Beckman v. Boggs

MURPHY, Chief Judge. In this case we must determine whether the adoption of a child by her maternal grandparents, following the death of her natural mother and with the consent of her natural father, precludes her paternal grandparents from petitioning for visitation with her pursuant to Maryland Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol., 1994 Cum.Supp.) § 9-102 of the Family Law Article. 1 If adoption is not found to entirely extinguish these grandpar ⁶⁹¹ ents’ rights, we must then decide whether awarding visitation in this case would be in the child’s best interest. I. At issue in this case is the proper interplay between the State’s adoption provisions, § 5-301 et seq., and its grandparent visitation statute, § 9-102. The concept of adoption did not exist at common law.

The Maryland General Assembly has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme to govern this area. Stambaugh v. Child Support Admin., 323 Md. 106, 110 , 591 A.2d 501 (1991). It is codified at §§ 5-301 through 5-330 of the Family Law Article. Id.

See also Carroll County v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150 , 577 A.2d 14 (1990); In re Lynn M., 312 Md. 461, 463 , 540 A.2d 799 (1988). The provisions that impact the decision in the instant case are as follows. Section 5-308(b) states: “after a decree of adoption is entered: (1) the individual adopted: (i) is the child of the petitioner for all intents and purposes; and (ii) is entitled to all the rights and privileges of and is subject to all the obligations of a child born to the petitioner in wedlock; (2) each living natural parent of the individual adopted is: (i) relieved of all parental duties and obligations to the individual adopted; and (ii) divested of all parental rights as to the individual adopted; and (3) all rights of inheritance between the individual adopted and the natural relatives shall be governed by the Estates and Trusts Article.” 2 ⁶⁹² The effect of this provision is that the adopted child is endowed with the status of a natural child of the adoptive parents and the adoptive parents are accorded all the rights and obligations of a natural parent. The policies and procedures underlying the adoption rules are deemed to be socially necessary and desirable.

See § 5-303(a). One of their principal aims is to encourage the creation of new familial affiliations and to safeguard adoptive parents “from a future disturbance of their relationship with the [adopted] child.” Id. Finally, as with custody and visitation determinations, the paramount consideration guiding decisions concerning adoption is what best serves the interest of the child. Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 469-70 , 648 A.2d 1016 (1994).

See also In re Adoption No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 113-14 , 642 A.2d 201 (1994); In re Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 561 , 640 A.2d 1085 (1994). The right to grandparent visitation is codified at § 9-102. It provides that “[a]n equity court may: (1) consider a petition for reasonable visitation of a grandchild by a grandparent; and (2) if the court finds it to be in the best interests of the child, grant visitation rights to the grandparent.” 3 In Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 49 , 622 A.2d 121 (1993), we ⁶⁹³ held that exceptional circumstances, apart from what is in the child’s best interest, need not be shown as a precondition justifying grandparental visitation. We further concluded: “The statute’s use of the word ‘may,’ rather than ‘shall,’ signifies that the steps prescribed in § 9-102 are available, but not mandatory____ The discretionary import of the statute is thus consonant with the common-law rule that grandparents have no inherent right to custody of their grandchildren.” Id. at 46-47, 622 A.2d 121 .

The legislative history of this provision verifies the fact that neither are grandparents automatically deemed to be entitled to visitation rights. Id. at 47 , 622 A.2d 121 . While grandparents are clearly part of a class that may be eligible for such a privilege, an actual grant of visitation is dependent on a chancellor’s determination that it will be in the grandchild’s best interest. As we stated in Fairbanks : “The outcome of the grandparents’ petition lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, guided solely by the best interests of the grandchild.” Id. at 49 , 622 A.2d 121 .

See also Petrini, supra, 336 Md. at 469-70, 648 A.2d 1016 . In other words, a visitation award is not granted for the grandparents’ gratification or enjoyment, but to fulfill the needs of the child. Id. In making such decisions the court must focus exclusively on the welfare and prospects of the child.

Id. 330 Md. at 50 , 622 A.2d 121 . While all relevant factors and circumstances should be considered in assessing what will best serve the child’s interest, we have set forth some special criteria with regard to grandparental visitation. These include, but are not limited to: “the nature and stability of the child’s relationships with its parents; the nature and substantiality of the relationship between the child and the grandparent, taking into account frequency of contact, regularity of contact, and amount of time spent together; the potential benefits and detriments to the child in granting the visitation order; the effect, if any, grandparental visitation would • have on the child’s attachment to its nuclear family; the physical and emotional ⁶⁹⁴ health of the adults involved; and the stability of the child’s living and schooling arrangements.” Id.

