Fischbach v. Fischbach

⁶⁸ DAVIS, Judge. This case involves a dispute as to whether Donald Fischbach, appellant, should be required to pay Greer Fischbach, appellee, a sum of $19,936 in pension arrears. 1 On January 15, 2008, appellee filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County requesting an award of pension arrears against appellant, which appellant was alleged to have accrued from the date of his retirement in 2001 through 2007. Appellant filed an answer, asserting the defenses of waiver and laches, and he also filed a motion for summary judgment. After hearing argument by counsel on June 30, 2008, the trial court (Jaklitsch, J.) denied appellant’s motion for summary judgment.

A trial on the merits was conducted that same day. At the conclusion of trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of appellee. On appeal, appellant asks us to review three questions, 2 3 which we have consolidated as follows: I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment?

II

Did the trial court err by awarding appellee $19,936.00 in pension arrears? For the reasons that follow, we answer both questions presented in the negative and affirm the judgments of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. ⁶⁹ FACTUAL BACKGROUND On October 5, 1990, the parties entered into a Separation Agreement, which was incorporated, but not merged, into the Judgment of Absolute Divorce entered on October 22, 1990 that terminated the marriage of the parties. The Separation Agreement, which was executed by both parties and placed under seal, provided, in pertinent part: Husband shall pay to wife a portion of the pension he receives from his employer, C & P Telephone Company, if, as, and when he receives the same in an amount calculated by multiplying 40% times a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of years the parties have been married during which he has been accruing pension rights and the denominator of which is the total number of years he accrues pension rights as of the date of his retirement, further multiplied by the total amount of the pension he will receive from the said employer. Husband shall assign to Wife, assuming he can do so, an amount of the survivor benefits in the said pension equal to the percentage of the said pension the Wife shall receive hereunder, with the further understanding that, in the event there is any cost for him to do so, whether a one time cost or a continuing deduction from the said pension, the Wife shall bear said expense to the extent it is necessary for her to receive the said percentage of the said survivor benefits.

The Judgment of Absolute Divorce provided that the court would retain jurisdiction to amend the order issuing the judgment pursuant to subsequently filed Qualified Domestic Relations Orders (QDRO) relating to the parties: This Court shall retain jurisdiction to amend this Order to establish its qualifications under Annotated Code of Maryland, Family Law, and the United States Code, including specifically authority to make such modifications as to form to constitute a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) constitute [sic] the Agreement of the parties entered therein. ⁷⁰ Approximately eleven years later, in September 2001, appellant, a lineman, retired from Verizon, the successor to C & P Telephone. Appellant was sixty-two years old at the time. Thus, in 2001, appellant began to receive his pension benefits. Appellant made no effort to contact appellee to alert her to the fact of his retirement or the resulting payment of his pension benefits.

In fact, both parties concede that “neither party made any attempt to contact the other until appellant received a proposed QDRO from appellee’s attorney in February or March of 2006.” According to appellee’s testimony at trial, she assumed that appellant would naturally retire at the age of sixty-five. Thus, in 2006, having heard nothing from appellant regarding his retirement, appellee approached an attorney to inquire about receiving her portion of appellant’s pension benefits. Appellee subsequently learned that appellant had, in fact, retired in 2001. Accordingly, appellee initiated the process of preparing and submitting a QDRO in order to access future payments from appellant’s pension benefits, as agreed to by the parties in their Separation Agreement.

On March 29,2006, the circuit court entered a QDRO, jointly executed by the parties, that provided for the disposition of appellant’s pension benefits. This QDRO was subsequently rejected by the pension plan administrator and a second, amended QDRO was signed by both parties and entered by the circuit court on April 23, 2007. Appellee began receiving pension benefits in September 2007, in the form of a lump sum payment of $7,710.65 and subsequent payments of $441.46 per month. Neither of the aforementioned QDROs addressed appellee’s claim to pension arrears accumulated from the time of appellant’s retirement to the point in time when the QDROs were filed.

