Benjamin v. Woodring

Murphy, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The testator in this case, William L. Benjamin, Sr., died on August 4,1971, at the age of fifty, from an overdose of barbiturates. In due course, a petition for probate and a will dated July 12, 1971 were filed in the Orphans’ Court for Prince George’s County by appellee, Kenneth S. Woodring, Jr., as Personal Representative of the testator’s estate. Shortly thereafter, the appellant, Betty L. Benjamin, the testator’s wife, filed a petition and caveat, together with an earlier will executed by the testator on November 27, 1968; she sought to have the 1968 will admitted to probate, claiming that the 1971 will was null and void for want of testamentary capacity.

The issue of testamentary capacity was certified to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County and a jury was impanelled. At trial, Judge William H. McCullough presiding, appellant undertook to establish that when the testator executed the 1971 will, he was suffering from an insane delusion with respect to her marital fidelity, and that the will, as a product of that delusion, was improperly admitted to probate. The court directed a verdict in appellee’s favor at the end of the appellant’s case, and this appeal followed. The evidence at trial showed that appellant and the testator began living together in 1962, and had one son, William L. Benjamin, Jr. (known as David), born August 30, 1963.

They were married on December 24, 1966. Each had children by previous marriages; no other children were born after the marriage. Appellant testified that the testator was “a very, very jealous man, and while he never really accused me of any particular ⁵⁹⁶ man at any time during our entire married life, if I had talked to another man he automatically assumed that they wanted to go to bed with me.” She said that she had given her husband no reason to doubt her fidelity during their married life, and that he had never accused her of being unfaithful. She testified that during the last six months of their marriage, the testator had become “very reserved in communication with me,” but that otherwise things were “pretty much the same.” She said that they had never discussed divorce.

Ben Schwartz testified that the testator was his “dearest friend”; that in the month of July 1971, and on several prior occasions within six months of his death, the testator indicated to him that he was considering divorcing the appellant. Schwartz testified that in early July 1971 the testator told him that he was preparing a will “to make sure, I think, the children were protected, and he wanted to make sure PGP [Prince George’s Properties, Inc.] was protected.” Schwartz recalled “something . . . [the testator] did say about infidelity to me at one time there.” He said that he tried to make the testator “understand at the time that I felt that he was more or less overreacting”; that “I didn’t feel that this was so at all.” When asked exactly what the testator said with respect to the appellant’s infidelity, Schwartz replied: “Honestly before God, I cannot remember what he actually did say.” Appellant also called Dr. Charles Springate, an assistant State medical examiner who had examined the testator’s remains. The court advised the jury that according to the death certificate prepared by Dr. Springate “the immediate cause of death was an overdose of barbiturates.” Upon appellee’s objection, the court refused to admit into evidence the death certificate which expressed Dr. Springate’s opinion that death resulted from suicide. Three documents pertinent to the issue of insane delusion were admitted into evidence: the 1968 and 1971 ⁵⁹⁷ wills, and a note written in the testator’s handwriting to the appellant.

By the terms of the 1968 will, the testator’s entire estate was given to appellant with the further provision that if she predeceased the testator, the estate would go to their five named children in trust during the minority of any of them, “absolutely and in fee simple” when the last shall have attained his majority. By the terms of his 1971 will, the testator limited appellant to her statutory share of his estate; 1 he made specific bequests to three children, 2 and two non-relatives ; 3 he directed a continuation of payments in the amount of present alimony to his first wife; and he gave the residue of his estate to “David” Benjamin in trust during his minority. The 1971 will also directed the Per ⁵⁹⁸ sonal Representative, upon David’s majority, to sell all shares of Prince George’s Properties, Inc. (the testator’s main business interest) with first right of refusal granted to specified “faithful and trusted employees,”' the proceeds to be divided equally among the three children. The total amount of the estate is not indicated in the record before us.

The testator’s handwritten note admitted into evidence was found by appellant in a briefcase shortly after his death; dated June 28, 1971—approximately two weeks before the will in question was executed, and approximately five weeks before the testator’s death—the testator’s note to the appellant was as follows: “Betty Benjamin I guess there is so much to say I find it difficult in starting. You have done a lot for me over the years, and you have caused many heart ach, hour of mental anguise, and a reason to want to stop the world & get off. from the early days of our relationship you have not be able to over come the party girl thrills, I dont blame you getting all you could get out me, you treated me like worse than a dog you thrill in going into bars, you thrill in men making a fuss over you. I’ve prayed that you had changed after you last fling at Fred’s cottage several years ago. Ive been a fool you know it and you have taken full advantage of it. the thought of going on in life knowing that you will only become meaner, and of course you will become bold and as you succeed in business, you will push to do the things that you want & like to do, with boys gone and only David I’m sure you will be free to go.

