Bell v. Allstate Insur. Co.

Singley, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant here would have us turn our backs on Grantham v. Board of County Commissioners for Prince George’s County, 251 Md. 28 , 246 A. 2d 548 (1968) which held that upon full satisfaction of a judgment entered against one person, who was, along with another, alleged to be liable for a single harm, the other joint tortfeasor is released. To buttress his argument, he relies on McMillen v. Klingensmith, 467 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1971) and Bartholomew v. McCartha, 255 S. C. 489, 179 S.E.2d 912 (1971) which he thinks have adopted a more enlightened view. We shall be as unresponsive to this argument as was the court below.

On 1 July 1969, John Steven Bell and William Dennis Bell, the two minor sons of the appellant, Burton M. Bell (Mr. Bell), were passengers in a truck owned by Times-Crescent, Inc., and operated by William Larry McKenzie. Both of the boys were injured in an accident which occurred on that day, and Mr. Bell, as father and next friend of the boys, brought suit against the driver and owner of the truck on 27 April 1970 in the Circuit Court ⁷²⁹ for Charles County for damages, and on 16 August 1971 recovered consent judgments against Times-Crescent, Inc. in the amount of $9,166.66 on which an order of satisfaction was entered on 23 August 1971. While the Charles County damage suit was pending, Mr. Bell brought suit on 19 June 1970 against Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, asserting claims arising out of Allstate’s alleged breach of duty under an insurance policy which Allstate had written for Mr. Beil providing for medical payments, not to exceed $2,000.00 each, for any relative of the insured injured while a passenger in a non-owned vehicle. The first count of Mr. Bell’s declaration was a suit on the policy, which was disposed of when Allstate paid $2,000.00 to Steven and $1,867.20 to Dennis on 16 October 1970.

On 7 December 1971, the case came on for hearing on the second count, alleging that Allstate fraudulently represented that it would promptly pay claims for medical payments, but did not; on a third count, alleging that Allstate was negligent in failing to make prompt payment, and on a fourth count, added by amendment, seeking to recover damages for breach of contract, the theory being that the damages were foreseeable at the time of breach. Allstate’s motion for summary judgment on counts two, three and four was granted, and Mr. Bell appealed. Certainly, there was no dispute as to a material fact on the fraud issue. Mr. Bell obviously got the coverage which Allstate’s agent said he would have, and collected the amounts provided for in the policy.

With regard to the negligence and contract counts, the court below granted the motion for summary judgment because it concluded that Allstate was entitled to judgment as a