On January 15, 2008, appellee filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, alleging that she was entitled to $24,515.93 in pension arrears accrued during the seventy-three month period between appellant’s retirement and appellee’s receipt of the first partial payment pursuant to ⁷¹ the approved QDRO. Appellant answered and raised, inter alia, the affirmative defenses of statute of limitations, laches and waiver. Motion for Summary Judgment Appellant subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Separation Agreement constituted a “contract under seal,” and, as such, was subject to a twelve-year statute of limitations pursuant to § 5—102(a)(5) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 3 According to appellant, appellee’s cause of action as to her right to his pension benefits accrued on October 5, 1990, the date that the Separation Agreement was executed. Thus, because appellee’s complaint was filed on January 15, 2008, more than twelve years after the Separation Agreement was executed and placed under seal, appellant asserted that appellee’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

Appellant further contended that appellee waived her right to collect any benefits by failing to mention the arrearage in any of the QDROs submitted to the court. Finally, appellant argued that appellee’s claim was barred by the doctrine of laches. After hearing arguments by both counsel at a hearing scheduled for that purpose, the trial court denied appellant’s motion for summary judgment. Trial Both appellant and appellee testified at trial.

Appellee testified that appellant began working at C & P Telephone in the mid-1960s, when he was approximately twenty-six to twenty-eight years old. Appellant was fifty years old at the time of the divorce. Notwithstanding the fact that the parties are parents to two adult children, appellee stated that she shared no communication with appellant, adding that appellant rarely visited with his children. Appellee stressed that she ⁷² never knew that appellant retired in September 2001 and assumed that he would retire at sixty-five years old.

According to appellee, she first learned about appellant’s retirement in September 2001 from her attorney, when, in 2005, appellee retained counsel in order to access pension payments. Appellant asserts that he was sixty-six years old at that time. Appellee first began to receive benefits, pursuant to the aforementioned QDRO, in September 2007, when she received a lump sum payment and began to receive subsequent monthly payments from appellant’s pension benefits. Appellee emphasized that she sought, through the instant lawsuit, to recover $24,515.93 in pension arrears.

According to appellant, the parties understood, during their marriage, that appellant could retire from his job anytime after thirty years of employment. He further testified that the company allowed him to retire at sixty-two years old, which he did, in September 2001. Although he testified that he never concealed his retirement, he also conceded that he never notified appellee about it. According to appellant, he first learned what a QDRO was when he was contacted by appellee’s counsel.

As for receiving pension benefits without deducting any portion therefrom for appellee, appellant testified: Q What was your understanding regarding the fact that nothing was being taken out for your ex-wife? A I really didn’t give it much thought. I figured she would have a reason. I don’t know, I got on with my life not just, I guess like I said remarried, got on with my life.

My past was my past. Appellant acknowledged, during cross-examination, that he understood that appellee was entitled to a percentage of his pension benefits and stated that he took “no steps, whatsoever” to notify her of his retirement. Appellant was further questioned as to whether appellee deserved any of his pension benefits: Q Well, let’s ask it a different way. You kept the money, didn’t you? ⁷³ A Yes, I kept the money.

I worked 35 years for it. Q It was your feeling then in 1990 when this agreement was signed and then again when you retired in 2001 that she wasn’t entitled, didn’t deserve any of it, isn’t that right? A Based on our divorce, why we are divorced, right. Q You didn’t think she deserved any of it?

A No, sir I don’t now. Q Well, that explains why you didn’t tell her. In addition to that, with respect to the survivor benefit you were also required to provide her as the designated survivor beneficiary, were you not? A I don’t recall that, sir.

No, sir. Why would I want my ex to be a survivor of anything? At the conclusion of trial, the court ruled that the parties entered into a Separation Agreement on October 5, 1990, which provided appellee with the right to a portion of appellant’s pension benefits. The court further found that appellant failed to notify appellee of his September 2001 retirement and began to receive the full amount of his pension benefits, without deducting any portion therefrom for appellee.

