Beaman v. State

Greene, J. This case involves a direct appeal under the Post-conviction DNA Testing Statute, Md. Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.), § 8-201 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CRIM. PROC.”). James Patrick Beaman (“Appellant”) seeks review ⁴⁰⁹ of the denial by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County of his Petition for Post-conviction DNA Testing.

BACKGROUND Procedural History On February 2, 1990, Appellant was charged in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County with four counts of first-degree murder, four counts of using a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. After a jury trial between April 18, 1990 and April 21, 1990, the jury convicted Appellant of all counts. On September 13,1990, Appellant was sentenced to four consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole, and four concurrent terms of twenty years. Appellant noted an appeal on September 19, 1991, and the intermediate appellate court affirmed the convictions and sentences.

Appellant subsequently filed several post-conviction petitions. Appellant filed the instant pro se Petition for DNA Testing of Scientific Evidence in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on August 30, 2012. A hearing on the Petition was held on March 17, 2016. On October 20, 2016, the Circuit Court issued an order denying Appellant’s Petition.

On November 2, 2016, Appellant filed a notice of direct appeal to this Court pursuant to § S^ORk)®. 1 Facts In the early morning hours of November 7, 1989, police responded to the scene of 6439 Hil-Mar Drive, an apartment residence in Prince George’s County, after receiving a call for shots fired. Police found four men—Terrance Stephenson, Edmond Stephenson, Robert Morton, and Abraham Williams—murdered as a result of gunshot wounds. The body of Abraham Williams was found inside the fourth-floor apart ⁴¹⁰ ment unit in front of the door. Police discovered a broken window in one of the bedrooms, through which it appeared someone had jumped.

Officers found a second body in the hallway of the living room, and a third body in the den area of the apartment. The three men in the apartment each had a gunshot wound to the head. Police found a fourth body, that of Edmond Stephenson, at the side of the apartment building. The State’s theory of the case was that the victims, who were living in the apartment together, were killed by Appellant and Ervin Holton in retaliation for a dispute over turf for narcotic sales.

The dispute between Appellant, Holton, and the Stephenson brothers had occurred one week prior to the murders. 2 Investigators recovered blood evidence from the ground-level patio, directly below the fourth-floor apartment’s window, from which, the State believed, the fourth victim had jumped. The State’s theory regarding the murder of the fourth victim, Edmond Stephenson, was that he jumped through the bedroom window to escape and was shot in the buttocks as he did so. The State believed that Edmond Stephenson landed on a balcony where he tried to get into that apartment to evade the shooters. Edmond Stephenson left blood on the ground of the balcony’s patio as well as on a table that was on the balcony’s patio.

The State argued that Edmond Stephenson was then “chased, pursued like an injured animal” and ultimately shot to death by either of the two shooters as he ran around the back of the building. 3 At trial, Doria Rogers testified as an eyewitness. Ms. Rogers and her mother lived in the same apartment complex where the murders took place. Ms. Rogers knew the deceased residents of the apartment. Ms. Rogers testified that loud ⁴¹¹ noises “like people was fighting or something” awoke her on the morning of the November 7.

She testified that she got up and ran to the balcony and saw “two boys running past.” One was light-skinned and wore a white jacket with blue windbreaker pants and was carrying a gun. The other was dark-skinned and wore a black coat. Ms. Rogers described the men as being “together.” Ms. Rogers testified that the light-skinned man was in front and the dark-skinned man was behind him. 4 Both men were about the same height and the dark-skinned man had a “big nose and a little bit of hair on his mustache.” Ms. Rogers testified that she watched until the men disappeared from her sight. Once she returned inside the apartment, she heard gunshots.

On the day following the murders, Ms. Rogers saw the same two men walking by the apartment building. She testified that the dark-skinned man was wearing the same pants he wore the previous night and the light-skinned man was wearing the same coat he wore the previous night. The police showed Ms. Rogers photographic arrays and she identified Appellant and Ervin Holton as the two men she saw running from the scene the morning of the murders. At trial, the State conceded that it could not ascertain which of the two suspects shot which victim, but the State argued that Appellant at least bore accomplice liability in all four shootings.

Defense counsel explained to the jury during closing arguments Appellant’s theory of misidentification: [Mr. Ferguson 5 ] was specifically inquired of as to whether there were one person or two persons who ran behind that building. He said there was one person. This evidence was established primarily through the direct examination of the [Sjtate, but the [Sjtate doesn’t mention this evidence to you, ⁴¹² and why not? Because if you consider this evidence and you consider the credibility, and you are the judges of the credibility of the witnesses, if you consider the credibility of Mr. Ferguson, who is a middle-aged gentleman who is living across the court who knows none of the people involved here who testified to you directly, looked right at you, told you that that is what he saw, that there were no obstructions, and you consider that evidence together with what Doria Rogers tells you that she saw, you must reach the inescapable conclusion that the second person that she saw from inside of her apartment looking out across the balcony and her limited field of vision, and there is an exhibit which demonstrates that where she was asked to make some marks ... the conclusion is that the dark-skinned person that she saw ahead of the light[-]skinned person was a person who ended up dead at the comer of 6487, Edmond Stephenson.

What she saw in those two seconds was Edmond Stephenson running for his life and a gentleman in a white coat and white hood with a gun she said she saw that individual with a gun chasing after him. As previously stated, the jury found Appellant guilty of all counts. 6 Post-conviction Proceedings In Appellant’s pro se Petition, he sought DNA testing of the blood-evidence found on the first-floor patio. The Circuit Court held a hearing on March 17, 2016 regarding Appellant’s post-conviction petition. At the hearing, Appellant, representing himself, stated in a colloquy with the hearing judge why he believed that DNA testing of the blood was appropriate: THE COURT: Because there was some confusion by Ms. Rogers with respect to this dark-skinned man versus light-skinned man, right? [APPELLANT]: Exactly. ⁴¹³ THE COURT: And the order they were moving in. [APPELLANT]: Yes, Your Honor.

