BD. OF CTY. COMMISSIONERS OF PRINCE GEORGE'S CO. v. Donohoe

Bruñe, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellee, as the owner of a tract of about forty acres of land, located on Oxon Hill and Kirby Hill Roads in that part of Prince George’s County which was added to the Maryland-Washington Regional District by Chapter 698 of the Acts of 1957, filed a petition with the Board of County Commissioners of Prince George’s County as a District Council (the Council), the appellant, for the rezoning of this tract from a Rural Residential (RR) classification to a higher density clas ³⁶⁵ sification for residential use, designated as R-55. The property had been zoned RR in November, 1957, as a matter of original zoning. The petition was considered by the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission and its Technical Staff.

The Staff made a report recommending the denial of the petition, and this report was approved by the Park and Planning Commission, which also recommended that the petition be disapproved. The Council held a hearing on the matter on April 16, 1958, and denied the petition. The appellee then filed a petition for review in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. That Court first overruled a demurrer interposed by the Council and then, over objection by the Council, took testimony in extenso.

At the conclusion of the hearing the Court delivered an opinion holding that the action of the Council was arbitrary and illegal. A few days later, on December 24, 1958, the Court entered an order in conformity with that opinion, which reversed the decision of the Council and ordered “that the property be and it hereby is zoned ‘R-55’ on condition that the minimum standards established by the preliminary plat filed herein be maintained.” The Board of County Commissioners appeals, and no question is raised as to its right to do so. The appeal brings up for review not only that order, but also the questions raised by the demurrer. The specific grounds of demurrer included three attacks upon the constitutionality of Chapter 712 of the Acts of 1957 (Ch. 712) under which the appellee’s petition for review was filed.

The first challenges the sufficiency of the title of Ch. 712; the second is based upon alleged violation of the doctrine of separation of powers (Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 8) in that Ch. 712 attempts to confer a legislative power (power to zone) upon a court; and the third, also based on the separation of powers, is that Ch. 712 imposes a “legislative” power upon the court in that the court is to base its decision on the weight, as distinguished from the legal sufficiency, of the evidence in zoning matters. We find it necessary in this case and at this time to decide only the first of these constitutional questions. The other principal question presented on this appeal is whether or not Ch. 712 authorized the taking of testimony in ³⁶⁶ the Circuit Court as if in a proceeding de novo, on a petition for review of the action of the Council in a zoning matter. The appellant’s first argument against the sufficiency of the title (and the only one, we think, which its demurrer presented), as we understand it, is to this effect: that Ch. 992 of the Acts of 1943, which created the Maryland-Washington Regional District in Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties is a bi-county act, and not a public local law of either county; that although Sec. 2-S of that Act was codified in the Public Local Laws of Prince George’s County (1953 Ed.) as Sec. 1113, it remained a bi-county act; that any amendment of it, as by Ch. 712, was an amendment of a law applicable as well.to Montgomery County; and that since the title made no reference to an amendment of the law applicable to Montgomery County, it was insufficient to describe the Act and the Act is therefore void.

We find no merit in this contention. The 1953 Edition of the Code of Public Local Laws of Prince George’s County was “legalized” by Ch. 339 of the Acts of 1953. There is no difficulty in identifying the law with which Ch. 712 undertook to deal. It referred specifically, both in its title and in the body of the Act, to “Section 1113 (a) of the Code of Public Local Laws of Prince George’s County (1953 Edition), being Article 17 of the Code of Public Laws of Maryland, title ‘Prince George’s County’, sub-title ‘Maryland-Washington Regional District’ ”, which it amended and repealed, and it likewise spoke of adding and did add “new Sections 1113 (d) and 1113 (e) to said Article and sub-title”.

Anyone troubling to read the title would know that Ch. 712 undertook to amend a law relating to the Maryland-Washington Regional District insofar as the portion of that District lying in Prince George’s County was concerned. 1 Any argument that because Ch. 998 of the Acts of 1943 was ³⁶⁷ a bi-county act, any amendment thereof had to be a bi-county act is quite untenable. There were no vested rights of any party involved, and the General Assembly of 1943 could not, if it would (and we have no reason to suppose that it desired to do so), bind its successors. Montgomery County v. Bigelow, 196 Md. 413, 423 , 77 A. 2d 164 ; State v. Fisher, 204 Md. 307, 315 , 104 A. 2d 403 ; Wright v. Wright, 2 Md. 429, 449; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151, 159. The appellant, in this Court, also undertook to challenge the sufficiency of the title of Ch. 712 on the ground that the clause following the statement of the purpose of repealing and reenacting with amendments Section 1113 (a), supra, and of adding two new Sections, which describes the general nature of the Act, is misleading.

This clause described the Act as “providing for stenographic records and transcripts of proceedings before the District Council and providing generally for appeals from hearings in zoning map amendments before said Council.” The exact point of attack is that the title does not specify the extent of the powers conferred upon the Court upon appeal. If this objection is properly before us (which seems doubtful from the language of the demurrer), we find it, too, lacking in merit. A title need not give an abstract of the Act. It is sufficient that the purpose of a statute be described in its title and it is not required that the means by which that title is to be effected be set out.

Allied American Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 219 Md. 607 , 150 A. 2d 421 ; Neuenschwander v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm., 187 Md. 67, 79-80 , 48 A. 2d 593 , and cases therein cited. We find no likelihood of deception. See Pressman v. State Tax Comm., 204 Md. 78, 91-92 , 102 A. 2d 821 .

Further discussion of this point and more extensive citation of authority seems superfluous. The question of the extent to which the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County may go in taking testimony on review arises under Ch. 712. The order of the Circuit Court in this case recites that it is entered “[u]pon consideration of the Petition for Review, the record of the proceeding under review, testimony to clarify said record and argument of counsel.” (Italics supplied.) The provisions of the statute relating to ³⁶⁸ the taking of testimony in review proceedings are contained in Section 1113 (d), supra, which was added by Ch. 712. The fourth paragraph of that Section, after providing for the transmission of the record before the Council to the Court (with a provision for shortening it by stipulation), concludes with this sentence: “The court may require or permit subsequent corrections or additions to the record when deemed advisable.” The fifth paragraph of that Section reads as follows: “If, before the date set for hearing, application is made to the court for leave to present additional evidence on the issues in the case, and it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the additional evidence is material and that there were good reasons for failure to present it in the proceeding before the District Council, the court may order that the additional evidence be taken before the District Council upon such conditions as the court deems proper.

In cases in which the additional evidence is taken before the District Council, it may modify its findings and decision by reason of the additional evidence and shall file with the reviewing court, to become a part of the record, the additional evidence, together with any modifications or new findings or decision.” (Italics supplied.) The sixth paragraph provides in part' that: “In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the District Council not shown in the record, testimony thereon may taken in the court.” The instant case was heard before the Council on oral evidence consisting of a detailed statement by counsel for the then petitioner (now appellee), testimony or a statement by" .an official of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission in opposition to the petition and testimony or statements of several owners of property in the neighborhood (among them the president of a neighborhood association) also in opposition. There was also documentary evidence in the form of maps or plats and reports. From the recital in the order with regard to “testimony to ³⁶⁹ clarify said record” it may be inferred that the trial court relied upon the fourth paragraph of Sec. 1113 (d), supra, to support the admission of the challenged testimony. The argument on behalf of the appellee and the comments of the Court during the discussion as to the admissibility of this testimony do not add much to show the basis for admissibility.

The appellee claimed then, as he claimed in this Court, that the admission of this testimony merely