The court, in determining that the period of time between appellant’s retirement and appellee’s actual receipt of benefits was seventy-three months, ruled: The issue in this case, at least one of the issues, involves when [appellee] knew or should have known with due diligence, recently should have known of the wrong or when she knew she had a cause of action for these back benefits. [Appellee] testified, and [appellant] as well, that there was no set date, at least during the parties [sic] marriage, of a retirement date. [Appellee] assumed that he would retire at the age of 65 and that was an appropriate time. [Appellant] testified that he would retire some time after 30 years and he did retire, as I mentioned, in September of 2001. So, the Court finds that it is reasonable and that [appellee] ivas on notice at least by the age of 65 that she had a ⁷⁴ cause of action and that is when the cause of action accrued. She did file her cause of action timely using the date of age 65 or 2005 as the date the cause of action accrued. Therefore, I find that it is not barred by the statute of limitations.

I find that she is entitled to $24,515.93 minus the amount for taxes. I would like to enter judgment if it’s possible today so that if counsel can take a few minutes to calculate it. Otherwise, I will keep the record open since both counsel did concede that that amount should be reduced by the appropriate taxes and I will enter judgment once that amount has been agreed upon for the $24,515.93 minus the amount agreed upon for taxes in favor of [appellee] against [appellant]. (Emphasis added).

LEGAL ANALYSIS I Motion for Summary Judgment Appellant initially argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for summary judgment. According to appellant, the following material facts are undisputed: (1) the parties’ Separation Agreement, which was incorporated into the October 22, 1990 Judgment of Absolute Divorce, entitled appellee to receive a portion of appellant’s pension benefits; (2) appellee only took action to collect these benefits in 2006, over fifteen years after -the agreement between the parties was executed and placed under seal; and (3) neither appellee’s first QDRO, entered by the court on March 29, 2006, nor the subsequently amended QDRO, entered on April 23, 2007, mentioned arrearages or retroactive payments. Based on these undisputed facts, appellant contends that he was entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, on the grounds of statute of limitations, waiver and laches. Appellant argues that the trial court “erroneously held that the statute of limitations does not begin to accrue until the benefit could be received and as such, ⁷⁵ there was a dispute of material fact regarding when [appellee] could reasonably have known [appellant] retired.” Appellant also faults the trial court for “failing] to even address appellant’s defenses of laches and waiver.” We address each of these arguments infra.

A Standard of Review A trial court may “enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Md. Rule 2-501 (f). Although a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is subject to de novo review on appeal, see Harford County v. Saks Fifth Ave. Distrib. Co., 399 Md. 73, 82 , 923 A.2d 1 (2007) (citing Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 396 Md. 469, 478 , 914 A.2d 735 (2007)), a trial court has discretionary authority to deny a motion for summary judgment in favor of a full hearing on the merits, even when the moving party “has met the technical requirements of summary judgment.” Dashiell v. Meeks, 396 Md. 149, 164-65 , 913 A.2d 10 (2006) (citations omitted). “Thus, on appeal, the standard of review for a denial of a motion for summary judgment is whether the trial judge abused his [or her] discretion and in the absence of such a showing, the decision of the trial judge will not be disturbed.” Id.

(citations omitted). See also Bouton v. Potomac Edison Co., 288 Md. 305, 311 , 418 A.2d 1168 (1980) (“on appeal from a final judgment entered following a full trial of the general issue, we would not review a pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment, other than for an abuse of discretions”) (citing Metro. Mortgage Fund v. Basiliko, 288 Md. 25, 28-29 , 415 A.2d 582 (1980)). B Factual Findings In denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court ruled as follows: ⁷⁶ Actually, it’s a very interesting legal argument and there are not any Maryland cases that I was able to find on point.