Yes. THE COURT: Okay. And why would that information have some mitigation or exculpatory effect on your case? [APPELLANT]: It would show that she misidentified me as being the victim. And also, Your Honor— THE COURT: She misidentified you as being the victim? [APPELLANT]: She identified me as being the dark-skinned man.

And I’m trying to say it was not me, it was Mr. Edward Stevenson [sic] that she seen running when (inaudible). Also I’d like to say that in my trial, on page, I believe it’s 420, the trial judge told the jury that if you believe her identification, then it was enough to convict me. She also gave a second identification saying the next day or two days later, she seen the same two men that she seen out back of her apartment, in front of her apartment two days later. She gave the jury reason to believe that she did see me.

But the blood tests will show that it was the victim that she seen and it would have been impossible for her to see the same two men, because the victim, Edward Stevenson [sic] was deceased. * * * [APPELLANT]: It could establish that the dark-skinned man was somebody else other than myself. That’s what I’m claiming ... I’m saying that the dark-skinned person that was seen running underneath the (inaudible) was the victim. I’m saying if I could have that blood tested, I could establish by showing a jury that it was the victim that she seen underneath (inaudible), not the defendant.

The Circuit Court issued a written order denying Appellant’s petition. In doing so, the court ruled: [Mr. Beaman] was charged with four counts of first degree murder. Murder is a crime of violence as detailed in § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article, thus it is the Petitioner’s right to request for DNA testing of scientific identification evidence the State possesses related to the judgment of conviction. ⁴¹⁴ [Mr. Beaman] contends that the State’s eyewitness Doria Rogers testified at Grand Jury that a dark-skinned man was in the front. [Mr. Beaman] continues to explain that on June 20, 1990, Doria Rogers testified in trial that the dark-skinned man was second. [Mr. Beaman] states that on August 8, 1990, 7 State’s witness Doria Rogers testified that the dark-skinned person was in front and the light[-]skinned person was in the back, and then she recanted her testimony. Because of this, [Mr. Beaman] claims that the State knowingly used false evidence to obtain a conviction. [Mr. Beaman] explains that the jury determines the truthfulness and or the falsity of the evidence and had no reason to believe that the red fluid substance was relevant to the identity of the dark-skinned person. [Mr. Beaman] claims that the DNA test is relevant to the true identity of the dark-skinned person seen running underneath and past the balcony area. [Mr. Beaman] continues to claim that there was no eyewitness testimony or evidence introduced at his trial that identified the victim Edmond Stephenson as the dark-skinned person running to or from the patio area. [Mr. Beaman] requests a search of, but not limited to, the Prince George’s County Police Department’s Forensic Science Division and other law enforcement agencies or databases or logs used for the purpose of identifying the source of the physical evidence used for DNA testing.

The State argues that [Mr. Beaman] is seeking to prove what was already presented at trial, that the donor of the blood found on or about the patio area belonged to the victim Edmund Stephenson, and thus the petition should be denied as DNA testing would not produce mitigating or exculpatory evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or sentencing. The [c]ourt agrees. In this instance, it is not reasonable to believe that simply testing blood found at the crime scene would prove [Mr. Beaman’s] innocence, especially since the State never presented an argument that ⁴¹⁵ the blood belonged to [Mr. Beaman], The Victim was found shot several times, and therefore it is reasonable to believe his blood would be found at the scene. Since there is not a substantial probability that testing DNA would have changed the verdict, the request is denied, DISCUSSION Standard of Review Because we must interpret CRIM, PROC. § 8-201 and determine whether the hearing court applied the correct legal standard when it denied Appellant’s petition, our review is de novo.

Edwards v. State, 453 Md. 174, 185 , 160 A.3d 642 , 2017 WL 2266932 (2017). See also Fuster v. State, 437 Md. 653, 671 , 89 A.3d 1114, 1124 (2014) (“An appellate court reviews without deference the legal standard that a trial court uses in ruling on a petition.”). Parties’ Contentions Appellant maintains that the Circuit Court erroneously denied his petition for postconviction DNA testing because in reaching its conclusion, the court applied the incorrect standard of law. Appellant argues that the standard is whether there is a reasonable probability that DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or sentencing.

Appellant contends that the Circuit Court applied a more stringent standard when it ruled that DNA testing would not “prove” Appellant’s “innocence” and that there was not a “substantial probability” that DNA testing would have “changed the verdict.” The State argues that even if the outcome of the requested testing is as Appellant desires, such would not produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence. The State contends that if DNA testing showed that the blood belonged to the victim, this would be consistent with the State’s theory at trial that the victim jumped out of the window after being shot in the buttocks in an attempt to flee from the shooters, but that the ⁴¹⁶ shooters chased after the victim and shot him fatally outside the apartment. The State notes that it argued at trial that the blood on the ground was that of the victim, and that it never argued that the blood belonged to the assailant. Crim.

Proc. § 8-201 We recently discussed generally our Post-conviction DNA testing statute in Edwards v. State: Maryland’s post-conviction DNA testing statute, which was enacted by the General Assembly in 2001, is codified at § 8-201 of the Criminal Procedure Article. “Section 8-201 entitles persons convicted of certain serious crimes to pursue DNA testing of physical evidence that is in the possession of the State and might produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or sentencing.” Simms v. State, 409 Md. 722, 727 , 976 A.2d 1012, 1015-16 (2009). See also Md. Rule 4-703(2)(A). The statute was enacted “in line with a nationwide trend to adopt postconviction DNA testing statutes designed to provide an avenue for the exoneration of the actually innocent.” Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213,