II

Kenneth A. Boggs (Kenny) and Kathie O’Neal (Kathie) were married on June 28, 1986. Their only child, Audriana, was born on September 11, 1991. Approximately four months after their daughter’s birth, the couple separated and Kathie and Audriana went to live with Kathie’s mother, Nina, and stepfather, Carlton (collectively, the Beckmans). Kenny and Kathie subsequently divorced, leaving decisions concerning visitation up to Kathie who retained custody of Audriana.

During the first month of her life, Kenny’s parents, Jane and Kenneth L. Boggs (collectively, the Boggses) saw their grandchild several times. Soon after this, however, Audriana became ill and was admitted to a hospital in Morgantown, West Virginia. Jane stayed with her granddaughter there until Kathie asked her to leave, complaining that she and Audriana needed to get more rest. In February, 1992, after the child was released from the hospital, it is alleged that Kathie brought Audriana to see the Boggses on numerous occasions, often leaving her with them for three or four hours at a time while she worked.

The Boggses contend that the last time they were permitted to see Audriana was on July 6, 1992. Nina Beckman claims that the last contact took place in April pf 1992. In October, 1992, Kathie was diagnosed with leukemia and her mother quit her job to help her care for Audriana. Kathie succumbed to her illness on August 9, 1993.

On October 19, 1993, the Beckmans filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Allegany County to adopt Audriana. The court granted the adoption on November 12, 1993, reserving visitation rights in the child’s father who consented to the adoption. 4 Kenny’s ⁶⁹⁵ reasons for agreeing to his daughter’s adoption by the Beck-mans were several. First, he wanted to be sure that Audriana would be taken care of if anything were to happen to him. He also wanted her to be with people that she already knew and with which she felt comfortable.

And, finally, as a result of bad memories of his own childhood, he did not want his mother to have the opportunity to raise Audriana or to expose her to the negative atmosphere that he had been subject to growing up. The Boggses claim that they made at least one effort to see their grandchild between July of 1992 and August of 1993 when Kathie died; however, they maintain that the visit was discouraged by the Beckmans due to their daughter’s condition. After Kathie’s death, additional attempts at visitation were made by the Boggses, but, according to them, these requests were also refused. The Boggses contend that they have been denied all access to their grandchild since July 6, 1992.

As a result of their inability to secure visitation with their only granddaughter, on October 26, 1993, the Boggses filed a Petition for Visitation in accordance with § 9-102. The Beckmans opposed the visitation request, claiming that the intervening adoption of Audriana by them terminated any rights that the Boggses may have had to visitation and, in the alternative, that visitation with them would not be in the child’s best interest. On February 22, 1994, a hearing was held in the Circuit Court for Allegany County (Leasure, J.). The court concluded that Audriana’s adoption did not prevent the Boggses from seeking visitation with their granddaughter and it subsequently granted such contact, finding that it would be in the child’s best interest to do so.

The Beckmans then noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, requesting a reversal of the ⁶⁹⁶ circuit court’s order granting the Boggses visitation rights. We granted certiorari prior to intermediate appellate review to address the important issues raised by this case.

III

The Beckmans argue that their adoption of Audriana with the consent of her natural father terminated any rights that the Boggses may previously have enjoyed with regard to their granddaughter, including the right to petition for visitation with her. The Boggses disagree, contending that such a conclusion results from a misinterpretation of the adoption and grandparent visitation provisions of the Family Law Article. In essence, the proper interrelation between these two important areas of law is what is of concern in this case. 5 Both sides rely on In re Adoption No. 92A41, 95 Md.App. 461 , 622 A.2d 150 (1993), in support of their position. In that case, the maternal grandmother of two children whose mother had died and whose father had remarried petitioned the court for visitation with her grandchildren, which was granted.

The children’s stepmother later sought to and succeeded in adopting her husband’s children. The grandmother then petitioned for a continuation of her visitation. The court denied her petition, determining that the intervening adoption of the children by their stepmother had terminated the grandmoth ⁶⁹⁷ er’s right to seek further visitation with them. The Court of Special Appeals vacated the judgment of the circuit court, holding that “upon the death of a natural parent and the adoption of the child by a stepparent, a grandparent remains eligible under section 9-102 to petition the court for visitation.” Id. at 469 , 622 A.2d 150 .

