Beane v. McMullen

Barnes, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Five principal questions are presented by the appellants, Eugene C. Beane, Sr. and Mary Beane, his wife, plaintiffs below, to us for decision, i.e., whether the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (Robert B. Mathias, J.) erred in granting the motion of Stephen .McMullen and Virgie McMullen, his wife, two of the appellees and two of the defendants in the lower court, for a directed verdict in their favor at the end of the case in regard to the claims of the plaintiffs for (1) an alleged invasion of privacy, (2) interference with the pursuit of business by the plaintiff, Eugene C. Beane, Sr., (3) the slander of the plaintiffs’ title by the McMullens, (4) the dismissal of the counterclaim of the Beanes to the Mc-Mullens’ counterclaim in regard to water damage and (5) the sufficiency of the injunctive relief granted the Beanes in regard to water damage caused by the Board of County Commissioners for Prince George’s County, the remaining appellee and a cross-defendant below. We have concluded that there was no error in the lower court’s rulings in regard to the first four questions but that there was error in its ruling in regard to injunctive relief. The Beanes and the McMullens own adjacent property in the Melwood Election District in Prince George’s County partly on the Ritchie-Marlboro Road not far from Upper Marlboro.

They acquired their respective properties in 1956 from a common owner. The adjoining line of each property is substantially identical, being the second call in each deed. The call in the McMullen deed is “to an iron peg, thence on center line of Old Forest-ville-Oak Grove Public Road (2) S 66° 45' E 763.62 Ft. to an iron peg.” The second call in the Beane deed is “to ⁵⁸⁹ an iron peg, thence with Stephen McMullen’s 4.14 acre parcel, thence (2) South 66° 45' East 763.2 feet to an iron peg. ...” A survey of B. J. Dirks, referred to in both deeds and attached to the Beane deed, shows the adjoining line as the center line of the Old ForestvilleOak Grove Public Road and as being a straight line. The testimony, however, indicated that the roadbed curved.

This old roadbed has been closed and unused for approximately 30 to 35 years. The Beanes first moved to their property in 1956 between Christmas and New Year. The McMullens moved to their property somewhat later. There was a friendly relationship between the neighbors initially.

Mr. Beane, in return for a promise given by Mr. McMullen to supply water for rabbits raised by Mr. Beane and sold for experimental purposes, assisted Mr. McMullen to locate and construct a well for a spring on the McMullen land which was making that land swampy. He also assisted Mr. McMullen in lowering a pipe under what is presently known as Bauman Road. A water pump was installed and a substantial water supply resulted, used by Mr. McMullen for azaleas raised and sold by him, and by Mr. Beane for his 250 rabbits. Later, Mr. McMullen desired to build a dwelling house on his land and requested that Mr. Beane convey to him a portion of his frontage inasmuch as McMullen was having difficulty in obtaining a mortgage through the bank with only 40 feet of frontage.

Mr. Beane indicated his willingness to do this if the consent of his mortgagee to the proposed arrangement could be obtained. The mortgagee was agreeable to the proposal provided there was an equal exchange of back land by the McMullens to make the Beane land more regular in shape. When Beane told McMullen what the mortgagee said, McMullen, in an hour’s time, cut off Beane’s water supply so that there was no water for the rabbits. After this episode, there were no friendly relations between the Beanes and the McMullens. ⁵⁹⁰ Mr. Beane had been in the fuel oil business for some 35 years.

In the fall of 1958, he began to work for the Temple Hills Oil Company. He worked for this company until 1964 when he went into the fuel oil business for himself. On April 24, 1961, the Zoning Ordinance for Prince George’s County became effective for most of the County. The Beanes and McMullen properties were placed in the R-R zone (Rural Residential).

A nursery business was allowed in the R-R zone and there were provisions permitting the continuance of nonconforming uses to which reference will be made later. According to Beane, Mrs. McMullen began making complaints to county officials in 1965 concerning his parking of oil trucks and dumping fill. He estimated that there had been 50 investigations since that time but he gave no details concerning them except in regard to the following specific complaints. Mrs. McMullen, in a letter dated “April 1969” addressed to the County Commissioners of Prince George’s County, stated that she had a problem to which she had been trying to find a solution, i.e., in regard to the situation on the neighboring Beane property.