You’ve played a great game with me, and I just cant go any further with it, I’ve given up everything I worked so hard for. all I have left is a memory of some of the nicer ⁵⁹⁹ things that happened before & after meeting you. I’m fully aware now of my great mistake, as I think everyone knew the outcome but me, and of course I was sure that if given a chance you would change to be the person I wanted you to be, you & Fred can have your laughs & your kicks, I’m sure you wont find things as easy as they were planned because after finding approving the boys bringing beer etc in the home & then taking Billy into the bars with you I made some changes, which Im sure will stand up any court you appeal to. You know after the trip to Greensboro the one that you stayed out all nite with someone. I almost walked out on you & I should have, but you always hung over my head, the story about carrying my baby and if you really want to know I would had left you many years ago, but I loved you and I didn’t want to go further to worse at this point Im sure you are laughing go ahead I’ve taken care of David I hope only you know who the father of this boy is, or maybe it might be that you dont know I didn’t leave you anything and I hope the shop get involved in the estate, you shouldnt worry about this you have always used your good look & your bed ability to get by and Im sure you not to old to still be successful at party girl roll, you can burn this after reading it, but Im making several copies to be open after my death.

Youve worked hard at putting down & running my life and even to the point of hoping something would happen to me, okay it has happen now how do you feel,? Im glad life is over for me, please dont attend my funeral or the viewing of the body—in fact I dont have any family, I gave the one I had up for you & yours, your mother & dad have been wonderful & a real pleasure in my life. I want ⁶⁰⁰ him to keep the car there should be insurance to pay for it. I hope that will find someone that loves you as much as I did, and I hope that you can & will appreciate it this time because love can turn into hate,” Evidence proffered by appellant but not admitted by the trial court on the ground of remoteness, included: (1) the testator’s United States Navy medical records from 1950 and 1951, showing delusional episodes during a nine-month hospitalization for psychiatric observation and a diagnosis of dementia praecox, paranoid type; (2) two records from the Washington Hospital Center signed by Dr. Jonathan Williams (1962-1963), indicating “Opinion—Schizo Depression with possible drug intoxication” and “Opinion—Anxiety Depressive Reaction possible schizophrenia”; (3) testimony of Dr. Jonathan Williams relative to the reports in (2) above; (4) testimony of Dr. James Burns relative to the testator’s psychiatric history taken in the early 1950’s.

I Appellant contends that the evidence admitted by the trial court was legally sufficient “to make out a prima facie case that the Testator was suffering from an insane delusion concerning his wife’s fidelity when he executed the Will of July 12, 1971, and that the will was a product of those delusions.” She maintains that the trial court took a “very myopic view” of the evidence; that it confused what it thought would be the ultimate success of appellant’s proof before the jury, with the quantum of proof necessary to survive the motion for a directed verdict made at the conclusion of appellant’s case. ⁶⁰¹ It is settled law in this State “. . . that when a testamentary disposition is the direct consequence and offspring of the testator’s delusion, which was calculated to pervert his judgment and control his will in respect to the disposition of his estate, the court should hold that he did not possess testamentary capacity, although hé may have been rational and sane on other subjects.” Doyle v. Rody, 180 Md. 471, 477-478 , 25 A. 2d 457, 460 (1942). To set a will aside on the ground of a delusion, it is necessary for the caveator to show (1) that the delusion was an insane delusion, and (2) that the will was the consequence or the product of the delusion. Sellers v. Qualls, 206 Md. 58 , 110 A. 2d 73 (1954); Doyle v. Rody, supra; Johnson v. Johnson, 105 Md. 81 , 65 A. 918 (1907); Jones v. Collins, 94 Md. 403 , 51 A. 398 (1902). An insane delusion, in the legal sense, is “a belief in things impossible, or a belief in things possible, but so improbable under the surrounding circumstances, that no man of sound mind could give them credence,” Johnson v. Johnson, supra, 105 Md. at 85-86 , 65 A. at 919 ; otherwise defined, an insane delusion is “a false belief for which there is no reasonable foundation, and which would be incredible under similar circumstances to the same person if he were of sound mind, and concerning which his mind is not open to permanent correction through argument or evidence,” Doyle v. Rody, supra, 180 Md. at 479 , 25 A. 2d at 461 . 4 See also Townshend v. Townshend, 7 Gill 10 (1848).