There are some cases that are out of jurisdiction that I do believe give some guidance, at least, with respect to what is appropriate in this case. The cases, at least, from New York and Tennessee and some other jurisdictions dealing with this matter clearly indicate that the statute of limitations begins to accme when the benefit could have been received. So, it could not be in this case. Although, there was some suggestion that because the divorce was 1990 and the [QDROs] weren’t done that somehow it should relate back to 1990, I think, is not appropriate and that the operable date is at least the date of retirement or when [appellee] knew, or should have known, that [appellant] was going to retire. 4 In this case there is a question of dispute as to when [appellee] could have reasonably known when [appellant] retired.

So, for that reason I don’t believe it is an appropriate case to decide. As a matter of law, I believe there is a factual dispute. So, therefore, I am going to deny the motion for summary judgment. (Emphasis added).

Thus, in denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court focused entirely on the merits of appellant’s argument as to the statute of limitations and did not expressly address appellant’s arguments that he was entitled to summary judgment on the grounds of waiver or laches. Appellant asks us to hold that the lack of any specific findings of fact or conclusions of law in the trial court’s ruling as to these specific grounds for summary judgment constituted error, requiring reversal of the trial court’s judgment. ⁷⁷ As we have stated, a judge may deny a motion for summary judgment even if that motion is technically correct, merely because the judge wishes to hear the evidence produced at a full hearing on the merits. We, therefore, are not inclined to hold that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to render specific findings regarding appellant’s affirmative defenses of waiver and laches in ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Moreover, we have previously recognized that there may be instances when a trial court, in granting a motion for summary judgment, will not necessarily have placed on the record its reasons for doing so.

Thus, in our review of a trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment, “[i]f the trial court did not specify the grounds upon which it granted summary judgment, appellate courts assume that the trial court ‘carefully considered all of the asserted grounds and determined that all or at least enough of them ... were meritorious.’ ” Kimmel v. SAFECO Ins. Co., 116 Md.App. 346, 354-55 , 696 A.2d 482 (1997) (quoting Bond v. Nibco, Inc., 96 Md.App. 127, 133 , 623 A.2d 731 (1993)). We see no reason to treat the denial of a summary judgment motion any differently. In denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment, we infer that the trial court implicitly rejected appellant’s assertion that summary judgment was required in light of his asserted defenses.

That the trial court did not expressly state the reasons for that rejection is not, in and of itself, grounds for reversal, particularly in light of the discretion afforded to trial courts in denying such motions, and when taking into account the remainder of our analysis in this opinion. C Statute of Limitations L6J Appellant contends that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, when it denied appellant’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that appellee’s claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. Appellant argues, and appellee ⁷⁸ concedes, that the applicable statute of limitations is codified in C.J. § 5-102(a), which provides: (a) Twelve-year limitation.—An action on one of the following specialties shall be filed within 12 years after the cause of action accrues, or within 12 years from the date of the death of the last to die of the principal debtor or creditor, whichever is sooner: (1) Promissory note or other instrument under seal; (2) Bond except a public officer’s bond; (3) Judgment; (4) Recognizance; (5) Contract under seal; or (6) Any other specialty. Maryland Rule 8-131(a) provides that, ordinarily, a party cannot raise an issue on appeal unless the issue has been either raised in or decided by the trial court.

Before the trial court, appellant argued that the Separation Agreement constituted an agreement placed under seal, subject to the twelve-year statute of limitations established in C.J. § 5-102(a)(5). Before this Court, however, appellant argues that the Separation Agreement, having been incorporated into the Judgment of Absolute Divorce, constitutes a judgment, subject to the twelve-year statute of limitations established in C.J. § 5-102(a)(3). In either event, the gravamen of appellant’s argument is that appellee’s ability to assert her cause of action expired twelve years after the specialty was formally recognized by the court. We further observe that the trial court based its denial of appellant’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that appellant’s cause of action did not accrue from the date of the Judgment of Absolute Divorce, but rather, “when the benefit could have been received” and “when [appellee] knew, or should have known, that [appellant] was going to retire.” Because the trial court decided the statute of limitations on those non-specific grounds, we find it appropriate to address the merits of appellant’s claim. ⁷⁹ Having considered whether appellant has preserved the issue for review, we turn to the merits of appellant’s argument.

