Bel Air Social, Literary, Musical & Dramatic Club v. State

Alvey, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The single question presented here is, whether the right of removal exists in cases ofi proceedings insfci ³⁰⁰ tuted under the statute for the forfeiture of chartered franchises, for abuse, misuse or non-use of such franchises, as .provided by the Code, Art. 23, secs. 255 to 263. The Constitution of the State, Art. 4, sec. 8, provides that in all suits or actions at law, issues from 'the Orphans’ Court or from any Court sitting in equity, and in all cases of presentment or indictment for offences, &c. upon suggestion in writing under oath, &c., that such party cannot have a fair arid impartial trial in the Court in whiclPthe same may be pending, the said Court shall order and direct the record, &c. to be transmitted to some other Court, having jurisdiction, for trial. The terms, “all suits or actions at law,” are certainly very comprehensive, and if they be allowed their largest import, might, perhaps, be made to embrace a case such ■as the present, and many others, such as proceedings under the insolvent laws, (Trayhern vs. Hamill, 53 Md., 90 ,) that have been held not to be embraced by them.

But those terms must have a reasonable construction given them, and such as will consist with a fair and rational administration of justice. They must not have placed upon them a construction that would tend to defeat or unduly embarrass the prosecution of special statutory remedies or proceedings, where the exercise of the right of removal might produce such consequences. We cannot suppose that the authors of the Constitution ever intended that the provision of that instrument in regard to removals should be so applied. In the construction of it, therefore, we must have reference to the nature of the action or proceeding, the extent and limit of the jurisdiction to be exercised, the character of the final judgment, and the nature of the process or proceedings to follow thereon; for if the removal of the cause would seriotisly interfere with or hinder the enforcement of the final judgment, or embarrass the proceedings thereon, we must assume that such cases were not intended to be embraced by the constitutional provision. ³⁰¹ Now the proceedings prescribed and directed for the forfeiture of corporate franchises, for abuse, misuse or non-use, are of a special statutory nature, and can only be pursued as the statute directs.

And though they have been devised and provided to take the place of the more tedious and complex remedies known to the common law in such cases, that fact does not divest the statutory remedy of its special character, nor authorize the Court, in applying it, to exercise a more enlarged or unrestricted jurisdiction than that prescribed to it by the statute. The Code, Art. 23, sec. 255, provides that whenever the Attorney-General of the State, or the State” s Attorney for the City of Baltimore, or for any county in the State, shall be authorized by the Governor to