She stated that Mr. Beane had put a discarded water heater, an old washing machine and other debris on his lot which caused the water to stand in a stagnant form with green mold. She had communicated with the Public Works Department (Mr. Marburger’s office) and was promised that there would be an inspection but none had occurred. She also stated that there was an unfinished house on the Beane property, that the property was used for business although never posted or zoned for business use, and further that she understood that occupancy permits for one-family use under the zoning law would be soon required after inspection — a procedure which she approved “100%.” She hoped the County would “look into the matter and help me clear up my problem.” On May 13, 1969, Mr. McMullen wrote to the County ⁵⁹¹ Commissioners, complaining about the depositing of debris on the Beane property and stagnant water. He expressed the hope that the County would send someone out to “view this problem” inasmuch as it is difficult to visualize the situation without personal inspection. .

The County Commissioners wrote to Mrs. McMullen in June 1969, advising that the Department of. Public Works and the Bureau of Urban Services had inspected and were inspecting the Beane property. Mrs. McMullen, on September 30, 1969, not having been advised in regard to the results of the investigations, wrote to the County Commissioners, indicating that although she was grateful that the investigation had been made, she thought that three months was sufficient time within which to complete it and she hoped that the problem could be solved “before the winter snows * * * add to the condition.” On October 7, 1969, an inter-office memorandum of the County indicates that as a result of the letter of September 80, 1969, Mr. Jones and Mr. Sabona, Refuse Collections Supervisor of the Department of Public Works, had “re-investigated this situation in the field on Friday, October 3, 1969.” 1 The memorandum then continued in part: “This inspection confirmed that there was indeed some bulky items of refuse located in the drainage ditch on Mr. Beane’s property as shown on the enclosed sketch. This trash consists of one washing machine, two hot water tanks, one car seat, one stove and some miscellaneous wood.

The items are located at the toe of the ⁵⁹² drainage channel which is approximately 25' deep. These items are not blocking the natural drainage or the flow of water contributed by the County storm drainage system from Sans-bury Road. Obviously, they should be removed. However, to do so by the home owner would cost a considerable amount of money since a crane is needed to lift the items to road bed or truck height. “Mr. Beane indicated that he would prefer to fill the drainage channel, thereby covering the discarded items which, of course, would not only be cheaper but improve his property.

Such action would block the flow of storm water and require the County to expend a large sum of money to extend the storm drain system from Sansbury Road along Ritchie-Marlboro Road. * * *” Apparently as a result of the McMullen complaint of November 13, 1969, the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission considered the zoning situation at the Beane property. It ruled that Beane was in violation of the zoning ordinance in using the property for commercial purposes, in having fuel oil tanks and in parking fuel oil trucks on the Beane property. Beane appealed the decision to the Board of Appeals for Prince George’s County. On January 27, 1970, that Board affirmed the Park and Planning Commission in regard to keeping the oil tanks on the property but reversed it in regard to the parking of oil trucks, finding from the evidence that Beane had established a valid nonconforming use for parking the trucks.

In March 1970 Mrs. McMullen wrote a letter to Congressman Lawrence J. Hogan, reviewing the prior efforts to obtain action by the County, without much success (according to Mrs. McMullen), stating the water problem and the presence of 3 families on the Beane property. She requested Congressman Hogan (for whom Mrs. ⁵⁹³ McMullen stated she had voted) to help solve her problem. Congressman Hogan promptly wrote to the County’s Supervisor of Zoning on March 4, 1970. He reviewed the McMullen complaints and inquired whether (1) a person could operate an oil business in the area, (2) could three families live in the Beane dwelling, and (3) could the owner of the Beane property be made to complete the house?

After investigations by the Housing Coordinator and possibly others, the Chief Zoning Inspector replied to Congressman Hogan, on March 18, 1970, in part, as follows: “In response to Mr. McMullen’s complaint to this office on September 30, 1969, we directed Mr. Eugene Beane, owner of the subject property to apply for a use and occupancy permit for his oil delivery business. Since the property is zoned residential, Mr. Beane was required to present proof that his use of the premises is ‘legal non-conforming’, i.e., that the use began prior to the zoning of the area. “In a public hearing before the Board of Zoning Appeals on January 12, 1970, Mr. Beane established his right to use the west side of his property for the parking of fuel oil trucks as he had done for many years. Since the hearing, Mr. Beane has done much to improve the appearance of the premises, and eliminated the unauthorized storage of tanks. “With regard to the residence, a housing inspector has reported no violations of the housing code. The residents on the property are blood relatives.