To be clear, appellant does not challenge appellee’s right to file QDROs in 2006 and 2007. Rather, appellant argues that appellee’s lawsuit to recover her portion of pension benefits, paid to appellant from 2001 through 2007, was barred by the twelve-year statute of limitations set forth in C.J. § 5—102(a)(3). Appellant cites to Lang v. Wilmer, 131 Md. 215 , 101 A. 706 (1917), in support of his assertion that “[i]t is black letter law in this State that limitations begin to run from the date the judgment is entered.” Lang involved a suit by a creditor who obtained a judgment by confession against a judgment debtor. Id. at 216 , 101 A. 706 .

The Court of Appeals held that, “[wjhere the defendant in a judgment dies, a scire facias [5] may be sued out to revive the judgment against the administrator alone to bind the assets in his hands, but where it is desired to review the judgment against the land of the deceased judgment debtor the scire facias should also issue against the heirs and terretenants.” 6 Id. at 225 , 101 A. 706 . In that context, the Court of Appeals held that the “statute of limitations begins to run as to judgments from the date of the judgment, and is not suspended by the death of the judgment debtor, or neglect of those entitled to administration upon his estate.” Id. at 227 , 101 A. 706 (citations omitted). Lang is factually and legally inapposite. We find instructive, instead, Marshall v. Marshall, 164 Md. 107 , 163 A. 874 (1933). 7 In Marshall , a divorce decree entered on November ⁸⁰ 23,1905, required one spouse to pay alimony and child support to the other spouse until the beneficiaries’ death or remarriage.

Id. at 109-10 , 163 A. 874 . The defendant paid support, as required by the decree, for several years, but discontinued payments for a variety of reasons. Id. at 110 , 163 A. 874 . The plaintiff sought an attachment against the defendant’s interest in a personal estate to which the defendant “recently” became entitled.

Id. An order granting the attachment was later rescinded by the lower court, which also disallowed the plaintiffs claim as to support arrears. Id. at 111 , 163 A. 874 . The plaintiff appealed.

Id. In ruling, the Court explained: It is conceded that no sums ivkich became payable under the decree more than twelve years before the filing of the petition for the enforcing process can be recovered, in view of the Code provision that no “bill, testamentary, administration or other bond (except sheriffs’ and constables’ bonds), judgment, recognizance, statute merchant, or of the staple or other specialty whatsoever, except such as shall be taken for the use of the State, shall be good and pleadable, or admitted in evidence against any person in this State after the principal debtor and creditor have both been dead twelve years, or the debt or thing in action is above twelve years’ standing.” Code, Art. 57, Sec. 3. [8] 164 Md. at 114-15 , 163 A. 874 (emphasis added). The Court then distinguished the support decree at issue from those that “survive the death or marriage of the person for whose benefit they were originally entered”: Preliminary to an execution on a decree like the one now under consideration, a proceeding to ascertain the amount of the unpaid installments, and the existence of the conditions upon which its enforcement is dependent, would be ⁸¹ essential. That course was followed in the present case.

Until the passage of an order determining the amount due and authorizing execution, the decree would not become a lien on the defendant’s property, but would only have the effect of an adjudication of liabilities thereafter matwing at stated periods. Upon a proper petition and order such a decree may be enforced by execution or attachment as to all unpaid installments which may have become due within the preceding twelve years. When a supplemental order to that end is procured, it should be docketed and indexed as an original decree or judgment creating a lien. Id. at 116 , 163 A. 874 (emphasis added).

Thus, in the context of a proceeding initiated to enforce a defendant’s compliance with a divorce decree establishing support obligations, the Court held that the decree could be enforced by execution or attachment as to all unpaid installments that became payable twelve years before the petition to enforce such payments is filed. The Court’s opinion in Bradford v. Futrell, 225 Md. 512 , 171 A.2d 493 (1961), is similarly instructive. In Bradford , a decree entered on August 10, 1960, ordered a father to pay arrears to a mother in an amount equaling the total of several unpaid installments of child support owed by the father under an October 1944 divorce decree. Id. at 514-15 , 171 A.2d 493 .