The Beckmans contend that there are significant differences in the fact pattern of In re Adoption No. 92A41, which make its narrow holding inapplicable to the instant case. First, in In re Adoption No. 92A41, the mother was deceased and it was her parent who was seeking visitation with the grandchildren. In the present case, however, it is the parents of a living natural father who has voluntarily consented to the adoption of his daughter who are petitioning for visitation. The Beckmans argue that § 5-308(b)(2) only expressly divests living natural parents of their parental rights as to the individual adopted.

They contend that the provision was clearly not intended to affect the status of deceased parents, which is what In re Adoption No. 92A41 holds. In that case, the Court of Special Appeals concluded: “[Even if] § 5-308 is properly read to void parental rights of ‘living natural parents’ (an issue which we do not decide here), it clearly does not purport to terminate the rights of a deceased parent’s mother or father.” In re Adoption No. 92A41, supra, 95 Md.App. at 465-66 , 622 A.2d 150 (emphasis added). According to this, a deceased parent, does not, simply by his or her death, surrender the parental rights to which that person was entitled in life and, accordingly, the parents of the deceased also retain their rights as grandparents after their child’s death. In support of this view, the Court of Special Appeals stated: “Since the deceased father continues to be a parent, we find his parents should continue to be considered grandparents.” Id. at 468, 622 A.2d 150 (quoting In Matter of C.G.F., 168 Wis.2d 62, 67 , 483 N.W.2d 803 , cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 408 , 121 L.Ed.2d 333 (1992)).

The Beckmans maintain that because Kenny is still alive and voluntarily relinquished his rights with regard to Audriana at the time of her adoption, ⁶⁹⁸ he ceased to be her legal father at that time and, in turn, the Boggses could no longer be considered her grandparents. The Beckmans also argue that while in In re Adoption No. 92A41, there was an order allowing grandparental visitation which existed prior to the adoption of the child, in the instant case, no rights had vested in the Boggses prior to Audriana’s adoption by them. In addition, they maintain that the adoption created a new family structure, which should not be disrupted by outside parties. Such an intrusion, they say, would be unnecessary and would unduly interfere with the new relationship created between them and Audriana.

They point out that this was not an issue in In re Adoption No. 92A41 because the same familial relationship, in which the natural father, stepmother, and children were living together as a family, was in place both before and after the adoption and thus the visitation order was not found to alter the status quo that existed at the time of the adoption. Accordingly, there was no danger of the children in that case being confused or their lives being disturbed by the introduction of “strangers” into their lives; however, the Beckmans contend that this remains a concern in the instant case. See In Interest of R.C.E., 535 So.2d 673 (Fla.1988). The Beckmans also rely heavily on the case of Acker v. Barnes, 33 N.C.App. 750 , 236 S.E.2d 715 (1977), which deals with a similar issue as the instant case.

In Acker , the natural parents divorced. The mother remarried and her new husband adopted her.children with the consent of their natural father. When the children’s paternal grandmother and aunt petitioned the court for visitation with them, it was denied. Explaining the denial, the court cited a statute strikingly similar to § 5-308, which provides that upon a final decree of adoption, natural parents “shall be divested of all rights” with respect to the adopted child.

The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that “[b]y adoption, the adopted child becomes legally the child of the adoptive parents and becomes legally a stranger to the bloodline of his natural parents.” It further held: “So long as [the adoptive] parents retain lawful custody of their minor children, they retain the prerogative to deter ⁶⁹⁹ mine with whom their children shall associate. Where, as here, the parents firmly resist any move by others seeking authority to visit the children, the courts will not compel the parents to allow such visitation.” Id. 236 S.E.2d at 716 . The Beckmans’ final contention is that if this were a confidential or closed adoption or one in which Audriana was to be placed with people outside her natural family, it is clear that the visitation would not have been permitted. The Court of Special Appeals has held that “under Maryland law, where the rights of the natural parents have been terminated and a child has been placed for confidential adoption, the courts of this state are not empowered to award visitation to the child’s natural family over the objection of the ... adoptive parents.” L.F.M. v. Dep’t of Social Serv., 67 Md.App. 379, 397 , 507 A.2d 1151 (1986).

The