While a wing of the structure is not yet completed, no violation of the building code was noted by a building inspector on the site. “Mr. Beane interrupted the expansion of the dwelling when he learned that the State Roads ⁵⁹⁴ Commission plans to condemn a portion of Ms property. Until that matter is resolved, the Chief Building Inspector will request Mr. Beane to improve the appearance of the exterior. It is emphasized, however, that no code violations exist. “While this report may provide little satisfaction for Mr. McMullen, I am sure you appreciate that the rights of Mr. Beane, too, must be protected.” There was another complaint by the McMullens to the County, dated April 13, 1970. On April 21, 1970, the Assistant to the Administrative Officer of the County wrote to the Director of Inspections and Permits, as follows “Re: McMullen Complaint”: “Sounds like the Hattfields and the McCoys!

Don’t mean to put you in the middle, but please furnish Mr. McMullen with a direct reply summarizing action taken to date and current status. Has Mr. Beane cooperated? Was a follow-up inspection conducted? Is he now in compliance? etc. “It appears that Mr. Beane may be filling in the drainage channel as forecast in Nick Stoliaroff’s memo of October 7th (attached).

Is this legal? Will it involve county extension of the storm drain system as predicted by Nick? “Please provide me with a copy of your reply. I have told Mrs. McMullen that she will be hearing from you around the first week of May.” The Director of Inspections and Permits wrote to Mrs. McMullen on May 1, 1970, in part, as follows: “As you know, the Board of Zoning Appeals has determined after a public hearing that Mr. Beane has a right to use his property for parking oil trucks. Regardless of who owned the trucks which were parked there before the zon ⁵⁹⁵ ing was established, the continued use of the property is legal non-conforming. “With regard to your complaint of recent dumping of rubble in a manner to obstruct drainage along Fernwood Drive, I am forwarding a copy of your letter to the Director of Public Works.

I am sure that he will take appropriate steps to have the drainage restored if it has been unlawfully obstructed.” The Beanes filed their declaration in the present case on June 2, 1970. It consists of three tort counts. Count I seeks recovery of damages for alleged violations of the Beanes’ right to privacy by defendants, “by making extreme, excessive, vigorous and unjustified complaints to the various persons and the public authorities that the Plaintiffs’ home was occupied by three (8) families in violation of the law, that the Plaintiffs did not have a building permit for a porch improvement and that trash was being dumped on the Plaintiffs’ property illegally when the Defendants knew or should have known that said complaints were unjustified.” These complaints, it was averred, were made with “the intent to harass and vexed [sic] the Plaintiffs and invade, adversely affect and destroy the Plaintiffs’ right to privacy.” It was further averred that the complaints were made “with the intent that the public authorities would investigate said complaints which said authorities did causing the Plaintiffs the loss of their privacy, harassment and undue notoriety as the Defendants well knew or should have known * * $5,000.00 in actual damages are claimed together with “such exemplary damages as may be just under the circumstances * * *” Count II claims $5,000.00 actual damages and such punitive damages as may be just for alleged unlawful interference with Mr. Beane’s business. It avers that the McMullens did “willfully, wantonly, maliciously and without cause or justification” interfere with Mr. Beane’s lawful fuel oil distribution business “by complaining to ⁵⁹⁶ the public authorities of Prince George’s County, Maryland, that said business was not properly zoned and by giving misleading statements to said authorities” concerning Mr. Beane’s operation of the business as a nonconforming use.

Count III sounds in slander of title and avers that Mrs. McMullen “did maliciously, willfully and wrongfully claim title to the Plaintiffs’ land well knowing the same not to be hers and did then and there give permission to install drainage pipe thereon to the public authorities of Prince George’s County” with the intent that those authorities would install drainage thereon, which they did, “thereby destroying the value of the Plaintiffs’ property, causing drainage to be dumped thereon and stagnate and the loss of use of the Plaintiffs’ land.” $25,000.00 in damages was claimed and such exemplary damages as might be just. The general ad damnum clause claims $100,000.00 “in total damages both actual and exemplary and costs of this suit.” A jury trial was elected. After a demurrer to the declaration was overruled, the McMullens, on September 1, 1970, pleaded the general issue pleas in tort and, on the same day, filed a counterclaim declaration containing two counts. Count I alleged that the Beanes deposited trash, debris, dirt, sand, loam and other materials on their land which interrupted the natural flow of surface water which caused the inundation of a part of the McMullen property.