The father appealed, in part, on the grounds that the mother’s claim for arrearages was barred by limitations or laches. Id. at 521 , 171 A.2d 493 . The Court of Appeals observed that Marshall, supra, was controlling on the issue of limitations. Id. at 522, 171 A.2d 493 (quoting Marshall, 164 Md. at 114-15 , 163 A. 874 ).

The Bradford, Court also relied on the following passage from Winkel v. Winkel, 178 Md. 489, 506 , 15 A.2d 914 (1940): Another point decided [in Marshall] was that continuing periodical instalment payments of money under a decree were not barred by limitations as to those which had severally become due within the tivelve years next preceding the proceedings for enforcement. The court did not hold that the agreed periodical payment must be paid if without ⁸² the statute of limitations, but carefully confined the application of the statute to ‘the amount of the unpaid instalments, and the existence of the conditions upon which its enforcement is dependent’ as ascertained by an appropriate proceeding. The rule of limitations stated in Marshall v. Marshall, supra, would seem to apply to the periodical instalments of alimony under a decree, to the extent that when such instalments separately became due the statute of limitations of twelve years began respectively to run severally as a bar to the enforcement of every such instalment, if it had accrued due and remained undischarged. Bradford, 225 Md. at 523 , 171 A.2d 493 (quoting Winkel, supra) (emphasis added).

The Court continued: [W]hile Maryland does not follow the rule of some states that each installment for support becomes, when due, a final judgment on which execution may issue ... our view as to the nature of support payments is in harmony with the approach to limitations that prevails in most jurisdictions, that the statute of limitations begins to run against each installment of support payments from the date on which it accrues. Id. at 524 , 171 A.2d 493 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court concluded: From what has been said, it follows that the chancellor should have taken into account, in computing arrearages, only those installments which accrued within twelve years prior to April 16, 1958, when [the mother] filed suit in the District Court. Id. at 525 , 171 A.2d 493 (emphasis added).

Appellant cites to O’Hearn v. O’Hearn, 337 Md. 292, 301 , 653 A.2d 446 (1995), to establish that a marital separation agreement, not under seal, but incorporated into a divorce decree, is governed by the twelve-year statute of limitations set forth in C.J. § 5-102(a). We do not disagree with this point in light of the fact that appellee in this case brought her complaint under the Separation Agreement, which was incor ⁸³ poratecl, but not merged into the Judgment of Absolute Divorce. 9 The Court of Appeals’ decision in O’Hearn , however, further undermines appellant’s position that the twelve-year statute of limitations, as to pension payments, begins to run from the date the divorce judgment was entered. In O’Hearn , the appellee filed a petition for contempt on December 2, 1991, seeking arrearages in alimony and child support related specifically to medical and orthodontic bills incurred on behalf of the children since the divorce, which appellant was obligated to pay pursuant to an April 23, 1981 divorce decree that incorporated a separation agreement between the parties. Id. at 294 , 653 A.2d 446 .

The appellant argued that bills and expenses incurred more than three years prior to December 2, 1991, the date when appellee filed the action, were barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in C.J. § 5-101. Id. at 295, 653 A.2d 446 . In rendering its holding, the Court of Appeals observed that Marshall, supra, “described the procedures to be followed in a claim for arrearages in support payments”: [The appellee] followed the same procedure in the case at bar. The [April 23, 1981] decree of divorce was a judgment that [the appellee] sought to reduce to a monetary amount.

She sought that remedy for those bills that had been inmrred more than three years, but less than twelve years, prior to December 2, 1991[,] [the date on which the action was filed]. [The appellee] succeeded and obtained a money judgment for those amounts. As she sued on a judgment, the twelve-year statute of limitations applied. 337 Md. at 298 , 653 A.2d 446 (emphasis added). We are aware of no Maryland case applying the reasoning of Marshall, Bradford and O’Hearn under circumstances involving a claim regarding pension arrears. The holdings discussed supra, however, are fully applicable under ⁸⁴ these circumstances.

