subject to the general rules of contract such as the adequacy of consideration, a consent decree adds a critical element to the contractual act— judicial conclusiveness. A consent decree is entered under the eye and with the sanction of the court and should be considered a judicial act not open to question or controversy in a collateral proceeding. (Internal citations omitted).

In Dorsey , the Court determined that an agreement entered on the record in open court is distinct from a settlement agreement that is not entered on the record. There, the parties held “a ‘settlement type conference’ in the judge’s chambers” and, when they reached an agreement, the judge “requested that a consent decree be prepared and presented to him.” Id. at 360 , 370 A.2d 577 . Before the draft decree was presented to the judge, however, counsel for one of the parties informed the judge that his client no longer agreed to the terms. Id. at 361 , 370 A.2d 577 . “The trial judge stated that he considered the matter settled and that he would sign the ‘consent’ decree when it was presented.” Id.

The judge then signed the decree, prompting an appeal. After reviewing relevant authorities, the Dorsey Court determined that the general rule is that “the power of the court to enter judgment by consent is dependent on the existence of actual consent of the parties at the time the judgment is ⁴⁰⁹ entered____” Id. at 362 , 370 A.2d 577 . But, of import here, the Court recognized an exception to the rule “where the parties had dictated an agreement into the record and the judge, in open court, had approved the agreement, even though actual judgment had not been entered at the time one of the parties sought to disavow the agreement.” Id. at 362-63 , 370 A.2d 577 . The Dorsey Court reversed because “it [was] obvious there was no consent [to the settlement agreement] in open court nor was there a written stipulation filed in court.” Id. at 363 , 370 A.2d 577 .

Nevertheless, the Dorsey Court held that “the entry of a judgment by consent implies that the terms and conditions have been agreed upon and consent thereto given in open court or by filed stipulation.” Id. Accord Chemick v. Chemick, 327 Md. 470, 484-85 , 610 A.2d 770 (1992) (rejecting “rule in some other jurisdictions that a consent judgment or consent decree should not be entered unless the consent continues until the moment the court undertakes to make the agreement the judgment of the court”). Accordingly, when, as here, “the parties entered into an agreement in open court, which under Maryland law is binding upon the parties,” intending that the court will subsequently reduce the agreement to a written order, the legal principles regarding consent orders are “equally applicable” to the resulting order. Smith, 165 Md.App. at 470-71 , 885 A.2d 894 .

We next consider the appealability of a consent order. In Suler v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211 , 935 A.2d 731 (2007), the Court of Appeals recently addressed the appealability of a consent order in the context of an appeal to the circuit court from a “domestic violence protective order[ ] entered by consent in the District Court....” Id. at 221 , 935 A.2d 731 . After surveying Maryland case law dating from 1848 to the present, and English jurisprudence dating back far further, id. at 222-24 , 935 A.2d 731 , the Court observed: “It is a well-settled principle of the common law that no appeal lies from a consent ⁴¹⁰ decree.” Id. at 222 , 935 A.2d 731 . 3 The Court explained, id. at 224-25 (internal footnotes and some internal citations omitted): The rule that there is no right to appeal from a consent decree is a subset of the broader principles underlying the right to appeal. The availability of appeal is limited to parties who are aggrieved by the final judgment.

A party cannot be aggrieved by a judgment to which he or she acquiesced----The rationale for this general rule “has been variously characterized as an ‘estoppel’, a ‘waiver’ of the right to appeal, an ‘acceptance of benefits’ of the court determination creating ‘mootness’, and an ‘acquiescence’ in the judgment.” The nature of a consent judgment precludes appeal. Consent judgments “are essentially agreements entered into by the parties which must be endorsed by the court. They have attributes of both contracts and judicial decrees.” Chernick v. Chernick, 327 Md. 470, 478 , 610 A.2d 770 (1992). Like contracts, the parties bargain and provide consideration.

Consideration is not always tangible. In the case of a consent judgment, the fact that “the parties give up any meritorious claims or defenses they may have had in order to avoid further litigation” may serve as consideration. In Chemick , this Court addressed the impact of one of the parties’ change of mind on a consent order which had been signed and filed with the court. Chernick, 327 Md. at 484 , 610 A.2d 770 .

We held that where the underlying bargaining was not unconscionable nor the product of duress, “[t]he fact that one of the parties may have changed his or her mind shortly before or after the submitted consent order was signed by the court does not invalidate the signed consent judgment.” Id. The contractual nature of the consent decree meant that when there was uncoerced “bargaining for the reciprocal promises made to one anoth ⁴¹¹ er” the end product should not be disturbed. Id. at 480 , 610 A.2d 770 . The public policy of promoting settlement agreements by ensuring finality is another reason to disallow appeals from consent judgments.

The Court in Chemick pointed to the desirability of settlement agreements that are binding and enforceable. Id. at 481 , 610 A.2d 770 . Thus, the general rule is that no appeal lies from a consent order. Nevertheless, the Suter Court recognized an exception that is relevant here, stating: “The rule is otherwise if there was no actual consent.

If there was no actual consent because the judgment was coerced, exceeded the scope of consent, or was not within the jurisdiction of the court, or for any reason consent was not effective, an appeal will be entertained.” Id. at 224 n. 10, 935 A.2d 731 . Therefore, an appeal will lie “from a court’s decision to grant or refuse to vacate a ‘consent judgment’ where it was contended below that the ‘consent judgment’ was not in fact a consent judgment because ... the judgment exceeded the scope of consent, or for other reasons there was never any valid consent.” Chernick, 327 Md. at 477 n. 1, 610 A.2d 770 . In attacking an alleged consent decree under this narrow exception, “[t]he only question that can be raised ... is whether in fact the decree was entered by consent.” Dorsey, 35 Md.App. at 361 , 370 A.2d 577 . See also Mercantile Trust Co. v. Schloss, 165 Md. 18, 24-25 , 166 A. 599 (1933); Casson v. Joyce, 28 Md.App. 634, 636-38 , 346 A.2d 683 (1975); Prince George’s County v. Barron, 19 Md.App. 348, 349 , 311 A.2d 453 (1973).

In essence, appellant argued below, as she does on appeal, that she did not consent to the terms of the Order issued by the court. Our review is confined to whether the circuit court erred in entering the Order. Put another way, we must examine from the record the core question of whether appellant consented to the terms of the Order. Appellant insists that “the settlement agreement is invalid because it does not represent a meeting of the minds of the ⁴¹² parties to the agreement and was not entered into by the Appellee in good faith.” She explains that the parties only discussed the terms of the settlement with their attorneys “for approximately 10 minutes prior to the settlement hearing.” In appellant’s view, appellee’s “egregious and intentional omission” to “provide Appellant and the Court with the necessary financial information to make a proper determination of the marital assets ... demonstrates the Appellee’s failure to negotiate in good faith and lack of candor with the trial court.” Moreover, appellant maintains that “[t]he transcript of the settlement hearing does not include any statements wherein the Appellant waived her rights to all other portions of the Appellee’s retirement plans....” Yet, to appellant’s dismay, “the Consent Order waives her rights to all other property which is not mentioned in the order.”