For the damages resulting from this, the McMullens claimed $25,000.00 compensatory damages and $50,000.00 punitive damages. Count II incorporated by reference the averments of Count I and claimed that the conduct of the Beanes created a nuisance causing stagnant water to accumulate — a breeding place for mosquitoes as well as causing noxious odors, the damages from which were claimed to be $25,000.00 compensatory damages and $50,000.00 punitive damages. ⁵⁹⁷ The Beanes filed the general issue plea, i.e., that they did not commit the wrongs alleged and an additional plea, that the alleged causes of action “did not accrue within three years of the filing thereof.” The Beanes thereafter filed a motion to join the Board of County Commissioners of Prince George’s County (County Commissioners) as an additional party defendant in view of the filing of the McMullen counterclaim. This motion was granted by the lower court. On October 2, 1970, the Beanes filed a counterclaim against the McMullens and the County Commissioners, averring that the County Commissioners and their agents, servants and employees with the help and assistance of the McMullens did “unlawfully, willfully and wrongfully and without just excuse collect various surface waters” which did not naturally flow onto and upon the Beane property into a man-made drainage ditch and pipe, casting the water upon the Beane land, causing great damage and loss of use of the Beane property.

The damage claim was for $100,000.00 actual damages and $50,000.00 punitive damages. It was also prayed that an injunction issue against the County Commissioners enjoining the County “from further allowing unnatural surface water to flow on the lands of the Plaintiffs.” A jury trial was elected for the trial of the counterclaim. The County Commissioners filed the general issue plea —that it did not commit the wrong alleged — on February 16, 1971. The case came on for trial before Judge Mathias and a jury on July 12, 1971.

In addition to the facts already given, Mr. Beane testified that, as a result of the worry resulting from the complaints of the McMullens, he suffered a heart attack on July 1, 1969, and was in the hospital some 24 days. He had a second heart attack on August 1, 1970, allegedly resulting from the same cause. He testified there was very little natural drainage of water that did not soak into the ground prior to the placing of the pipe by the County. Since then, the water ⁵⁹⁸ continues to run for hours after a storm, collects in the roadbed and stays for weeks at a time. “It stagnated.

It stunk.” Since the County directed the water from Sans-bury Road to his property, he has “hundreds of thousands of gallons [of water] more when it rains.” He has been filling the area in question with dirt with some cement mixed in it, but no trash. Beane also stated that he had two oil trucks and a “stake body” he had purchased new. He had erected a fruit stand on his property “this spring” having received a permit to buy and sell produce. Mr. Beane’s son, Elwood, testified in regard to a complaint made by the McMullens beginning in 1965 to the county officials.

He stated that there had been “no less than 25 or 30 inspections of that ditch or road bed, fill site.” Various photographs of the site were introduced into evidence. He had “griped about that pipe to nearly every county official that ever came there regardless of what initiated his visit.” Additional facts will be given when the questions presented for decision are later discussed. At the conclusion of the testimony, after an elaborate oral review of the testimony and exhibits, with certain findings of fact, the lower court directed the verdict in favor of the McMullens on all three counts of the original declaration. The trial judge also directed a verdict for the McMullens on the Beanes’ counterclaim.

The counterclaim of the McMullens against the Beanes (Counterclaim #1) and the counterclaim of the Beanes against the County Commissioners (Counterclaim #2) were submitted to the jury which found a verdict in favor of the Beanes on Counterclaim #1 and in favor of the Beanes against the County Commissioners for $2,000.00 on Counterclaim #2. After the verdict, the lower court considered the matter of injunctive relief in chambers and orally decided initially to deny that relief. Later, the lower court, on its own motion, decided to have a further hearing in regard to injunctive relief because of a lack of a survey ⁵⁹⁹ and topographical study of the land below the drainage pipe in question. The Beanes objected to this procedure, relying upon the finality of the verdict of the jury on the question of liability of the County and the consequent need for injunctive relief, and further because of the lack of any motion by any of the parties for the taking of additional testimony on the merits.