The testator may be outwardly competent in every other area and yet have an insane delusion or “monomania.” Brown v. Ward, 53 Md. 376, 394 (1880). The law of insane delusion, as expounded in England by Chief Justice Cockburn in Banks v. Goodfellow, 5 L.R.Q.B. 549, 560, 565, was quoted by us with approval in Doyle, 180 Md. at 478-79 , 25 A. 2d at 461 , viz. ⁶⁰² “ ‘The pathology of mental disease and the experience of insanity in its various forms teach us that while, on the one hand, all the faculties, moral and intellectual, may be involved in one common ruin, as in the case of the raving maniac, in other instances one or more only of these faculties or functions may be disordered, while the rest are left unimpaired and undisturbed; that while the mind may be overpowered by delusions which utterly demoralize it and unfit it for the perception of the true nature of surrounding things, or for the discharge of the common obligations of life, there often are, on the other hand, delusions, which, though the offspring of mental disease and so far constituting insanity, yet leave the individual in all other respects rational, and capable of transacting the ordinary affairs and fulfilling the duties and obligations incidental to the various relations of life. No doubt when delusions exist which have no foundation in reality, and spring only from a diseased and morbid condition of the mind, to that extent the mind must necessarily be taken to be unsound .... It is essential to the exercise of such power . . . that no disorder of the mind shall poison his affections, pervert his sense of right, or prevent the exercise of his natural faculties—that no insane delusion shall influence his will in disposing of his property and bring about a disposal of it which, if the mind had been sound, would not have been made. ...

If the human instincts and affections, or the moral sense, become perverted by mental disease; if insane suspicion, or aversion, take the place of natural affection; if reason and judgment are lost, and the mind becomes a prey to insane delusions, calculated to interfere with and destroy its functions, and to lead to a testa ⁶⁰³ mentary disposition, due only to their baneful influence—in such a case it is obvious that the condition of the testamentary power fails, and that a will made under such circumstances ought not to stand.’ ” The law in Maryland on insane delusions is in accord with the law in other jurisdictions. See 1 Page, Law of Wills 631, §§ 12.29, et seq. (Bowe-Parker Revision 1965); Atkinson, Handbook of the Law of Wills, 242-48 (2d Ed. 1953); 94 C.J.S. Wills § 18 (1956). In determining whether appellant produced evidence legally sufficient to survive the motion for a directed verdict, we must resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the caveatrix, and assume the truth of the evidence produced thereby, as well as all reasonable inferences in her favor that may be drawn from the evidence.

Ingalls v. Trustees of Mt. Oak Methodist Church Cemetery, 244 Md. 243, 247 , 223 A. 2d 778, 779 (1966). We thus are not concerned with the weight of the evidence produced by the caveatrix (which appellant concedes, arguendo, is slight and which she characterizes in a more affirmative vein as “sophisticated” and “subtle”), but rather its legal sufficiency to carry the case to the jury under the test above articulated. The testator’s handwritten note contains statements from which the jury could reasonably infer that he believed his wife was unfaithful to him, both before and after their marriage, and that he had recently given up hope that she would change her ways.

The testimony of Schwartz tended to corroborate the existence of this suspicion in the testator’s mind. Appellant testified that she had never given the testator any reason to doubt her fidelity; her testimony was buttressed by that of Schwartz, the testator’s “dearest friend,” when he said: “I tried to make him [testator] understand . . . that I felt that he was more or less over-reacting. I didn’t feel that this was so at all.” From this evidence we think a jury could have found that the testator, during a period ⁶⁰⁴ within weeks of the execution of the 1971 will, was suffering from an insane delusion, as defined by cases such as Doyle, i.e., “a false belief for which there is no reasonable foundation, and which would be incredible under similar circumstances to the same person if he were of sound mind, and concerning which his mind is not open to permanent correction through argument or evidence.” Interwoven among the implications of infidelity and misconduct contained in the testator’s note to the appellant are references to intended changes in his will (“I made some changes, which I’m sure will stand up any court you appeal to”; “I didn’t leave you anything and I hope the shop get involved in the estate”), which, when considered in light of the provision actually made in the will limiting her to the bare minimum required by law, could lead a jury reasonably to conclude that the diminishment in appellant’s share of the testator’s estate, comparing the 1968 and 1971 wills, was the result of an insane delusion entertained by him concerning his wife’s fidelity. We think, therefore, that legally sufficient evidence was adduced by appellant to require submission of the case to the jury on the question of testamentary capacity at the time the testator executed his 1971 will.

In so concluding, we neither give nor imply any view as to the proper resolution of the substantive issue; we hold only that on the state of the record before us, the trial court was in error in taking the case from the jury and directing a verdict against the appellant. n As heretofore indicated the trial court advised the jury of the parties’ stipulation that the death certificate prepared by Dr. Springate, the assistant medical examiner, stated that the immediate cause of the testator’s death was an “overdose of barbiturates.” The court refused, however, to admit the