The Separation Agreement bound appellant to pay to appellee a fixed percentage of his pension benefits “if, as, and when” he received such benefits. The incorporation of the Separation Agreement into the Judgment of Absolute Divorce had the effect of adjudicating the liabilities of the parties “thereafter maturing at stated periods.” Marshall, 164 Md. at 116 , 163 A. 874 (quoted in Bradford, 225 Md. at 524 , 171 A.2d 493 ). Thus, the proper procedure for seeking payment of pension arrearages was the filing of a proper petition and the issuance of an order enforcing the divorce decree “by execution or attachment as to all unpaid installments which may have become due within the preceding twelve years.” Id. Stated alternatively, upon maturation of appellant’s liabilities as to payment of his pension benefits, which occurs when an installment payment on those benefits becomes due, appellee is afforded twelve years from that point to enforce her rights as to that pension payment.

It would thwart justice to hold otherwise. In many instances, divorce judgments are entered decades before pension benefits may become payable. Under appellant’s logic, a party must submit a QDRO within twelve years of the entry of a divorce judgment in order to preserve his or her right to access pension benefits that are paid more than twelve years after the entry of judgment. However, in Potts v. Potts, 142 Md.App. 448, 461 , 790 A.2d 703 (2002), we observed: We have found no case, statute, or rule in Maryland or elsewhere that requires a QDRO to be filed within a specific time frame after a judgment of absolute divorce has been entered.

Therefore, the timing of the presentation of the QDRO is dependent on the diligence of the parties and their counsel or the assertiveness of the trial court. In the end analysis, we decline to treat the jurisdictional limitations on a party’s efforts to enforce a divorce decree in relation to installment payments of pension benefits in a manner different from that set forth in the cases described supra. ⁸⁵ We now turn to the trial court’s ruling on appellant’s motion for summary judgment. In denying appellant’s motion, the trial court observed that “[t]he cases, at least, from New York and Tennessee and some other jurisdictions dealing with this matter clearly indicate that the statute of limitations begins to accrue when the benefit could have been received.” 10 This statement is consistent with our assessment of Maryland law, which we have set forth supra. Under the facts of this case, appellant retired in September 2001.

His pension benefits would have become payable sometime after that point. Appellee’s January 15, 2008 complaint sought the payment of pension arrearages dating back to 2001. Because her claim as to ⁸⁶ unpaid installments fell within the twelve-year period preceding January 15, 2008, her claims were not time barred by the twelve-year statute of limitations set forth in C.J. § 5-102(a). We pause to address the trial court’s statement that summary judgment was inappropriate because a “factual dispute” existed as to when appellee “knew or should have known” that appellant was retired.

Ordinarily, the “discovery rule,” which “tolls the accrual of the limitations period until the time the plaintiff discovers, or through the exercise of due diligence, should have discovered, the injury,” applies “to all actions where limitations are governed by the three year statute of limitations, and has long applied in all manners of malpractice litigation.” Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 95-96 , 756 A.2d 963 (2000) (internal citations omitted). See Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636 , 431 A.2d 677 (1981) (holding that the “discovery rule” is generally applicable to all causes of action). As we have explained, the complaint in this case is subject to the twelve-year statute of limitations set forth in C.J. § 5-102(a).

We are aware of no case law extending the application of the discovery rule to cases such as the one currently before us. 11 We need not decide the applicability of the discovery rule in this instance. There is no need to apply the discovery ⁸⁷ rule in this instance as appellant’s claim sought the payment of pension arrears that became payable within the twelve-year period preceding her complaint. Thus, based on the trial court’s ruling in toto, and in light of the foregoing discussion, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment. Such a grant of the motion on the grounds advanced by appellant would have been contrary to the law.

D Laches and Waiver Appellant next argues that the trial court’s “implicit rejection” of appellant’s laches and