At the further hearing a plat prepared for the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission by an unidentified firm was offered in evidence by the County Commissioners ; and its admission into evidence was strenuously objected to by counsel for the Beanes. It was, however, received into evidence and the lower court construed it to contain facts contrary to the facts upon which the jury based its verdict. The lower court declined to grant the full injunctive relief prayed for by the Beanes, but did require the County Commissioners to remove so much of the offending pipe as was on the Beane property. The Beanes filed timely appeals from all adverse rulings.

No cross-appeal was filed by the County Commissioners. 1. Invasion of privacy. The parties do not differ in regard to the law applicable to an alleged invasion of privacy, recognizing that the tort is now well established in Maryland. We observed in the recent case of Summit Loans, Inc. v. Pecola, 265 Md. 43 , 288 A. 2d 114 (decided March 14, 1972) that Judge (now Chief Judge) Hammond, in a carefully considered opinion for the Court, in Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578 , 177 A. 2d 841 (1962), had reviewed the development of the law in regard to this tort and that, in a proper case, damages could be recovered in Maryland resulting from an invasion of privacy.

We noted also in Summit Loans that Judge Finan, for the Court, in Household Finance Corp. v. Bridge, 252 Md. 531 , 250 A. 2d 878 (1969) had cited Carr with approval and in that opinion had provided an excellent analysis of the cases, law review articles and textbook comments in regard to oral invasion of privacy. Like the Household Finance case, ⁶⁰⁰ Summit Loans involved an oral invasion of privacy and turned upon the sufficiency of the evidence to be submitted to the jury. We held in Household Finance that there was no such sufficient evidence, but in Summit Loans that there was. In Household Finance, we quoted with approval § 652 A of the Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts, as follows: “Professor Prosser is now the Reporter for the Restatement, covering the sections on invasion of privacy, and in Tentative Draft No. 13, published April 27,1967, of the Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts there is found listed in § 652 A the four different kinds of invasions of privacy: ‘§ 652 A. Meaning of Invasion of Privacy The Right of Privacy is Invaded When There Is (a) Unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, * * * (b) Appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, * * * (c) Unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, * * * (d) Publicity which unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public, * * *.’ “The text writers and authorities make it clear that an invasion of the right of privacy by anyone of the above four courses of conduct may give rise to a cause of action and, on occasion, there may be an overlapping or concurrent invasion by any or all of the above means working toward the injury of the plaintiff.

Restatement Second, 652 A, Comment d.” ( 252 Md. at 537-38 , 250 A. 2d at 882-83 .) In all of the types of invasions of privacy, except perhaps “(b) Appropriation of the other’s name or like ⁶⁰¹ ness,” reasonableness under the facts presented is the determining factor. We inquire then whether, under the facts of the present case, the Beanes produced legally sufficient evidence from which a jury might conclude that the complaints of the McMullens, already described, were unreasonable, bearing in mind, of course, that the Beanes as the non-moving party in a motion for a directed verdict, are entitled to a resolution of any conflicts in the testimony in their favor and to the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from that testimony. Katz v. Holsinger, 264 Md. 307, 311 , 286 A. 2d 115, 118 (1972). As we have noted, Mr. Beane stated in his testimony that there had been 50 investigations inspired by the Mc-Mullens ; but he gave no details in regard to these alleged complaints other than the specific complaints to various governmental officials already mentioned.

Any alleged complaints other than those described could not be considered by the jury as unreasonable because there were no facts given in regard to them from which such a determination could be made. Indeed, in Count I of the Beanes’ declaration, the alleged violations of their right to privacy are the complaints relating to an excessive number of families in the Beane home, the absence of a building permit for a porch improvement and the illegal dumping of trash on the Beane property, and no others. First of all, it should be observed that the complaints in question were principally requests to the public authorities to investigate possible violations of the zoning and other county laws. These investigations did, in fact, result in the discovery by the county officials of some violations of the applicable law.

For instance, the Park and Planning Commission concluded that the entire Beane fuel oil operation was a violation of the zoning ordinance and this finding was affirmed, in part, on appeal to the Board of Appeals and Mr. Beane was ordered to discontinue the use of the Beane property for the storage of oil tanks; but the Board of Appeals determined that he had a valid nonconforming use for the parking of oil trucks. In regard to the permit, it is uncontradicted that the build ⁶⁰² ing under the original permit had ceased for a substantial period of time and Mr. Beane was required to obtain a renewal permit. Nor can it be thought unreasonable to seek an investigation of a possible violation of the density provisions of the zoning ordinance permitting only one family when a property is occupied by 10 persons and has three separate dwelling units. The Beanes failed to offer sufficient evidence to enable a jury to conclude that these complaints were “unjustified” as alleged in Count I. Secondly, these complaints were made only to governmental officials and not to the press, to neighbors or social friends of the Beanes so far as the evidence discloses.

It is presumed that public officials will properly perform their duties. Lerch v. Maryland Port Authority, 240 Md. 438, 457 , 214 A. 2d 761, 771 (1965). See Clark v. Volatile, 427 F. 2d 7 (3rd Cir. 1970). Compare Sappington v. United States, 408 F. 2d 817, 819 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 876 , 90 S. Ct. 150 , 24 L.Ed.2d 133 (1969).

The record does not indicate any highhanded or oppressive conduct on the part of any county or other official in making the investigations. On the contrary, the McMullens — rather gently to be sure — thought that the requested investigations were made far too slowly and without much vigor on the part of the county officials. This was the principal complaint of Mrs. McMullen to Congressman Hogan and, here again, this complaint produced some accelerated action. Thirdly, the tone of the complaints was not extreme or inflammatory.

They were principálly directed to the obtention of facts which likely would indicate a violation of the county ordinances. The complaints did not contain abrasive, scurrilous, or vile language. Their language was rather restrained. Fourthly, there was no evidence sufficient to justify a jury in finding undue persistence by the McMullens in seeking relief from the county officials.

They were firm, ⁶⁰³ but the relatively small number of established complaints, under the circumstances proved, did not indicate an undue or unreasonable persistence on the part of the Mc-Mullens. When they obtained the partial relief they sought, there were no further complaints directed to that type of relief. In short, there was no evidence offered in the case from which a jury could conclude that the complaints of the McMullens were unreasonable or unjustified. The trial judge accordingly properly directed the verdict in favor of the McMullens on Count I in regard to the invasion of privacy. 2.

Interference with business. In Count II of the declaration the Beanes charged that the McMullens willfully, wantonly, maliciously, and without cause or justification interfered with Mr. Beane’s right to pursue a lawful fuel oil distribution business by complaining to the public authorities of the County that the business “was not properly zoned and by giving misleading statements” to the authorities concerning facts with respect to Mr. Beane’s operation of the business as a nonconforming use. In Maryland it is well established that there may be recovery of damages resulting from malicious interference with the right to pursue a lawful business, trade or occupation. Our predecessors recognized this tort in Lucke v. The Clothing Cutters & Trimmers Assembly, 77 Md. 396 , 26 A. 505 (1893).

In Willner v. Silverman, 109 Md. 341, 355 , 71 A. 962, 964 (1909), Judge Henry, for the Court, stated: “[A]ny malicious interference with the business or occupation of another, if followed by damage, is an actionable wrong.” The Court in Willner cited with approval the case of Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 562 , decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1871 and quoted ⁶⁰⁴ from the opinion in that case the elements of this tort which the plaintiff must prove, as follows: “ ‘ (1) intentional and wilful acts; (2) calculated to cause damage to the plaintiffs in their lawful business; (3) done with the unlawful purpose to cause such damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of the defendants (which constitutes malice) and (4) actual damage and loss resulting.’ ” ( 109 Md. at 355 , 71 A. at 964 .) See 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interference §§ 3-6, at 281-85, § 14, at 290-92; 52 Am. Jur. Torts § 44, at 387-88; 86 C.J.S. Torts § 43, at 955-59.

See also 16 A.L.R.3d 1191 Prima Facie Torts. As Professor Prosser points out in The Law of Torts, at 954, note 4 (4th ed. 1971), however, there is a qualified privilege to interfere with a lawful business by complaints to the public authorities; but if the complaints are in bad faith or if the motive is spiteful, there is no protection under this qualified privilege. See also 1 Harper and James, Law of Torts §§ 6.11-6.12, at 510-17 (1956). The Beanes contend that the complaint of the McMullens to the County Zoning authorities was predicated upon falsehood and hence was not in good faith and was motivated by spite in that the statements